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Abstract 
This thesis addresses the question of why the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has 
remained in power since the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 by deploying the concept of 
political legitimacy. In this, the focus is not on whether the CCP is legitimate per se 
!>ut rather on how the Party has legitimated its authority in this period. To that end, the 
Weberian conceptualisation of legitimation is situated within the Strategic-Relational 
Approach and, in so doing, allows, through the concept of "discursive selectivity", for 
legitimation to be reconceptualised as a dialectical relationship consisting of both 
material and ideational factors. The effect of this move is to provide a suitable 
framework in which to consider additional legitimating strategies that are employed 
by the CCP. Consequently, this paper moves beyond the conventional explanation of 
"economic performance + nationalism" to argue that the CCP's use of the stability 
discourse in the post-Tiananmen period has contributed to the regime's legitimation. 
In order to understand how this discourse has been used, a critical discourse analysis 
is performed on selected articles from the People's Daily published during the Beijing 
Spring, the "anti-Falun Gong" campaign and the "anti-Japan" demonstrations on the 
basis that these exceptional instances inform its usage in conventionalised slogans. 
This analysis found that the term "stability" took the form of an "empty signifier", 
making most use of positive argument schemes to project a negative Chinese future 
without CCP authority. Finally, this thesis concludes that, in terms of legitimation, the 
events in 1989 constituted a strategic moment in the formation of the stability 
discourse, in that the Party's hegemonic interpretation of these events allowed for this 
discourse to "resonate" with people in the period that has followed. 
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Note on Transliteration 
This thesis generally uses the pinyin system of transliteration for all names, including 
those that are commonly known in their Wade-Giles (or other) transliteration in 
English. For example, Beijing is used instead of Peking. The sole exception to this is 
the use of "Chiang Kai-shek" instead of "Jiang Jieshi". In addition, when quoting an 
author or citing book and article titles, the author's original transliteration is used. An 
example of this is the reference on p. 244 to the Nationalist Party using the name 
"Kuomintang" instead of "Guomindang", which is used throughout the rest of the 
thesis. 
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Introduction 
"With regard to the political disturbances of 1989, had the Chinese government not 
taken the resolute measures then, we could not have enjoyed the stability that we 
are enjoying today. ,,1 
Research Question 
Reports in recent years in the Western media have highlighted the increasing 
prevalence of protests taking place across China. This has been evidenced not only in 
the attention paid to specific outbreaks of unrest, such as those that have taken place 
in Youyang county in the Chongqing municipality, Zhushan town in Hunan province 
and Dongzhou village in Guangdong province, but also in the conclusions that have 
been drawn from the recent publication of figures detailing protest activities in China. 
The first set of figures was published by Chinese government officials in the summer 
of2005 and stated that number of "mass incidents" (quntixing shijian) increased from 
8,700 in 1993 up to 74,000 in 2004, with the number of incidents increasing every 
single year by a minimum of 9%. A further set of figures was published by the 
Ministry of Public Security in January 2006 which showed that the number of "public 
order disturbances" (raoluan gong gong zhixu Jamu;) in 2005 had increased by 6.6% 
from 2004 to 87,000.2 Commenting on these statistics, Sisci notes, "one might be 
tempted to think that Chinese society is falling apart, and indeed, various books and 
1 Jiang Zemin, as quoted in a live televised debate with the-then US President, Bill Clinton, in the Great 
Hall of the People on 27 June, 1998. See "Clinton, Jiang debate human rights on TV" (27 June 1998). 
2 These two terms are not directly comparable as they purport to measure different variables, albeit 
what it is that these variables measure is not clear. It seems that ''mass incidents" refers only to 
demonstrations involving a large number of people (being more than 100 people is the commonly cited 
definition) but is not concerned with the cause of such demonstrations. Furthermore, this category 
appears to constitute a subset of the broader category of ''public order disturbances", which refers to the 
disturbing of "public order" i.e. violations of the law, and, as such, is not directly concerned with the 
number of people involved. However, most media and, indeed, academic reports on these figures have 
merged these two data sets under the generic term "protest/demonstration" (which appears to carry the 
implication that their purpose is to oppose government authority) and, in so doing, claim that they rose 
from 74,000 in 2004 to 87,000 in 2005. This is not to say that the number of demonstrations has not 
increased markedly throughout China over the past fifteen years or SO but rather that it may not be as 
dramatic as has been widely reported. For a more detailed explanation, see "Statistics of Mass 
Incidents" (1 S November 2006). 
1 
articles have appeared suggesting exactly that.,,3 Indeed, Wasserstrom contends that 
the effect of such reports has been to "portray the P.R.C as a country in danger of 
coming apart at the seams, ruled by a leadership group whose members are growing 
increasingly anxious about both the extent of unrest and the domestic media's 
coverage of acts of contention. ,,4 Typifying such commentary is that offered by He 
Qinglian who, in comparing the outbreaks of demonstrations to those of forest fires, 
suggests that, "the fire hazards are not simply random areas covered by dry 
wood ... [but] underground fires, smoldering dangerously just below the surface, that 
could erupt and rage out of control in any place and at any time."s Indeed, He predicts 
that, "[t]he day will come when the CCP will not be able to tamp down these fires.,,6 
Although He's view is somewhat apocalyptic in its prediction concerning the future of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),7 it is part of a more widely held view that the 
end of CCP rule is simply inevitable.8 This view first gained widespread consensus 
following the nationwide demonstrations against CCP rule that took place in 1989. 
3 Sisci (20 October 2005). 
4 Wasserstrom (December 2004). 
SHe (2003: 71). 
6 Ibid., p.72. 
7 In light of the fact that the People's Republic of China is a one party-state in which the government is 
under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party, a number of terms referring to this power arrangement 
including "the CCP", the Party", "the top leadership of the CCP", ''the regime" and ''the Chinese 
fovemment" will all be used interchangeably, unless otherwise specified. 
Within this view, the main difference of opinion centres on how long the CCP will remain in power. 
Some have made specific predictions about when "regime change" will take place while others insist 
only that such change will eventually happen. Examples of the former include Goldstone, who, in 1995, 
predicted "a terminal crisis [for the CCP] within the next 10 to 15 years." Chang made a similar 
prediction·in 2001 when declaring that CCP rule will end by 2010 while Gilley has also stated that 
China will become a democracy by, at the latest, 2020. More recently, Rowen has predicted that, 
though the rule of the CCP might not necessarily end in the near future, the Chinese people will be 
"free" (defined by the Freedom of House Index) by 2025. As for those who believe that "regime 
change" is inevitable but do not specify when this might take place, Pei contends that China's "illiberal 
adaptation" means that "[t]he Party is over". For Gallagher, it is only the sequencing of China's 
economic reforms, specifically the influx of foreign direct investment before privatisation and state-
owned enterprise reform, that has "delayed democracy". For others, including Lam, Zhao, Zheng and 
Wang, the difficulties of a democratic transition are acknowledged but the long-term political survival 
of the regime is largely discounted. See Goldstone (1995), Chang (2001) & (2006) Gilley (2004) 
Rowen (2007), Pei (2006) & (2002), Gallagher (2002), Lam (2006), Zhao (2000b): Zheng (2006): 
Wang (2007). 
2 
Prior to these demonstrations, China was largely thought to be stable, despite the 
disagreements amongst the Party's top leadership concerning the direction of the 
"reform and opening up" programme.9 However, the demonstrations in 1989, not only 
the size and scale of popular support involving different groups from society but also 
the division and indecision that they produced amongst the top leaders of the CCP, 
convinced many that the grievances of the protestors would lead to fundamental 
change. Indeed, Wasserstrom remembers that "[e]ighteen years ago, with protesters 
marching through scores of Chinese cities and giant crowds gathering in Beijing's 
Tiananmen Square, many outside observers, myself included, assumed that the era of 
Communist Party rule in China was nearing its end."IO Moreover, though the 
leadership's use of military force to suppress the demonstrations indicated the Party 
was not prepared to easily give up its power, this simply strengthened such views on 
the grounds that the CCP had effectively lost any possibility of recovering its 
legitimacy. Summarising this change, Goldstein stated back in 1994 that, "[a]lthough 
scholars continue to disagree about the probable life-span of the current regime, now 
is usually about when, not whether, fundamental political change will occur and what 
it will look like.,,11 Moreover, though the CCP has remained in power since 1989, this 
view is still dominant in debates concerning the Party's future. Indeed, commenting 
on this recently, Schubert claims that "[i]t seems to be the established wisdom in the 
Western academe that Communist one-party rule in present-day China is historically 
anachronistic and ... [r]egime change will therefore happen ... and is only a matter of 
time.,,12 
9 Teiwes makes the point that China was much less open to outsiders during this period and as a result 
it was more difficult for scholars to gain accurate information. Moreover, the view o f C h i n ~ ' s s apparent' 
stability was part of the broader consensus on communist regimes. See Teiwes (2000: 71-72). 
10 Wasserstrom (4 June 2007). 
11 Goldstein (1994: 727) 
12 Schubert (2008: 191-192). 
3 
This established wisdom concerning the end of the CCP's rule points to a number of 
problems that exist both within and without the Party. In the case of the Party, it is 
claimed that the communist ideology has been undermined by the market-oriented 
reforms put in place since 1978 which, despite recent ideological innovations, such as 
the "Three Represents" (san ge daibiao), no longer has any legitimating effect with its 
own cadres or, indeed, the public. In addition, the organisational strength of the Party 
is said to have declined in the period of "reform and opening up" (gaige kaijang), in 
large part due to the decentralising effect of the economic reforms, with the result that 
the central level of government now exercises less control over the lower levels. As a 
consequence of this, cadres at the lower levels have been engaged in rent-seeking 
behaviour, such as land requisition and the levying of supplementary fees and taxes 
that has both alienated the population while frustrating the leadership of the Party. 
That said, the steep rise in corruption that has occurred at all levels of government in 
the reform period is also said to have severely damaged the moral authority of the 
CCPregime. 
However, even on the economic front and in spite of the consistently high growth 
rates, analysts who foresee the end of the regime point to the numerous structural 
problems that must be addressed by the CCP while noting the lack of political will 
that has been demonstrated, thus far, in dealing with them. These problems include 
the weakened state of the banking system, with its high ratio of non-performing loans, 
the continued propping up of unsuccessful State-Owned Enterprises (SOE), despite 
the reform of this sector at the end of the 1990s, the predatory role that the 
government continues to play in the economy as well as the inefficient use of 
4 
resources and energy shortages. Moreover, the reform programme is said to have 
produced a number of social problems that have not been adequately addressed by the 
government, including the widening levels of economic inequality between the rich 
and the poor as well as the wealthy regions on the eastern seaboard and the poorer 
regions in the hinterland, the increased levels of social dislocation, in large part due to 
rural-urban migration, the lack of funding for public goods, such as health care and 
education, as well as increasingly serious environmental concerns. Consequently, for 
analysts who see "regime change" as a matter of time, the increasing numbers of 
protests that have taken place in the post-Tiananmen period are a reflection of these 
problems and demonstrate the CCP's failure to properly address them.13 
However, though the number, as well as the scale, of the problems confronting the 
Chinese government is not disputed, the interpretation of China as a country rife with 
instability can be challenged. As Zheng points out, "[l]aundry-listing many dangers 
that the Chinese regime is facing without spelling out how these dangers might be 
turned into opportunities gives the mistaken impression that the current regime in 
China is nearing collapse. Given so many serious crises, however, one needs to 
wonder why it hasn't collapsed already.,,14 Indeed, a recently published study on 
governance by the World Bank for the period from 1996 to 2006 ranks China seventh 
out of the world's twenty most-populous countries in terms of political stability and 
ahead of democratic countries such as Turkey (ninth) and India (eleventh). IS 
Furthermore, research carried out on the nature of the recent protests indicates that, 
13 For more on the problems of the CCP's governance capabilities, see Chung, Lai and Xia (2006). 
14 Zheng (2003: 51). For other recent accounts that put forward a similar view, see Wang (2006) Perry 
(2007) and Schubert (2008). ' 
15 This survey was compiled using subjective perception-based data. Moreover though China dropped 
one place in the rankings since 2004, over the course of the survey from 1996 ~ ~ 2006 its measure of 
political stability declined less than 2 percentage points (from 34.6% to 33.2%) d e s p i ~ ~ the increase in 
the frequency of protests during this time. See Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007). 
5 
though the grievances are real and serious, they do not yet pose a fundamental 
challenge to the rule of the CCP, unlike those that took place in 1980s and which 
culminated in the Beijing Spring of 1989. Whereas those demonstrations were 
nationally focused and took issue with the central government, those that have 
occurred more recently seem to be the result of more localised and specific 
concerns.
16 According to Solinger, these concerns relate to ''unpaid wages and 
pensions; sudden and massive job terminations; and management corruption held 
responsible for the bankruptcy of industrial enterprises - where discharged workers 
were secure enjoying privileges and benefits since the 1950s. ,,17 Concurring with this 
depiction, Shue notes that the protestors are typically "[s]uffering state-sector workers 
and peasants [who] have been prone to frame their protests in localized and limited 
ways, taking as their protest targets not the architects of central refonn policy but 
local "bad" officials, "incompetent" finn managers, and "heartless" employers.,,18 
The significance of the localised nature of the protests in suggesting that the increase 
in the number of protests does not yet threaten the survival of the Party comes from 
the distinction that Chinese citizens appear to make between local and central 
government.19 In his research on political trust in China, Wang found that, "Chinese 
citizens hold high trust in the abstract government, but are much less satisfied with the 
16 Wasserstrom (December 2004). 
17 Solinger (February 2005). 
18 Shue (2004: 29). Of coW'Se, framing grievances in this way does not preclude the possibility that 
protestors do so only because they are permitted by the state while grievances directed against higher 
levels of authority are not. Indeed, Oi contends that the state's handling of local protests has resulted in 
them becoming "an accepted part of local politics", such that ''workers and peasants now take to the 
streets feeling that it is now within bounds." See Oi (2003: 453). 
19 Moreover. this distinction has been actively promoted by the Party through different media channels, 
with the central level being portrayed as responsible for the drafting of policies and the lower levels as 
responsible for the implementation of these policies. In Chari's research on the content of Jiaodian 
Fangtan, a CCTV investigative news programme, he found that, "[c]riticism was limited to policy 
implementation by local cadres, not policy formulation by central government, or problems with 
existing institutions." See Chan (2002: 44). 
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agencies that carry out the real functions of the state. ,,20 For Wang, this distinction can 
be explained in terms of national leaders constituting an "imagined state", in that 
citizens' perceptions are, in the absence of direct interaction, formed through 
education and the media discourse, whereas the local government agencies represent 
the "real state", with citizens' perceptions being based on actual experience.21 
Moreover, following his surveys on popular support in China, Chen similarly 
concluded that "people in China seem to separate more or less their interest and 
assessment of local affairs from their diffuse feelings about the political system as a 
whole.,,22 In addition to these two studies, Nathan notes that, "[t]here is much other 
evidence from both quantitative and qualitative studies to suggest that expressions, 
including widely reported worker and peasant demonstrations are usually directed at 
lower-level authorities, while the regime as a whole continues to enjoy high levels of 
acceptance. ,,23 
The high levels of acceptance that Nathan refers to are those that have been repeatedly 
recorded in surveys of political support going back to 1990. Indeed, a nationwide 
opinion survey conducted by Nathan and Tianjian Shi in co-operation with the Social 
Survey Research Centre of the People's University of China back in 1990 suggested 
that the government enjoyed a level of support which indicated that its authority w ~ ~
20 Wang (200S: 122). 
21 Wang (200S: 121-123). 
22 Chen (2004: 113). This finding was also reached by Li in his research into political trust in rural 
China. In this, Li found that "Chinese villagers tend to 'bifurcate' the state: one part is the more 
trustworthy higher levels; the other, the less trustworthy lower levels." Moreover, a recent survey from 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' "Blue Book" on Chinese society reached a similar 
conclusion. In its findings, the Blue Book found that, overall, people had a high level of trust in the 
central government (on a scale of 1 to 5, this was measured as 3.56) but a low level of trust in local 
government (2.88). That s a i ~ ~ F e ~ s m i t h h points 0,:" that, ~ t h o u ~ ~ the composite figure was high for 
central government, on particular Issues, such as tmprovmg SOCIal affairs and cadre honesty it received 
a lower score. See Li (2004: 233), Fewsmith (2007: 12-13). • 
23 Nathan (2003: 13). 
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secure, in the short tenn at least.24 This finding was supported by a further nationwide 
survey conducted by Tianjian Shi in 1993, in which 94.l percent of respondents 
agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that "we should trust and obey the 
government, for in the last analysis, it serves our interests.,,25 A longitudinal survey 
across the period from 1995 to 1999 also produced similar findings and left Chen to 
conclude that "the respondents in these three samples offered strong support for the 
political regime as a whole or considered the current regime legitimate.,,26 A similar 
conclusion was reached by Tang following his survey of six Chinese cities in 1999. 
For Tang, the results indicated that "Chinese urban residents showed not only 
relatively strong support for the current political system and a rising sense of 
nationalism, but also an unwillingness to challenge the authorities, at least not through 
institutional channels such as the workplace.,,27 More recently, responses given to the 
Wodd Values Survey indicate that the central government still continues to enjoy 
widespread support.28 In response to the question, "How much confidence do you 
have in the national government?" 95.2 percent of respondents claimed that they had 
either "quite a lot of confidence" or "a great deal of confidence". Indeed, of the eighty 
countries surveyed, such levels of support for the national government were only 
higher in Vietnam (1) and Hungary (2). 
24 Cited in Nathan (2003: 13). 
2S Ibid., p.13. 
26 Chen (2004: 29). 
27 Tang (2001: 907). 
28 Wang, commenting on whether the responses of the Chinese population could have been the result of 
political fear or intimidation, cites the finding in Shi's 1993 survey that there was little correlation 
between political fear and the level of expressed trust in the government (Wang's calculates that 
between 4% and 14% of the support for the government could be derived from fear). That said, 
Schubert acknowledges that there remains ''the suspicion that in an authoritarian environment, people 
do not say what they think, even if this danger has diminished considerably in the course of China's 
reform process, given the degree of social pluralisation that it has produced." See Wang (2005: 123), 
Schubert (2008: 200). 
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As a consequence, this thesis holds that the increasing frequency of protests taking 
place in China do not yet pose a challenge to the authority of the CCP, as was the case 
in 1989. This is both because of the localised and disconnected nature of the protests, 
the distinction that many people make between the local and central levels of 
government and also because the available empirical data indicates that people's 
support for the central government remains high.29 As such, this thesis agrees with 
Shambaugh's assessment that China is in a period of ''''stable unrest" that may 
continue for some time. ,,30 
However, accepting this view leaves unexplained why it is that China "enjoys" 
relative stability under the one-party rule of the CCP. After all, not only has the Party 
seemingly recovered from the dissatisfaction expressed by segments of the population 
in the 1989 demonstrations but it has undertaken a series of reforms that appear to be 
inimical to Communism while managing to avoid the ''third wave" of democratisation 
that collapsed many of remaining communist regimes in the world.31 As Nathan 
points out, "[u]nder conditions that elsewhere have led to democratic transition, China 
has made a transition instead from totalitarianism to a classic authoritarian regime, 
and one that appears increasingly stable.,,32 Although the CCP's use offorce in 
29 In addition, a new set of figures measuring "mass incidents" was released by the Ministry of Public 
Security for the period from January 2006 to September 2006, which claimed that there had been 
17,900 "mass incidents" during this period. Moreover, this was said to constitute a drop of 22.1 % on 
the same period from the previous year. However, the definition for "mass incidents" appeared to refer 
only to riots, protests, large petitions and so was different from that used in the earlier figures published 
in the summer of 2005. See "Statistics of Mass Incidents" (15 November 2006). 
30 Shambaugh (2000: x). This assessment of stability is political, in that it does not deny that China is 
changing but holds that these changes do not necessarily threaten the CCP's hold on power. 
31 In this context, communism is primarily understood as an economic system and is contrasted with 
that of capitalism. However, the emphasis in this question is on the widespread perception that the 
economic reforms are capitalist, or rather non-communist, in nature rather than trying to demonstrate 
this from a strictly theoretical perspective. 
32 N a ~ ~ (20?3: .16). H ~ w e v e r , , Perry disputes the notion that the CCP now fits the description of a 
C l ~ l C C authontarian ~ ~ m e e on the ~ u n d s . . that, rather ~ ~ suppressing collective action, the Party has 
actIvely encouraged CItiZens to partiCIpate m mass moblhsations at specific times so as to carry out a 
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stopping popular demonstrations expressing discontent at its practices and 
suppressing political organisations threatening its authority has contributed to this 
transition,33 this thesis follows Wasserstrom in asserting that "force alone cannot 
explain the party's hold on power".34 Consequently, this thesis begins by posing the 
question of how has the CCP remained in power throughout the post-Tiananmen 
period? 
Of the many possible ways to answer this question, this thesis will deploy the concept 
of political legitimacy in an analysis of state-society relations.3s However, the focus of 
this thesis will not be on whether the CCP is legitimate per se but rather on how the 
Party has attempted to legitimate its rule in the post-Tiananmen period. More 
fonn of confrontational politics. Indeed, for Perry, the CCP can be better understood as "revolutionary 
authoritarian" regime. See Perry (2007: 9-10). 
33 For more on the CCP's suppression of political opposition, particularly the example ofthe China 
Democratic Party in 1998, see Wright (2004). 
34 Wasserstrom (31 August 2006). 
35 There are many other explanations within the academic literature that seek to explain the CCP's 
"hold on power". For example, both Dickson and Tsai highlight the cooptation of the new entrepreneur 
class (seen as strategic in tenns of bourgeois-led political transformations in other states) into the CCP 
ranks. Others, such as Unger, Li and Wang, point to the lack of political activism amongst the 
formative middle-classes, who are viewed as important in tenns of the link between rising per capita 
income and democratic change. Even for workers from sectors that have "lost out" in the economic 
reforms, such as laid-off state-owned enterprise workers, Wright contends that the CCP's combination 
of state-led development and socialist ideals means that these workers still support the rule of the CCP 
in the hope that new economic policies will be of benefit. The increased access to resources and higher 
financial rewards in exchange for political acquiescence amongst the intellectual stratum in the post-
Tiananmen period has, it is claimed, deprived possible opposition movements of the ideas needed to 
challenge the Party's authority. However, Perry suggests that it is the Party's continued use of 
"controlled polarisation" that has maintained a fragmented Chinese society and, in so doing, ensured 
that the CCP retains its primary role in leading society. Meanwhile, for Brady, it is the Party's use of 
the propaganda system that has worked to persuade members of Chinese society to support its 
leadership. In contrast, Nathan points to the increased role of "input institutions", such as local 
elections, the xinfang system, the supervision role of the media, increased number of lawsuits, that have 
provided a number of channels for citizens to express grievances without directly challenging the state. 
Finally, for NaUghton and Yang, the continued primacy of the CCP can be explained through the 
Party's retention of the nomenklatura system, which has allowed it to use political patronage to ensure 
cadre loyalty. Indeed, for Walder, the regime can withstand any external challenges from society as 
long as the Party cadres remain united. In drawing attention to all these different explanations (as well 
as acknowledging that there are many other credible explanations for which there was insufficient 
space to include), my focus on the legitimating effect of the stability discourse is intended to 
s u p p l e m ~ n t t ~ a t h e r r than replace these e x p l ~ t i o ~ . . I n d ~ e d , , accepting the notion that no single 
explanatIon IS complete, all these explanatIOns, lDcluding that presented in this thesis, work to deepen 
the understanding ofthe.CCP's "hold on power" ~ n n contemporary China. See Dickson (2007), Tsai 
(2005), Unger (2006), Ll (2003), Wang (2008), Llpset (1981), Wright (2007), Perry (2007), Brady 
(2002), Nathan (2003), Naughton and Yang (2004), Walder (2006). 
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specifically, this thesis will seek to understand how the discourse of stability (wending) 
has been employed as a legitimation strategy by the CCP. In this, the analysis will 
focus on the production of this discourse at the "elite" level rather than on its 
reception at the lower levels of society. 
In light of this aim, the next section of this chapter will present a brief survey of the 
contemporary literature on the legitimation of the CCP and, in so doing, demonstrate 
that the analysis of the Party's stability discourse constitutes a legitimate area of 
enquiry. The chapter will then detail the approach that will be used to conduct this 
analysis before stating its contributions to scientific knowledge. Finally, the chapter 
will conclude by providing an overview of the remaining chapters in the thesis. 
11 
The Legitimation of the CCP 
The dominant view in the academic literature on the legitimation of the CCP 
throughout the post-Tiananmen period is neatly expressed by Lee, who states that 
"[e]conomic growth and nationalism have come to form the raison d'etre of the 
regime's legitimation, replacing the bankrupt communist ideology that finds very few 
true believers in China today.,,36 With regard to communist ideology, there is 
widespread consensus amongst analysts that the legitimating effect of the Party's 
communist ideology has declined. As Zhao makes clear, "[t]ill now, the state has been 
dominated by a Party that clenches onto a communist ideology that fewer and fewer 
Chinese take seriously.,,37 Agreeing with this assessment, Gries and Rosen state that, 
"traditional ideological appeals to implement Marxian-Leninism-Mao Zedong 
Thought and build a socialist China find little resonance among the public.,,38 This 
lack of "resonance" with the Chinese public, or at least some of its members, is most 
commonly explained in terms of the Party's economic reform programme, in that the 
implementation of a series of market-oriented economic policies worked to undermine 
the communist ideological formulations intended to justify them. 
The period in which the economic reform programme began can be linked to Deng 
Xiaoping's emergence as the ''paramount leader" in 1978. Moreover, these economic 
reforms were enacted in response to the preceding failures of the Cultural Revolution. 
These failures occurred both in the political sphere, where disputes between factions 
within the Party and movements among the people caused political and social 
dislocation, and the economic sphere, where the putative aim to alter the economic 
36 Lee (2003: 1). 
37 Zhao (2001: 440). 
38 Gries and Rosen (2004: 16). 
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base through a transformation of the superstructure produced minimal economic 
growth.39 As a result, the "ten years of chaos" served to damage the leading role of the 
Party and so, negatively impacted upon its legitimacy. In order to strengthen the 
Party's legitimacy, the reformist leadership under Deng decided that economic growth 
would be the most effective strategy but, in so doing, implemented a series of 
economic policies more associated with capitalism than communism. Consequently, 
the CCP leadership was put in a position of needing to justify its role in carrying out 
reforms that appeared to be at odds with its previous interpretations of communism 
while, at the same time, maintaining its appeal with those who still believed in 
communism, both inside and outside the Party. The result was that the leadership 
began to adapt the communist ideology in an attempt to legitimate both the reforms 
and the Party. However, in order to do so, it was necessary for aspects of the 
communist doctrine as well as parts of the Party's history to be subjected to criticism. 
Where previously there had been "politics in command", in the "reform and opening 
up" period, people were encouraged to "seek truth from facts" on account of "practice 
being sole criterion of truth." 
However, though the CCP insisted on pursing "socialism with Chinese 
characteristics", problems arising from the economic reforms resulted in a tension 
between their material effects and the ideological claims put forward by the CCP. As 
Kluver points out, "[ e lither the Party was legitimate or the reforms were legitimate, 
but it seemed inconsistent to argue that both could be so. ,,40 Indeed, this tension 
became evident with the pan-class nationwide demonstrations that took place in 1989. 
~ 9 9 Even in 1976, the rate of production grew at just 1.7%, which was less than the rate of population 
growth for that year. However, more recently. Weatherley contends that the economic growth rate 
during the ten-year period was not so low and, indeed, averaged around 4%. See Saich (2004: 56). 
Weatherley (2006: 12). 
40 Kluver (1996: 94). 
For Zhao, these protests "showed the fatal consequence of loosening "spiritual pillars 
(jingshen zhizhu) which had been incarnated as Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong 
Thought and guided the Chinese people to support and even sacrifice for the regime 
under Mao.,,41 Despite this, however, the Party continues to justify its policies through 
communist ideological formulations in the post-Tiananmen period; yet, there is little 
evidence that they have any real legitimating effect. The most recent addition to the 
CCP's development of Marxism-Leninism has been Jiang Zemin's "Important 
Thought of the Three Represents", which was officially included at the 16th Party 
Congress in 2002. However, for Misra, "[t]he real importance of this formulation 
lies ... in ... bring[ing] its stated ideological goals closer to the practical policies that the 
leadership has been implementing.'.42 Indeed, Zheng and Lye summarise this 
transformation in the reform and opening up period by noting that "[ w ] here before 
ideology dictated how things ought to be, now circumstances dictate what ideology 
should be."43 
For many analysts, this decline in the legitimating force of the communist ideology 
has left the Party solely reliant on the material performance of the economy to 
legitimate its authority. Indeed, Zheng and Lye again point out that, "[i]t is not far-
fetched to argue that the CCP has so far been able to remain at the helm of power due 
to its success in delivering economic goods, i.e. provide employment and material 
benefits, to the people.',44 With the exception of the immediate post-Tiananmen 
retraction, the Chinese economy has continued to grow at a high rate, with GDP 
averaging 10% over the period from 1990 to 2004 while never falling below 7% in 
41 Zhao (1998: 289). 
42 Misra (2003: 740). 
43 Zheng and Lye (2005: 187). 
44 Ibid., p. 193. 
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anyone year.4S Moreover, when viewed from a comparative perspective, China's 
economic growth has been the highest of any country in the world over this period. 46 
Indeed, the effect of such sustained growth has been to bring about one of the fastest 
and largest reductions in the number of people living in absolute poverty in history, 
from 250 million in 1979 to 29 million in 2003.47 In addition, Sisci notes that the 
benefits of such a reduction can be seen in the "highly visible improvements in daily 
life" which extend from a higher standard of living to the greater availability of social 
opportunities, such as attending university or starting up a business.48 
Nevertheless, despite the continued success of the Chinese economy, Zhao points out 
that, "[a] regime that bases its legitimacy on performance .. .is intrinsically unstable.,.49 
Indeed, Hong and Sun contend that, "due to the inevitable fluctuations of the market 
economy, this legitimacy is tenuous."so That said, in paying attention to the overall 
performance of the Chinese economy in the "reform and opening up" period, both 
perspectives presuppose that economic growth enhances the legitimacy of an 
incumbent regime. Yet, as Zhong notes, "economic growth in and by itself does not 
directly contribute to political stability ... [i]n fact, it has been argued that economic 
development and modernization lead to political instability."sl Indeed, such instability 
can occur when economic growth is not evenly spread, either geographically or 
4S This figure is based on ''world development indicators" published by the World Bank for the periods 
from 1 9 9 ~ 2 0 0 0 0 (10.6%) and 2 ~ 2 0 0 4 4 (9.4%). See World Bank (2006). 
46 From the period from 1 9 9 ~ 2 0 0 0 , , China is ranked first in terms of average GOP growth; in the 
period from 2000-2004, China is ranked sixth. However, given that only one of the five more highly 
ranked countries in this latter period experienced positive growth in the 1990-2000 period (Chad, with 
1.9% OOP growth), China clearly has the highest economic growth when both periods are taken into 
account. See World Bank (2006). 
47 Zheng and Lye (2005: 193). 
48 Sisci (21 O c ~ b e r r 2??5). C o ~ p a r i n g g the d ~ v e l o p m e n ! , ~ f f India and China since the 1980s, Perry 
. concludes that, in add1t1on to hIgher econom1C growth, in terms of quality-of-life measures such as 
literacy and life expectancy, China also notably outperforms India." See Perry (2007: 3). 
49 Zhao (200 I: 440-441). 
50 Hong and Sun (1999: 33). Indeed, Saich points to the collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998 
following the Asian Financial crisis, as evidence of this point. Saich (2004: 84). ' 
51 Zhong (1996: 202). 
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amongst different groups in society, as it will produce differences in the levels of 
wealth between members of society. In the case of China, Saich notes that, "[m]uch of 
the initial success and popular support [for the CCP] stemmed from the fact that there 
were relatively few losers and those who did lose out were politically marginalized."s2 
That said, Saich warns that, "[i]t is now apparent that as reform moves to the next 
stage and China integrates further into the world economy, there will be significant 
losers, including those workers and institutions that have formed the core of the CCP 
socialist system."S3 Yet, Wang estimates that this scenario had already taken hold by 
1994, with the government's economic reforms becoming a "zero-sum game.,,54 
According to Wang, this represented the first time in the reform process that "some 
segments of society became real losers, losers not only in a relative sense, but also in 
an absolute sense."ss Indeed, Wang's claims are evidenced by, amongst other things, 
the negative change in the Gini coefficient over this period. S6 Designed to measure 
income inequality, the Gini coefficient for the first year of the reforms in 1980 was 
calculated at 0.33. This marginally increased to 0.37 in 1992 before breaking through 
the "warning" level of 0.4 in the past decade and is now measured at 0.496.57 
~ 2 2 Saich (2004: xvi). 
~ 3 3 b'd . I I ., p. XVI. 
S4 Prior to this, from 1978 to 1993, Wang claims that the reforms constituted a "win-win" game on 
account of the fact that all social groups benefited, even ifsome groups benefited relatively more than 
others. See Wang (1999: 379-380) 
~ ~ ~ Ibid., p. 380. An example of such reforms is the closure of "many non-performing" State-Owned 
Enterprises, which has contributed to an urban unemployment figure estimated to be in excess of 100 
million. Moreover, such reforms have taken place during a period when the government has sought to 
end the "cradle-to-grave" benefits that linked the Party with the urban proletariat. Indeed, due to the 
effect of these reforms upon the urban working classes, Weatherley contends that ''what was once the 
original constituency of the party now poses one of the biggest challenges to its very incumbency." See 
Weatherley (2006: 146-149). 
56 The Gini coefficient ranges from between 0 and I, with "0" representing a society where everyone 
has exactly the same income and "1" representing a society where one person has all the income and 
everyone else has none. 
57 An a d d i t i o ~ l l Gini c0-:efficient calculati.on by , ~ e e C ~ . n e s e e People's University estimates the figure to 
be 0.561, which, Fcwsnuth notes, puts Chtna at Brazthan levels ofinequality", with the top twenty 
percent of the Chinese population having 72.4 times the wealth of the bottom twenty percent. See 
Fewsmith (2007: 9). 
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Given the increasing economic problems upon certain sectors and regions in China 
during the post-Tiananmen period, many analysts suggest that the CCP has also 
drawn on nationalism as an ideological replacement for communism in order to 
augment its support amongst disaffected members of the population. Typifying this 
view is Zhao, who contends that ''the rapid decay of Communist ideology has led the 
Chinese Communist Party to emphasize its role as the paramount patriotic force and 
the guardian of national pride in order to find a new basis of legitimacy to sustain its 
role."s8 Moreover, for Saich, "since 1989, the CCP has been fairly successful in 
manipulating public opinion to instil nationalism as a legitimizing core value."s9 
Indeed, though nationalism has always been played a role in Party's legitimation 
efforts, particularly at certain points during the People's Republic of China, both the 
emphasis placed on nationalism as well as its content has changed following the 
events in 1989. In particular, Weatherley identifies an "anti-foreign" nationalism that 
emerged in response to the international community's condemnations of the military 
suppression of the pro-democracy demonstrations.6o These condemnations contributed 
to rise of "anti-China theories" that suggested that the international community, 
particularly the United States of America, was attempting to "contain" China in the 
same way that it did the Soviet Union during the cold war.61 Indeed, the 
"humiliations" that China suffered from "foreign imperialists" during the 19th and 
20th centuries were used as examples to demonstrate the historical origins of their 
present-day intentions. Even calls for democratic change were held to be part of a 
S8 Zhao (1997: 725). 
S9 Saich (2004: 308). 
60 Weathcrley (2006: 153-154). 
61 Zheng (1999: 95). 
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strategy of "peaceful evolution" (he ping yanbian) that was intended to "contain" 
China.62 
The propagation of anti-foreign nationalism opened up the space for the Party 
leadership to argue that patriotism constituted the only course for China in resisting 
the intentions of the "international bourgeois hostile forces".63 In order to persuade 
people of this argument, extensive "patriotic education" campaigns were promulgated 
across a range of channels including the media, leadership speeches and educational 
institutions. In this, the campaigns worked to promote political loyalty and obligation 
to the regime by linking the concept of the nation (guo) to that of the state (zhengfu) 
while, at same time, promoting the Party's norms and values by emphasising the 
"Chinese characteristics" of the reform programme.64 For Chen, these campaigns have 
been effective, in that the expression of strong nationalist support in response to 
survey questions could be attributed, in part, to ''the government's continuous 
promotion of it for the purpose of strengthening its legitimacy. ,,65 That said, Chen also 
contends that the ''public's yearning for a strong national identity under a perceived 
foreign threat" is an additional factor explaining the high levels of nationalism in 
China.66 Indeed, it is this aspect of Chinese nationalism which highlights the limits of 
legitimation claims that rely on nationalism. 
According to Seo, "successful nationalism redirects the target of political loyalty of 
the subjects from the political institutions or charismatic political leaders to a 
"nation ... [so] political subjects with genuine loyalty perceive themselves as the 
62 For more on the policy of ''peaceful evolution", see Ong (2007). 
63 Zbeng (1999: 104-105). 
64 Zhao (1998: 288-290). 
6S Chen (2004: 107). 
66 Ibid., p.107. 
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owners of the political community which the ruling regime tries to keep under 
control. ,,67 In this, the promotion of nationalism not only promotes loyalty amongst 
the Chinese people towards the CCP but also obligates the CCP to "protect" the 
Chinese nation in the name of the people. As a consequence, nationalism can serve to 
both legitimate and, crucially, delegitimate the regime. This delegitimation can occur 
when people perceive that the actions of the government do not correspond with its 
ideational claims. Furthermore, by shifting the locus of allegiance from the Party to 
the nation, such instances can give rise to a popular nationalism that attempts to 
contest the government's official nationalism.68 Indeed, Gries explains that "[t]he 
1990s witnessed the emergence of a genuinely popular nationalism in China that 
should not be conflated with state or official nationalism.'.69 The emergence of 
popular nationalism was signified with the publication of "China Can Say No" 
("Zhongguo keyi shuo bu") in 1996.1° Although this book reproduced the "anti-China 
theories" line that the West, particularly the US, along with Japan and some 
"disgusting Chinese" (mostly referring to Taiwan), was plotting to "contain" a rising 
China, it deviated from the Party's formulation of "patriotism" by declaring that 
China needed to formulate a counter-containment strategy in order to stand up and 
"say no" to the West. As Weatherley points out, while "not overtly critical of Chinese 
foreign policy, there was a clear implication ... that the government was too soft in its 
dealings with the West.'.7l Moreover, despite the government's attempt to later ban 
67 Seo (2005: 143). 
68 In this thesis, such contestation will be considered only from the perspective of popular nationalism; 
however, it is important to note that nationalism can be further disaggregated to consider additional 
dimensions, such as ethnic nationalism and external nationalism. For more on this topic, see Zheng 
~ 9 9 9 ) . .
Gries (2004: 19). Xu dates the emergence of popular nationalism to 1996 and claims it was the "joint 
result of the evolving nationalist thinking of the early 1990s and the ongoing debates on 
modernity, postmodernism, postcolonialism, and their political implications", See Xu (2001: 120), 
70 Qiang et a1. (1996), According to Wang, this book became an "instant bestseller" after its fU'St print 
and, by the autumn of 1996, bad become a "small cultural phenomenon". See Wang (1997: 161), 
71 Weathedey (2006: IS8). 
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this book, as well as the number of imitators that were quickly released, the 
publication of "China Can Say No" and its subsequent success indicated that 
nationalism could be used to challenge the authority of the CCP, particularly on issues 
of foreign policy. 72 
This challenge was more explicitly demonstrated in the spontaneous anti-Japan 
protests that broke out following the seizure of the Fisherman Islands 
(Senkaku/Diaoyutai) by Japanese activists in 1996.73 Although the government was 
able to quickly suppress the demonstrations, Weatherley notes that, "a number of 
internet sites and print publications subsequently appeared which expressed strong 
anti-Japanese sentiments and suggested that the CCP was too submissive on the 
DaioyulSenkaku issue.,,74 A further example was the demonstrations that took place 
in response to the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. The 
bombings, which had been carried out by the US, under the command of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), during the invasion of the Republic of 
Yugoslavia in 1999, killed three Chinese nationals and provoked spontaneous 
demonstrations in more than 100 Chinese cities involving people of all ages and from 
different social backgrounds. Although the protests were largely directed against the 
actions of NATO-the US and British embassies in Beijing were a particular focus 
for the protests-Gries notes that criticism was also directed at the Chinese 
72 Other books in this genre included "China Can Still Say No", "Behind a Demonised China ", "The 
Third Eye", and "Be Vigilant Against Japanese Militarism". As for the government's banning of these 
books, this only came about after initial support for these books. Indeed. according to Wang, 
"CCP ... organizations in Beijing reportedly bought a copy of the book for every party member." See 
Wang (1997: 162). 
13 The Fisherman Islands refers to an uninhabited set of five islets and three rocks in the East China Sea 
that l i ~ ~ 125 miles o f f T ~ i w a n n and 185 miles offOkina'."a. ~ e e sovereignty of these islands is disputed 
by China, Japan and T81wan and has become more senous smce geological surveys at the end of the 
1960s estimated that a nearby continental shelf contained up to one hundred million barrels of oil. For 
more detail on this dispute, see Strecker Downs and Saunders (1998/99). 
14 Weatherley (2006: 157-158). 
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government's response of only lodging a "formal protest,,75 Indeed, despite a televised 
address by the then Vice-President, Hu Jintao warning against behaviour that 
damaged social stability while supporting the "patriotic" actions of the demonstrators, 
the government was not fully able to control the demonstrations but, instead, was 
forced to accommodate them.76 This was most evident in the buses that were laid on 
for students to take them to the US and British embassies in Beijing, at which they 
threw various objects. As Fewsmith points out, "[i]t was certainly better, from the 
Party's point of view, to have such public anger directed at the United States than to 
have students throw stones at Zhongnanhai [the resident compound for Chinese 
leaders]".77 More recently, the spectre of popular nationalism was again displayed 
with the "anti-Japan" demonstrations that took place across a number of Chinese 
cities in April 2005. Although ostensibly in reaction to the approval by the Japanese 
Ministry of Education of history textbooks that downplayed the actions of the 
Japanese military during its occupation of China, the demonstrations visibly 
highlighted how the government's use of "anti-foreign nationalism", in this case the 
atrocities of the Japanese, could be used by others to challenge its legitimacy. Indeed, 
for Gries and Rosen, these examples demonstrate that, "Party legitimacy now depends 
on meeting the expectations of nationalists." 78 While not fully accepting the 
overdeterminative nature of such a proposition, these examples of popular nationalism 
do indicate that government's use of nationalism can, on occasion, be the subject of 
resistance and, as such, is more limited in its legitimating force than commonly 
suggested. 
7S Gries (2004: 129-131). 
76 Zhao (2005-2006: 140). 
77 Fewsmith (2001: 213). 
78 Gries and Rosen (2005: 14). 
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In acknowledging this, the possibility is opened up to interrogate other sources of 
legitimation that have supplemented the Party's authority in the post-Tiananmen 
period. In this thesis, I will focus on only one of these additional sources: the CCP's 
ideational use of "stability" (wending). Indeed, stability has been identified by other 
analysts as a source of legitimacy. Shue appears to be the first analyst to specifically 
discuss stability in terms oflegitimation.79 For Shue, this is because the CCP, as a 
result of the economic reform programme, no longer derives its legitimacy from its 
''technical capacity" to deliver economic growth but from its "political capacity" to 
create a stable environment in which economic development can take place. In this, 
Shue asserts that the CCP's legitimacy now rests on the transcendental truths of Truth, 
Benevolence and Glory. While agreeing with Shue on the importance of stability, my 
research examines the content of the CCP' s discourse of stability rather than focusing 
on its link to these truths. More recently, Weatherley, in his study ofCCP legitimacy, 
also identifies stability as a source oflegitimacy.8o However, while providing 
interesting insights, his brief treatment of the concept opens up the space for my 
research to develop a fuller understanding of this source. 
The importance of stability in the post-Tiananmen period has also been noted by other 
analysts. Indeed, Schoenhals comments that this tenn has been ''the CCP catchword 
of the 1990s",81 while Wong points out that, in the post-Tiananmen period, "'Stability 
overrides everything' became the mantra of the state as it went about managing 
society.,,82 Shirk even claims that this mantra has been so important that the CCP now 
79 Shue (2004). 
80 Weatherly (2006: 149-151). 
81 Schoenhals (1999: 597). 
82 Wong (2004: 156). 
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determines its economic policies using an "algorithm" to ensure stability.83 Moreover, 
in terms of legitimation, Chen contends that, "the Chinese regime has been able to 
bolster its legitimacy by controlling the media and using them to cultivate a general 
sense of progress while perpetuating official paradigms that emphasize stability and 
economic development over political change.,,84 However, while this has the case in 
the post-Tiananmen period, Zheng points out that the call for stability by Party leaders 
was not necessarily accepted in the 1980s.85 Indeed, while CCP leaders highlighted 
the central role of stability in the economic development of other East Asian countries, 
those in favour of greater political reform viewed such explanations as excuses 
intended to prevent increased participation in the political process and so allow the 
CCP to maintain its monopoly on political rule. Ultimately, Zheng concludes that 
these groups pushing for political reform "gradually grew into something close to a 
social movement by the late 1980s, as shown in the 1989 pro-democracy 
movement."S6 Moreover, in considering why the stability discourse has legitimated 
the authority of the CCP in the post-Tiananmen period but did not do so in the pre-
Tiananmen period, this thesis contends that the events of 1989 constituted a strategic 
moment in the formation of the stability discourse, with the post-Tiananmen political 
context "favouring" this discourse.87 Furthermore, the CCP's hegemonic 
interpretation of these events, disseminated through various media channels, has 
83 According to Shirk, the government has calculated the economic growth rate needed to create a 
sufficient number of jobs to maintain the unemployment rate at a level that will prevent social 
discontent. See Shirk (2007: 55). 
84 Chen (2005: 4). 
85 Zbeng (2003: 55). 
86 Ibid, p.5S. 
87 This interpretation draws on the concept of discursive selectivity that will be discussed in greater 
detail in chapter one. 
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legitimated its authority by virtue of successfully "resonating" with the Chinese 
1 · 88 popU atlOn. 
The CCP's emphasis on stability has also been reflected in surveys measuring the 
public's attitudes. Data from the World Values Survey shows that Chinese people 
regard "stability" as being of the highest importance.89 Moreover, Xie, Wang and Xu 
found in their surveys on risk perception that Chinese people were most concerned 
with risks that threatened national stability and economic development.9o Tang's six-
city survey also found that a majority of respondents preferred maintaining political 
stability over democratisation, with 58% agreeing that political stability was more 
important than democratization while only 26 percent disagreed with such a notion.91 
In addition, Chen's longitudinal survey from 1995 to 1999 supported Tang's findings, 
with over 80% of respondents preferring "a stable and orderly society to a freer 
society that could be prone to social disruption. ,,92 As a consequence, Chen concludes 
that the public's preference for stability has been due to "the government's relentless 
propaganda to portray the current political regime as the only guarantor for 
sociopolitical stability and defender of national interests. ,,93 In light of this, the main 
aim of this thesis is to analyse the government's propaganda in order to understand 
more fully how the discourse of stability has been used in the post-Tiananrnen period 
88 This interpretation has been further strengthened by the government's selective use of the subsequent 
collapses of the other authoritarian regimes, such as the former Yugoslavia and USSR as examples of 
instability that brought about economic chaos and national disintegration. 
89 The survey gave the respondents five options: "order in the nation"; "give people more money"; fight 
rising prices"; ''protect free speech"; and "don't know". In 1990, 66.2% chose "order in the nation" 
while, in 1995, the figure rose to 69.2%. Though the figure dropped in 2001to 49.7%, it still received 
the highest number of responses, with the biggest increase in those who responded "don't know" 
which jumped from 2.9% in 1995 to 12.6%. ' 
90 Xie, Wang and Xu (2003). 
91 Wang (2000: 899-900). 
92 Chen (2002: 14). 
93 Ibid., p.l5. 
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to legitimate its authority. The approach that will be taken in this thesis will be briefly 
detailed in the next section. 
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Thesis Approach 
This thesis addresses the question of how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has 
remained in power since the events of 1989 by deploying the concept of political 
legitimacy. In this, the focus is not on whether the CCP is legitimate per se but rather 
on how the Party has legitimated its authority in this period. The conventional 
explanation relating to the legitimation of the CCP is that the declining legitimating 
power of the communist ideology has left it reliant on a combination of economic 
performance and nationalism. However, while agreeing with the important role that 
these two sources play in legitimating the CCP, this thesis argues that both sources 
have limitations and, as a result, it is possible to consider additional sources of 
legitimation during this period. In this thesis, the CCP's use of the stability discourse 
will be analysed in terms of legitimation. 
However, the concept of legitimation is limited in its explanatory value, in that it 
presents the relationship between structure and agency in functionalist terms, with 
agents being conceptualised in terms of directly "reading off" the structural effects of 
rules and norms. In light of this, Weher' s conceptualisation of legitimation will be 
situated in the strategic-relational approach, as developed by Jessop and Hay, in 
chapter one.94 This conceptual move works to extend the understanding of 
legitimation beyond the identification of specific modes by interrogating the 
interaction of strategic actors and a strategically selective context from a spatio-
temporal perspective. Moreover, within this framework, space is opened up in which 
to consider the role played by discourse, through the concept of "discursive 
selectivity", in mediating between the structural effects of rules and nonns and the 
94 This conceptual framework will be elaborated in the follOwing chapter. 
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Lebenswelt notion of belief that informs action. As such, situating legitimation within 
the strategic-relational approach allows for a more dynamic understanding of this 
concept. In addition, the concept of discursive selectivity allows for the possibility of 
interrogating the "cognitive filters" that are used by powerful actors to influence the 
formation of strategies by other less powerful actors.95 Of these, this thesis will focus 
on how the CCP has used the particular "cognitive filter" of the stability discourse to 
enhance its legitimation in the post-Tiananmen period. 
The method by which this discourse will be analysed is the discourse-historical 
approach, as developed by Wodak, which is detailed in chapter two. The discourse-
historical approach will be used to analyse a selection of articles from the People's 
Daily newspaper covering the period from 1989 to 2007. This approach was selected 
on account of its emphasis on the historical dimension of discourse as well as its 
incorporation of argumentation theory. The selection of the People's Daily as the 
source for this analysis is due to its status as the CCP's "official mouthpiece". As such, 
it occupies an influential position in shaping China's national discourse. Within the 
identified time period, three instances will be selected for analysis: the "Beijing 
Spring" in 1989, the "anti-Falun Gong" campaign in 1999 and the "anti-Japan" 
demonstrations in 2005. These events have been selected on the basis that they 
constituted exceptional instances in which the stability discourse was used to 
legitimate the CCP's authority. Moreover, in each of these three instances, the 
challenge to the Party's power was different and, as such, carrying out an analysis of 
how the stability discourse was used in each of these instances will lead to a more 
complete understanding of the discourse. 
95 As pointed out in the next chapter, such filters are not held to be detenninative and not all actors will 
be influenced in the same way and to the same extent. 
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The empirical analysis in each of these instances begins with a contextual analysis, 
adapted from Wodak's "Theory of the Context", before an intensive textual analysis 
of a selected commentary is conducted. This analysis will take place at the 
paragraphicallevel, which allows for movement between the sentential and discursive 
levels while making the analysis sufficiently explicit to allow readers to engage with 
the analysis. The categories for this intensive analysis were also adapted Wodak's 
"four-step" approach using an abductive process. As indicated above, particular 
attention will be paid to the use of argumentation strategies, including fallacies and 
topoi, as well as various rhetorical figurae. The empirical analysis will be concluded 
with an extensive textual analysis of texts that were also published during each 
instance in order to avoid producing an overly narrow understanding of the discourse. 
Having detailed the approach that will be taken in this thesis, the following section 
will explain the contributions to scientific knowledge that this thesis hopes to make. 
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Contributions to Scientific Knowledge 
This thesis seeks to make a number of contributions to scientific knowledge. In the 
field of Chinese politics, the analysis of the CCP's discourse of stability will highlight 
how this discourse has been used in certain instances during the post-Tiananmen 
period and, in so doing, explain both the continuities and differences in this usage. 
Furthermore, the analysis of the stability discourse intends to build on the work of 
other analysts who have identified stability as a source of legitimacy in order to make 
an important contribution to existing explanations concerning the continued rule of 
the CCP in this period. Indeed, if one accepts Brady's contention that the CCP's 
legitimacy in the post-Tiananmen period now rests largely on persuasion rather than 
coercion, analyses of particular discourses propagated by the CCP as well as the 
arguments used to support them constitute an increasingly important area of research 
in Chinese politics.96 As a consequence, the approach that has been developed in this 
thesis to analyse the stability discourse will be useful to other analysts who focus on 
this research area. 
Beyond the field of Chinese politics, this thesis also hopes to contribute to the concept 
of legitimation. By situating this concept within the strategic-relational approach, this 
thesis has provided a framework in which the previously functionalist relationship 
between structure and agency has been reconceptualised to take account of the 
mediating influence of discourse and, in so doing, allows legitimation to come closer 
96 See Brady (2002), (2006). A further point is that much of the literature on the legitimation of the 
CCP has focused on areas where its claims have been contested or resisted. While this work, which 
often draws on Scott's "weapons of the weak", provides valuable insight into the limits of the CCP's 
claims as well as demonstrating the criticality of Chinese citizens, the continued success of the CCP's 
claims seems to be an overlooked area of research. Indeed, given increasing plurality of information in 
China, this success seems all the more remarkable and, as such, in need of more extensive research. For 
an example of recent scholarship that focuses heavily on the resistance of the CCP's legitimation 
claims, see the edited volume by Gries and Rosen (2004). 
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to capturing the lived complexity of the real world. Moreover, this reconceptualisation 
of legitimation provides a framework in which analysis can move beyond the 
identification of specific legitimation sources to consider the multiple temporally and 
geographically variable legitimating strategies that are employed by ruling regimes in 
different political systems. 
In terms of the strategic-relational approach, this thesis hopes to contribute to the 
development of the discursive selectivity concept by elaborating an explicit method of 
discursive analysis, namely Wodak's discourse-historical approach, that will allow 
other analysts to engage more fully with the findings of such research.97 Moreover, by 
integrating the discourse-historical approach with the strategic-relational approach, 
this thesis hopes to contribute to the development of the discourse-historical approach 
by providing a relevant sociological framework that is called for but absent in 
Wodak's own work. Indeed, in achieving this integration, this thesis hopes to put 
forward a coherent conceptual and methodological framework that can be applied by 
analysts across the social sciences. Finally, in developing the discourse-historical 
approach to allow for the analysis of Chinese language texts, this thesis hopes to 
extend the applicability of this approach beyond the European language texts to which 
it has hitherto been applied. 
The final section of this introductory chapter will conclude by providing an overview 
of the remaining chapters of this thesis. 
'17 Although ~ e e s t r . a t e g i c - r e l . a ~ o n a l l approach w a ~ ~ initially ~ e v e ~ o p e d d by Jessop, Hay developed the 
concept of dlscurslve selectiVlty and has used thlS concept m his empirical research. However as 
suggested in the text, Hay's empirical work does not use an explicit method and, as such is n:ore 
difficult to understand and so engage with his findings. For an example, see Hay (1996).' 
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Thesis Overview 
The remainder of this thesis will consist of five chapters. The first chapter will 
interrogate the concept of legitimacy in order to make clear the definition that will be 
applied in this thesis. Following this, the chapter will explicate the concept of 
legitimation i.e. the process by which legitimacy is attained. As pointed out above, 
due to the limitations of Weber's conceptualisation of legitimation, this concept will 
be situated within the strategic-relational approach and in so doing, the functionalist 
relationship between structure and agency will be reconceptualised in terms of 
strategic actors, strategically selective contexts and discursive selectivity. The effect 
of this conceptual move will open up the space in which discourse, in the form of 
"cognitive filters", can be analysed while, at the same time, placing the effects of such 
discourse within the broader context of political action. 
The second chapter will follow on by elaborating the methodological approach that 
will be taken in analysing the stability discourse. As pointed out above, the discourse-
historical approach, which is associated with the broader school of critical discourse 
analysis (CDA), will be used to analyse selected articles on stability from the People's 
Daily across the period from 1989 to 2007. In particular, articles from three 
exceptional instances in which the context "favoured" the stability discourse were 
selected for analysis. These instances were: the "Beijing Spring" in 1989; the "anti-
Falun Gong' campaign in 1999; and "anti-Japan" demonstrations in 2005. Each of 
these instances are analysed in turn in chapters three, four and five of the thesis. 
The third chapter focuses on the use of the stability discourse both during the "Beijing 
Spring" in 1989 and after the military suppression of these demonstrations. This 
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period has been selected for analysis on the basis that the demonstrations in 1989 
represented a direct challenge to the CCP's authority that resulted in a legitimation 
crisis, if not an outright loss oflegitimacy. Moreover, its significance in shaping the 
political context of the post-Tiananmen period is still evidenced by the leadership's 
ongoing refusal to officially revise its verdict of the protests as a counter-
revolutionary rebellion.98 A further aim in analysing articles from the period before 
and after the military suppression is to better understand why the stability discourse 
has been more effective in the post- rather than the pre:-Tiananmen period. 
The fourth chapter focuses on the use of the stability discourse during the "anti-Falun 
Gong" campaign in 1999. This period has been selected for analysis on account of the 
fact that the campaign was launched in response to what the government claimed to 
be "the most serious political incident since 1989". Indeed, this "incident", which 
refers to a demonstration that was held by Falun Gong adherents outside Zhongnanhai 
on 25 April 1999, represented the most significant instance of instability since the 
events in 1989. That said, though this instance provided another example in which the 
authority of the CCP was being challenged, this challenge was different in nature to 
that in 1989. Then, the government faced calls from protestors, at least in the initial 
stages, for reforms to be taken within the political system. In contrast, Falun Gong, a 
quasi-spiritual q;gong group, was perceived to be a threat to the legitimacy of the 
. 
CCP because it presented an alternative without the political system. In terms of the 
stability discourse, the "anti-Falun Gong' campaign was significant, in that the "25 
April incident" provided a material referent that highlighted the limitations of this 
discourse. 
98 Despite the lack of official revision, references in leadership speeches and other various media do not 
tend to use this verdict but rather.refer to the events as a ''political disturbance" or a ''political incident". 
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The fifth chapter focuses on the use of the stability discourse during the "anti-Japan" 
demonstrations that took place in 2005. This period has been selected for analysis on 
the grounds that these demonstrations have presented the most recent challenge to the 
government's authority. Moreover, as with the previous two instances, this challenge 
was different in nature, in that the demonstrations, on account of being directed 
against the actions of the Japanese government, did not directly challenge the 
government's authority. However, the demonstrations did present an indirect 
challenge to the government over when to bring the demonstrations under control 
without turning the grievances of the protestors away from Japan towards the CCP. 
Indeed, historical precedents indicated that ending the protests too quickly and 
permitting them to last too long could both result in this taking place. Consequently, 
this chapter looks at how the stability discourse was employed in bringing the 
demonstrations successfully under control. Moreover, it also analyses how the CCP's 
recent ideological fonnulation of "building a socialist harmonious society" has been 
incoIporated into this discourse. 
The thesis concludes by suggesting that, though the specific content of the stability 
discourse has varied in each of the periods under analysis, its usage has been similar, 
in that the positive value of stability has been linked to the leadership of the CCP and 
the negative value of instability has been linked to the "other", be that the 
demonstrators in 1989, Falun Gong in 1999 or the "anti-Japan" demonstrators in 2005. 
Moreover, these values have been achieved through the central claim that China's 
future can only be realised through continued economic development and political 
reform, for which stability is the necessary condition. In the positive version, the CCP 
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leadership will deliver this future while, in the negative version, the "other" will 
"destroy" this future. Moreover, these claims are strengthened by the use of historical 
evidence, the post-Third Plenum period in the case of the positive value of stability, 
and the periods of upheaval in Chinese history in the case of the negative value of 
instability. 
In tenns of legitimating the rule of the CCP, the stability discourse appears to be 
effective because it puts forward a "consequentialist" argument that shapes an as-yet-
undetennined future in line with the Party's interpretation of the present. That said, 
given that this discourse has remained largely the same in the pre- and post-
Tiananmen periods, it seems possible to suggest that the effectiveness of the stability 
discourse is in large part due to the hegemonic interpretation of the events in 1989 
that has shaped a political context which favours this discourse. Accepting this view, 
however, also suggests that, at some future point, the political context may no longer 
favour this discourse and, as such, it will lose its effectiveness in legitimating the 
CCP's authority. Indeed, the evidence from the protests taking place at the local level 
as well as, more recently, in Tibet suggests that there are already limitations to the 
legitimating logic of the stability discourse. 
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Chapter 1: A Strategic-Relational Approach to Legitimation 
Introduction 
This chapter will develop the conceptual framework to be used in this thesis for 
analysing the legitimating effects of the stability discourse employed by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). As such, this framework both opens up the space in which 
the stability discourse can be analysed in relation to the CCP's legitimacy and places 
the effects of this discourse upon its legitimacy within the broader context of political 
action in China. In order to develop this conceptual framework, it is first necessary to 
interrogate the concept of legitimacy. In so doing, the definition of legitimacy that 
will be applied in this thesis will be made explicit. Indeed, a criticism that can be 
levelled at the contemporary literature on the legitimacy of the CCP is that this 
concept is rarely interrogated, with the result that it is left unclear who or what is 
being legitimated.99 Following on from this, the concept of legitimation i.e. the 
process by which legitimacy is attained will be explicated. As pointed out in the 
introduction, Weber's conceptualisation of legitimation, which is the de facto standard 
framework used in such analyses, is limited by its functionalist view of the structure-
agency relationship. In order to overcome this, Weber's conceptualisation will be 
situated within the strategic-relational approach. Through its concepts of strategic 
actors, strategically selective contexts and discursive selectivity, this approach allows 
for a more dynamic understanding of legitimation to be put forward in which mUltiple 
legitimating strategies can be considered. Of these, this thesis will focus on the CCP's 
use of the stability discourse. 
99 Although unclear, by virtue of the exclusive focus upon the CCP leadership and the population-at-
large, many of these studies ~ e e m m to.conflate l e ~ t i ~ a c y ywith the notion of popular support. And 
though the CCP has become Increasmgly populIst In the "reform and opening up" period, such a 
narrow view of legitimacy seems to overlook other important power relations that playa role in 
determining the regime's legitimacy. 
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The Concept of Legitimacy 
This chapter will begin by detailing the concept of legitimacy to be applied in this 
thesis so as to better clarify what legitimation achieves. Firstly, it is necessary to 
establish that the legitimacy does playa role within a political system. For Gries and 
Rosen, "[l]egitimacy is central to politics everywhere"lOO while White acknowledges 
that legitimacy constitutes "a crucial basis ofpolitics."lOl Even Huntington, who 
refers to legitimacy as a "mushy concept", deployed it as one of the five independent 
variables when explaining the "third wave of democracy" that swept away 
authoritarian regimes in the early 1990s.102 For Weber, the centrality of legitimacy to 
the political system can be explained by ''the generally observable need of any power, 
or even of any advantage of life, to justify itself.,,103 Drawing on Weber's observation, 
Beetham goes further in stating that wherever power is exercised "societies will seek 
to subject it to justifiable rule, and the powerful themselves will seek to secure 
consent to their power from at least the most important among their subordinates."l04 
As a consequence, it is possible to state that in all political systems where power is 
exercised, legitimacy can, in theory at least, be said to operate. Such a statement, 
therefore, allows for the possibility that legitimacy exists not only in democracies, as 
some academics would hold, lOS but also in communist states, authoritarian regimes as 
well as dictatorships.l06 Indeed, for Beetham, legitimacy in a communist state is 
comprised of the same two components that make up legitimacy in capitalist 
100 Gries and Rosen (2004: 6). 
101 White (2005: 2). 
102 Huntington (1993: 46). 
103 Weber (1978: 953). 
104 Beetham (1991: ~ ) . .
105 For an example of this in relation to China, see Bruce Gilley (2003). 
106 C o ~ e n t i n g g on the r e l u c ~ c e e of social scientists to apply the concept of legitimacy to Asian 
countries, Ogden suggests that It may be due to the fact that they are unwilling to "confront the 
possibility that more authoritarian governments may actually attain and retain as much if not more 
legitimacy than democratic ones." See Odgen (2007: 149). " 
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democracies: namely, the interrelated but analytically distinct notions of the economy 
and the polity (or political ideology).lo7 
Moving onto define the concept oflegitimacy, it is important, at the outset, to 
acknowledge that legitimacy, as White admits, "is not easy to define."lo8 For 
Weatherford, this is because the concept "plays such a protean role in accounting for 
political phenomena, taking on different aspects as it links global attributes of the 
political system with orientations of individual citizens."I09 However, such difficulty 
also means that many competing definitions of legitimacy have been put forward to 
explain the concept. Holmes traces the origins of legitimacy back to Greek political 
thought on the grounds that "Plato and Aristotle were concerned inter alia with 
obligation, obedience and authority and thus with many of the issues that relate to a 
modem analysis oflegitimacy."lIo However, it is the German social scientist, Max 
Weber, who is widely credited with developing the actual concept of legitimacy to 
deploy in analyses of the modem political system. As Zheng and Lye note, "Max 
Weber's formulation of legitimacy has been a dominant thread in the literature on this 
topiC."lll Weber's conception oflegitimacy was derived from his conception of 
power as being relational i.e. actors did not possess power per se but rather their 
power stemmed from others' belief in that actor's rightfulness to exercise power. 
Consequently, for Weber, legitimacy rested upon this notion of belief, so that ''the 
basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness 
107 Beetbam (1991: 181). 
108 White (2005: 1). 
109 Weatherford (1992: 150). 
110 The term "legitimacy" is actually derived from the Latin term legitimus, meaning "lawful" or 
"legal". However, as Holmes points out, "most contemporary conceptions oflegality and legitimacy 
treat them as discrete concepts." See Holmes (1993: 10-11). 
111 Zheng and Lye (2005: 187). For examples of those employing a Wehman approach to legitimacy 
see Apter (1965), Barker (1991), Bendix (1978), Fish (2001) and Lipset (1981), ' 
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to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent 
prestige.,,1l2 Moreover, the effect of this belief in the legitimacy of the ruler(s) is to 
convert the exercise of power into that of authority. For Blau, these two concepts can 
be distinguished by virtue of the fact that "people, a priori, suspend their own 
judgement and accept that of an acknowledged superior without having to be 
convinced that his is correct.,,113 For Habermas, such authority is demonstrated when 
a political decision can be made "independently of the concrete use of force and of the 
manifest threat of sanctions and can be regularly implemented even against the 
interests of those affected." I 14 In effect, authority means that obedience is derived 
from the legitimacy of those who issue orders rather than from the actual orders 
themselves. I 15 
However, though infllJ,ential, Weber's formulation has been subject to numerous 
criticisms. These criticisms can be grouped into three categories: the notion of belief; 
incompleteness; and non-universality.116 In terms of belief, Schaar contends that 
Weber's definition conflates "legitimacy into belief or opinion ... [i]fpeople hold the 
belief that existing institutions are "appropriate" or "morally proper", then those 
institutions are legitimate. That's all there is to it.,,1l7 However, Schaar's charge that 
Weber conflates legitimacy with belief appears to overlook the fact that, within 
Weber's formulation, legitimacy is acquired through the process of legitimation from 
particular sources. 1 18 The relationship between these sources and the concept of 
Il2 Weber (1964: 382). 
113 Cited in Teiwes, (1984: 43). 
114 Habennas (1988: 201). 
115 Weber (1964: 324-325). 
116 Alagappa (1995: 12-14). 
117 Schaar (1981: 19-25). 
118 Weber cites the "ideal" types oflegal-rational, traditional, and charismatic. These will be examined 
in greater detail in the following section in this chapter. 
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legitimacy is the Lebenswelt notion of belief. Moreover, given that belief in 
legitimacy is the product ofthe dialectically-related sources, Weber's fonnulation 
avoids the charge of conflation directed at it by Schaar. With regard to incompleteness, 
Beetham criticises Weber on the grounds that his fonnulation does not allow space for 
the concept of legality or consent of the governed to be considered alongside to notion 
of belief. 1 19 However, I would argue that Beetham's criticism is misguided, in that 
neither the concept of legality nor the consent of the governed is independent of belief. 
Laws may possess fonnal recognition and a level of enforceability beyond that of 
belief, but, as Alagappa points out, its "authority derives from the beliefs that 
underscore the political order.,,120 As for consent of the governed, though not 
explicitly stated, Weber's fonnulation includes this concept within his recognition 
that power is relational and in need of justification. The final criticism of Weber 
concerns the non-universal applicability of his definition, in that Weber's focus on the 
notion of belief deprives the concept of legitimacy of any moral and evaluative 
force. 121 However, such criticism is emblematic of those who prefer to apply a more 
philosophical and nonnative definition of legitimacy rather than deploying a social 
scientific conceptualisation of legitimacy and, as such, constitutes an ontological 
difference rather than highlighting a theoretical inconsistency within Weber's 
fonnulation. 
Rejection of these criticisms does not equate to full acceptance of Weber's 
fonnulation. Rather, as Alagappa points out, "Weber's work on legitimacy, while 
useful, should be considered as a starting point that demands explication and 
119 Beetham (1991: 11-13). 
120 E x a m p l e ~ ~ of the b e ~ i e f funderpinning .legal s t a ~ ~ include b ~ l i e f f in the f a i r n e ~ s s of the legal system as 
well as a hehef that failure to comply With a particular law Will result in a specific punishment. See 
Alagappa (1995: 14). 
m Ibid., p.IS. 
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considerable development to make the concept analytically relevant.,,122 While 
accepting that legitimacy, in short, concerns the right to rule123 and that the notion of 
belief constitutes the basis oflegitimacy, Weber's definition fails to clearly specify 
who or what is being legitimated, by whom this legitimacy is conferred, and how 
much legitimacy is operating within the political system. A fuller definition is 
provided by Rigby, who states that legitimacy refers to "[t]he expectation of political 
authorities that people will comply with their demands ... not only [because of] such 
considerations as the latter's fear of punishment, hope of reward, habit or apathy, but 
also on the notion that they have the right to make such demands. This notion both 
inheres explicitly and implicitly, in the claims of authorities, and is reciprocated, to a 
greater or lesser extent, in the minds of those [from] whom compliance is 
demanded.,,124 Thus, in Rigby's definition, the focus oflegitimation is identified in 
the form of the "political authorities" and this power is legitimated, and so made 
distinct from that of coercive power, by the ''people''. Furthermore, Rigby's definition 
allows for the possibility that not all members of the people will accept the exercise of 
legitimate power as equally legitimate. However, while Rigby's defmition represents 
an advance on that offered by Weber's, it is still necessary to further interrogate the 
terms deployed in his definition so as to more fully understand the concept of 
legitimacy. 
System and Regime Legitimacy 
In Rigby's definition, legitimacy is seen as existing between the "political authorities" 
and the "people". However, for Holmes, "[t]he notion that citizens either believe or do 
not believe that rulers have a right to rule begins to look too simple: we have to 
122 Alagappa (1995: 340 n. 6). 
Il3 Holmes (1993: 39). 
124 Rigby (1982: 1). 
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distinguish between 'system legitimacy' and 'regime legitimacy' .,,125 In this, "system 
legitimacy" refers to the legitimacy of the political system while "regime legitimacy" 
refers to that of the government/position. The distinction between these two fonns can 
be made on the grounds that legitimate authority is derived from the belief in the 
legitimacy of the system whereas legitimacy of the government/position is dependent 
on the exercise of that authority within the system.126 Furthennore, applying this 
analytical distinction, it is possible for a government to suffer from a lack of 
legitimacy while the legitimacy of the system remains intact. Yet, if the system is 
delegitimated, then the legitimacy of the government/position will suffer a 
corresponding withdrawal oflegitimacy. 
However, the extent to which this distinction can be made depends on the extent to 
which power has been institutionalised.127 While such a distinction can be clearly 
made within democr:atic political systems, communist political systems, as a result of 
constructing a "party-state", have tended to blur the distinction between these two 
types of legitimacy, so that the legitimacy of the system becomes entwined with that 
ofthe government. With regard to the exercise of power in the People's Republic of 
China (PRC), there has been a move towards the partial institutionalisation of power 
in recent years. This was most clearly evidenced in the transfer of power from the 
''third generation" ofleaders, headed by Jiang Zemin as party secretary, to that ofHu 
Jintao and the "fourth generation" of leaders that took place at 16th Party Congress in 
125 Holmes (1993: 25). 
126 As Teiwes notes, "[l]egitimacy of position .. .is a prerequisite to authority but does not guarantee it." 
See Teiwes (1984: 44). 
127 Huntington defines institutionalisation as the point at which a particular aspect of a political system 
assumes the qualities of "adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence." Furthermore. the effect 
of such institutionalisation on a particular government is to make it "effective, authoritative [and] 
legitimate." Power that has not been institutionalised can be referred to as irregular arbitrary and 
personalised. See Huntington (1982: 2-12). ' 
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2002. In addition, following the recent 17th Party Congress in October 2007, a further 
orderly transfer of power appears to have been put in place for 2012. Commenting on 
this, Nathan notes that, "few authoritarian regimes - be they communist, fascist, 
corporatist, personalist - have managed to conduct orderly, peaceful, timely, and 
stable successions.,,128 Moreover, alongside the transfer of power, Hu's authority, in 
contrast to of his predecessors, is derived, in large part, from his status as party leader 
i.e. from his position rather than his person.129 As a consequence, the exercise of 
power within the Party as whole is now less personalised and more regularised, with 
rules and procedures increasingly governing its exercise. 130 In addition to rules of 
succession and political decision-making, other examples of institutionalisation within 
the CCP can be seen in the introduction of elements of the rule of law, the increasing 
differentiation and specialisation of government agencies as well as the 
''professionalisation'' of the political elites. l3l However, though there are signs of 
institutionalisation, Nathan cautions that, "to be sure, the Chinese regime is still a 
party-state, in which the Party penetrates all other institutions and makes policy for all 
realms of action. And it is still a centralized, unitary system in which power at lower 
levels derives from grants by the center.,,132 Consequently, it is still possible to state 
III Nathan (2003: 7). 
Il9 Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and, to a lesser extent, Jiang Zemin, were able to exercise power 
based on their revolutionary status. Indeed, given that Deng Xiaoping held no fonnal political positions 
in the 1980s, his power can be classed as entirely personal. 
130 Miller cites the increased consensus over decision made in the Politburo in recent years as evidence 
oftbis. That said, it is important to stress that this is relative to earlier periods when the reliance on 
personal authority was much greater. Moreover, though there is a greater emphasis on rules and 
procedures, this does not preclude the exercise of personal power within such limits. See Miller 
(Summer 2004). 
131 In his analysis of Party appointments, Walder found that the increasing trend in the period of reform 
and opening up has been to select candidates on the basis of education level and marks a change from 
the emphasis on people's "political" integrity in the earlier periods of the PRe. For more detail, see 
Walder (2006). 
132 Nathan (2003: 13). 
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that, in the People's Republic of China, the legitimacy of the political system and that 
of the Chinese government can not be clearly distinguished. 133 
Tripartite Legitimacy 
Having established that legitimacy can be analytically bifurcated into system 
legitimacy and regime legitimacy, it is now necessary to examine the society in which 
legitimacy is conferred. Up to this point, "the right to rule" has been presented as an 
exchange between rulers and the ruled. However, Weber's view of society conceived 
of three main strategic groups: "chiefs", "staffs" and "masses" .134 The "chiefs" 
referred to the political leaders or "rulers", the "staffs" referred to the bureaucracy 
responsible for implementing and enforcing the laws and policies of the "chiefs" 
while the "masses" referred to the public at large. In this thesis, the term, "elites" is 
preferred to that of "chiefs" and, applying Walder's definition of this group, refers to 
all cadres "at the rank of country magistrate or division chief and above.,,13S The term 
"cadres" is preferred to that of "staffs" and refers to those in the national bureaucracy 
below the level of county magistrate and division chief.136 As for the term, "masses", 
it will be retained on account of the fact that is still the term most frequently 
employed in public discourse when referring to the general public. However, it should 
be pointed out that these groups constitute analytical distinctions and, though each 
group has a material basis, the boundaries between them are not, as such, fixed. For 
133 The separation of the Party and the State (dang zhengfankaO was proposed in Zhao Ziyang's Work 
Report at the 13th Party Congress in 1987 as part of a wider package of political refonns; however the 
demonstrations and resultant suppression in 1989 occurred before such refonns were realised and they 
have been remained un-implemented ever since. 
134 In his earlier study on legitimacy in the People's Republic of China, Teiwes conceptualised society 
in terms of "leader", CCP elite" and ''the public". Teiwes (1984: 44-5). 
135 Using data from 1998, Walder calculates that this group number around 500,000 in size, with 900 
~ g g up ~ e e central apparatus, 2,500 being at the rank of minister or provincial governor, 39,000 
bemg compnsed of prefecture and bureau leaders and the remaining 466,000 holding positions at the 
CO\D1ty level. See Walder (2006: 19). 
136 Walder estimates that this group to consist of 40 million cadres. See Walder (2006: 19). 
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example, party members can belong to any of these three groups while non-party 
members can usually only belong to those of the "cadres" and the "masses" .137 
Moreover, within each of these broad categories, further sub-groups can be 
distinguished. 138 However, for the purpose of this thesis, the identification of these 
three strategic groups is sufficient to allow for heuristic analysis. 
For Weber, the relationships between each of these groups could be ordered 
hierarchically in terms of legitimacy. Consequently, Weber identifies three separate 
but interdependent relationships: elites-cadres; elites-masses; and cadres-masses. Of 
these, the relationship between the elites and cadres was viewed as the most important 
on the grounds that, even if there was a withdrawal oflegitimacy from the masses, 
elites would still continue to exercise legitimate authority if they retained the support 
of the cadres. Supporting this view, Alagappa states that, in the context of non-
democratic political systems, "[ c ]onsent of the administrative staff and strategic 
groups is critical for the legitimation of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes.,,139 In 
relation to China, Walder states that "[t]he political elite of 500,000 cannot rule the 
country unless it can retain the obedience of 40 million state cadres ... and if the elite 
maintains the discipline of state bureaucrats and the allegiance of party members, it 
can withstand challenges from other groups in society, even in periods of economic 
137 Walder states that approximately 8% of the population are CCP members (approximately 70 
million). Of these, 25% are cadres, either "elites" or "cadres", while the remaining 75% are part of the 
"masses". However, of the "elites" group, 95% are Party members while, in the "cadres" group, 
approximately 38% are Party members, leaving Walder to conclude that, "appointments into the elite 
are made almost exclusively from among those ordinary cadres who have already joined the party." 
See Walder (2006: 20). 
138 One sub-group that has received much attention is the military. However, while this sub-group plays 
an influential role in Chinese politics, I follow Ii's point that "[t]he military can sustain the CCP 
leadership but not the legitimacy upon which the Party's ultimate fate is decided." Indeed, the events in 
1989 provided a clear example of this, in that it was the military that maintained the CCP's hold on 
power in the short-term; however, it has been the Party's recovery of its legitimacy since then that has 
enabled it to hold onto power in the medium term. See Ii (2006: 59-60). 
139 Alagappa (1995: 24). 
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hardship and social upheaval.,,140 Following on from this, Holmes defines the 
withdrawal of legitimacy by the masses as constituting only a "severe legitimacy 
deficit" as long as "[o]fficial ideologists . .. do have new ideas for legitimation and a 
belief in what they are doing". 141 Consequently, for Holmes, a legitimation crisis only 
occurs when ''those who would normally be expected to attempt to legitimate the 
order are no longer able and/or willing to do SO.,,142 
The final relationship in Weber's hierarchy is that between cadres and the masses. 
Indeed, for White, it is important to distinguish this relationship, as "[m]any writers 
conflate trust in nationalleaderships with trust in local officials.,,143 This is not to say 
that a lack of trust in local officials cannot also affect peoples' perceptions of national 
leaders but that, generally, the cadres-public relationship should be treated as 
analytically distinct from that of elites-public. Moreover, as Wang's survey results as 
well as others have highlighted, it is possible for the masses to negatively view cadres 
while, at the same time, positively viewing the elites. Indeed, it seems plausible to 
suggest that the distinction which has been made between the central and local levels 
in China has acted as an effective replacement, in the short-term at least, for the lack 
of separation between system and regime legitimacy. 
140 Walder (2006: 21). Indeed, on his "southern tour" in 1992, Deng Xiaoping stated that, "[i]fChina is 
to have real problems, they will have to come from within the CCP .... The key is to do a good job 
maintaining the internal cohesion of our communist party. As long as no problems emerge from within, 
we can all lie down asleep reassured". Cited in Gore (2000). 
141 Holmes (1993: 23). 
142 Ibid., p.23. Applying these definitions to China, the demonstrations that took place in 1989, with 
over one million protestors and lasting roughly two months, would only constitute a severe legitimacy 
deficit on the grounds that, while the public (or certain groups within the public) withdrew their 
legitimacy, those who legitimate the regime held firm enough to bring the protests under control and so 
avoid a possible legitimation crisis. Indeed, despite the disquiet over the course of action taken to end 
the protests both at the elite as well as the cadre level, in the end, the belief in the legitimacy claims of 
the elites was sufficient to mobilise approximately 150,000 to 200,000 army troops to suppress the 
demonstrations and restore the rule of the Party. 
143 White (2005: 14). 
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However, within Weber's schema, an additional strategic relationship was left 
unidentified: the "intra-elites". Alagappa points out that, "[fJrom the ruler's viewpoint, 
legitimacy is not just a stratagem to secure more effective control or perpetuate 
themselves in office. Self-justification in moral terms is crucial for most rulers. They 
need to believe they are serving the national interest or a moral cause even if it 
necessitates a "noble lie".,,144 Moreover, in his analysis of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Holmes identifies the leadership's loss of belief in itself as one of the main 
factors, specifically the moment when the United States' announced its Strategic 
Defence Initiative. According to Holmes, the USSR was not capable, either 
technologically or financially, to match such a programme and "[a]s this fact became 
obvious to Gorbachev and other leaders, so they came to accept that they had now lost 
the decades-long competition with capitalism.,,}45 In relation to China, the importance 
of "intra-elites" legitimacy was most clearly demonstrated during the protests in 1989, 
as the top leaders disagreed over how to respond. Moreover, the post-Tiananmen 
appearance of unity and consensus, if not its actuality, indicates that the Party 
leadership has recognised the importance of this relationship. 146 Indeed, Teiwes 
contends that the leaders have learned ''the Tiananmen lesson of how leadership 
instability could contribute to a regime crisis. ,,147 This is because the appearance of 
perceived disunity at the elite leadership level can work to create uncertainty amongst 
the other groups in society over the political and economic direction of the country 
and, in so doing, allow for competing political viewpoints to be put forward, around 
144 Alagappa (1995: 4). 
14' Holmes (1993: 30), 
146 Though there has been outward appearance of consensus amongst the leadership, it is widely 
acknowledged that different factions still remain within the leadership. Indeed, Li characterises China's 
political system as "one party, two factions", in which the power of the "Communist Youth League" 
faction (tuanpal), headed by Hu Jintao, is offset by that of the "Princelings" faction, headed by Zeng 
Qinghong. For Li, these factions can be distinguished along socio-political and geographical lines as 
well as policy initiatives, with the former being more ''populist'' and the latter being more "elitist". See 
Li (6 December 2006). 
141 Teiwes (2000: 75). 
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which people can mobilise. 148 Conversely, the appearance of leadership unity creates 
a degree of certainty over the political direction of the state and so, can work enhance 
the legitimacy of the regime. Indeed, Zhao claims that the post-Tiananmen leadership 
consensus has had this effect: "after the 1989 repression, the government actually 
gained 'trust' among the Chinese people ... during the 1 980s, a major worry among the 
Chinese was whether the state policy was going to turn back to what it was during 
Mao's era. The fact that even after the military repression the state still maintained the 
reform policy convinced many Chinese that the reform was the only way out for the 
state.,,149 
Returning to Weber's adapted hierarchical schema of societal relationships, this thesis 
holds that access to power constitutes the most important criterion in determining the 
order of this hierarchy. On that basis, the intra-elites relationship is considered to be 
most important in terms of maintaining legitimacy. Following this, the elites-cadres 
relationship is considered next in importance, followed by the elites-public 
relationship and, finally, the cadres-public relationship. That said, this hierarchical 
order is not necessarily fixed but rather is contingent upon the particular context in 
which action takes place. Indeed, an example of when the order of this hierarchy was 
not determinative occurred with Deng Xiaoping's "southern tour" (nanxun) in 1992. 
In this, Deng used this "tour" of southern provinces to gain support from lower level 
cadres and members of the masses for his economic reforms in order to overcome 
opposition from members within the leadership elite. More recently, Hu Jintao's 
approach to governance, from the sacking of Beijing's mayor and the Health Minister 
in response to the initial cover-up of the SARS outbreak through to the promotion of 
148 Shirk points out that, "[l]eadersbip splits telegraphed to the pUblic .. .in other authoritarian regimes 
have triggered revolutionary upheavals." (Shirk 2007: 48). 
149 Zhao (2001: 434). 
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the "three people's principles" and the "building of a socialist harmonious society", 
has been characterised as "populist", 1 so which, even allowing for the relativity of the 
term and the perpetuation of factional politics, suggests that the order within the 
hierarchy can shift over time. 
Measuring Legitimacy 
Having outlined the different aspects oflegitimacy, it is now necessary to address the 
question of how to measure legitimacy.lSl As Chen has noted, "[s]tipulating a 
defmition of regime legitimacy is easy; operationalizing and testing a definition is 
much more difficult."ls2 The most straightforward test that can be applied in 
determining the legitimacy ofa regime is what Holmes refers to as "Meyer's ultimate 
test of legitimacy".lS3 This test simply holds that it is only possible to discern if an 
authoritarian regime is illegitimate (or close to it) when it is has collapsed (or appears 
in overt danger of collapse). Conversely, this proof also holds that if a regime or state 
does not appear to be in imminent danger of collapse, then it must be legitimate. 
Although this test may be problematic from a moral perspective, it is directly 
informed by Weber's defmition of legitimacy, which, in claiming that the legitimacy 
of a regime is the result of people's belie/in its legitimacy, views people's actions as 
a direct reflection of these beliefs. However, this also gives rise to a contradiction at 
the heart of Weber's definition, in that legitimacy is regarded as people's positive 
150 Li (6 December 2006). However, it should be noted that some analysts interpreted the sacking of the 
Mayor and the health minister as being as much about politics as populism in that, in tenns of factions, 
one was considered to be from the Tuanpai faction and the other from the "Princelings" faction. 
151 .Indeed, this issue has recently been addressed by Schubert in an attempt to overcome what he sees 
as the lack of research being camed out the legitimacy of the CCP. While I welcome this attempt to 
initiate a dialogue on this under-developed but extremely important subject, and though I share many 
of the perspectives that Schubert puts forward in relation to the regime's legitimacy, I feel that his 
emphasis in adopting a ''micro-political'' approach neglects important theoretical considerations which 
in effect, work to undermine the validity of any such claims that such an might achieve. For more, see ' 
. Schubert (2008). 
152 Chen (2005: 4). 
153 Holmes (1993: 29). 
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acceptance of power yet can only be empirically demonstrated in instances where 
such power is rejected as illegitimate. As Grafstein points out, "[ i]n the end, Weber 
virtually identifies legitimacy with stable and effective political power, reducing it to 
a routine submission to authority.,,154 Although problematic, this does not make the 
Weber's definition of legitimacy redundant but rather constitutes the starting point 
from which to measure legitimacy. I 55 
For a number of social scientists, the measurement oflegitimacy can be successfully 
achieved through the use of surveys that record citizens' responses to questions about 
a particular regime. The most comprehensive approach to this quantitative 
measurement of legitimacy has come from Easton, who devised a theoretical 
framework with which to measure "supportive attitudes". According to Easton, 
supportive attitudes can be defined when "[w]e can say that A supports B either when 
A acts on behalf of B or when he orients himself favorably toward B. B may be a 
person or a group; it may be a goal, idea, or institution." 156 For Easton, supportive 
attitudes equate to political support on behalf of the public and are directed towards 
three groups - the regime, the authorities and the political community, with the 
regime being the most important.1S7 Furthermore, political support can be broken 
down into two components, namely "diffuse support" and "specific support". Easton 
regarded diffuse support as equivalent to belief in legitimacy, as it constitutes a 
person's belief that the existence and actions of the government were in accordance 
154 Grafstein (1981: 456). Indeed, this is somewhat ironic, as Weber's intention in conceptualising 
legitimacy in this way was partly to overcome the problem of Verstehen-interpreting other cultures 
using the values of one's own c u l ~ a n d , , in so doing, allow for legitimacy to be empirically tested. 
155 Weber's conflation of stability with legitimacy is problematic only in so much as, while a legitimate 
te1!me is also stable, a stable regime is not necessarily legitimate. 
15 Easton (1965: 159). 
157 Cben (2004: 3). 
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with their ethical and moral principles regarding the political. l58 As such, diffuse 
support is built over a long time period through exposure to continuous socialisations 
as well as repeated judgements on a government's performance. For Easton, once 
diffuse support has formed, it tends to hold firm and remain stable, and is subject only 
to gradual change. In contrast, specific support refers to a person's satisfaction with 
the policies and performance of the government and, as such, is both short-term and 
prone to volatility, usually in response to the perceived benefits and costs of specific 
policies. Hence, Easton's composite concept of political support consisted of both 
belief and opinion, albeit with diffuse support being held as the more dominant 
variable. Commenting on the relationship between these two types of support, Chen 
states that, "although the two dimensions are not totally independent of one another, 
the relationship between them is weak or moderate. And change in one dimension 
should not translate into a one-to-one change in the other.,,159 
However, though Easton's approach represents a sophisticated attempt to 
operationalise and measure the legitimacy of a regime, it appears to be problematic on 
both a theoretical and a practical level. With regards to its theoretical framework, the 
relationship between diffuse support and specific support is problematic, in that the 
temporal aspect of the relationship is not clearly conceptualised nor explicitly 
acknowledged. Indeed, while Easton holds that diffuse support builds over a longer 
period of time than specific support, he does not make clear when or, indeed, how 
specific support could be ~ s f o r m e d d into diffuse support. As a consequence, this 
theoretical weakness causes difficulties in empirically measuring and distinguishing 
ISS Easton (1965: 278). 
1'9 Chen (2004: 5). Moreover, Chen used Easton's approach when conducting a longitudinal survey of 
political support in Beijing from 1995 to 1999. 
so 
between these two types of support. 160 Moreover, it raises the question of whether the 
analytical distinction between the two variables can actually be tested at the empirical 
level. Further problems with Easton's approach have occurred when it has been used 
to measure political support in China, in that political support has only been measured 
in terms of the relationship between the political authorities and the people. As a 
consequence, no consideration has been given to the intra-elites or elites-cadres 
relationship that also make up the legitimacy of a political regime. 
An additional problem, albeit one not solely confined to Easton's approach, concerns 
the generalisability of survey data. 161 Spatio-temporality considerations 
notwithstanding, this is an issue that is more important in the context of China, both 
because of its size and its political environment. For surveys being conducted in 
China, complete enumeration is effectively unobtainable, thus the use of samples is 
necessary. Moreover, from the evidence of previous surveys that have been conducted 
in China, these samples have tended to concentrate on a particular group (urban/rural) 
anellor a particular area (EastiSouthlWestINorth).162 For example, in Chen's 
longitudinal survey from 1995 to 1999 on popular political support in urban areas, the 
survey was restricted to Beijing,163 for which only 700 respondents were sampled in 
the first, survey while 720 respondents were selected for the following surveys in 1997 
and 1999.164 Furthermore, due to the high mobility of residents in Beijing, Chen did 
not survey the same respondents on each occasion but rather asked the same questions 
160 Chen (2002: p. 2 note 4). Other attempts to measure political support or political trust or some 
variant of all seem to run up against a similar difficulty of empirically distinguishing between belief 
and opinion. 
161 For more on this issue in relation to China, see Manion (1994). 
162 This point is also made by Friedman, who states that "public opinion polls that try to characterize 
Chinese opinion ... tend to ignore regional diversity and privilege Beijing but omit its recent 
immigrants." See Friedman (2002: 19). 
163 I have focused specifically on Chen's research as it constitutes the most substantive quantitative 
research solely concerned with measuring the legitimacy of the CCP. 
164 The response rates for the three surveys ranged from 93 percent to 96 percent. See (Chen 2004: 16). 
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to different residents. Consequently, this makes it difficult to support Chen's 
conclusion that the legitimacy of the regime is high but gradually declining. Moreover, 
though the use of multi-stage sampling seemed to ensure the representativeness of 
different categories within the sample group, the small sample size means that it is 
only possible to regard the data for Chen's survey as partial, at best, and not, as he 
claims, revealing of the state of popular political support in the urban areas throughout 
China. That said, such criticisms are not intended to dismiss entirely the validity of 
Chen's work or, indeed, other such approaches to the measurement oflegitimacy but 
rather attempt to make clear the limitations of relying only on quantitative data in 
assessing the legitimacy of a regime. 
The difficulties in empirically measuring legitimacy, therefore, suggest that it is 
necessary to use both quantitative and qualitative methods to assess the legitimacy of 
a regime. 165 However, given that the focus of this thesis is not on whether the CCP is 
legitimate but on how it has attempted to legitimate its authority in the post-
Tiananmen period, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to assess the current state of 
the CCP legitimacy. Rather, the arguments put forward in the preceding pages hold 
open the possibility that, in spite of the protests and problems that confront the 
Chinese government, members of Chinese society may still view the authority of the 
CCP as legitimate. More importantly, however, these arguments are intended to make 
clear the definition of legitimacy that will be applied in this thesis and, in so doing, 
allow for the claims of legitimation to be more fully understood. Consequently, a 
number of conditions that make up the concept of legitimacy will now be specified: 
165 Although this introduces a subjective component into the definition oflegitimacy it does not render 
it a moral concept. ' 
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(1) In this thesis, legitimacy is understood as "the belief in the rightfulness of a state, 
in its authority to issue commands, so that the commands are obeyed not simply out of 
fear or self-interest, but because they are believed to have moral authority, because 
subjects believe that they ought to obey.,,166 In short, political legitimacy can be 
regarded as converting power into authority. 
(2) Legitimacy is not natural but must be created by the incumbent regime. 
Furthermore, it is considered a desirable goal for all regimes, not only as an end in 
itself but also because the existence of legitimacy lowers the social, economic and 
political costs of governance. 167 
(3) Legitimacy is considered to be a dynamic concept and, as such, can fluctuate both 
positively and negatively over time. 
(4) The concept of legitimacy is held to be partial, rather than total, so that at no time, 
are all legitimacy claims accepted by all people. Rather, different groups believe 
different claims at different times and to differing degrees. 168 
(5) It is possible for coercion and legitimacy to operate in the same political system. A 
higher level of legitimacy corresponds to a lower level of coercion while a lower level 
of legitimacy corresponds to a higher level of coercion. 
166 Barker (1990: 11). 
167 Zheng and Lye (2005: 186). 
168 Gries and Rosen (2004: 9). 
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(6) Legitimacy can be distinguished between that of system legitimacy and regime 
legitimacy. However, the degree to which the distinction can be made depends on the 
extent to which power has been institutionalised. 
(7) Society is divided into three main groups and the relationships between these 
groups are ranked in importance of legitimating a particular regime. The intra-elites 
relationship is held to be the most important, followed by the elites-cadres 
relationship, the elites-public relationship and, finally, the cadres-public relationship. 
(8) Legitimacy crises can be ranked in order of seriousness. A severe legitimacy 
deficit is the least serious type of crisis and takes place when the public (or significant 
groups within the public) withdraw their support for the regime, expressed through 
acts of non-compliance and/or protesting, while the elites and cadres still believe in 
their right to rule. In this, it is still possible for a regime to recover from a severe 
legitimacy deficit to (re) gain a high level of legitimacy. A legitimation crisis occurs 
when the elite leadership no longer believes in its right to rule. In this situation, a 
system collapse represents only one of the possible outcomes. However, at the very 
minimum, a change in the leadership of the regime is required in order for legitimacy 
to be restored. The most severe type of crisis is that of illegitimacy, which indicates 
that the political system has collapsed and, as such, is a fmal and irreversible state. 
S4 
The Concept of Legitimation 
Having established the definition of legitimacy to applied in this thesis, . it is now 
necessary to focus on the question of how the CCP has obtained its legitimacy during 
this time. Indeed, as Nathan points out, "[o]ne of the puzzles of the post-Tiananmen 
period has been the regime's apparent ability to rehabilitate its legitimacy ... from the 
low point of 1989, when vast, nationwide prodemocracy demonstrations revealed the 
disaffection of a large segment of the urban population.,,169 In order to do this, this 
thesis will make use of the concept of legitimation. For Holmes, legitimation can be 
simply understood as "the process whereby legitimacy is acquired", 170 while 
Alagappa provides a more expansive definition, stating that it is "an interactive 
and ... dynamic process among the government, the elite groups, and the politically 
significant public: those in power seek to legitimate their control and exercise their 
power; the subjects seek to define their subordination in acceptable terms."l7l 
The main approach towards legitimation, and the one that has been used most 
frequently in explaining how the CCP has legitimated its authority, is Weber's 
"modes" of legitimation. 172 In this, Weber identifies three modes of legitimation from 
which regimes derive their authority: legal-rational; charismatic; and traditional. 
Moreover, Weber views these modes as "ideal types", in that "their one-sided 
accentuation of certain varied aspects of social reality is necessary to describe a 
complex phenomenon, even if reality never quite corresponds to the resulting 
169 Nathan (2003: 7). 
170 Holmes (1993: 39). 
171 Alagappa(199S: 13-14). 
172 For examples oftbis approach being e x p l i ~ i t l y y employed .in analyses of the CCP, see Teiwes (1984), 
Zheng (2003), Weatherley (2006). However, It should be pomtcd out that many more use Weber's 
approach implicitly on account oftbe fact that it has become the "standard" framework in which to 
analyse political legitimacy. For examples of work that attempts to develop a distinctively Chinese 
approach to Weber's notion oflegitimacy, see Guo (2003), Tian (2003). 
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construct.,,173 The first mode oflegitimation, legal-rational, is, according to Weber, 
derived from a "belief in the "legality" of patterns of normative rules and the right of 
those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands.,,174 Moreover, this 
"belief' rests on the establishment by a regime of clear rules and procedures whose 
implementation is transparent and accountable. From this, Weatherley notes that a 
regime which bases its authority of legal-rational norms "must adhere closely to these 
procedures.,,175 The charismatic mode of legitimation could be contrasted with that of 
the legal-rational mode, in that while the latter was concerned with institutional power, 
the former focused on the legitimating effect of personal power. For Weber, the 
notion of charisma "applied to a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue 
of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, 
superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.,,176 Moreover, it 
is on the basis of this charisma that people would obey the orders of a particular 
leader. That said, Weber also viewed this mode of legitimation as the most unstable 
form of power, which was only likely to emerge during periods of crisis before being 
"routinised" in its aftermath.177 The final mode of legitimation identified by Weber 
was that of tradition and this was viewed as mixing elements of the first two modes. 
According to Weber, this mode of legitimation could be understood as "an established 
belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising 
authority under them.,,178 Although this mode was derived from pre-democratic forms 
of governance, such as the "divine right of monarchs", Weathedey notes that it also 
refers to the "contemporary application of methods of governing or political ideas that 
173 Orafstein (1981: 458). 
174 Weber (1964: 328). 
175 Weatberley (2006: 6). 
176 Weber (1964: 358). 
177 Weatberley (2006: 7). 
171 Weber (1964: 328). 
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stretch back through the ages and which are familiar to the populace." I 79 In this, a 
leader will be considered legitimate and their orders will be obeyed if he/she acts 
within the limits of traditional conventions. 
However, though Weber analytically distinguishes these three ideal types, he was, as 
Holmes notes, "fully aware that all three 'pure' types overlap both conceptually and in 
the practice of 'the real world' .,,180 Consequently, it is possible for a leader to 
simultar\eously make use of charisma and tradition in legitimating his/her authority. 
Similarly, nonns and procedures that are based on legal-rational authority can, over 
time, also derive their force from tradition. Moreover, in contemporary applications of 
Weber's approach, analysts have sought to employ additional modes of legitimation. 
In relation to the People's Republic of China, Weatherley notes that an ideological 
mode of legitimation has been viewed as "crucial to any understar\ding of CCP 
legitimacy.,,181 Indeed, the initial rule, at least, of the CCP was based on its exclusive 
role in interpreting the "scientific" Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which identified the 
conditions necessary to progress towards a communist future. Moreover, to challenge 
the Party's interpretation of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine was effectively to question 
the legitimacy of the CCP itself. More recently, the decline of the communist 
ideology in the refonn and opening up period has led analysts to identify a 
"eudaemonic" mode ~ f f legitimation on the grounds that the authority of the CCP is 
now being legitimated on its perfonnance, particularly in relation to delivering 
economic growth.182 
179 Weatberley (2006: 8). 
180 Holmes (1993: 14). 
181 Weatberley (2006: 10). 
182 For an example oftbis, see Chen (1997). 
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Although Weber's concept of legitimation is useful in describing how a regime 
maintains authority, it is necessarily limited in explaining why a regime maintains its 
authority on account of the fact that no space is given to addressing the question of 
why people believe in the identified modes oflegitimation. Rather, Weber's 
conceptualisation seems to suggest that regimes which act in accordance with norms 
and rules that it has established, either directly, through tradition or by a charismatic 
leader, will continue to be legitimate. As such, this conceptualisation is overly 
structuralist and, though the inclusion of the Lebenswelt concepts of belief, meaning 
and intention suggest a role for agency, Weber effectively reduces it to that of 
material circumstances.183 Moreover, while this approach can describe a politically 
stable situation, it is unable to conceptualise political change. As a consequence, those 
works that adopt a Weberian approach in explaining the legitimation of a regime tend 
to produce, what Shue regards as, "[flunctionalist analyses ... [which] grossly misread 
the complexity of the lived world of belief most beings encounter". 184 However, this 
does not mean that Weber's approach to legitimation is not useful; rather, it is 
necessary to reconceptualise this concept so as to allow for a fuller explanation of 
why people believe what they believe and, in so doing, explain why a regime, 
specifically in this instance the CCP, maintains its authority. As a consequence, this 
thesis intends to situate the Weber's conceptualisation of legitimation within the 
strategic-relational approach 
183 Orafstein (1981: 457). 
184 Shue (2004: 42). 
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The Strategic-Relational ApproachI85 
The strategic-relational approach is concerned with explaining social and political 
change and draws on Bhaskar's critical realism to develop an understanding of causal 
mechanisms within the social and political world. 186 The effect of the critical realist 
ontology is evidenced in the strategic-relational framework's distinctive 
understanding of structure and agency, in that it attempts to transcend the dualism 
present in Weber's approach by focusing on the relationship between the two 
concepts. I87 Implicit within this is the notion that structure and agency are recursively 
related and so, influence each other. Furthermore, this approach holds that these 
concepts are merely analytical on the grounds that "neither agents nor structures are 
real, since neither has an existence in isolation from each other.,,188 In addition to 
being relational, structure and agency are also held to be dialectical, in that the 
product resulting from the interaction of structural and agential factors is distinct and 
so irreducible to the sum of these factors. 189 
18S Although the strategic-relational approach is principally associated with Jessop, it has also been 
developed by Hay. Moreover, it was Hay who introduced the concept of "discursive selectivity" into 
this approach and, as this concept is central to my reconceptualisation oflegitimation, I will principally 
draw on Hay's version of the strategic-relational approach. 
186 As such, this ontological position holds that the world exists independently of our knowledge of it 
and that social phenomena be accorded causal powers. However, the realist ontology also attributes 
causal powers to generative mechanisms that are not directly observable and which researchers may 
not be able to empirically prove are causally efficacious. Furthennore, realists contend that there can be 
a difference between appearance and reality, so that though a real world exists, outcomes within it can 
also be affected by the way in which this world is socially constructed. For further detail, see Bhaskar 
(1989), Hay (2002), Marsh and Furlong (2002: 30-31) and Jessop (2005). 
187 These relational concepts concern the interplay of actors (agency) and the conditions in which their 
actions take place (structure). Agency refers to the "capacity to act upon situations" and is exercised by 
actors who are conceptualised as both reflexive and rational and whose actions reflect conscious 
attempts to realise their intentions. In light of this, not only individual people but also governments can 
be regarded as actors, albeit they exercise differing levels of power. Contrastingly, structure is held to 
be constituted through the regulation of social relations, in the fonn of institutions, practices, routines 
and conventions. Moreover, the strategic·relational approach is not the only framework that attempts to 
move beyond the structure-agency dualism. Examples of other prominent attempts include Gidden's 
structuration theory, Archer's morphogenetic approach as well as Bourdieu's concept of the habitus. 
For further explanation, see Hay (2002), Lewis (2002) and McAnnulla (1998, 2002). 
188 Hay (2002: 127). 
189 Analogously, this is represented in an extension of the coin example used in Giddens' structuration 
theory, with structure and agency regarded, not as two sides of a coin, but as "the metals in the alloy 
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The strategic-relational approach further distinguishes itself by dispensing with the 
conventional pairing of structure and agency. As Hay points out, "the very tenns 
structure and agency themselves seem to imply an analytical and ontological 
separability at odds with the ontological assumptions of the strategic-relational 
approach.,,190 Rather, in contending that "all action contains at least a residual 
strategic moment,,,191 it makes the conceptual move from the dualism of structure and 
agency to the duality of strategically selective context and strategic actor. 192 Strategic 
actors are conceptualised as both conscious and reflexive, in that they are able to 
monitor both the immediate and longer-tenn consequences of their actions. They are 
also held to be intentional, even if these intentions are not always explicitly articulated, 
and have a partial knowledge of the context within which their strategies are 
fonnulated. Strategies represent "intentional conduct oriented towards the 
environment in which it is to occur,,,193 and constitute the means by which actors 
attempt to realise their intentions. As a consequence, an actor will necessarily make a 
strategic assessment of the potential courses of actions that will best allow intentions 
to be achieved. 194 Included within this assessment is also a consideration of the 
from which the coin is forged." As with looking at a coin. when the metals used cannot be 
distinguished in the fused result, so it is that we cannot see structure or agency but rather only the 
product of their relational interaction. Furthermore, as this analogy indicates, the strategic-relational 
approach focuses on the interplay of structure and agency in order to transcend their dualism. For 
further explanation. see Hay (2002: 121-129). 
190 Ibid., p.l29 (Italics used in the original quotation). 
191 This definition obviates the possibility that, within the strategic-relational theoretical framework, 
strategy is conflated with action. 
192 Beginning with structure and agency, agency is initially situated within structure to create a 
structured context and structure is brought into agency to produce a contextualised actor. This new 
conceptual pairing is what Jessop tenns a "doubled dualism" and represents the halfway point in 
moving towards the conceptual duality. To complete the process, the contextualised actor is then 
reinserted into the structured context and the structured context is brought back into the contextualised 
~ t o r r to leave a strategic actor within a strategically selective context. See Hay (2002: 127-128). 
Ibid., p.128. 
194 However, not all strategies are the result of explicit calculation but, instead, are the product of 
habitual practices. Drawing on Giddens' concept of "practical consciousness", these practices are held 
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context in which action will take place for, as Hay notes, "to act strategically ... is to 
project the likely consequences of different courses of action and, in turn, to judge the 
contours of the terrain.,,195 In judging the terrain, Hay is suggesting that the context is 
strategically selective, in that it will select for certain strategies over others in order to 
allow "a given set of intentions or preferences" to be realised. 196 However, though the 
strategic-relational approach conceptualises contexts as favouring certain strategies 
over others and, indeed, certain outcomes over others, to the extent that instances of 
systematically structured outcomes may occur over time, it holds that the context does 
not determine the outcome. Different actors confronted by the same strategically 
selective context will not necessarily opt for the same course of action. Furthermore, 
the same actors facing similar circumstances to those faced before will not necessarily 
employ the same strategy. This is because the strategic-relational approach allows 
conceptual space for actors to strategically learn from past actions so that strategies 
can be reformulated to overcome structural constraints. Added to this, the effects of 
action, both intended and unintended, also impact upon the structured context, thus 
enabling a ''partial'' transformation of the strategically selective context to take place. 
The Ideational and the Material 
The strategic-relational approach, as outlined above, puts forward the concept of 
strategy as the means by which to transcend the structure-agency dualism at the heart 
of the Weberian approach to legitimation. However, in order to fully explain why the 
(majority of) Chinese people could believe in the legitimacy of the CCP and so do not 
attempt to challenge its authority, it is necessary to explicate the process by which 
to be strategic on account of the fact that they orient the actor towards an environment. Furthermore if 
~ h h practices are rendered explicit. they reveal a strategic component. See Hay (2002: 132). ' 
Ibid., p.132. 
196 Ibid., p.129. 
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their (non-CCP challenging) strategies are fonnulated. At issue is the extent to which 
strategy is infonned by ideas and that to which it is fonned by material effects. 
Moreover, for Hay, this issue ''tends to resolve itself into the question of whether 
ideas should be accorded a causal role independent of material factors or not.,,197 
In the strategic-relational approach, the capacity of actors to fonnulate strategy 
demonstrates that they must have knowledge of the context in which they are situated. 
However, on the basis that actors cannot possess perfect or complete knowledge of 
their context but rather have only partial and not necessarily correct knowledge at best, 
Hay makes the point that, "if actors lack complete infonnation, they have to interpret 
the world in which they find themselves in order to orient themselves strategically 
towards it.,,198 And it is through this need to interpret the world that the strategic-
relational approach makes space for the inclusion of the ideational, as it mediates 
between the actor and the context. l99 Furthennore, Hay makes the point that "however 
accurate or inaccurate, such understandings infonn strategy and that strategy in turn 
yields both intended and, inevitably, unintended consequences.,,200 Consequently, in 
acknowledging that ideas can produce material effects and transfonn the context, the 
strategic-relational approach accords the ideational a role independent of material 
factors in political outcomes?OI 
However, in much the same way that strategy is circumscribed by a strategically 
selective context, the strategic-relational approach also holds that the ideational is 
197 Hay (2002: 205). 
198 Hay (2002: 211) 
199 Ibid., p.209 (Italics removed). 
:zoo Hay (2002: 212-213). 
WI McAnulla puts forward Giddens' concept of the "double henneneutic" as additional evidence that 
ideas are real on the grounds that it holds that ''people have ideas about the world and that those ideas 
are also part of that world." See McAnulla (1998: 11). 
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constrained by a context which is discursively selective. In essence, the context will 
select for particular ideas over others. However, as with strategy, the context does not 
detennine which particular ideas an actor chooses to hold. Rather, a reflexive and 
strategic actor can assess the efficacy of particular ideas that enable him to best realise 
his intentions. Moreover, in order for particular ideas to be repeatedly held by an actor, 
it is necessary that they retain, what Hay terms as, "a certain resonance" with the 
experiences, both direct and mediated, of an actor.202 That said, Hay also 
acknowledges "the power of those able to provide cognitive filters, such as policy 
paradigms, through which actors interpret the strategic environment.,,203 
Bringing Legitimation Back In 
Bringing Weber's conceptualisation of legitimation into the strategic-relational 
approach allows for the concepts of strategically selective contexts, strategic actors 
and discursive selectivity to be incorporated into its schema and, in so doing, extends 
understanding of legitimation beyond the identification of specific modes in Weber's 
approach by interrogating the interaction of strategic actors and a strategically 
selective context from a spatio-temporal perspective. Indeed, as Gries asserts, [r]ather 
than seek a single lodestone ofPRC legitimacy, analysts should focus on context: 
certain events make certain claims salient at certain times.,,204 Consequently, 
reconceptualising legitimation in terms of the strategic-relational approach provides a 
framework in which this type of analysis can take place. 
202 Hay (2002: 211-212). 
2031bid., p.214. 
204 Gries (2004: 181). A good example of this is Beijing's hosting of the summer Olympics games. 
Although it does not easily fit into a single mode oflegitimation, it clearly has had a legitimating effect 
upon the Chinese government. That said, this effect has not been constant since the announcement of 
Beijing's s u ~ c e s s ~ ~ bid but rather varies over time. In addition, the legitimatory claims made by the 
g o v e r n m ~ t tm bostmg the ~ e s s have not been ~ e c ~ t e d d by all groups in society or by all members in 
every SOCIetal group at all times. Rather, at certam times, for example, the official opening of a new 
venue, the legitimating effect may increase for a short period of time. 
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Of the three central concepts within the strategic-relational approach, discursive 
selectivity will be the focus of enquiry in this thesis on the grounds that this concept 
mediates between the structural effects of rules and norms and the notion of belief that, 
Weber claims, informs action. Whereas the relationship between structure and agency 
was previously functionalist, in that actors were conceptualised as being able to "read 
off" such effects and act accordingly, the concept of discursive selectivity is more 
dynamic and, as a result, captures more closely the lived complexity of the real world. 
Moreover, as pointed out above, the concept of discursive selectivity opens up the 
possibility of interrogating the "cognitive filters" that are used by powerful actors to 
influence the formation of strategies by other less powerful actors. Of these, this 
thesis will focus on how the CCP has used the particular "cognitive filter" of the 
stability discourse to enhance its legitimation in the post-Tiananmen period. Of course, 
as pointed out above, it is important to emphasise that a "cognitive filter" is not 
determinative, in that not all people will necessarily be influenced by, in this instance, 
the stability discourse. Rather, by virtue of the fact that the CCP has heavily 
propagated this discourse in the post-Tiananmen period and that surveys have 
recorded the issue of stability as being of primary concern to members of Chinese 
society, it is possible to infer that the stability discourse has had an effect. Moreover, 
in terms of legitimating the CCP, the stability discourse works by arguing that the 
continuation of CCP rule is the only way in which stability can be safeguarded.20s 
205 This point does not deny that the structural constraints put in place by the CCP, including the use of 
coercive techniques, such as suppressing dissent that criticises its rule and dismantling organisations 
that could challenge its authority, have brought about a strategically selective context which favours the 
maintenance of Party rule. However, within the strategic-relational approach, this context, as with 
"cognitive filters", is not held to be detenninative and, indeed, the increasing numbers of protests 
taking place in China demonstrate that some actors are still prepared to challenge the government over 
certain issues. Consequently, the stability discourse can be understood as complementing and indeed 
may even justify in certain instances, the structural constraints put in place to maintain the P ~ ' s s r u l ~ . .
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Conclusion 
This chapter has developed the conceptual framework in which analysis of the 
legitimatory effects of the CCP's stability discourse will take place. In this, the 
chapter first disaggregated the concept of legitimacy in order to make clear the 
definition that would be applied in this thesis. Adopting a social scientific 
conceptualisation of this concept, this thesis holds that it is possible for all regimes, 
including the CCP, to obtain legitimacy and, in so doing, allow for the conversion of 
political power into authority. As such, legitimacy is seen as desirable for a regime on 
account of the fact that it lowers the cost of governance. That said, this thesis does not 
hold that legitimacy is fixed and evenly spread amongst all groups in society but 
rather that it is a dynamic concept which can fluctuate both positively and negatively 
over time and amongst different groups in society. Consequently, it is possible for a 
regime to be considered legitimate, even if all groups do not view it as legitimate at 
all times. Indeed, drawing on Weber's hierarchy oflegitimating relationships, the 
"intra-elites" relationship is held to be the most important in maintaining the 
legitimacy of a regime. 
Having made clear the definition oflegitimacy, this chapter moved onto consider the 
process by which a regime obtains its authority. In this, Weber's conceptualisation of 
legitimation is the "standard" framework that has been used in analyses of the CCP's 
legitimation. However, due to its overly structuralist tendencies, this concept was 
considered to be of limited explanatory value and, as a result, was situated within the 
strategic-relational approach. Through the concepts of strategic actors, a strategically 
selective context and discursive selectivity, this conceptual move worked to extend 
legitimation beyond the identification of specific modes and, in so doing, opened up 
6S 
the possibility of interrogating multiple temporally and geographically variable 
legitimating strategies. Moreover, through the concept of discursive selectivity, space 
was made in which to consider the role played by discourse in mediating between the 
structural effects of rules and norms and the Lebenswelt notion of belief that informs 
action, in particular, the "cognitive filters" that can be used by powerful actors to' 
influence the formation of strategies by other less powerful actors. Of these cognitive 
filters, this thesis will focus on how the CCP has used the stability discourse to 
enhance its legitimation in the post-Tiananmen period. 
Looking ahead to the next chapter, it will detail the methodological approach that will 
be taken in analysing the CCP's use of this discourse. Moreover, in so doing, it 
intends to further develop the discursive selectivity concept by elaborating an explicit 
empirical method that has been absent in earlier analyses. 206 
206 See, for e x a m p l ~ , . . H a y ' ~ ~ ~ o r k k on the '.'winter of d i ~ ~ t e n t " ".. Although Hay's thesis is convincing, 
the lack of an explICit empmcal method IS problematic, m that It is difficult to follow his arguments and 
as a result, to engage with his work. See Hay (1996). ' 
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Chapter 2: A Discourse-Historical Approach to Stability 
Introduction 
This chapter will detail the methodological approach to be taken in the analysis of the 
stability discourse. In this, the discourse of stability will be analysed as it is 
instantiated in language. Indeed, with regard to Chinese politics, Fang contends that 
language plays a greater role than in Western countries, to the extent that "Chinese 
political reality is essentially established and constructed through rhetoric,,?07 This 
point is supported by Kluver, who asserts that the legitimacy of the CCP has been 
based on its ability to successfully promulgate national myths and maintain 
ideological orthodoxy.208 While not fully agreeing with the overdetermining value 
that these viewpoints place on language, this thesis does propose that discursive 
practices, and the ideas that they carry, have contributed to the legitimation of the 
Party. Moreover, amongst these discursive practices, this aim of this thesis is to 
Wlderstand how the discourse of stability has contributed to this legitimation. 
In order to elaborate the methodological approach by which I will try to analyse this 
discourse, it is necessary to begin by specifying the discursive site of enquiry. 
Following this, the chapter will outline the methodological approach that has been 
taken as well as specify the methodical tools that will be used in conducting the 
analysis. Finally, the chapter will detail the process by which texts were selected for 
analysis. 
'1111 Fang (2001: 585). From a historical perspective, Gries also notes that ''China's emperors saw 
language as a tool of rule. Diction mattered." This was not only because language served an ideological 
purpose but, Pye contends, because it also functioned as a loyalty device, in that using the language of 
the emperor was considered to demonstrate loyalty. In more recent times, the use of formulations (tifa) 
by CCP leaders bas also functioned as a loyalty-testing device. Indeed, Fewsmith states that those who 
disagree with current policy or power arrangements, or who want to launch new policy initiatives must 
challenge previous lifa." See Gries (2004: 9), (Fewsmith (2005: 4). ' 
201 Kluver (1996). 
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Selection of Source 
In analysing the CCP's use of the stability discourse to legitimate its authority, this 
thesis will focus on the media as the site of enquiry. Although there are other 
discursive sites which may more directly reflect the views of the leadership, such as 
leaders' speeches, the media was selected because of the legitimating role that it 
performs within the Chinese political system in both reflecting the views of the 
leadership and disseminating these views to other groups within society.209 Indeed, 
Chen contends that, ''the Chinese regime has been able to bolster its legitimacy by 
controlling the media and using them to cultivate a general sense of progress while 
perpetuating official paradigms that emphasize stability and economic development 
over political change.,,210 
The Party's control of the media is part of a broader propaganda system (xuanchuan 
xitong) that can be traced back to the Yan'an period prior to the establishment of the 
People's Republic of China. Moreover, the nature of this control was famously 
summed up by the former Secretary-General, Hu Yaobang, when he stated that "[ t ]he 
Party'sjoumalism is the Party's mouthpiece, and naturally it is the mouthpiece of the 
people's government, which is led by the party.,,211 For Kuo, "the underlying message 
ofHu's words is that news must be about the things that the Party decides the people 
209 On the content of the media, Brendebach comments that, "[e]xcept for briefflowerings of public 
expression (as in the Spring of 1989) media content in the PRC has consisted of little other than the 
leadership's opinion made public." See Brendebach (200S: 30). 
210 Chen (2005: 4). 
211 Cited in Lee (1990: 8). In the aftermath of the military suppression, Jiang Zemin, speaking at a 
seminar on journalism, echoed this sentiment when declaring that "[o]ur country's newspapers, 
broadcast and television are all the mouthpieces of the Party. the government and the people. This 
should be sufficient to ~ x p l ! i n n the character o ~ [ C h i n e s e ] ] journalism and its important place in the work 
of the party and the nation. More recently, LIU Yunshan, the current Director of the Central 
Propaganda Department, stated that "one of the primary tasks of journalists is to make the people loyal 
to the party." Cited in Brady (2006: 66). 
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should know rather than what they want to knoW.,,212 Moreover, though the media 
industry has become increasingly commercialised in the reform and opening up 
period and, as such, is more dependent on advertising revenues than government 
subsidies, the CCP still exerts considerable political control over the content of the 
media. Commenting on this control in relation to the newspaper industry, Brady 
points out that "[i]fthese papers step too far beyond the boundaries of official 
propaganda, central officials have no difficulty in reeling them back in to a more 
conservative line, whether through censure, sacking, or even arresting key staff.,,213 
The central officials who are tasked with taking such actions are located within the 
Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party (Zhong gong 
zhongyang xuanchuan bu).214 In addition to the powers specified above, these 
officials have a range of other powers that are intended to ensure the "correct" 
dissemination of the Party's message across the different media channels. In this, the 
Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCPPD) employs, 
amongst other devices, "news reviewer groups" (xinwen yueping xiaozu) which are 
made up of retired CCP "ideologues" and tasked with surveying media content and 
compiling regular reports on its political nature.2lS Commenting on these devices, 
Zhao states that "[t]or editors and journalists, the danger ofpostpublication retribution 
is omnipresent.,,216 Indeed, Chan contends that it leads editors and journalists to 
212 Kuo (2002: 12). 
213 Brady (2002: 577). 
214 It is also important to note that the CCPPD executes this power through an extended apparatus of 
control which includes the Ministries of Culture, Education, Information Industry, Public Security and 
State Security as well as the State Council Information Office, General Administration of Press and 
Publications and the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television amongst others. For a 
comprehensive overview of the CCPPD, see Shambaugh (2007). 
115 The closure of the weekly supplement of C h i n ~ ~ Youth Daily, "Freezing Point" (bingdian), in 
J a n ~ ~ 2006 was r ~ o ~ l y y ~ u e e to a r ~ ~ ~ br a 'news reviewer group" on an article by Yuan Weishi 
calling for a more objectIve VIew of China s hiStory to be presented in middle-school history textbooks. 
216 Zhao (1998: 21). 
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practice self-censorship when publishing media content.217 That said, Tang also 
makes the point that the CCPPD "does far more than censor material. .. [i]ts primary 
function is to mobilize public opinion behind party policy and to promote the party's 
legitimacy and its official ideologies".218 The CCPPD performs this function by 
laying down guidelines on what should be published in the media, as well as in other 
cultural industries, such as the arts and education.219 Moreover, in publishing these 
guidelines, the CCPPD has the authority to set political formulations (lifo). Indeed, for 
Fewsmith, "[t]he ability to determine formal language and impose it on at least the 
major media outlets is an important part ofpower ... [and] one that the CCP guards 
jealously.,,22o This is because these formulations work to frame particular issues in 
accordance with the Party line and, in so doing, "set the tone" (ding diaozi) for the 
coverage by other non-government media organisations. Consequently, in analysing 
the Party's use of the stability discourse, it is necessary to focus on those media 
outlets that most consistently use the "correct" formulations and, in so doing, 
reproduce the Party line. 
The major media outlets in the PRC are, according to Zhao, Xinhua news agency, the 
People's Daily newspaper, Central People's Radio (CPR) and China Central 
Television (CCTV).221 Of these, I intend to concentrate on the production of the 
stability discourse in the People's Daily newspaper. While CPR and, especially, 
CCTV reach a substantially higher number of people and the stories produced by 
217 Chan (2007: 558). 
21aTang (2005: 80). 
219 Brady (2002: 565). According to Zhao, these guidelines can be communicated through a number of 
different documents including "Party resolutions, directives. announcements. internal bulletins such as 
''Propaganda Trend'· ... speeches and informal verbal messages of leading Party figures." See Zhao 
R998: 20). 
o Fewsmith (2005: 3). 
221 Zhao (1998: 18). 
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Xinhua are picked up by newspapers across China,222 as well as the fact that the 
circulation figures for "hard copies" of the People's Daily has declined steeply in 
recent years,223 it is still regarded "China's official mouthpiece" on account of the fact 
that it is the "organ" of the CCP's Central Committee and under the direct control of 
the CCPPD?24 Indeed, Zhao makes the point that "[i]mportant editorials in People's 
Daily are frequently transmitted by Xinhua News Agency, summarized on the 
national radio and television broadcasts, and sometimes reprinted by provincial Party 
organs.,,225 Consequently, the People's Daily still plays an influential role in "setting 
the tone" of the official discourse?26 Indeed, in his analysis on the usage of 
nationalism, Christiansen states that, "[t]he usage in the People's Daily is carefully 
regulated; internal consistency, style conventions and restrictions on content are 
closely monitored, so that the People's Daily stands out as the most authoritative 
general medium in China ... 227 
An additional reason for selecting the People's Daily as the source of empirical 
analysis is its accessibility and availability. Indeed, commenting on the selection of 
media, Hansen et a1. note that this is "often one of the most decisive 
222 This is due to the fact that Chinese news media are allowed only to source stories from Xinhua. See 
Tang (2005: 81). 
223 Shambaugh notes that, from a figure of 5 million per edition in the 1980s, the number of copies sold 
per edition in 2004 was reported to be 1.8 million, with Wlofficial estimates putting the figure as low as 
200,000. Moreover, as it is the paper of the party leadership, its readership is mostly party cadres rather 
than the wider public. See Shambaugh (2007: 56). 
224 Wu (1994: 195). 
22S Zhao (1998: 18). 
226 This was demonstrated in March 2007 when the Property Law was being enacted at a session of the 
National People's Congress (NPC). This Law had engendered opposition from within the Party on 
acCOWlt of the fact that it appeared to protect private propertY rights and, indeed, according to reports, it 
had been first slated for passage at a session of the NPC in 2005 before being withdrawn at the last 
moment due to a lack of consensus. According to a report in the South China Morning Post, in order to 
avoid any opposition to the Property Law during the NPC session in 2007, the CCPPD instructed 
media outlets to only publish stories on this Law from Xinhua and the People IS Daily as they 
m'resented the "official" line. See "Media Told to Toe Official Party Line" (9 March' 2007). 
22 Christiansen (2000: 1). 
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factors ... particularly where retrospective analysis is needed.,,228 Consequently, in 
analysing the use of the stability discourse across the time period from 1989 until 
2007, the ability to access materials both when in China and in the UK is an important 
practical consideration.229 In this regard, Chan notes that the People's Daily has been 
impressive in both'compiling and making available its historical collection of articles. 
Moreover, this collection is available on a number of different formats, including CD-
ROMs as well as a searchable database. In this research project, I have made use of a 
searchable database that has all the editions of the People's Daily from the years 1946 
through to May 2007.230 
128 Hansen et a1. (1998: 101). 
229 This consideration is less important when the time period under analysis is after 2000, as materials 
from most media outlets are available online. That said, the search engines on these sites do not 
~ e r a l l y y allow the level of specificity that is possible with the searchable database. 
o The People's Daily databases that I used in the course of this research project were at three different 
sites: the University Zone Library ofNingbo and the Ningbo Municipal Library in the People's 
Republic of China and the School of African and Oriental Studies (SOAS) library in London, UK. 
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Selection of Methodology 
The two most commonly used methods for interrogating the production of mass 
media are those of content analysis (CA) and discourse analysis (DA). In the case of 
the former, Berelson, in a frequently cited definition, states that CA is "a research 
technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest 
content of communication.,,231 In describing CA as "objective", Berelson is referring 
to the ontological view put forward in this method that language constitutes a value-
free medium which directly reflects users' understandings of the world. Moreover, 
this ontological view informs content analysis' epistemological premise that the CA 
practitioner, by carrying out "systematic" and "quantitative" analysis of language use, 
can "reveal" such understandings. That such analyses are held to be systematic is due 
to the fact that they are conducted in accordance with a prescribed number of steps. 
Although the exact number of steps does vary from one research project to another, 
there is widespread adherence within the CA field to a broad set of sequential 
principles. Consequently, most research projects begin by defining the problem that is 
to be researched before moving on to select both the media as well as the sample to be 
analysed. However, before the selected sample can be analysed, it is necessary for the 
CA practitioner to both predetermine the categories that will be highlighted within the 
texts as well as put together a coc\ing schedule that will allow for comparative 
results.232 Commenting on this set of principles, Hansen et al. contend that it "lays 
open to scrutiny the means by which textual meaning is dissected and examined.,,233 
Moreover, CA practitioners hold that these meanings are strengthened by the 
method's emphasis on quantitative analysis, which is evident not only in the number 
231 Bcrelson (1952: 18). 
232 Hansen et al. (1998: 98-122). 
233 Ibid., p.98. 
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of texts analysed in a CA research project but also in the use of sampling strategies to 
select these texts. 
In contrast to the more quantitative approach of CA, discourse analysis adopts a more 
qualitative approach to the analysis of texts. Indeed, though van Dijk admits that DA 
is "an ambiguous concept", on account of the fact that there are many different 
versions,234 Gill states that "what these perspectives share is a rejection of the realist 
notion that language is simply a neutral means of reflecting or describing the world, 
and a conviction in the central importance of discourse in constructing sociallife.,,235 
Indeed, unlike content analysis, DA views language as ideologically constructed. As 
Fowler makes clear, "[a]nything that is said or written about the world is articulated 
from a particular ideological position: language is not a clear window but a refracting, 
structuring medium ... 236 Moreover, this view of language also opens up the space for 
the claim that the ideological effects of discourse playa role in shaping the social 
world. Consequently, discourse analysis views discourse as a form of social 
practice.237 Indeed, while this position is not, as Gill points out, consistent with a 
realist ontology, it is compatible with those of actualism and critical realism.238 
Furthermore, it has clear methodological implications for practitioners seeking to 
carry out discourse analysis, in that it becomes necessary to analyse not only the text 
but also the context in which it is disseminated. Indeed, citing Bourdieu, Hyatt states 
that "it would be meaningless to try to analyse political discourse by concentrating on 
234 van Oijk (1988: 24). 
235 Gill (2000: 172-173). 
236 Fowler (1991: 10). 
237 The extent to which discourse shapes the social is one point of variation among competing versions 
ofDA. 
238 It should also be pointed out that Gill's reference to realism appears to be to that more fonnally 
known as "classical realism" and, as such, does not apply to the discussion on realism in chapter 2 as 
this was concerned with ''modem realism" (also referred to as "critical realism"). Se,e Marsh and ' 
Furlong (2002: 30-32). 
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the utterances alone without considering the sociopolitical conditions under which the 
discourse is produced and received.,,239 
This dual focus on analysing both the text and the context in discourse analysis is 
what works to distinguish it from earlier approaches towards mass media.24o 
Moreover, in directly comparing discourse analysis with that of content analysis, van 
Dijk contends that this dual focus has the effect of making DA "less mechanical, less 
concerned with manifest content and more aware of the power of language and the 
varieties and contexts oflanguage use.,,241 For Sloam, this difference between the two 
approaches can be condensed into the observation that CA "describes" language 
usage while DA ''understands'' such usage.242 Indeed, because of this, Wang goes so 
far as to suggest that "[d]iscourse analysis is superior to content analysis.,,243 However, 
though rejecting the notion that one method is necessarily "superior" to another, in 
this thesis, I have opted to use a form of discourse analysis on the grounds that it is 
more appropriate in realising the aim of understanding the ideational content of the 
stability discourse promulgated by the CCP. Furthermore, discourse analysis is 
consistent with the critical realist ontology, in which the strategic-relational 
framework is located, in a way that content analysis is not. That said, elements of 
content analysis will be incorporated into the methodology at instances, particularly in 
the selection of articles, where it is felt that they will strengthen the overall 
effectiveness of my approach. 
239 Hyatt (2005: SIS). 
240 Fang (200 1: 587). 
241 van Dijk (1985b: 46). 
242 Sloam (2007: 4). 
243 Wang (1993: 561). 
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However, having selected DA, it is necessary to specify the particular fonn that it will 
take in analysing the selected media texts. Gill identifies three "broad theoretical 
traditions" within DA. The first tradition includes critical linguistics, social semiotics 
and critical discourse analysis while ethnomethodology, speech-act theory and 
conversation analysis are grouped in the second tradition. Those that take a post-
structuralist approach, such as Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory approach and 
Derrida's post-structuralism, are said to constitute the third tradition.244 In deciding 
the most appropriate tradition within which to situate this research project, it was 
possible to discount the second tradition on the grounds that its approaches are more 
generally used in the analysis of spoken communicative events. The third tradition of 
post-structuralist approaches was also discounted on the grounds that, though its 
approaches have been applied to the analysis of media texts, its actualist ontological 
position does not attribute any causal value to material objects and, as such, is 
inconsistent with the critical realist ontology of the strategic-relational approach.245 
As explained in the chapter one, critical realist ontology holds that the world exists 
independently of our knowledge of it and that social phenomena be accorded causal 
powers. Moreover, these causal powers are attributed to generative mechanisms that 
are not directly observable and which researchers may not be able to empirically 
prove are causally efficacious. Consequently, realists contend that there can be a 
difference between appearance and reality, so that though a real world exists, 
outcomes within it can also be affected by the way in which this world is socially 
constructed.246 In tenns of the strategic-relational approach, this ontological position 
244 0i1l (2000: 173-174). 
245 . A l t h o u ~ ~ the ~ i f f e r ~ t t a p p r o ~ h e s s do vary ?D ~ e e role accorded to extra-discursive practices, they 
ultimately VIew discursive practices as detenmnative. For more on the ontological differences between 
the empirical. the actual and the real. see McAnnulla (200S). 
246 For further detail, see Bhaskar (1989), Hay (2002), Marsh and Furlong (2002: 30-31) and Jessop 
(2005). 
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informs its understanding of the structure-agency relationship and, through the 
concepts of strategic actors, a strategically selective context and discursive selectivity, 
opens up the space for the role of discourse to be analysed within context of political 
action. Moreover, as indicated above, though discourse has effects independent of the 
context, it is not held to be determinative but rather, through the concept of discursive 
selectivity, the ideational and the material are held to be relational. As will be 
explained in greater detail below, this position is consistent with the view put forward 
in critical discourse analysis. 
Consequently, in turnin'g to the first tradition identified by Gill, I have selected critical 
discourse analysis as the most appropriate method with which to analyse the discourse 
of stability. Although critical linguistics (CL) and critical discourse analysis (CDA) 
are very similar and, indeed, CDA developed out of CL, the focus within a CDA 
project is on meaning-making at the discursive level, rather than just the lexical and 
sentential level, as is more often the case with the CL, and, as such, is more 
appropriate to the aims of my research project.247 Moreover, with regard to the 
analysis of media texts, Bell and Garrett note that, "CDA has produced the majority of 
the research into media discourse during the 1980s and 1990s, and has arguably 
become the standard framework for studying media texts within European linguistics 
and discourse studies.,,248 As for Chinese media texts, Kuo notes that ''there have been 
very few studies in Chinese media discourse, which many have dismissed as "purely 
247 This does not mean that I will not take account of meanings at the lexical and sentential level, rather 
that I will not be confined only to these levels. As for social semiotics, I have discounted the use of this 
method in this particular project, as I am not paying attention to visual dimension of meaning-making 
in this research. 
248 Bell, a n ~ ~Garrett .(1998: 6). I ~ d e e d , , Bell ~ d d G ~ ~ c o n ~ d d that the dominance of CDA in the study 
of media dlscoW'Se IS such that It now occupies a 'hegemonic" position in the field to the extent that 
other approaches have to outline their position in relation to it. 
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propaganda" and therefore not worthy of analysis. ,,249 Indeed, because of this, Fang 
argues that, "[a]s the mass media is a site for ... discursive practices, it is therefore 
vitally important for us to gain a greater understanding of Chinese media discourse 
and how it is used in the process of political socialization, as well as how such 
discourse has changed across a period oftime.,,25o Consequently, in conducting a 
critical discourse analysis of Chinese media texts, an additional aim of this research 
project is to contribute both to the ongoing work in understanding Chinese media 
discourse and to the development of CDA by applying it to non-European language 
texts. 
Critical Discourse Analysis 
As pointed out above, the emergence of CD A has been traced back to the 1970s,251 
when a form of textual analysis, which later took on the name 'critical linguistics' ,252 
began to focus on the relationship between language and society and, in particular, the 
role played by language in the exercise ofpower.253 The significance of this 
conceptual move was that, prior to this point, most linguistic research had 
conceptualised language as an autonomous structure which could be analysed 
separately from the environment in which it was used. However, on the grounds that 
the use of language involves choices and that these choices are value-laden, 
practitioners of CL and, latterly CDA, argued that such a conceptualisation was not 
249 Kuo (2002: 287). For further examples of CD A being applied to Chinese media discourse, see Wang 
~ 9 9 3 ) , , Fang (2001). 
o Fang (200 1: 585). 
251 While elements of CD A can be seen in Wittgenstein's understanding of "language games" and can 
indeed, be traced all the way back to Aristotle's notions of dialectics and rhetoric, Wodak confines her 
discussion to the emergence of CD A from the field of linguistics. 
252 Kress states that the term critical linguistics was "quite self-consciously adapted" from the critical 
theory associated with the Frankfurt School which avoided the materialist reductionism of classical 
Marxism by highlighting the role played by culture in shaping outcomes. See Kress (1988: 88), as cited 
in Wodak (2001: 5), Fairclough (200 1: 33). 
253 Wodak (2001 a: S). 
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possible. Rather, these practitioners argued that language plays an active role in 
shaping the world. That said, this role was not to be regarded as one of simple 
determination?54 Rather, the relationship between language and society was to be 
understood as dialectical, in that " ~ i s c o u r s e s s as linguistic social practices can be seen 
as constituting non-discursive and discursive social practices and, at the same time, as 
being constituted by them.,,255 The effect of this view is that, in order to perform a 
critical discourse analysis of a text, it is necessary to situate the text within its 
context.256 Furthermore, in order for this to be properly carried out, CDA is 
necessarily interdisciplinary in that it requires "a theorization and description of both 
the social processes and structures which give rise to the production of a text, and of 
the social structures and processes within which individuals or groups as social 
historical subjects create meanings in their interaction with texts.,,257 Consequently, a 
critical discourse analysis attempts to move beyond the linguistic so as to understand 
both how a text is produced and consumed. In light of this, the empirical chapters in 
the thesis begin a contextual analysis of the event so as to situate the selected text 
relating to this event in its historical and cultural context. Following on from this, an 
intensive analysis of this selected text will be produced and will be supplemented by a 
co-textual analysis that considers others articles that were published during this event 
relating to the stability discourse. 
The central aim of CDA is, according to Phillips and J0rgensen, "to shed light on the 
linguistic-discursive dimension of social and cultural phenomena, and processes of 
2'4 Wodak (2001 a: 3). 
25S Wodak (2001b: 66). 
256 The main distinction between CL and CDA is that the latter views the text, as opposed to words or 
sentences, as the basic unit of communication. See Wodak (2001 a: 2). 
257 Ibid., pp.2-3. 
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change in late modernity.,,258 More specifically, CDA pays attention to the concept of 
power and the role played by language in its construction and reproduction, with 
particular emphasis given to abuses of power, such as instances of domination and 
discrimination.259 Drawing on the notion of critique developed by the Frankfurt 
School, the aim of CDA in such instances is, according to Meyer, to "make explicit 
power relationships which are frequently hidden,,260 with the avowed intention to 
engage in the ''transformative politics" of social change by contributing to a 
redistribution of power within the communication processes. 
However, as seems appropriate for an approach which is intentionally 'critical', 
critical discourse analysis has also been subjected to numerous criticisms, most of 
which have emanated from within the field oflinguistics.261 These criticisms can be 
grouped into four broad categories. The first criticism concerns the lack of a clear 
definition of the term 'discourse'. For Widdowson, "discourse is something 
everybody is talking about but without knowing with any certainty just what it is: in 
vogue and vague.,,262 Indeed, Phillips and Jergensen also note that "[t]he concept has 
become vague, either meaning almost nothing, or being used with more precise, but 
rather different, meanings in different contexts. ,,263 Certainly, there does appear to be 
a lack of consensus on an agreed defmition, with each CDA practitioner seemingly 
defming the concept in relation to their own particular research enquiries. However, 
this stems in part from the very nature of CDA, which as Bell and Garrett point out, is 
258 Phillips and J01'gensen (2002: 61). 
259 However, Wodak points that "[flor CDA, language is not powerful on its own-it gains power by 
the use powerful people make of it." Wodak (2001 a: 10). 
260 Meyer (2001: 15). 
261 The most well-known of these criticisms were published in an exchange of articles between H. G 
Widdowson and Norman Fairclough in the journal Language and Literature in 1995 and 1996. 
262 Widdowson (1995: 158). 
263 Phillips and Jsrgensen (2002: 1). 
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"best viewed as a shared perspective accompanying a range of approaches rather than 
as just one school. ,,264 Furthermore, this is not a problem that is solely confined to 
CDA but exists within the wider domain of the social sciences. Consequently, until 
such time as an agreed definition emerges, it would seem necessary to understand the 
term within the theoretical and methodological frameworks in which it is being 
deployed. 
In addition to the 'fuzzy' concept of discourse, Widdowson raises a further criticism 
against CDA's claim that "language realises social context" by arguing that linguistic 
analysis of the text does not, in itself, provide sufficient explanatory analysis?6S 
Stubbs also criticises this aspect of CDA by claiming that the link between the text 
and context is neither properly explained nor fully developed.266 However, while 
neither of these criticisms seems to be fully developed, Hyatt does raise a more 
legitimate concern over the concept of context. For Hyatt, "[t]he strongest of potential 
critiques lies with the fact that any attempt to look at the sociohistoric context of a text 
involves a process of social construction. ,,267 Indeed, it would seem that this problem 
is an inescapable corollary of the ontological view that knowledge is socially 
constructed. Recognising this, Wodak stresses the need for the adoption of a 
triangulatory approach, which can, if not overcome this problem, then at least serve to 
minimise it. For Wodak, a triangulatory approach can be achieved through the use of 
"different approaches, multimethodically and on the basis of a variety of empirical 
data as well as background information. ,,268 
264 Bell and Garrett (1998: 6). 
26S Widdowson (1995). 
266 Stubbs (1997: 102). 
267 Hyatt (2005: 523). 
268Wodak(2001b:65) 
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A third criticism raised by Widdowson centres on CDA's notion of criticality. For 
Widdowson, this explicitly ideological position has the effect of producing biased 
analysis, both in the selection of the texts and in the readings of them by CDA 
practitioners?69 Luke also criticises CDA for producing ideologically biased analysis, 
contending that CDA is "more akin to political, epistemic stances: principled reading 
positions and practices for the critical analysis of the place and force of language, 
discourse, text and image.'.270 Fairclough has responded to these criticisms by 
pointing out that CDA practitioners make clear their ideological commitments, unlike 
analysts in other fields, and by emphasising that the results produced by a critical 
discourse analysis are inherently open-ended?71 For Meyer, these criticisms directed 
at CDA's explicit ideological positions tie into the wider debates on whether any 
research can be carried out without "a priori value judgements" and whether it is 
possible to analyse empirical data without using "preframed categories of 
experience. ,,272 Meyer regards the positions in these debates as "irreconcilable" and, 
as such, reconciles himself to applying a critical approach towards research. While 
also taking a critical approach towards the analysis of text, Hyatt accepts the 
possibility that textual analysis can lapse into a more ideological reading and that, in 
order to reduce such a potentiality, "it is necessary for the analyst to be open about 
hislher positionality, to attempt to offer a reflexive account of the interpretation, to be 
aware that textual encodings are polysemic, and to emphasis the centrality of the 
context of the production and reception oftexts.,,273 
269 Widdowson (1995: 169). 
270 Luke (2002: 97). 
271 Fairclough (1996). 
272 Meyer (2001: 17). 
273 Hyatt (2005: 520). 
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The final criticism of CDA raised by Widdowson concerns the relatively selective 
linguistic corpus that is analysed by CDA practitioners. Indeed, for Widdowson, such 
a limited number of texts goes against the commonly understood idea of "analysis" as 
involving the examination of several different interpretations and, in so doing, further 
strengthens his position that CDA produces biased and unrepresentative textual 
analyses. 274 In response, Meyer admits that "[a]lthough there are no explicit 
statements about this issue, one might assume that many CDA studies ... mostly deal 
with only small corpora which are usually regarded as being typical of certain 
discourses.,,275 Indeed, though Widdowson is correct to draw attention to the need for 
representativeness, he runs the risk of committing an epistemological fallacy in 
equating it with the number of collected texts. Though there is a weak link between 
the two variables, the number of collected texts is less important in terms of 
representativeness than the particular texts which have been collected. Moreover, 
given that it is rarely possibly, or, indeed, practical, to analyse all texts on a particular 
subject, the decisions as to which text(s) should be analysed must be made by 
individual analysts. Consequently, in order to negate Widdowson's charge, it is 
necessary for CDA practitioners to make transparent the methods by which texts were 
collected as well as making explicit the reasons by which analysed texts were selected. 
As will be explained in detail in the final section of this chapter, I have sought to 
address these issues in the empirical chapters of this thesis by including a "selection 
of data" section that explicitly details the process and reasoning by which each text 
was selected. 
274 Widdowson (1998: 132). This criticism has also been raised by Stubbs (1997). 
l7S Meyer (2001: 25). 
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As stated above, CDA, like discourse analysis, should not be thought of in terms of a 
single unified approach. Indeed, Fairclough and Wodak have identified a number of 
major trends that have emerged within this approach: French discourse analysis; 
critical linguistics; social semiotics; socio-cultural change and change in discourse; 
socio-cognitive studies; discourse-historical method; reading analysis; and the 
Duisburg School. 276 As a consequence of these trends, it is necessary to further 
specify the particular version of CDA that will be applied in this research project. In 
order to achieve this, Meyer suggests that CDA be thought of as "an 
approach ... which constitutes itself at different levels - and at each level a number of 
selections have to be made.,,277 The s ~ l e c t i o n s s which confront a CDA practitioner 
range from those on the theoretical understanding of 'discourse' to be applied to 
whether a historical dimension of analysis needs to be included through to the 
selection of a methodical tools for the empirical study of the data.278 Moreover, as 
with the decisions that were taken at earlier junctures in the methodological process, 
the basis on which such selections are made is not in terms of one being more 
"correct" than another but rather being more appropriate to realising the aims of the 
research project. In light of this, I have opted to employ the discourse-historical 
approach, as laid out by Wodak, in carrying out the analysis on the discourse of 
stability?79 However, in keeping with Wodak's insistence that the CDA practitioner 
should exercise "conceptual pragmatism," I will necessarily adapt this approach to 
better fit, where appropriate, my research aims.28o 
276 For a fuller description, see Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 262-268). For an alternative overview, 
see Meyer (2001: 20-23) or Wodak (2004: 200-210). 
277 Meyer (2001: 14). 
278 Phillips and Jsrgensen (2002: 64). 
279 Wodak states that the discourse-historical approach was developed with the intention of analysing 
''historical, organizational and political topics and text." Wodak (2006: 134). 
280 For.W odak, " c o n c e p ~ l l p ~ g m a t i s m " " demands ~ n n approach which relates "questions of theory 
fonnatlon and conceptuahzatton closely to the specific problems that are to be investigated." Wodak 
(2001: 64). 
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The Discourse-Historical Approach 
The discourse-historical approach, according to Weiss and W odak, "attempts to 
transcend the pure linguistic dimension and to include more or less systematically the 
historical, political, sociological and/or psychological dimensions in the analysis and 
interpretation of a specific discursive occasion.,,281 In particular, this approach, by 
situating specific discourses within their socio-historical context, pays greater 
attention to the effect of the historical dimension on discursive practices than appears 
to be the case with other approaches within CDA and, in so doing, allows those 
deploying the discourse-historical approach to better explore the ways in which 
specific discourses have been subject to diachronic change.282 As such, the discourse-
historical approach appears to represent the most appropriate method with which to 
carry out my research objective of interrogating how the discourse of stability has 
been used by the CCP across the post-Tiananmen period. 
Within the discourse-historical approach, the term 'discourse' is understood as "a 
complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts, which 
manifest themselves within and across social fields of action as thematically 
interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens, very often as 'texts', that belong to 
specific semiotic types, that is genres.,,283 Moreover, discourses are differentiated 
from texts on account of the latter being conceptualised as "materially durable 
products oflinguistic actions".284 In addition, discourses should not be viewed as 
closed systems but rather as ones which are open and mixed and, as such, can operate 
both in and between different "fields of action". Discourses are also held to consist of 
281 Weiss and Wodak (2003: 23). 
282 Wodak (2001b: 65). 
283 Wodak (200 1 b: 66). 
284 Ibid., p. 67. 
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both macro-topics and sub-topics, with new sub-topics being created through 
rearticulation in different fields of action. And, as with other approaches in CDA, the 
discourse-historical approach conceptualises discourse as a form of social practice 
that both constitutes and is constituted by other social practices. That said, the 
distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive is held to be analytical and, 
as such, cannot be demonstrated through empirical analysis of texts. Indeed, this view 
of the ideational-material relationship makes the ontological position of the discourse-
historical approach consistent with that of the strategic-relational approach. 
A distinctive feature of this approach is that it proposes a ''theoretical'' concept of 
context.28S Indeed, Gill makes the point that, "[w]hen a discourse analyst discusses 
context, he or she is also producing a version, constructing the context as an 
object.,,286 In light of this, Wodak's concept of context can be understood as offering a 
set of explicit principles upon which such construction can take place. Moreover, for 
Hyatt, this concept "persuasively argues that interdisciplinarity is a necessary and 
logical corollary if context is to be considered as more than merely situation in a 
spatial or temporal sense but a concept that requires much deeper theoretical 
description andjustification.,,287 Consequently, context is held to consist of four 
interrelated levels, in which the first level is considered to be descriptive while the 
second, third and fourth levels constitute ''theories of the context".288 For Wodak, this 
means that the first level should be concerned with "the immediate, language or text-
internal co-text" while the second level concentrates on ''the intertextual and 
285 Meyer (2001: 29). 
286 Gill (2000: 180). 
287 Hyatt (2005: 519). 
288 Wodak (2004: 205). 
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interdiscursive relationships between utterances, texts, genres and discourses".289 
Level three moves beyond the linguistic dimension in order to take account of social 
factors, which Wodak collectively refers to as "middle-range theories, that work to 
frame the "context of the situation" while the fourth level is concerned with so-called 
'grand theories', that is the wider socio-political and historical contexts, in which the 
discursive practices are embedded.29o That said, it is also important to point out that, 
though these levels guide the construction of the context, they constitute analytical 
distinctions and, as such, the context will be presented in the form of a coherent 
narrative relating to the relevant period. 
Applying Wodak's theory of the context to my research project, it is possible to state 
that the first level will involve the texts which have been selected for analysis, in this 
case those from the post-Tiananmen period. Moreover, the intertextual and 
interdiscursive relationships that form the second level of the context in which the 
selected texts have been published will be highlighted in order to understand both 
how different discourses have been used in the promulgation of the stability discourse. 
At the third level, the selected texts, situated within the fields of politics and media, 
are viewed from the perspective of the CCP's legitimation while the strategic-
relational approach will constitute the fourth level of context and, as such, the social 
will be conceptualised in terms of strategic actors, a strategic selective context and 
discursive selectivity. A final point on the construction of context is that, according to 
Meyer, in Wodak's empirical work, "general social theory plays a negligible part 
compared with the discourse mode1. .. and historical analysis.,,291 Consequently, in 
situating the discourse-historical approach within the broader strategic-relational 
289 Wodak (2004: 205). 
290 Wodak (2001: 67). 
291 Meyer (2001: 22). 
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framework at the fourth level, this thesis intends to introduce a social theory that 
works to strengthen the results of its analysis and, in so doing, contribute to the 
development ofWodak's approach. 
The final aspect of the discourse-historical approach to consider is the analysis of the 
texts. Drawing on Glaser and Strauss's Grounded Theory, Wodak emphasises that this 
part of the research process is necessarily abductive, in that there should be continual 
movement between theory and empirical data in establishing the categories of 
analysis.292 That said, Wodak, in her own empirical research on racist and 
discriminatory discourses, has employed a "three-dimensional" discourse-analytical 
approach which is comprised of four distinct steps. Adapting these steps in order to fit 
in with the aim of analysing the CCP's use of the stability discourse, the first step is to 
analyse the main themes (or topics) of the selected texts. According to van der Valke, 
a theme can be defined as "a semantic macrostructure regulating the overall coherence 
and global meaning of a text including ideological dimensions.,,293 Indeed, Vaara et al. 
state that a thematic analysis is the "recommended way to start any critically oriented 
media analysis.,,294 This is because themes structure and stress what is most important 
in a news text. 295 In order to carry out a thematic analysis of media texts, it is 
necessary to begin with the headline of the text. For Fang, "[h]eadlines signal a 
particular perspective or framework for interpreting what to follow ... the overall gist 
or topic of a news article is presented or even summarized in the headline. ,,296 
Following on from this, "lower-lever' themes within each paragraph of the selected 
text will be highlighted. 
292 Meyer (2001: 27). 
293 van der Valk (2003: 318). 
294 Vaara et a1. (2006: 797). 
19S van Oijk (1985a). 
296 Fang (2001: 587). 
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The second step in the discourse-analytical approach is to analyse the discursive 
strategies employed in the selected texts. For Wodak, a strategy can be understood as 
"a more or less accurate and more or less intentional plan of practices (including 
discursive practices) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or 
linguistic aim.,,297 More specifically, discursive strategies are defined as "systematic 
ways of using languages. ,,298 With regard to my research, I will pay particular 
attention to the use of argumentation strategies on the grounds that they are intended 
to persuade the reader of a particular viewpoint so as to generate consensus.299 Indeed, 
Werlich's typology of discourse classifies political discourse as largely 
argumentative.3oo In terms of specific argumentation strategies, I will follow Wodak 
in drawing on the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation.301 This approach 
proposes ten central rules by which argumentative discussions can analysed. 302 
Moreover, these rules are not concerned with the content of the arguments but with 
the way in which such arguments are constructed.303 In this, an argumentative strategy 
can be identified by its "violation" of one (or more) of the ten central rules. 304 
However, I should also point out at this juncture that while such violations are useful 
in identifying specific argumentative strategies, this thesis does not share the pragma-
dialectical approach's view of such strategies as committing logical fallacies. Indeed, 
297 Wodak (2004: 207). 
298 Ibid., p 207. 
299 Fowler (1991: 214). 
300 Werlicb's typology identifies five different types of discourse: descriptive; narrative; explanatory; 
a r ~ e n t a t i v e ; ; instructive. See Werlicb (1982). 
30 Wodak was the first CDA practitioner to incolpOrate aspects of argumentation theory into her 
research and is a further reason for my use of the discourse-historical approach in analysing the 
discourse of stability. 
302 For this list ofruIes, see van Eemeren et aI, (2002: 182-186). 
303 C o m m e n t i ~ g g on these rules, van der Valk refers to the first five rules in the pragma-dialectical 
approach as "process-argumentation rules" and the second set of five rules as ' ~ r o d u c t - a r g u m e n t a t i o n n
rulcs". See van der Valk (2003: 318). 
304 It is possible for an argumentative strategy to simultaneously violate more than one of these rules. 
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this thesis is concerned with analysing the CCP's use of the stability discourse rather 
than detennining its nonnative value. 
In tenns of argumentative strategies, though it is not practical to provide a complete 
list here, I will highlight those that feature prominently in the selected texts following 
preliminary analyses. The strategy of argumentum at consequentiam occurs when, 
according to van Eemeren et al., "unfavourable light is cast on a thesis by pointing out 
its possible consequences, without the rightness of the thesis itself being disputed.,,30s 
In relation to the stability discourse, this strategy can be used both to justify action 
(e.g. suppression) by appealing to the consequences of inaction (instability) and 
justifying inaction (the demands of demonstrators) by appealing to the consequences 
of action (chaos). Indeed, this was the most frequently deployed argumentative 
strategy in the events selected for analysis and was central to the stability discourse's 
hegemonic presentation of a future in which CCP leadership maintained stability and 
the absence of its leadership resulted in chaos. An additional strategy is that of 
argumentum ad hominem which is, according to Wodak, an "attack on the 
antagonist's personality and character (of her or his credibility, integrity, honesty, 
expertise, competence and so on) instead of argumentatively trying to refute the 
antagonist's arguments.,,306 In the relation to the stability discourse, a clear example 
of this strategy was evidenced in the treatment of Li Hongzhi, the founder of Falun 
Gong. In the selected text, which is analysed in chapter four, the actions of Falun 
Gong were attributed to Li' s intention to "destroy" stability and, as such, worked to 
justify the government's suppression of the group in order to "maintain" stability. The 
final example is the "straw man" strategy which, according to Wodak, "amounts 
30' Van Eemeren et al. (1987: 30), as cited in Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 74). 
306 Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 72) 
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to ... presenting a distorted picture of the antagonist's standpoint in order to be able to 
refute the standpoint or argument more easily and to make it less tenable.,,307 In 
relation to the stability discourse, this strategy works to deny proposed changes by 
distorting their overall content, or, indeed, by overemphasising a negative aspect of 
such changes in order to delegitimate such changes in favour of maintaining 
stability.308 Indeed, this strategy was deployed during the initial stages of the Beijing 
Spring in 1989, which is analysed in the chapter three, when the demands of the 
demonstrators were conflated with democracy and, in so doing, refuted on the 
grounds of causing instability. 
In terms of analysing the content of the argumentative strategies, this thesis will make 
use of the linguistic device of topoi. This linguistic device can be traced back to 
Aristotle's theory of argumentation in which its literal meaning was that of "place". 309 
However, in more recent versions of argumentation theory, W odak states that topoi 
have become understood as "recurrent argument schemes which are intended to make 
the audience draw a particular inference ... often by using a fallacy".310 In this, Wodak 
views topoi as "conclusion rules" that constitute the condition upon which the move 
from argument to conclusion is justified.311 Indeed, van der Valk shares this view 
when describing topoi as "general principles that support an argument without 
themselves constituting the argument itself.,,312 As with argumentation strategies, it is 
not practical to provide a comprehensive list here; however, I will highlight those that 
307 Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 73). 
308 An additional point to make is that it is possible for two argumentative strategies to be employed 
simultaneously. For example, the straw man strategy may be used in combination with that of 
argumentum at consequentiam, so that a particular viewpoint may be distorted and then refuted by 
~ a l i n g g to its negative consequences. 
van der Valk (2003: 318). 
310 Wodak (2006: 136). 
311 Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 75). 
312 van der Valk (2003: 319). 
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feature prominently in the selected texts following preliminary analyses. The topos of 
stability presents "stability" as the condition upon which a particular course of action 
is justified, be that, for example, in bringing demonstrations to an end or suppressing 
movements that the government views as "dangerous". The negative version of this 
topos is that of chaos and this works by justifying the same course of action but by 
presenting the demonstrations or anti-government movements as causing chaos. A 
further variation of these topoi is that of threat, which serves to justify the same 
course of action but, in this instance, by presenting the demonstrations or anti-
government movements as threatening the stability of the country. Moreover, a more 
specific variant ofthis topos is that of external threat, which was particularly seen in 
the aftermath of the military crackdown in 1989 in attempting to justify this action by 
claiming that the protests were part of external threat from foreign powers to 
undermine China's stability.313 
A further set of discursive strategies that will be analysed is that of the legitimation 
strategies used to justify particular viewpoints put forward in the selected texts. In this, 
I will use van Leeuwen's typology of these strategies, in which four general types of 
"semantic-functional" categories are identified: Authorization; Moral Evaluation; 
Rationalization; and Mythopoesis.314 The category of authorization refers to those 
strategies which make use of the authority of tradition, custom, law and/or those in 
whom the institutional authority is vested in order to achieve legitimation. The second 
category of moral evaluation refers to those strategies which reference particular 
value systems while the third category of rationalization achieves legitimation by 
313 Indeed, this topos gained credence from the sanctions that were subsequently imposed on China by 
foreign coWltries. 
314 See Van Leeuwen (2007) for an outline of this typology and Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) for an 
application of this typology . 
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appealing to the utility of "institutionalised social action". The final category of 
mythopoesis uses narratives in which "outcomes reward legitimate actions and punish 
non-legitimate actions.,,31S With regard to application of this typology, Vaara, Tienari 
and Laurila caution that "Van Leeuwen's model is a general one and has not been 
developed for legitimation in contexts such as the media.,,316 Indeed, van Leeuwen, in 
his application of this model, focuses on the legitimation of the institutional practice 
of compulsory education rather than on a specific form of discourse.317 Consequently, 
an additional aim of this research project is to contribute to the development of van 
Leeuwen's typology by employing it in an analysis of political discourse. 
The third step in the discourse-analytical approach is to analyse the linguistic means 
employed in the empirical data. In particular, I will pay attention to the rhetorical 
means on account of the fact that such figurae are intended to persuade the reader. 
Indeed, as van Dijk points out, "both classical and modem rhetoric deals with the 
persuasive dimension of language and, more specifically, with the account of those 
properties of discourse that can make communication more persuasive.,,318 As with 
argumentation strategies and topoi, it is not practical to give a prescriptive list of these 
means; however, specific rhetorical means that will be highlighted include the 
modality of semantic propositions. For Fowler, "modal expressions signify as to truth 
(,correct'), likelihood ('certainly', 'might'), desirability ('regrettable'); other modal 
usages stipulate obligations ('should', 'ought to') and grant pennission ('may,).,,319 In 
particular, I will pay attention to epistemic modality, which works to strengthen the 
m Van Leeuwen (2007: 92). 
316 Vaara et a1. (2006: 795). 
317 Though van Leeuwen did inclUde media texts in his corpus, it did not featw'e prominently in his 
empirical analysis. Rather, more use was made of children's textbooks and school brochures Moreover 
318 van Dijk (1988: 28). . , 
319 Fowler (1991: 64). 
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truth value of claims, and deontic modality, which works to impose obligation upon 
the reader. A further rhetorical means to be highlighted is that of metaphors. Van der 
Valk explains that, "in a metaphor, one domain of reality is compared with another, 
more familiar domain of reality, whereby the understanding of the less familiar 
domain is enhanced by means of common sense reasoning.,,320 Moreover, in terms of 
persuasion, this use of analogous language can be effective in persuading the reader to 
accept the claims being forward. Additional rhetorical means that will be analysed 
include rhetorical questions and imperatives that direct the reader to a particular line 
of thinking, formulaic phrases such as CCP slogans that encode prefixed meanings, 
intensifying phrases like hyperboles that work to heighten the persuasiveness of 
claims as well as mitigating terms, what Kuo refers to as "downtoners", that work to 
minimise negative effects. Other rhetorical means that are highlighted throughout the 
course of the empirical analyses will be defined at the appropriate points. 
The final step in the discourse-analytical approach is what W odak terms "specific 
context-dependent linguistic realizations".321 In terms of CDA, this step is important, 
as it explicitly acknowledges the relationship between the text and its context. 
In terms of analysis, I will make particular use of the concept of political implicatures. 
In van Dijk's analysis of a speech by the former Spanish Prime Minister, Jose Marla 
Amar, to legitimate the decision to go to war in Iraq, he defines political implicatures 
as "inferences based on general and particular political knowledge as well as on the 
context models".322 Moreover, van Dijk distinguishes implicatures from implications 
on the grounds that the latter refers to semantic strategies taking place within the text 
while the former is concerned with pragmatic strategies taking place beyond the text 
320 van der Valk (2003: 330). 
321 Wodak (2004: 206). 
322 van Dijk (2005: 65). 
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i.e. the context. 323 Consequently, in order for implicatures to be understood, it is 
necessary for the reader to have contextual knowledge of the communicative event. 
Indeed, van Dijk contends that this knowledge rests upon three sources: readers' 
"representations of the structures of the discourse and its meanings; readers' "context 
model of the current communicative situation"; and readers' "more general 
knowledge about the political situation in the world and in the country".324 In addition, 
a particular function of political implicatures is that they are often used to indirectly 
delegitimate oppositional viewpoints while avoiding direct negative presentation of 
the other. Indeed, implicatures were found in all of the texts analysed in the empirical 
chapters, particularly in the texts relating to the "anti-Japan" demonstrations in 2005. 
This can be explained through the government's "softly-softly" approach in dealing 
with demonstrations for fear of turning the demonstrators' grievances away from 
Japan towards itself. As such, these texts avoided direct negative presentation of the 
demonstrations. As for further context-dependent linguistic realizations, these will be 
highlighted at the relevant points throughout the analyses. 
323 van Dijk (2005: 69). 
314 Ibid .• p. 70. 
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Selection of Data325 
Commenting on conducting media analysis, Hansen et al. make the point that "[i]t is 
rarely either possible or desirable to analyse all media coverage of a subject, area or 
issue.,,326 Accepting the validity of this point, it is then necessary to make a number of 
decisions concerning the selection of the material to be analysed. Moreover, it is 
important to point out that the decisions taken should not be judged in tenns of being 
correct or incorrect but rather in tenns of being appropriate to fulfilling the aims of 
the particular research project. An additional point is that, in making decisions over 
the selection of materials, I acknowledge that there exist alternative ways in which to 
fulfil these aims; however, I hope that the justifications supporting the decisions taken 
in this research project serve to make them valid. 
In the opening section of this chapter, I stated that I will principally focus my analysis 
of the stability discourse on articles published in the Party newspaper, the People's 
Daily on account of its authoritative position in representing the views of the 
leadership. Consequently, my initial search of the People's Daily database was to 
assemble those articles most relevant in the production of the stability discourse. The 
categories available on the database with which to search for these articles were: date 
(riqi); headline (biaoti); page number (bancO; edition (banming); author (zuozhe); 
special column (zhuanlan); text (zhengwen). For this initial search, I perfonned a 
"keyword" search (zhengwen) for the tenn "stability" (wending) between the dates of 
325 The process by which I selected the data does, for the purposes of presentation in this chapter 
assume a linear, sequential narrative. However, the actual process was much "messier", in that the 
selection of the data was necessarily abductive and involved constant movement between the data the 
literature relating to the discourse-historical approach and methodical tools of textual analysis as ;ell 
as relevant literature on China over a time period of approximately 18 months. 
326 Hansen et a1. (1998: 100). 
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26 April 1989 until 16 May 2007 (the last available date on the database).327 However, 
given that the number of articles mentioning this term totalled 63,431 articles, it was 
then necessary to introduce additional criteria in order to reduce the linguistic corpus 
to a more manageable size. 
The first of such criteria was to establish the type of article that would be most 
relevant to my analysis. In this, I decided to restrict the search to editorials (shelun) 
and commentaries (pinglun)?28 The reasoning for this decision was twofold. Firstly, 
as Wu points out, "[ e ]ditorials and commentaries in the People's Daily represent the 
viewpoints of the Chinese leadership.,,329 Indeed, Wu elaborates on this point by 
stating that "[ c ]ommentaries in the People's Daily do not obtain their authority from 
their viewpoints, analyses of event, or good writing style, but from their position as a 
vehicle of command ... [t]he more information they convey directly from the party-
state Centre, the more they are seen as valuable, unquestionable representations of the 
will of the leadership.,,33o Furthermore, in addition to important editorials and 
commentaries being carried by other media outlets, as noted above, Wu states that 
they can also form the basis of cadres' weekly "political studies" sessions.331 In light 
of this, the editorials and commentaries of the People's Daily can be considered to 
327 Although the term "stability" is used in a number of different contexts, such as financial stability, 
the physical sense of stability, which are not directly related to my concern with the political use of the 
term, my approach was to intended to initially include as many articles as possible before going on to 
reduce the linguistic corpus. Indeed, a search for the term "social stability" (shehui wending) in this 
period resulted in only 9,776 articles while, for the term ''political stability" (zhengzhi wending), the 
number of articles totalled 2,650 in this period. 
328 Wu classifies editorials and commentaries as belonging to the "typology" of commentaries. 
Furthermore, Wu also differentiates between two different types of commentaries: commentator's 
articles (pinglunyuan wenzhang) and signed commentaries (shuming pinglun). Moreover, the first type 
of commentaries can be further distinguished between staff commentaries (benbao pinglunyuan 
wenzhang) and special commentator's articles (teyue pinglunyuan wenzhang). See Wu (1994: 196-
198). 
329 Ibid., p. 195). Indeed, it was because of this understanding that students demonstrating in 1989 
reacted so strongly to a People's Daily editorial published on 26 April denouncing the demonstrations 
as causing ''turmoil''. 
330 Ibid., p.195. 
331 Ibid., p. 195. 
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occupy a privileged position in shaping the officially sanctioned discourse. Moreover, 
the second reason for specifically focusing on this type of article is because of its style, 
in that, unlike news reports, it is generally constructed around a particular theme and, 
in so doing, is more explicitly argumentative in justifying a viewpoint in relation to 
this theme. Consequently, given that part of my discourse-analytical approach is 
analysing the use of argumentation strategies, this type of article is more useful in 
understanding how the CCP uses the stability discourse in legitimating its authority. 
However, the available categories with which to search the People's Daily database 
does not allow for commentaries and editorials to be searched independently of the 
other newspaper articles. Consequently, drawing again on Wu, I introduced the 
additional criterion of selecting editorials and commentaries that had been published 
on the front page. Indeed, though Wu states the distinction between the different types 
of commentaries is not clear-cut in terms of importance, he points out that 
"[ c ]ommentaries, including editorials, are published on different pages according to 
editors' perceptions of their importance ... [and] the most important appear on the front 
page of the People's Daily.,,332 
Following on from this, I then sought to collect the most relevant articles by focusing 
on specific time periods within the eighteen-year period. In total, fifteen time periods 
consisting of single eight-week blocks were initially selected. Moreover, their 
selection was based on two interrelated factors. Firstly, a preliminary survey of the 
articles from the People's Daily indicated that the usage of stability could be 
separated into four broad categories: social stability; political stability; economic 
332Wu(1994: 196). 
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stability; and national stability. Secondly, a close reading of the literature pertaining to 
Chinese politics in the post-Tiananmen period led me to identify a number of 
significant instances in which the issue of stability was prominent. However, in order 
to make the collection of articles manageable, I opted to search three time periods in 
each of the categories of social stability, economic stability and national stability and, 
on account of a high number of instances, six time periods within the category of 
political stability. In addition to these nine time periods, further searches were 
conducted for editorials and commentaries that were published on the politically 
significant dates of New Year's Day (1st January), the date on which the CCP was 
founded (1st July) and National Day (lst Octot>er). 
The main criteria for selection of articles within this time period, in addition to the 
two that were outlined above, were that stability featured in the headline of the article 
and that it was mentioned a minimum of five times in the body of the text. The 
significance attached to the presence of stability in the headline was drawn from van 
Dijk's observation that the headline "usually expresses the most important topic of the 
news item.,,333 In addition, stipulating the minimum number of times that stability was 
mentioned in a single text was intended to complement this criterion so as to ensure 
that the collected articles would be relevant in understanding the use of the stability 
discourse. These additional criteria were necessary because the tenn "stability" is 
used so frequently in articles in the People IS Daily; however, in the vast majority of 
these articles, stability is not the central theme but rather is briefly included as part of 
a standard political fonnulation.334 This is not to overlook the role played by such 
uses of stability in constructing the stability discourse; indeed, I believe that these 
333 van Dijk (1985: 69). 
334 The most common of these formulations is: "stability is the foundation of economic development". 
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fonnulaic phrases have a diffuse effect in persuading people over the need to maintain 
"stability". However, I also contend that, by analysing instances in which the u s ~ ~ of 
stability is explicit, one is able to understand how stability is used in such 
fonnulations. In effect, I am suggesting that the use of stability in exceptional 
instances infonns its usage in conventionalised slogans. 
As for the searches conducted with the specified time periods, they produced 
inconsistent results, with relevant articles being found only in some of the time 
periods. Indeed, the surprising lack of articles on stability during some of these 
politically significant instances, such as the occasion of China's fonnal membership 
of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1999 and the changeoverin the Party's 
leadership in 2002, suggested that the stability discourse was not always employed in 
instances where the threat of instability was not explicit. In response, I decided to 
conduct a further, more comprehensive search of the database by going through all the 
published articles from the end of April 1989 through to the middle of May 2007 
using the four criteria outlined above in order to collect the most relevant articles 
relating to stability.335 The completion of this search resulted in the collection of 
sixty-four articles in total. The next step was to sort through these articles in order to 
detennine which would be most suitable for empirical analysis. This determination 
was based on a number of factors including the political significance of the article, the 
context in which the article was published as well as the way in which the concept of 
stability was used. Following this, I selected articles on stability that were published 
in relation to three events: the Beijing Spring in 1989; the "anti-Falun Gong" 
campaign in 1999; and the "Anti-Japan" demonstrations in 2005. These three events 
335 To restate these criteria: editorials and commentaries; published on the page 1· feature stability in 
the headline; mention stability at least five times in the text. ' 
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were connected by the fact that they constituted exceptional instances in which 
stability was, or, at least, was perceived to be, explicitly threatened. Indeed, drawing 
on the concept of discursive selectivity, it could be stated that these events took place 
in a context which "discursively selected" the stability discourse to be emphasised. In 
addition, in each of these instances, the threat of instability was different and so, by 
analysing articles published during these periods, it was hoped that different aspects 
of the stability discourse would be emphasised which would allow for a fuller 
understanding in how the Party makes use of this discourse to legitimate its authority. 
In the case of the Beijing Spring, the authority of the CCP was being directly 
challenged by a group of protestors, initially made up of students, but later including 
other groups from society, who were demonstrating over aspects of the Party's rule. 
In the case of Falun Gong, the authority of the CCP was perceived to be challenged 
by a quasi-spiritual group which propagated a belief system at odds with that 
"communism".336 As for the "anti-Japan" demonstrations in 2005, these were 
ostensibly directed against the actions of the Japanese government and, as such did 
not present a direct challenge to the Party's authority.337 However, the concern for the 
Party's leadership was over how to bring the demonstrations to an end without having 
the protests being redirecting against the government. 
Proceeding onto the question of how articles from these events will be analysed, for 
the chapter relating to the Beijing Spring, I opted to take the approach of intensively 
analysing two texts while in the chapters relating to the "anti-Falun Gong' campaign 
and the "anti-Japan" demonstrations, I intensively analysed a single text along with an, 
~ 3 6 . . In actual fact, t!te campaign against Falun Gong appeared to be at the insistence of Jiang Zemin and 
1t 1S not clear that It was fully supported by other members of the leadership elite. My appreciation to 
Professor Zheng for pointing this out. 
331 Indeed, !here is much evidence to suggest that the Party leadership encouraged, if only tacitly, these 
demonstrations. 
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extensive analysis of the "co-texts" that made use of the stability discourse during the 
period surrounding these events.338 In order to do this, I specified a time period 
relating to each particular event in which I conducted a search of the People's Daily 
using the same four criteria outlined above. From this, I selected the texts for 
intensive analysis according to the consideration of the article's political significance 
as well as its use of stability. In this, the selection of these texts rested on the 
judgement of the analyst. As for adopting the approach of intensively analysing an 
entire text, I chose this method on the basis that it allowed for a fuller understanding 
of how the stability discourse was practically employed in legitimating the authority 
of the CCP as well as delegitimating those who challenged this authority. The other 
prominent approach to take when carrying out this type of analysis is to extensively 
analyse a wider number of texts according to a set of prescribed categories. In this, the 
discourse is broken down into a series of structural features. However, as with the 
decision to use discourse analysis over content analysis, neither of these approaches is 
necessarily better than the other. Rather, it is for the analyst to decide which approach 
is more appropriate in realising the aims of the research. Consequently, for this 
research, I felt that the intensive analysis approach yielded a greater explanatory value 
in understanding how the CCP employed the stability discourse in particular instances 
during the post-Tiananmen period. Indeed, when experimenting with the extensive 
analysis approach, I felt that it produced an empirical analysis which was disparate 
and fragmented and, as such, was distanced from how the stability discourse was used 
in the texts. That said, I also recognise that to rely only on intensive analysis can 
338 The decision to omit the co-textual analysis in chapter three on the 1989 Beijing Spring was due, 
both to the limited coverage of the military suppression in its immediate aftermath and the political 
s i g n i ~ ~ a n c e e of the 4 !une 1990 e ~ i t o r i a l . . This editorial was published on the first year anniversary of 
the mlbtary suppression and prOVIded a clear statement of the government's justification for taking 
l I ~ i l i t a r y y action ~ n n 1989. In so doing. it hegemonically ~ e r ~ e d d ~ e e usage of stability in the post-
Tlananmen penod and, as a consequence. I felt that this edltonal should be intensively analysed. 
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produce an overly narrow understanding of a discourse. Therefore, the inclusion of 
the co-textual analysis is intended to supplement the intensive analysis and, in so 
doing, avoid such a result. 
In terms of the empirical analysis, I opted to conduct it at the paragraphicallevel. 
Although this is not necessarily the most conventional approach, I believe that it is the 
approach that best allows for the analysis to be both detailed and coherent. 339 
Moreover, this approach is also intended to make explicit my reading of the texts. 
This is because I am aware that my analysis will produce a single reading that is 
derived from my particular position vis-A-vis the texts. Consequently, by making them 
explicit, I hope to allow other readers to engage with my findings and, in so doing, 
produce a fuller understanding of the stability discourse. 
339 Many discursive analyses take place at t h ~ ~ text or super-text level; however, while I feel that such 
analyses produce coherent accounts of a particular discourse, the lack of direct and specific reference to 
the texts make it difficult to engage with such accounts. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has explained how I will analyse the CCP's use of the stability discourse 
in legitimating its authority. It set out by identifying the mass media as the site of 
enquiry for the analysis of this discourse. This site was selected on the grounds that it 
both reflected the views of the leadership and most widely disseminated these views 
to the members of Chinese society. Within the mass media, the People's Daily was 
chosen as the source from which texts would be selected in the carrying out of this 
analysis. Although the information broadcast via the media of radio and, particularly, 
television reach a wider audience, the People's Daily was selected on the grounds that, 
as the "official mouthpiece" of the CCP leadership, it occupied an influential role in 
shaping the national discourse in China. An additional factor in the selection of this 
source was the greater likelihood of being able to access the articles most relevant to 
my research due its availability on different formats, such as CD-ROMs and databases. 
The selection of the method by which the articles from the People's Daily would be 
analysed was between the approaches of content analysis (CA) and discourse analysis 
(DA). Although content analysis allowed for a higher number of articles to be 
analysed, it was felt that the richer qualitative analysis produced by discourse analysis 
was more appropriate to the aims of this research. Moreover, given that discourse 
analysis refers to a broad collection of qualitative approaches to textual analysis, it 
was also necessary to select a particular approach. In this, the approach of critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) was selected on the grounds that its understanding of the 
relationship between language and society Was consistent with the ontological 
viewpoint of the strategic-relational approach. In addition, it has been frequently used 
in analyses of discourses in the media. However, as with discourse analysis, CDA is 
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also a broad collection of approaches that view language as a social practice. 
Consequently, it was necessary to select a particular CDA approach. In this, Wodak's 
discourse-historical approach was selected due to its emphasis on the historical 
dimension of discourse which was appropriate to my aim of examining the stability 
discourse across the post-Tiananmen period. Moreover, this approach incorporated 
argumentation theory into its analysis which was also appropriate to my aim of 
focusing on the legitimatory effect of the stability discourse. 
The selection of articles from the People's Daily to be analysed was determined by a 
number of searches carried out on the newspaper's database. These searches were 
conducted in accordance with a set of criteria that were developed abductively and 
resulted in the selection of texts related to three events: Beijing Spring in 1989; the 
"anti-Falun Gong' campaign in 1999; and the "anti-Japan" demonstrations in 2005. 
These events were selected on the grounds that they constituted exceptional instances 
in which the stability discourse was used to legitimate the CCP's authority. Moreover, 
in each of these three instances, the challenge to the Party's power was different and, 
as such, carrying an analysis of how the stability discourse was used in each of these 
instances would hopefully lead to a more complete understanding of the discourse. 
Looking ahead to the empirical section of the dissertation, the following three 
chapters will diachronically analyse the use of the stability discourse in chronological 
order, beginning with the Beijing Spring in 1989 in chapter three before moving onto 
analyse its usage in the 1999 "anti-Falun Gong' campaign in chapter four and then 
finally examining the "anti-Japan" demonstrations in 2005 in chapter five. 
lOS 
- - - - - - - - -
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Chapter 3: The 1989 "Beijing Spring" 
Introduction 
This chapter will analyse two editorials from the People's Daily that were published 
in relation to the events of 1989. The term "Beijing Spring" (Beijing zhi chuan) is 
collectively used to refer to both the demonstrations that began soon after the death of 
Hu Yaobang on 15 April and the military suppression that brought these 
demonstrations to an end on 4 June.340 As made clear in the previous chapter, the 
decision to focus on this particular period is because the demonstrations that took 
place in 1989 constituted a fundamental challenge to the authority of the CCP. Indeed, 
by the time martial law had been imposed on 4 June, what had begun as small 
demonstrations made up of mostly students and teachers calling for political reforms 
had expanded to include people from various strata throughout Chinese society, 
including even Party cadres,341 demanding democratic change. As such, the 
demonstrations represented a pan-class, region-wide challenge to the leading role of 
the CCP in Chinese society. In light of this challenge to the CCP's authority, the 
intention of analysing the two editorials is to examine how the discourse of stability 
was employed to maintain the Party's legitimacy. 
340 The term "Beijing Spring" was originally given to the pro-democracy and human rights, also known 
as the Democracy Wall Movement, that broke out in Beijing in September 1978. However, in light of 
the fact that it has also been used by academics, amongst others, to refer to the demonstrations that took 
place in 1989, I have opted to use this term, as it more adequately refers to both the demonstrations and 
the military suppression than would be the case with the alternative terms the "Democracy Movement" 
or the ''Tiananmen Massacreffiananmen Incident". Moreover, these alternative terms have also been 
used in a more political explicit manner than has been the case with "Beijing Spring". However, the 
drawback in using this tenn is that it geographically restricts the demonstrations to Beijing and, as a 
result, neglects the demonstrations that took place throughout the country. 
341 According to an internal party audit conducted after the Tiananmen Incident, more than 10 000 
cadres took part in the Beijing demonstrations. See Baum (1994: 276). ' 
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The first article to be analysed in this chapter is entitled "Safeguard the Overall 
Situation, Safeguard Stability" and was published on 29 April. This editorial was 
selected because it was published during the initial demonstrations and, as a result, 
demonstrated how the CCP leadership attempted to use stability to both maintain its 
legitimacy against the challenge posed by the demonstrations and undermine the 
legitimacy of the demonstrators. In contrast, the 4 June editorial, entitled "Stability 
Prevails Over Everything", was published on the first year anniversary of the military 
suppression. Consequently, this editorial was chosen because it demonstrated how the 
CCP leadership attempted to use stability to justify the politically significant decision 
to use military force in order to bring the demonstrations to an end. 
As explained in chapter two, the analyses of the editorials will begin by presenting a 
contextual analysis of the events that situates the publication of the editorial in the 
political context of this period. Following on from this, an intensive analysis of the 
editorial will be carried out at the paragraphicallevel so as to make explicit my 
reading of the text. In this, the aim of this reading is to answer three principal 
questions: 
1. What meaning was given to stability in the editorial? 
2. How did the editorial attempt to persuade the reader of the validity of this meaning? 
3. How did this use of stability relate to the legitimacy of the CCP? 
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29 April Editorial: Contextual Analysis342 
The first article to be analysed is an editorial from the People's Daily entitled 
"Safeguard the Overall Interests, Safeguard Stability" that was published on 29 April 
1989 ?43 The timing of the editorial was significant, in that it came three days after 
another People's Daily editorial, "It is Necessary to Take a Clear-Cut Stand Against 
Tunnoil".344 This earlier editorial represented the fust official response from the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership to the ongoing student demonstrations. 
These protests had begun as mourning for the passing of the fonner Secretary-General 
of the CCP, Hu Yaobang, who had died from a heart attack on 15 April. However, as 
Blecher points out, these demonstrations "quickly went well beyond merely 
honouring a deceased hero. ,,345 Indeed, for Baum, the death of Hu Yaobang provided 
the "catalytic spark,,346 to a set of tensions that had been in evidence throughout parts 
of Chinese society since the middle of the 1980s and which culminated in protests that 
''presented the regime with one of the greatest threats to its power and policies 
encountered in the forty years since the Communists came to power.,,347 
Pre-Tiananmen Tensions 
Such tensions had emerged in response to the deepening changes being brought about 
in the "refonn and opening up" period that began in 1978. The most visible evidence 
of these tensions was seen towards the end of 1986 and into the beginning of 1987 
when students from different universities carried out a series of demonstrations. The 
342 The complexity and varied nature of the events surrounding the Beijing Spring of 1989 is such that I 
do not intend to fully examine them here. Rather, my purpose in briefly detailing them is both to 
demonstrate that the Beijing Spring of 1989, in terms of challenging the legitimacy of the CCP, was not 
an isolated, even if unprecedented, event as well as to provide adequate contextual understanding for 
the textual analysis. 
343 Shelun (29 April 1989). 
344 Shelun (26 April 1989). 
34S Blecher (2003: 100). 
346 Baum (1994: 247). 
347 Manion (1990: xxxvi). 
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initial protests took place in Hefei in Anhui Province and were a reaction to perceived 
CCP interference over individual students' attempts to take part in local elections.348 
However, the demonstrations quickly spread and, in addition to specific grievances 
over the quality of their living and studying conditions, became more concerned with 
the lack of political reform being undertaken by the govemment.349 Demonstrations 
were held in cities across China including Shanghai, Kunming, Chongqing and 
Shenzhen/5o at which, according to Blecher, banners bearing slogans such "long live 
freedom" and "give us democracy" could be seen.351 The leadership of the CCP did 
not respond to this series of protests until a mass rally, organised by Beijing students, 
defied a recently enacted regulation requiring prior approval of demonstrations and 
took place in Tiananmen Square in early January 1987.352 According to Spence, "the 
party hard-liners ... moved swiftly to quash the burgeoning student movement, striking 
not at the students themselves, but at those the students found most inspirational.,,353 
These inspirational figures included academics, such as Fang Lizhi,3s4 and writers, 
such as Liu Binyan and Wang Ruowang, who, in the view of the CCP leadership, 
promulgated ideas that both attacked the Party and encouraged "bourgeois 
348 Saich (2004: 66). 
349 According to He, it was specifically the lack of any political reforms to emerge from the conclusion 
of the Sixth Plenum of the Twelfth Party Congress in September 1986 that caused disaffection amongst 
university students. See He (200 I: 119-120). 
3S0 Spence (1999: 683). Spence estimates that the demonstration in Shanghai consisted of 
approximately 30,000 students as well as 30,000-40,000 Shanghai residents. However, despite the 
apparent show of support in this instance, Saich makes the point that the student demonstrations in 
1986, in general, found little resonance with the wider populace because their grievances, although 
against the policies of the CCP, were perceived as being narrowly concerned with student life. See 
Saich (2004: 66) 
3S1 Blecher (2003: 9 ~ 9 7 ) . .
352 Kwong (1988: 972). 
353 Spence (1999: 684). 
354 Fang was the Vice-President of the University of Science and Technology in Hefei, the site of the 
initial demonstrations, and for Kwong, Fang probably gave support to these protests. Indeed, his name 
appeared on the ballot for the rescheduled election on 29 December. In addition, Blecher claims that a 
lecture tour of several university campuses \Dldertaken by Fang in November 1986 in which he had 
a d v o c ~ t e d d the c o m p l e ~ ~ ' ' w e s t e ~ t i o n ' ' ' o ~ ~China with regard to democracy, human rights and popular 
sovereignty, was also lDstrumentaltn sparking the student demonstrations. See Kwong (1988: 973), 
Blecher (2003: 97). 
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liberalisation". A further casualty of the leadership's response to the student protests 
was CCP Secretary-General, Hu Yaobang. Although Hu resigned following a "self-
criticism of his mistakes on major issues of political principles",355 his resignation 
was widely seen as being forced by the conservative faction within the leadership for 
his perceived softness on "bourgeois liberalisation", as well as his tacit support for the 
student demonstrations.356 However, the manner of his resignation, in that the putative 
leader of the CCP had been forced to issue a "self-criticism" did, according to Spence, 
leave "a bad taste in Chinese mouths". 357 
Although the student demonstrations had been successfully put down by the CCP, the 
tensions that had given rise to them continued to increase and, indeed, were no longer 
solely concerned with the lack of political reforms but also focused on the direction of 
the economic reforms. As a consequence, by 1989, there was, according to Blecher, a 
''palpable air of crisis".35& With regard to the economy, the early successes of the 
reforms had given way to an increasing number of problems. More specifically, these 
problems began to emerge in what Shi has identified as the second stage of economic 
reforms. 359 The beginning of this stage was signalled by the "Decision of "the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China on Reform of the Economic System" 
that was taken at the Third Plenum of the Twelfth Congress in October 1984. In 
contrast to the initial reforms, which were characterised by an emphasis on 
decentralisation and, according to Shi, resulted in a "non-zero sum game", the second 
35S Spence (1999: 685). 
356 Bawn (1994: 247-251). However, Shi contends that it was not solely the conservative faction that 
forced Hu's resignation but rather a ''joint venture" between the reformers and the conservatives. 
Furthermore, this alliance was formed in response to proposals by Hu that intended to punish party 
officials engaged in corruption and "official profiteering" (guandao). See Shi (1990: 1191). 
357 Spence (1999: 697). Saich makes the point that the manner of Hu's resignation left intellectuals in 
particular, disillusioned with the Party leadership, so that "many of the harsh judgements that had been 
reserved for private discussion were thrown into the public domain." See Saich (1994: 258). 
3S8 Blecher (2003: 99). 
359 See Shi (1990: 1188-1190). 
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stage was intended to transform China from a planned to a market economy. However, 
for Shi, this was done ''without fully acknowledging the complex internal dynamics of 
such a transformation or the political and social impact of the proposed changes.,,36o 
Ironically, Shi contends that it was the success of the first stage which contributed to 
the problems encountered in the second one, both in the (over)confidence of the 
leaders to push ahead with the reforms that they believed would generate sufficient 
economic growth to overcome any potential problems and the raised expectations of 
the public which was unprepared for the possibility that the reforms could create 
losers as well as winners.361 
The centrepiece of this second stage was the introduction of price reform, in which 
the state's control over pricing was to be replaced by that of the market. The Decision 
announced at the Third Plenum made clear the importance of price reform to 
continued economic reform by stating that, "[t]he various aspects of the reform in 
economic structure, including the planning and wage systems, depend to a large 
extent on reform of the price system. Pricing is a most effective means of regulation, 
and national prices constitute an important condition for ensuring a dynamic yet not 
chaotic economy. Therefore reform of the price system is the key to reform of the 
entire economic structure.,,362 However, before moving towards a system in which all 
prices would be set through market interactions, the leadership opted for a "dual-
track" pricing system, in which the price of certain goods would still be 
administratively determined. In line with the gradual expansion of commodities that 
were subject to market pricing, in May 1988, the leadership choose to expand price 
reforms to the foodstuffs of meat, vegetables, fruit and sugar. According to Stavis, 
360 8hi (1990: 1189). 
361 Shi (1990: 1189). 
362 Beijing Review, vo1.27, no.44 (29 October 1984), p.viii, as cited in Chan (1987: 98). 
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"[ c ]hinese leaders were very much aware that sharp increases in food prices [had] 
sparked politically destabilizing strikes and demonstrations in Poland and other 
countries.,,363 Despite this, by the middle of May, prices in non-staple foods had risen 
by 24.2% while the price of vegetables increased by 49.7%.364 Although food 
subsidies were issued to certain groups by the government in an attempt to mitigate 
the rise in food prices,365 the effect of the price refonn, along with the panic buying 
that accompanied it,366 was to strengthen the inflationary pressures that were already 
in the economy.367 
Despite a period of economic retrenchment towards the end of 1988 that was intended 
to cool the economy, by 1989, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was 
experiencing the highest level of inflation in its history, with the rate above 20% in 
some urban areas. 368 For many workers, the rate of inflation was outpacing the 
increase in wages and merely strengthened the impression that the economic refonns 
were leaving them worse off.369 This impression was created as the refonn process 
brought an end to the welfare system of the "iron rice bowl". Principally, this came 
through the implementation of a contract-based system of employment for workers, 
which was intended to remove the guarantee of lifetime employment and so improve 
the productivity of enterprises. However, enterprises also functioned as the provider 
363 Stavis (1990: 41). 
364 Ibid., p. 41. 
365 These groups were college students, technical students, government workers, workers in state-run 
enterprises, retirees, and minority nationalities. See Stavis (1990: 41). 
366 Spence notes that the high level of inflation caused outbreaks of panic buying and hoarding of goods, 
adding to the sense of crisis in China at the time. See Spence (1999: 692-694). 
367 According to Stavis, the official price index rose by 8.8 percent in 1985. 6 percent in 1986, and 
between 7.3 to 9.7 percent in 1987. He attributes the high inflation to the increases in wages for state 
workers. increase in availability of credit, increase in the money supply as well as an increase in 
investments. See Stavis (1990: 40). • 
368 Shi also cites the urban cost-of-living index which rose by nearly 40% in 1988 as evidence of high 
inflation at the time. See Shi (1991: 1190). 
369 Stavis cites the 1988 Economic and Social Development Communique issued by the State Statistics 
Bureau as showing that approximately 35% of families in 13 w-ban cities experienced a decline in their 
living standards. See Stavis (1990: 41). 
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of welfare services, such as medical care and housing, to their employees and a 
further effect of this change was to make workers' access to these services less secure. 
As Saich sums up, "[e]ssentially, urban workers were offered a deal that involved 
giving up their secure, subsidy-supported low-wage lifestyle for a risky contract-
based system that might result in higher wages at the possible price of rising costs and 
unemployment.,,37o And although Saich contends that, prior to the Beijing Spring, 
workers decided to "reserve judgement" ,371 a number of strikes and slowdowns by 
workers did take place from 1985 onwards.372 
This negative impression of the economic reforms was further compounded by the 
perception that party officials were abusing their political position to engage in 
widespread corruption, in particular, a form of corruption dubbed "official 
profiteering" (guandao). This type of corruption was made possible through the 
exploitation of the "dual-track" system set up for the policy of price reform that 
created both a free market price and a lower, administratively determined, price and 
involved both lower-level officials as well as, indirectly at the very least, leaders at 
the highest level. According to Stavis, lower-level officials' participation extended to 
accepting bribes from companies to sell them allocations of the lower-priced goods, 
from which profits could be made by reselling the goods at the higher market price.373 
Shi also points out that the link to higher level officials came frotn the fact that many 
of the companies to whom these lower priced goods were being sold were family 
members and relatives.374 Indeed, so severe was the perception amongst large parts of 
the populace that this type of corruption was taking place that Saich contends it had 
370 Saich (2004: 70-71). 
371 Ibid., p. 71. 
312 Blecher (2003: 95-97). 
373 Stavis (1990: 41). 
374 Shi (1990: 1190). 
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the effect of eroding "any vestigial notions that the party was a moral force in Chinese 
society. ,,375 
In addition to the economic problems that were escalating across China during this 
period, tensions were also becoming more apparent within the leadership of the CCP. 
By 1989, Blecher notes that the leadership "was widely known to be weak and 
divided.,,376 Indeed, Baum has characterised the political dynamic of the reform 
process throughout the 1980s as being marked by cycles of "letting go" (fang) and 
"tightening up" (shou).377 These cycles were considered to indicate whether the 
"reform" or "conservative" faction held sway within the leadership at a particular time. 
Periods of liberalisation were understood as periods in which the "reform" faction was 
decisive while periods of conservatism implied that the "conservative" faction was 
more powerful. As well as giving rise to political infighting, the effect of these cycles 
of "letting go" and "tightening up" was to create uncertainty over the future direction 
of China amongst the public and this was further heightened by the relatively open 
debate on the subject that took place within the media during this period.378 
Alongside these tensions, Spence also points out that 1989 was a symbolic year for 
revolution, marking not only the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution but also 
the 70th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement as well as the 40th year of the 
m Saich (2004: 71). Figures for 1987 showed that approximately 150,000 CCP members had been 
punished for corruption, with 25,000 also being expelled from the party altogether. What is not known 
is how many members were investigated in total. See Spence (1999: 694). 
376 Blecher (2003: 99). 
377 See Baum (1994). 
37. Petracca and Xiong highlight the debate between proponents of neo-authoritarianism and democracy 
in the People's Daily and Guangming Daily from the middle of 1988 until the government crackdown 
in June 1989 as making "China's urban intellectuals, students, and workers '" believe that "all is 
possiblc"." Sec Pctracca and Xiong (1990: 1100). 
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founding of the PRC.379 Indeed, according to Manion, "[e]ven before Hu's 
death ... student activists at Beijing University had begun organizing a big 
prodemocracy demonstration for the anniversary of the 1919 May Fourth 
Movement.,,38o As a consequence, when Hu's death was announced, it was not 
surprising that students mobilised so quickly to express their grievances, especially 
given the fact that Hu' s official obituary ignored their calls for a reassessment of his 
career by omitting any reference to his resignation as CCP Secretary-General in 
1987.381 
The Outbreak of Protests 
The first indication that the mourning by students for Hu' s passing was becoming 
more political came two days after the announcement of 15 April when hundreds of 
students, as well as teachers, from the University of Political Science and Law went to 
Tiananmen Square to lay wreaths in commemoration at the foot of the Monument to 
the People's Heroes. However, in actions that had echoes in those that took place in 
the same space during the commemoration for Zhou Enlai on Qingming festival in 
1976, the students and teachers also used the opportunity to shout slogans such as 
"long live democracy", "long love freedom", "long live the rule of law" and "down 
with corruption".382 The following day, thousands of students from Beijing University 
and People's University gathered in Tiananmen Square and listened to a series of 
impromptu speeches on political reform. After the speeches had ended, hundreds of 
students also remained behind and staged a sit-in in front of the Great Hall of the 
379 Spence (1999: 696). 
310 Manion (1990: xv). 
381 Ash (1989: 667). 
312 Ibid., p. xv. This is not to suggest that, either in size or political significance, these actions were 
directly comparable to those that occurred in the "April Fifth" Movement (stwu YUlldollg) but rather 
that, on both occasions, the performance of grievance became a political moment. 
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People.383 However, it was not until 20 April, when approximately ten thousand 
students massed in front of Xinhuamen and attempted to gain entrance to the 
leadership's residential compound at Zhongnanhai, that clashes between students and 
armed military guards took place.384 The students had a list of five issues that they 
wished to present to the Party leaders for discussion concerning a re-evaluation of the 
1986 demonstrations and Hu's role in these demonstrations, the financial dealings of 
the leaders and their relatives, political freedoms as well as funding for tertiary 
education.385 Needless to say, their list was not presented to the leaders. 
The occasion ofHu Yaobang's memorial service on 22 April presented another 
opportunity for these demands to be communicated to the Party leadership. Indeed, 
according to Esherick and Wasserstrom, "[i]n the People's Republic, memorial 
services for important political leaders are ... critical political moment[s]" on 8.9count 
of the fact that the memorial service requires space to be given to public mourning 
and so opens up the potential for destabilising volatility.386 With thousands of 
mourners congregated in Tiananmen Square, the students again attempted to petition 
the government to meet with them and discuss their concerns. This petition took the 
fonn of three students kneeling on the steps of the Great Hall of the People, where the 
memorial service for Hu was taking place, requesting to be received by the Premier, 
Li Pengo For Oksenberg and Sullivan, this perfonnance was "consciously emulating 
the way virtuous but loyal censors remonstrated in imperial times to petition the 
383 Manion (1990: xv). 
384 Blecher (2003: 100). 
385 Ibid., p. 100. 
386 Emerick and Wasserstrom (1992: 33). Oksenberg and Sullivan point out that, as Hu was not a 
prominent leader in the Party at the time of his death. it was not necessary to hold a memorial service .. 
Consequently, they speculate that it may have been held in order to mollify the public. See Oksenberg 
and Sullivan (1990: 190). . 
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govemment.,,387 However, the petition was not received by Li Peng but, instead, by 
two members of the funeral committee and Manion notes that the students 
"considered that response inadequate and even humiliating. ,,388 
The following day, the students released a seven point petition (qitiao). In addition to 
the five demands issued on 20 April, the students also called for legislation to ensure 
press freedoms that would, amongst other things, allow the accurate reporting of their 
demonstrations as well as a full enquiry, along with public disclosure of the results, 
into the violence towards the students outside Xinhuamen by the anned military 
guards on 20 April. 389 The further significance of this petition came from the fact that 
it was released on behalf of the students by the Preparatory Committee for Beijing 
Autonomous Union of Students. This committee was made up of representatives from 
nineteen Beijing colleges and universities and, in addition to defying a government 
ban on autonomous organisations, it signalled that these demonstrations were both 
bigger in size and better organised than those that had taken place in 1986. 
The 26 April Editorial, 
As previously stated, the first official response from the government came on 26 April 
with the publication of the People's Daily editorial entitled "It is Necessary to Take a 
Clear-Cut Stand Against Tunnoil" and Blecher contends that it marked a "turning 
point" in the direction of the Beijing Spring.390 The importance of this editorial 
derived from the fact that it was based on an 'unpublished' speech given by Deng 
387 Okscnberg with Sullivan (1990: x). Spence also considered the students' act to be ''ritualistic but 
sincere"; however, for Blecher, although appearing to follow the protocol from imperial times the 
students were doing so ''mockingly''. See Spence (1990: 698), Blecher (2003: 100). ' 
3S8 Manion (1990: xv). 
389 'd . ,. lb. ., pp. XVl-XVll. 
390 Blecher (2003: 100). 
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Xiaoping on April 25,391 and, as such, represented the verdict of China's paramount 
leader on the student movement. 392 In light of this, Manion asserts that the editorial 
"had to be taken seriously.,,393 The verdict given in the editorial was that the student 
movement constituted "turmoil" and was the work of "an extremely small number of 
people with ulterior motives" who were attempting ''to sow dissension among the 
people, plunge the whole country into chaos and sabotage the political situation of 
stability and unity.,,394 The editorial also stated that the "turmoil" was a "planned 
conspiracy" whose "essence is to once and for all negate the leadership of the CCP 
and the socialist system.,,395 
Oksenberg, Sullivan and Lambert describe the 26 April editorial as "[u]nequivocally 
tough and ... signaled the intent of conservative leaders to crack down.,,396 This intent 
was signalled through the reference in the editorial to "an extremely small number of 
people with ulterior motives". Although the identification of these people was 
unclear,397 Wang Ruowang notes that this usage was similar in construction to "a 
handful of people", which was "consistently used by Mao before he went all-out to 
attack people.,,398 It was also redolent ofDeng Xiaoping's labelling of the Democracy 
Wall activists as "bad elements", which served as a pretext for suppressing the 
391 Despite this speech being 'unpublished', Manion contends that it was "common knowledge" in 
Beijing that the editorial came from a speech by Deng. See Manion (1990: xx) 
392 Zhang and Krauss contend that this verdict "directed the news angle-set the agenda-for China's 
~ e s s s concerning the movement." See Zhang and Krauss (1995: 416). 
93 Manion (1990: xx). Indeed, Manion notes that a further indication of its importance was the fact that 
it was also televised nationally on the national evening news on 25th April. 
394 Shelun (26 April 1989). 
395lbid. 
396 Oksenberg and Sullivan (1990: 191). 
397 Suggestions include the student leaders responsible for organising the protests, intellectuals 
''inspiring'' the protests and whom the CCP had targeted after the student demonstrations in 1986 or 
even leaders within the CCP. who were manipulating the protests for their own political gain. 
391 Wang (16 May 1989). 
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Movement.399 Alongside the use of this label, the editorial also classified the student 
demonstrations as constituting "turmoil" (dongluan).4oo Brook comments that the term 
"signifies a chaotic condition that works against the good order of society. Nothing 
good can come out of turmoil; life can proceed only when tunnoil subsides.'.401 In 
addition, the use of "turmoil" in the editorial was politically significant. Whereas the 
student protests in 1986 had been officially classified as ' ' t r o u b l e ~ m a k i n g ' ' ' (naoshit02, 
the term "turmoil" had been previously used to describe the " c o u n t e r ~ r e v o l u t i o n a r y " "
activities of the "Gang of Four" (siren bang) during the Cultural Revolution. As a 
consequence, by using the same description for the student demonstrations, the 
leadership was stating that they viewed them as comparable.403 Not only did this 
comparison attempt to discredit the aims of the student movement but, for Wang 
Ruowang, it was intended ''to arouse the people's strong aversion.,.404 
The comparison with the Cultural Revolution by CCP leaders was based not so much 
on the content ofthe student demonstrations but rather its size and organisation. As 
Manion points out, "[t]he big character posters, unofficial students organizations, and 
link-ups with other units and cities recalled for many older officials the tactics of 
student Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution.'.40S However, for the students, such a 
comparison caused disbelief as well as anger. They believed that their actions, far 
399 Zhang and Krauss make the point that this tactic has been used since imperial times: "[i]n traditional 
China, the Emperor always labelled the opponent force as ''bandits'', "robbers", or ''betrayers'' and the 
like, and then eliminated them." See Zhang and Krauss (1995: 417). 
400 The term dongluan is also translated as "disturbance" in some publications, such as Shi (1990) and 
Baum (1994). Regardless of the preferred English translation. however, all publications agree on the 
s i ~ f i c a n c e e of its political usage. 
40 Brook (1992: 4). 
402 Baum(1994: 249). 
403 Wasserstrom notes that the negative connotations of this term pre-dated the Cultural Revolution 
decade: "Long before the cataclysmic events that those alive today lived through, the tenns for chaos 
were already enshrined as pejorative descriptions for anything that threatened the stability and security 
of the community." See Wasserstrom (1994: 289). 
404 Wang (16 May 1989). 
405 Manion (1990: xvii). 
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from presenting a counter-revolutionary challenge to the Party's leadership,406 were 
patriotic and, by drawing the government's attention to issues which needed reform, 
would contribute to the CCP-Ied revolution. Indeed, this belief on the part of the 
students had been, in part, encouraged by the CCP leaders. In response to what had 
taken place during the Cultural Revolution, Manion points out that, the leaders "had 
acknowledged ... that the country could benefit from more consultative politics-
encouraging people to voice suggestions and criticism about problems including 
mistakes and abuses in leadership. ,,407 Furthermore, the students had grown up in a 
period of ideological flux, in which the emphasis on the correct theoretical 
formulations (tifa) of communism that had marked the first thirty years of the PRe 
was being challenged by a new orthodoxy that emphasised the importance of practical 
results. This new emphasis was expressed in political slogans, such as "seek truth 
from facts", "emancipate the mind" and "practice is the sole criterion of truth", which 
accompanied the launching of economic reforms and suggested that socialism was 
now more flexible than had been the case during the period under Mao.408 However, 
as would be clearly demonstrated on 3-4 June, this view was not shared by the CCP 
leadership. As Manion makes clear, "[a]lthough the authorities had granted the 
masses the right and provided the means to raise opinions, they had more or less 
reserved a monopoly on defining and imposing solutions,,409 
406 Shi contends the student movement should not be characterised as "demonstration" but 
''remonstration'', as this tenn implies "a claim to criticize and disagree with the policy of the 
government but without any intention or plan for replacing that government with one composed of its 
critics." See Shi (1990: 1195). 
407 In order to facilitate this, the Party set up and reinstated various practices, such as Party discipline 
inspection commissions and local people's congresses as well as "mass organisations" for groups 
within society like students, workers and women. See Manion (1990: xxii). 
408 Zhao contends that the campaign to ''reassess'' Maoism brought about the unintended effect of the 
''three crises of faith" (crisis of faith in socialism; crisis of faith in Marxism; and crisis of faith in the 
CCP). See Zhao (1998: 288). 
409 Manion (1990: xxii). 
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The publication of the strongly-worded 26 April editorial, which was intended to 
quell the protests, had the opposite effect upon the students and they responded by 
organising the largest demonstration in the history of the PRC.410 On 27 April, 
approximately 100,000 students from 40 universities marched to Tiananmen Square, 
where they were joined by citizens to make up 500,000 demonstators.411 As Shi points 
out, "[t]he decision makers of the CCP had never thought the demonstrations would 
reach such a scale,.412 and it is in this context that the 29 April editorial will be 
analysed. 
410 Sbi (1990: 1197). 
411 Manion (1990: xxv). 
412 Ibid., p. 1197. 
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29 April Editorial: Selection of Data 
The 29 April commentary was selected following a number of searches that were 
conducted within the available categories in the People's Daily database.413 The time 
frame in which the search was carried out was a five and a half week period beginning 
on 26 April 1989 and ending on 4 June 1989. The selection of26 April 1989 was 
made on account of the fact that this was the date on which the infamous editorial 
labelling the demonstrations as causing "turmoil" (dongluan) was published and, as 
pointed out in the contextual analysis, it marked a "turning point" in the nature of the 
demonstrations against the government. As for the end date of 4 June, this was chosen 
because it marked the date on which the military suppression of the demonstrations at 
Tiananmen Square began. As explained in the chapter two, the intention of these 
searches was to begin with the broadest possible search before adding more specific 
criteria that would allow for the number of hits to be reduced to the point where the 
most suitable articles could be selected. However, as made clear throughout the thesis, 
the selection of an article was not based solely on the ordered results of the People's 
Daily database search but was also dependent on other variables, such as the political 
significance of the article as well as the relevance of its content to the stability 
discourse. Moreover, the relative weighting of these variables was not subject to 
statistical calculation but rather, in keeping with the discourse-historical approach, 
was determined by the judgement of the analyst. A further consideration specific to 
this search period was that some journalists, particularly at the People IS Daily, 
dissented from the government line and even went so far as to join protestors in 
demonstrating against the government. Indeed, Brendebach states that "[ n Jews 
workers played a vital role to generate the atmosphere of political change by joining 
413 As detailed in chapter two, these c a t e ~ o r i e s s are: date (riql); headline (biaotJ); page number (bane;)-
edition (banming); author (zuozhe); special column (zhuanian); text (zhengwen). ' 
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the protests.,,414 Consequently, given that the aim of this thesis is to analyse the 
government's use of the stability discourse, the editorial or commentary selected for 
analysis will be one which closely follows its line. 
The first search to be conducted was a keyword search for the term "stability" in the 
selected time period. From a total of 3,546 articles that were published during this 
period, 230 articles featured this keyword. The first result was an editorial that was 
published on 29 April entitled "Safeguard the Overall Situation, Safeguard Stability", 
in which "stability" was mentioned a total of 19 times.41S Moreover, according to the 
People's Daily ratings system, this article had a relevancy rating of 100%. The second 
article on the list was a staff commentary entitled "Jointly Safeguard the Stability of 
the Overall Situation" that was published on 23 Apri1.416 This article, which had a 
relevancy score of 95%, mentioned "stability" 6 times. The remaining articles in the 
first ten hits consisted of minor news items and articles covering Li Peng's meeting 
with student demonstrators. 
The second search to be conducted added the additional criterion of searching for 
articles that contained the term "stability" in the headline. As pointed out in chapter 
two, making use of this criterion is based on the understanding that the headline 
generally indicates the most important topic to be addressed in the article.417 However, 
though my research suggests that the inclusion of stability in the headline does not 
always ensure that the concept is the central focus of the article, its absence from the 
414 Indeed, because of this and, in a move that reflected the importance of the media's role in China, it 
was journalists rather than students who were the first target of the post-Tiananmen purging campaign 
(qingcha), with 597 out of the 700 editorial staff at the People's Daily's ''blacklisted'' and a further four 
members imprisoned. See Brendebach (2005: 41). 
415 Shehm (29 April 1989). 
416 Benbao Pinglunyuan (11 May 1989). 
417 van Dijk (1985: 69). 
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headline does indicate that the concept will not feature prominently enough to make 
intensive analysis worthwhile. Of the 26 articles that featured "stability" both as a 
keyword and in the headline, the first two results were the same as those produced by 
the first search while the remaining articles in the first ten results again consisted of 
minor news items and articles covering Li Peng's meetings with student 
demonstrators. 
The final search to be conducted was to restrict the headline and keyword search to 
include only those editorials and commentaries published on the first page of the 
People's Daily. As acknowledged in chapter two, though these articles are not 
necessarily more influential than those published on other pages of the newspaper, 
their placement on the first page did signify that they were more likely to represent 
the authority of the top leadership of the CCP.418 Of the ten articles to be returned in 
the search results for this time period, the first article, with a relevancy rating of 100%, 
was, once again, the 29 April editorial. The second result was also the same as in the 
previous searches. Of the remaining articles in the list, only the fourth result was an 
editorial or a commentary reprinted copy of an editorial from Liberation Army Daily 
(Jiefang Junbao) entitled "Important Measures to Safeguard the Capital's and the 
Country's Stability" that was published on 22 May.419 This article, which was 
concerned with the measures put in place following the declaration of martial law on 
20 May, had a relevancy rating of 76% and mentioned "stability" a total of 14 times. 
Following the searches, the article selected for intensive analysis was the 29 April 
editorial. In addition to being the first result in all of the database searches, this 
418 Wu (1994). 
419 Shclun (22 May 1989). 
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editorial was selected for its political significance, in that it provided a clear example 
of how the CCP leadership attempted to use stability during the initial stages of the 
protests to both maintain its legitimacy against the challenge posed by the 
demonstrations and undennine the legitimacy of the demonstrators. 
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29 April Editorial: Textual Analysis420 
"Safeguard the Overall Situation, Safeguard Stability" 
As explained in chapter two, the headline indicates the most important topic of an 
article. In the case of the 29 April editorial, the headline suggested that safeguarding 
the overall situation and stability would be the central focus. Moreover, the headline 
was presented as an emphatic statement, which not only worked to establish the 
authority of the editorial but also instructed the reader to follow its order.421 In this, 
the reference to the "overall situation" appeared intended to minimise the specific 
grievances of the demonstrators, in particular the list of criticisms (qitiao) made at the 
27 April protest,422 by directing the reader to place them in a wider context. The use 
of the tenn "safeguard" in the headline also worked to achieve several effects. Firstly, 
the tenn "safeguard" was employed as an anaphora that served to establish a 
corresponding relationship between the two clauses, in which the "safeguarding" of 
stability was presented as a necessary condition for the "safeguarding" of the overall 
situation. Secondly, the term "safeguard" functioned as a militaristic metaphor that 
conveyed the impression that stability and the overall situation were under attack and, 
as such, needed to be "defended". Taken together, the headline for the 29 April 
editorial used stability to legitimate the authority of the CCP by making the claim that 
to threaten stability was to threaten the overall situation. Conversely, by drawing on 
van Dijk's concept of political implicatures, this headline also worked to delegitimate 
the demonstrators, as the use of the "overall situation" obscured their criticisms and, 
420 Shehm (29 April 1989). The intention of this translation has not been to necessarily produce the 
most fluent English translation but rather one that closely conveys the meaning and Structure of the 
Chinese original. For the Chinese original, see the Appendix section. 
421 When considering the ''reader'' of the editorial, it is important to remember that the editorial is 
intended to persuade not just those demonstrating against the government but also Party cadres and 
members of the public, for whom infonnation about the demonstrations are limited at best, of the 
validity of its claims. 
421 It should be noted that the list of demands/criticisms made by the demonstrators varied in number 
and scope as the movement progressed. 
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in so doing, enabled the act of demonstrating to be portrayed as responsible for 
threatening this stability. Furthermore, this de legitimation was strengthened by the use 
of a nominalised form of stability in the headline. According to Fowler, 
nominalisation takes place when predicates are "realized syntactically" as nouns.423 
One possible effect of this transformation is, what Fowler terms, mystification.424 
Consequently, in the headline of the 29 April editorial, the nominalised usage of 
"stability" functioned to mystify both what constituted stability as well as who was 
threatening this stability, with the effect that the space in which to challenge the claim 
made in the headline was closed off and so the negative implicature that the 
demonstrators were threatening stability was allowed to go uncontested. 
(J)China needs stability. (2) At present, the great issue of overall interest above 
everything else is to maintain social stability. (3)Ignoring and departingfrom this 
issue of overall interests can only bring disasters to the nation and the state. 
The first paragraph of the editorial was typographically distinct from the proceeding 
six paragraphs, on account of the fact that, while they were all of a similar length, this 
paragraph was substantially shorter. Furthermore, this difference in length can be 
attributed to the different functions that they, performed within the editorial, in that the 
first paragraph provided a summary of the stability discourse that the following 
paragraphs elaborated upon. The first paragraph began by declaring that "China needs 
stability", wherein the toponym "China" worked to complement the use of the 
"overall situation" in the headline by linking the threat to stability with the future of 
the nation. Moreover, the editorial deployed this populist toponym in order to create 
consensus amongst the readership and so, while claiming to speak on behalf of the 
423 Such a distinction is less clear-<:ut in Chinese than in English, where it is more common for verbs 
and adjectives to function as nouns and vice versa. That said, the entry for wending in hanying cidian 
lists it only as an adjective and a verb. . 
424 See Fowler (1991: 78-81). 
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Chinese people, the editorial was also directing them to accept this proposition. The 
first sentence of the paragraph also worked to impress the significance of the threat to 
stability, as the use of "needs" semantically implied that China does not have stability. 
Indeed, this impression is reinforced by use of the temporal marker "at present" at the 
start of the second sentence, which also suggested that the threat to stability was a 
current concern. The collocation of "social stability" put forward in the second 
sentence then located this present threat to stability amongst the people and, so, as 
with the headline, implicated the demonstrators as the source of this threat. The 
second sentence also worked to emphasise the importance of the threat to stability 
with the declaration that maintaining social stability is the "great issue of overall 
interest above everything else". Indeed, employing van Leeuwen's typology of 
legitimating strategies that was detailed in chapter two, this declaration, in making an 
intertextual reference to Deng Xiaoping's proclamation that "stability prevails over 
everything,,425, can be identified as "authorization", as it makes use ofDeng's 
personal authority to persuade the reader of its importance.426 The final sentence of 
the paragraph attempted to justify the preceding claim of the second sentence by 
warning of the consequences ifit was not followed. Employing the topos of chaos, 
this sentence imagined that "disasters" will be brought upon ''the nation and the state" 
and so, as with the first sentence, attempts to link the threat to stability with the future 
of the nation. Indeed, the likelihood of this scenario is strengthened by the collocation 
of the modal verb "can" and the singular adjective "only", which worked to privilege 
this particular vision of future reality over any alternative.427 However, the lack of 
specific details to substantiate it meant that, as Gill points out, ''the force of the 
425 According to He, Deng flfSt made this statement on 26 February 1989 when meeting with President 
Bush during his visit of China. See He (2001; 471-472). For the original statement, see Deng (1993: 
284). 
426 van Leeuwen (2007: 94) .. 
427 Dunmire (2005). 
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argument rests on rhetoric alone. ,,428 In tenns of legitimation, the first paragraph 
followed on from the headline in delegitimating ~ h e e demonstrators by implicating the 
act of demonstrating as the threat to stability, which, in the paragraph, is projected 
against whole nation, while the criticisms of the demonstrators are, in the words of 
Wodak and van Leeuwen, "rhetorically eliminated".429 As a consequence, this use of 
stability again worked to strengthen the authority of the CCP by undennining the 
possibility of change. 
(l)Since the beginning of this century, China has experiencedfar too much turmoil. 
(2) During the first half of the century, the political rule of imperialism, feudalism and 
bureaucratic capitalism brought frequent chaos with war, hunger and famine here 
and there and resulted in a state in which our people had no means of livelihood. 
(3) Since the founding of new China, the country has achieved unity, and the nation has 
gained independence. (4) We have the conditions for stability and construction. (5) Due 
to our mistakes in providing subjective guidance, we have wasted more than ten years. 
(6) If we count the number of years, it has only been some 20 years that we have stable 
conditions under which to truly engage in construction. (7)The reason for China's 
economy being so backward now and the currently restrained development of China's 
politics and culture is due to many objective factors. (8) In addition to the historical 
conditions, which constitute the main cause, that the nation's construction period has 
been too short is also an important factor. (9) However, in the more than ten years 
since the Third Plenary Session of the 11 th CCP Central Committee, the reason that it 
has been possible to implement the correct guidelines and policies, the reason that it 
has been possible to smoothly carry out the reform programme, and the reason that it 
has been possible for the achievements in construction to be obvious to all is due to 
the most important condition of maintaining social stability. (lO)This kind of stable 
situation is the result of joint efforts made by people throughout the whole country. 
(11) Stability is not easy to achieve. (12) What would happen without stability? (H) It is not 
difficult for all those responsible people with intellect, including the broad masses of 
young people, to draw conclusions from the recent turmoil in Xi 'an and Changsha. 
(14) If we let such regional turmoil spread unchecked then a promising China will 
become a hopeless China. (l5)This is something that the people of the country would 
hate to see. 
The second paragraph moved away from concern over the present threat of stability to· 
expand upon the proposition, made in the second sentence of the first paragraph, that 
stability was ''the great issue of overall ,interest" . In order to do this, the paragraph 
418 Gill (2000: 184). 
429 Wodak and van Leeuwen (2002: 365). 
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attempted to demonstrate the importance of stability by presenting it in a transitional 
narrative that moved between China's past, present and future. The first part ofthe 
paragraph was concerned with China's past and represented an example of ''using the 
past to serve the present". Indeed, this treatment of history can be viewed in terms of, 
what Cao refers to as, the dual strategy of "active forgetting" and "selective memory". 
For Cao, the strategy of "active forgetting" involves the omission of ''what is 
inconvenient" while that of "selective memory" works to include ''what is 
convenient".430 The paragraph began by stating that "China has experienced far too 
much turmoil" in the past century. However, within this straightforward description, 
the intertextual use of the term ''turmoil'', which had been used in the 26 April 
editorial, worked to politically implicate the ongoing demonstrations within this 
history of "turmoil" and, in so doing, reminded the reader of the negative effects of 
this'turmoil. In terms of legitimation, this use of historical comparison seemed 
intended to de legitimate the demonstrations by linking the label of "turmoil" to a 
discourse of morally negative values.431 As for the intertextuality of "turmoil", it 
suggested that this editorial, rather than signalling a change in the verdict of "turmoil" 
that had been demanded by the demonstrators on 27 April, was published in order to 
explain more fully why the CCP leadership had reached such a verdict in the 26 April 
editorial.432 
The second sentence followed on from the first by highlighting the negative effects 
that instability had caused in China's past. Moreover, the use of emotive vocabulary 
in this sentence seemed intended to rhetorically heighten the imagery of instability in 
430 Cao (1999). 
431 van Leeuwen (2007: 99). 
432 The 26 April editorial was a relatively short article (comprising only I, 288 characters) and did little 
to explain how the CCP leadership had arrived at this verdict. Rather it relied on the leadership's 
authority to persuade the readership that its claims were valid. See Shelun (26 April 1989). 
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this period. However, the deployment of a temporal marker at the beginning of this 
sentence worked to confine these examples of instability to the period before the CCP 
took power. Furthermore, the identification of imperialism, feudalism and 
bureaucratic capitalism as the causes of this instability, presented as "morally 
abstract" concepts, seemed intended to delegitimate these politico-economic systems 
and so, indirectly, legitimate that of the CCP. This strategy of positive self-
presentation and negative other presentation was continued in the third sentence by 
linking the founding of the People's Republic of China to the positive values of unity 
and independence while the fourth sentence semantically implies that these values had 
created ''the conditions for stability and construction" and so enabled the editorial to 
assert a positive association between stability and the party-state. The fourth sentence 
also attempted to strengthen the causal relationship between stability and construction 
that was put forward, albeit in the negative form, in the second sentence and, in so 
doing, implicitly suggested that "construction" is the main objective in people's lives. 
This point concerning "construction" was further developed in the fifth and sixth 
sentences; however, in contrast to the previous sentences in the paragraph, use is 
made of negative events that had taken place within the history of the PRC. The fifth 
sentence made the admission that "mistakes" have happened under the leadership of 
the CCP over a period of more than ten years and, taken together with the claim in the 
following sentence that construction had only been possible in stable conditions for 
approximately twenty years, ~ e e political implicature was that these tnistakes took 
place with the Great Leap Forward experiment and the Cultural Revolution. The 
claim of approximately twenty years of stable conditions then appears to roughly refer 
to the periods from 1949 until 1957, 1962 to 1965 and 1978 to 1989. The underlying 
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nature of this comparison appears to be that the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural 
Revolution were periods of instability that caused China to experience negligible 
economic growth whereas the periods of stability enabled China to achieve high 
economic growth. Consequently, the propagation of this link between economic 
growth and-stability worked to obscure alternative explanations that would challenge 
this simplified account of PRC history and, in so doing, attempted to strengthen the 
legitimacy of the CCP leadership and its "central task" of economic development. In 
addition, this link also served to delegitimate the demonstrations by suggesting that 
their outcome will be comparable to events, recent in the memory for many Chinese 
people, that had taken place under the previous leaderships of the CCP and which 
resulted in instability along with negligible economic growth. 
This link between economic growth and stability was further emphasised in the next 
three sentences of the paragraph. In particular, it was made most forcefully in the 
ninth sentence, which claims that all the "successes" that had taken place since the 
Third Plenum could be attributed to the "most important condition of maintaining 
stability". Furthermore, the persuasiveness of this claim was heightened through the 
rhetorical strategy of parallelism, in which three successive clauses within the 
sentence employed the same lexical formulation of "the reason that it has been 
possible ... ". Alongside this strategy of parallelism, the ninth sentence also featured 
morally evaluative adjectives and adverbs that worked to strengthen the positive self-
presentation of the leadership's successes. Consequently, the "guidelines and 
policies" were presented as being "correct", the "reform programme" had been carried 
out "smoothly", while the task of construction had been marked by "achievements". 
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The final part of the paragraph began by stating that stability comes from the "joint 
efforts" of ''people throughout the country". The effect of this statement was to place 
responsibility for maintaining stability onto "the people" while, at the same time, 
working to deny other possible explanations for why stability might be maintained.433 
Again, this particular explanation of stability represented another example of the 
editorial's rhetorical strategy to foreground actions while obscuring possible causes 
for these actions. Indeed, this explanation of stability was reinforced in the following 
sentence with the statement that "stability is not easy to achieve". Using van 
Leeuwen's typology oflegitimating strategies, the declarative tone of this statement, 
as with the previous sentence, could be identified as constituting a "definition" and, as 
such, represented an appeal to a form of theoretical rationalisation. Having defined 
what stability consisted of, the twelfth sentence then poses the rhetorical question of 
"what would happen without stability". As explained in chapter two, rhetorical 
questions constitute an example ofa "linguistic mean" in Wodak's discourse-
analytical approach. More specifically, Fowler points out that, "formulating a 
question on behalf of the addressee is a standard strategy in pedagogic discourse.,,434 
Furthermore, for van der Valk, rhetorical questions are argumentative, in that "[t]hey 
strengthen a claim that is made by forcefully inviting an intended answer and thus 
preventing the opposite answer that is in line with the opponent's arguments,'.435 
The space opened up by the rhetorical question is closed down in the following 
sentence and the use of the term ''turmoil'' to describe the recent outbreaks of violence 
in Xi'an and Changsha worked to equate them with those taking place in Beijing and, 
433 Given the nature of the criticisms made by the demonstrators, one possible explanation might be 
that stability is the result of people's overall satisfaction with the CCP leadership. Indeed, such a 
determination is a close approximation of Weber's conceptualisation oflegitimacy. 
434 Fowler (1991: 189). 
435 van der Valk (2003: 330). 
133 
in so doing, further delegitimate the Beijing demonstrations.436 Indeed, this sentence, 
in referring to "responsible people with intellect" and "the broad masses of young 
people", attempted to persuade the reader towards this negative view of the Beijing 
demonstrations by employing what van Leeuwen identifies as the impersonal 
authority of conformity. However, the negative "conclusions" that the reader was 
impelled to "draw" about demonstrations in the thirteenth sentence were then made 
explicit in the fourteenth sentence. This sentence takes the form of an "if ... then" 
construction and van der Valk identifies this as constituting a "counterfactual 
argument". For van der Valk, it is deployed for "argumentative moves that are based 
on imaginary situations ... [and] are used to persuade the audience of the necessity of 
specific policy measures.,,437 In the case of the fourteenth sentence, the imaginary 
situation of regional turmoil leading to a "hopeless China" seemed intended to both 
further delegitimate the ongoing demonstrations as well as legitimate any possible 
future action that might be taken to suppress them. Indeed, the legitimation of future 
action was rhetorically heightened by the use of the metaphor "spread" in this phrase, 
which implicitly conveyed the negative impression that these demonstrations were 
comparable to that of a medical virus or a wildfire. Furthermore, the combination of 
the pronoun "we" alongside the terms "allow" and ''unchecked'' presented these 
metaphoricalised turmoil as requiring human action in order to prevent them from 
affecting the whole nation. The final sentence of the paragraph complemented the 
legitimation of possible action by claiming that it would have the imprimatur of ''the 
people" while, at the same time, directing the reader to accept this proposition. 
436 During the demonstration in Tiananmen Square on 27 April, protestors did denounce the outbreak of 
violence in these two cities, in part, to avoid those demonstrations being negatively compared to that in 
Beijing. See Manion (1990: xix). 
437 van der Valk (2003: 320). 
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(1) What does China's stability depend on? (2) What does China's economic and social 
development depend on? (3)They dependjirmly on thefour cardinal principles and 
they dependfirmly on reform and opening up. (4) The general guiding principles of the 
four cardinal principles and reform and opening up constitute the foundation for the 
stability and development of our country. (5) These two guiding principles are also the 
basic requirements of the party's theories and line during the primary stage of 
socialism. (6) In contemporary China, all opinions and acts that acknowledge and 
ul:hold these two basic points are beneficial to our social stability and development. 
(?On the other hand, all opinions and acts that go against these two basic points are 
harmful to our social stability and development. (8) China's train of modernisation 
must rely on these two wheels to moveforward. (9)Neither wheel can be separated. 
(10)To all opinions and acts that negate the four cardinal prinCiples, facts have shown 
us that not only must we pay attention to theory and knowledge when carrying out 
serious and conscientious criticism and education, but also that we must adopt even 
firmer measures in our practical work to resolutely stop themfrom spreadin/f;' (ll)We 
must not lower our guard and never give in to connivance or appeasement. 2) Party 
organisations and members must never relax their vigilance on this question of the 
overall situation that concerns the fate of the country. 
The two macropropositions put forward in the second paragraph were that stability is 
necessary for economic growth and that stability is maintained by the people; 
however, the third paragraph linked these two macropropositions by asserting that 
they were both dependent on the leadership of the CCP. In tenns of legitimation, this 
rhetorical move attempted to bolster the authority of the CCP by claiming that its 
leadership had been responsible for the period of stability and economic growth that 
occurred after the Third Plenum in 1978 while also working to delegitimate the 
demonstrations on the grounds that, by causing instability, they were rejecting the 
leadership of the CCP and, in so doing, threatening economic growth. 
The link between the two macropropositions from the second paragraph was 
established at the start of the third paragraph through the posing of two consecutive 
rhetorical questions that used repetitious patterning to generate a relationship of 
equivalence between stability and economic and social development. Furthermore, the 
dialogic quality of these questions opened up the space for the editorial to put forward 
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a new formulation for stability and development which stated that they were 
dependent upon the Four Cardinal Principles (sixiangjiben yuanze) and Reform and 
Opening Up (gaige kaifang).438 The use of these ideological slogans were also 
examples of what Fowler terms "formulaic phrases", in that "they can be strongly 
foregrounded offering conceptual simplicity and memorability ... [and] their simplicity 
provides a packaging of ideas with a very solid and clear outline. ,,439 In the case of the 
Four Cardinal Principles and Reform and Opening Up, the package of ideas that they 
referred to formed part of the political line of "One Centre, Two Basic Points" that 
was set at the 13th Party Congress in 1987. The Four Cardinal Principles and Reform 
and Opening Up constituted the "Two Basic Points" upon which the "One Centre" of 
economic development was dependent. 440 
The programme of Reform and Opening Up was launched at the Third Plenum of the 
11 th Party Congress held in December, 1978.441 In addition to the political ouster of 
Hua Guofeng and the "Whateverist" faction, this Plenum also marked the beginning 
of China's economic reform programme. For Gore, the slogan of Reform and 
Opening Up refers to ''the task of 'liberating and developing the forces of 
production'" that constitutes the basis of the CCP-defined socialism.442 In contrast to 
the economic focus of Reform and Opening Up, the slogan of the-Four Cardinal 
438 Fowler defines dialogism as "an argumentative engagement with the imagined points of view of 
those referred to by the text, and those who read it." See Fowler (1991: 21S). 
439 Fowler (1991: 17S). 
440 Bo (2004: 34). 
441 The use of the term "reform" (gaige) in describing this programme was significant, in that it 
connoted a move away from the "revolutionary" policies pursued under Mao's leadership. Indeed, 
according to Miller, the term ''reform'' was ''previously a dirty word in the Maoist lexicon". As for that 
of "opening up" (kaifang), Lu notes that it had previously been used, albeit in the long-hand form of 
menhu k a i f a ~ g , , to ~ f e r r to the ~ d e e ~ l i C Y Y imposed on ~ h i n a a by America in the late 19th Century. 
Moreover, Kim pomts out that, 10 penod from 1971 until 1975, the comprehensive Chinese-English 
~ c t i O n a r y , , c?mpi.led by f:he B e i j i ~ g g F o ~ i ~ ~ L a n g u a g ~ S S Institute, .defined "menhu kaifang zhengce" as 
" Open Door polIcy (whlch U.S. lmpenaltsm once fOlsted on China to secure the same privileges as 
the other imperialist powers)". See Miller (2007: 6), Lu (1999: 506), Kim (19S1: 463). 
442 Gore (2000). 
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Principles is concerned with the political leadership of the economic reform 
programme. The use of this slogan first occurred in a speech given by Deng Xiaoping 
at the Forum on the Principles for Theoretical Work on 30 March 1979.443 In this 
speech, Deng stated that these principles consisted of: keeping to the socialist road; 
upholding the dictatorship of the proletariat; upholding the leadership of the CCP; and 
upholding Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.444 The significance of the 
Four Cardinal Principles came from the fact that it signalled the intention to suppress 
the "Democracy Wall" Movement and so closed down the possibility of political 
refonn by reasserting the leadership of the CCp.445 Consequently, its usage in this 
editorial also suggested that these new demonstrations calling for political reform 
would be suppressed by the CCP leadership.446 More generally, the promulgation of 
the Four Cardinal Principles and Refonn and Opening Up was reflective ofLu's 
observation that "political slogans are coined to meet the changing need of social 
conditions as well as the need of authorities to establish control.,,447 
The remainder of the third paragraph was concerned with intensifying the relationship 
between stability, development and the "Two Basic Points" and so legitimate the 
Party's leadership while, at the same time, delegitimate the demonstrators by 
implicating them in the negation of this relationship. The fourth sentence made use of 
the metaphor "foundation" to semantically imply that negation of the "Two Basic 
443 Hu (2001: 435). 
444 The ordering of the principles can also be interpreted as politically significant, with the principle 
concerning ideology placed last and so reflecting a move away from ideological dogma towards 
f1;actical results. 
S In order to legitimate the Four Cardinal Principles, Deng used the negative comparison between the 
criticisms made by members of this 'movement' to those made by the Gang of Four and Lin Biao 
during the Cultural Revolution. For Deng's speech, see Deng (1983: 157). For further information on 
the "Democracy Wall" Movement, see Brodsgaard (1981). 
446 The authority of the Four Cardinal Principles was also strengthened in 1982 when it was inserted 
into the CCP Constitution and the PRC Constitution Consequently, violation of the Four Cardinal 
Principles could now be classified as a legal, as well as political, offence. See He (2001: 435). 
447 Lu (1999: 487). 
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Points" would result in the "collapse" of stability and development. The sixth and 
seventh sentences, operating as a pair of contrastive sentences, reinforced this point 
by using the moralised abstractions "beneficial" and "harmful" to present support for 
the "Two Basic Points" and, by extension, the leadership of the CCP, in terms of 
objective reasoning. The tenth sentence also conveyed this impression of objective 
reasoning when stating that "facts" require greater attention to theory and knowledge 
to prevent the negation of the Four Cardinal Principles from "spreading". The final 
sentence of the paragraph then completed the intensification of the relationship 
between stability, development and the "Two Basic Points" by linking the need to 
prevent the negation of the relationship to the "fate" of China and, in so doing, 
appealed to the reader's sense ofnationalism.448 
(1) Under socialist conditions, stability and democracy are unitary. (2)Fundamentally 
speaking, there are no contradictions between the two nor should there be. (3) Marxism 
always considers democracy to be an important development in the civilisation of 
mankind and a great banner of the people's liberation movement of the proletariat. 
(4) Socialism should realise a higher, more extensive and more earnest form of 
democracy than that practised by capitalism as its own lofty goal. (5)Communist Party 
members have always strived for people's democracy and socialist democracy. 
(6)Since the third plenary session of the 11th CCP Central Committee, we have 
conscientiously drawn lessons from our historical ~ e r i e n c e s s and expended 
tremendous efforts in the promotion of democracy. Compared to 10 years ago, our 
country has made clear progress in pursuing democracy, in theory and in practice, in 
our country's political life and in its social life, in relations within the Party and 
without the Party. (8)This is what people throughout the whole country have 
personally experienced. (9)This is also what fair-minded international public opinion 
firmly recognises. (10) Without the stable situation of the past 10 years, this 
development of democratic construction would not been possible. 
The fourth paragraph continued on the theme of the CCP's leadership but moved 
away from concern with the relationship between stability, development and the "Two 
Basic Points" to emphasise the democratic construction that has been made since the 
448 The use of "fate" performs an additional function, in that it conveys the impression that China does 
~ e d , , have .a "fate" or e n d p o i n ~ ~ that c ~ ~ be ~ a ~ i s e d d through the CCP-lcd reform programme. As such, 
this usage heightens the teleolOgIcal claims Wlthin the slogan of ''the primary stage of socialism" in the 
fifth sentence and metaphor ''the train of modernisation" deployed in the eighth sentence. 
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Third Plenum in 1978. The political implicature of this rhetorical move suggested that 
the paragraph was intended to be read as a response to the demonstrators' demands. 
However, on account of the fact that these demands, as outlined in the seven-point list 
(qitiao) at the April 27 demonstration, made no direct mention of democracy,449 this 
rhetorical move can be classified as the argumentative strategy of the straw man. For 
Reisigl and Wodak, this particular strategy involves "presenting a distorted picture of 
the antagonist's standpoint in order to be able to refute the standpoint or argument 
more easily and to make it less tenable. ,,450 In the case of this editorial, the conflation 
of the demonstrators' demands with that of democracy allowed these demands to be 
ignored while, at the same time, the need for non-Party led democracy was refuted. 
The use of stability in relation to this democratic construction, although it only 
featured twice in the paragraph, is similar to the relationship between stability and 
economic growth that was advanced in the second paragraph, in that stability was 
presented as constituting the necessary condition. This relationship between stability 
and democracy was initially established in the tirst sentence of the paragraph, when it 
was claimed that "[u]nder socialist conditions, stability and democracy are unitary". 
Through the deployment of the conjunctive conjunction "and", which worked to 
connect stability and democracy, the effect of the sentence was to suggest that 
democracy cannot function without stability. Furthermore, the reference to "socialist 
conditions" specified that this relationship between stability and democracy, as well 
as the proceeding discussion of democracy, only pertained to socialism and, as a 
result, it worked to close off the space in which to challenge this claim. The second 
449 This is not to say that some banners on display in Tiananmen Square did not proclaim slogans 
concerning democracy n o ~ ~ that s o m ~ ~ political speeches ~ e e ~ f e r e n c e e to democracy; however, the 
purpose of the demonstrations, at thIS early stage, was still bmlted to receiving a response to a set 
number of demands. . 
450 Reisig} and Wodak (2001: 73). 
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use of stability, in the final sentence of the paragraph, attempted to strengthen the 
relationship between stability and democracy by claiming that the democratic 
progress that China had made in the past ten years was due to stability. In addition, 
this appeal to instrumental rationalisation was heightened by the use of the conditional 
conjunction ''without...it would not have been possible ... ", which, for Shi, "renders 
the causal link factual and absolute.,,451 In terms of legitimation, the nominalised 
usage of stability in this paragraph opened up space for the political implicature that 
the demonstrations, by causing instability, must also be opposing democracy and, as a 
result, worked to delegitimate the demonstrators. Conversely, such use of stability 
also allowed the CCP leadership to obscure the grievances of the demonstrators while, 
at the same time, presenting itself as the party of democratic progress. 
(1) Of course, there is a fairly big distance between the actual construction of our 
country's democratic politiCS and the proper meaning of socialism as well as the 
demands of the people. (2)Therefore, at the 13th Party Congress, we made the 
construction of socialist democratic politiCS the main task of our country's political 
r r ; ~ r m . . (3) But the smooth advance of political reform also depends on social stability. 
(4 In undertaking political reform, we must, under the premise of upholding our 
country's basic political system, promote what is beneficial and abolish what is 
harmful, and, in no way, undertake "complete westernisation" or imitate other 
countries' political model. (5)The democracy that we are promoting and pursuing is 
the kind of democracy which will earnestly engender the enthusiasm of the broad 
masses of workers, peasants and intellectuals. (6) We hope that the actual process of 
democratic construction is beneficial for the normal social order and the nation's 
lasting political stability. (7) It should, by no means, hinder the social order or 
undermine stability. (8)Since the Second World War, there is no lack of examples of 
developing countries throughout the world not properly handling the development of 
democracy, which has resulted in economic confusion. (9)The lessons of other 
countries as well as our own experience demonstrate that, on the question of 
democracy, we must, first, make gradual progress according to our country's actual 
conditions and not be hasty or be guided only by our emotions. (lO)Second, we must 
promote democracy on the basis of the legal system. (ll)We must not lose our 
yardstick. (12)Only by adhering to these two conditions will we have the possibility of 
avoiding setbacks while paying a relatively small cost for making essential progress. 
(13)/fnot, then it's possible that the opposite will happen and turmoil will be planted 
. as the root of disaster meaning that our honest wish for democracy will eventually 
come to nothing. 
451 Shi (2004: 150). 
140 
The fifth paragraph continued on the theme of democracy put forward in the previous 
paragraph. But where the fourth paragraph emphasised the socialist democratic 
progress that China had made in the past ten years under the CCP's leadership, the 
fifth paragraph was concerned with the future form and pace of this democratic 
progress. In terms of form, however, the paragraph did not explicitly detail what 
democracy in China would be but rather specifies what it should not be, namely an 
imported version from other countries. As for the pace of this democratic progress, 
the paragraph was more explicit when it stated that progress must be "gradual". 
Indeed, this focus upon the form and pace of democratic progress had a further 
rhetorical effect, in that it rested on the presupposition that China would become 
democratic. Consequently, this paragraph continued the work of the fourth paragraph 
by shifting the argument away from how democracy would reform the CCP onto that 
of how the CCP would reform democracy and so, attempted to strengthen the CCP's 
leadership over the process of democratic reforms. 
In order to assert the CCP's leadership over the democratic reforms, the editorial 
discursively represented these reforms, not as the result of a political process but as a 
set of objective measures that would be best suited to China's development and 
positioned the CCP as the actor most capable of formulating and implementing these 
measures. Furthermore, this discursive representation was accomplished through the 
use of moralised abstractions, which worked to shift the notion of democratic progress 
away from a discourse of politics towards one of scientism. Consequently, in the 
fourth sentence, the process of political reform was defined in terms of promoting 
''what is beneficial" and abolishing ''what is harmful", which worked to create 
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consensus amongst readers by obscuring the political power exercised by the CCP in 
determining what is "beneficial" and "harmful". In the ninth sentence, China's past 
was rendered into the moralised abstraction of "experience" while its present was 
given the form of "actual conditions" that worked to objectify these periods of time 
and, in so doing, enabled the editorial's conclusion of the need for gradual progress to 
be presented as the result of "objective" analysis, with the political role of the CCP 
again discursively minimised. This claim of objectivity was also supported by the use 
of negative comparative examples, both the "lessons" of other countries, which 
implied that this is from whom China should learn, as well as those who are "hasty" 
and "guided only by our emotions", which implicated that this is the behaviour of 
those who favoured democracy and, by extension, the demonstrators while also 
offering the contrastive implication that the proponents of "gradual progress" i.e. the 
CCP leadership were rationally-minded. The use of moralised abstractions was also 
evident in the twelfth sentence, in which the concept of "gradual progress" and the 
use of the legal system were presented as the only "two conditions" that would result 
in the avoidance of "setbacks". Moreover, the use of the economic metaphor "paying 
a relatively small cost" worked to strengthen the impression that the reforms had been 
objectively constructed by suggesting that the complex process of democratic reforms 
could be, and indeed, had been by the CCP leadership, fully costed in advance. 
The use of stability in relation to the discussion on the future form and pace of 
democratic reforms was similar to that put forward in the fourth paragraph, in that 
stability was presented as constituting the necessary condition for the implementation 
of these reforms. Furthermore, the iteration of this link in the third sentence also 
served to restrict the role of the masses in this process to that of only aiding the 
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implementation of the refonns while denying them participation in shaping its content. 
Rather, the implicature of the link suggested that this power in deciding the nature of 
the refonns remained exclusively with the leadership of the CCP. This statement of 
stability as a necessary condition of political refonns performed an additional 
rhetorical function, in that it also worked to deny the converse relationship that 
political refonns were a necessary condition of maintaining social stability. In light of 
the fact that the lack of political refonns constituted one of the main motivations for 
the demonstrations, the denial of this link seemed intended to shift the blame for any 
lack of political refonn onto the masses and, as a result, deepen the' delegitimation of 
the demonstrators. 
The use of stability in the fifth paragraph also goes beyond that in the previous 
paragraph, as it was presented as the criterion by which to determine the 
implementation of proposed political refonns. Consequently, in the sixth sentence, the 
effects of political reforms were presented in terms of being beneficial to stability 
while, in the seventh sentence, it was claimed that they should not ''undermine'' 
stability. This appeal to future effects in these sentences makes use of the 
argumentative strategy, argumentum at consequentiam, to put forward the impression 
that political reforms should not be taken if they cause instability. Indeed, this point 
was reinforced in the final sentence of the paragraph with the prediction that political 
reforms which cause "turmoil" would also result in the end of the "honest wish" for 
democracy. In terms of legitimation, this presentation of stability worked to 
strengthen the authority of the CCP leadership by placing it in the position of the 
"expert" that can rationalise political reforms by appealing to effects that have not yet 
happened. 
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(I) The "Cultural Revolution" was just over ten years ago. (2) People over the age of 
thirty can not forget the turmoil of this period. (3)No one, including the young students, 
can hope that this kind of tragedy is repeated. (4) If all kinds of large- and small-
character posters that slander, vilify and attack party and state leaders are allowed to 
fill up the heavens, if all kinds of "power seizures" and "occupations of v ~ r i o u s s
localities by force" are allowed to spread and if there are series of students' strikes 
everywhere, our country will very probably, once again, fall into total civil strife. 
(5) All good and honest pure-minded young students should understand that, in large-
scale mass incidents, good and bad people are often mixed together, in which those 
with ulterior motives are like fish in troubled waters and are waiting to play on your 
emotions and inappropriate behaviour. (6)The incidents in Xi 'an and Changsha that 
saw some people beating, smashing and looting deserve our vigilance. 
The sixth paragraph did not directly mention stability but, instead, presented a future 
account of the demonstrations that imagined its outcome to be instability. Indeed, the 
paragraph claims that this instability would "very probably" take the form of "total 
civil strife". In order to validate this claim, the paragraph used events that took place 
during the Cultural Revolution as a rhetorical device to project their consequences 
onto the demonstrations taking place in Beijing. Moreover, the deployment of 
political terminology from the Cultural Revolution period, such as "power seizures" 
and "occupying various localities by force" worked to more forcefully remind readers 
of this period, particularly the activities of the Red Guards, and, in so doing, 
attempted to implicate the behaviour of the student demonstrators with those of the 
Red Guards. However, as with previous references to demonstrations in the editorial, 
this implicature was possible by focusing only on the act of demonstrating while 
obscuring any discussion of the reasons for these demonstrations. In tenns of 
legitimation, this comparison with the Cultural Revolution elaborated upon the 
negative label of "turmoil" and seemed intended to delegitimate the 
demonstrations.4s2 Indeed, this delegitimation was heightened in the final sentence 
452 Note that there had been much media coverage given over to the negative effects of the Cultural 
Revolution since the arrest of the "Gang of Four" in 1976 and, more extensively, following the 
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with a repeated reference to the violent incidents that took place in Xi' an and 
Changsha. In addition to equating them with the demonstrations taking place in 
Beijing, the terms used to describe people's behaviour in these incidents strengthened 
the comparison between the demonstrators and the Red Guards as they had also been 
used to describe the behaviour of the Red Guards. 
An additional theme in the sixth paragraph that seemed intended to delegitimate the 
demonstrators was that of age and, by extension, its implied correlative relationship 
with wisdom.453 This was evident in the two references that were made to students in 
the paragraph being collocated in both instances with the enaging adjective ''young''. 
The youthfulness of the students was also emphasised in the claim made in the second 
sentence that only people over the age of thirty were in a position not to forget the 
"turmoil" during Cultural Revolution. In terms of argumentation, this claim seemed 
intended to negate the students' rejection of the label ''turmoil'' on the grounds that 
they had not experienced the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, the implicit supposition put 
forward in this claim was that only those who had experienced the turmoil of the 
Cultural Revolution had the wisdom to determine the "real" nature of the student 
demonstrations. Consequently, this supposition also worked to enhance the legitimacy 
of the CCP's declaration that the demonstrations constitute "turmoil". 
depositio? ofHua G u ~ f e n g g in .1978. C.on,sequently, readers would m.ost likely have been fully aware of 
the negative connotations of the assocIation between the demonstrations with the Cultural Revolution. 
453 Chinese culture, as with many cultures, tends to view the relationship between age and wisdom in 
tenns of the older a person is, the wiser he/sbe is considered to be. Conversely, the younger a person is 
the less wisdom they will bave. ' 
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The theme of age and wisdom was also evident in the use of proverbs (chengyu) in the 
sixth paragraph.454 Indeed, this paragraph was the only one of the seven in the 
editorial to make use of proverbs. In terms of the discourse-analytical approach 
detailed in chapter two, proverbs can be categorised as an ~ x a m p l e e of a "linguistic 
mean" and are similar to slogans, in that they encode prefixed meanings. Indeed, 
Fowler refers to proverbs as "generic statements" on the grounds that they work by 
propagating ''what is taken to be common-sense wisdom",455 while Gunthner refers to 
them as "collectively recognized life-maxim[s]".456 Kuo also makes the point that, 
"[q]uoting proverbs .. .is a frequently-used rhetorical device for Chinese to strengthen 
their argument.,,457 In the sixth paragraph, of the five proverbs that were employed, 
four of them appeared in the fifth sentence alone. This sentence began by addressing 
"[a]ll good and honest pure-minded young students" before making the claim that 
people with ''ulterior motives" use "large-scale mass incidents" to play upon the 
"emotions and inappropriate behaviour" of students. In order to validate this claim, 
the sentence did not provide supporting evidence but rather continued with the theme 
of age and wisdom established in the preceding sentences by employing the inherited 
wisdom of proverbs to enhance its truthfulness and so persuade the students of the 
need to end their demonstrations. Furthermore, this sentence also had the effect of 
portraying the students as callow and naive while, at the same time, placing the 
454 The Chinese term chengyu generally refers to a concise four-character structure which 
communicates a particular idea or axiom that has often been drawn from ancient texts or historical 
stories. Furthermore, it can also be translated into English as an idiom. However, while all proverbs can 
be classified as idioms, all idioms cannot necessarily be classified as proverbs. In this chapter, I have 
opted to employ the English term ''proverb'', as I feel it places greater emphasis on the wisdom that can 
be conveyed in these phrases . 
." Fowler defines generic statements as 'Jdescriptive propositions which are supposedly true of any 
iDItanCe of the entities to which they refer ... [and] are inevitably authoritarian, claiming total and 
definitive knowledge of some topic." See Fowler (1991: 211). 
456 Ounthner (1991: 407). 
~ 1 1 K.uo (2002: 295). 
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editorial and, by extension, the CCP leadership in a position of experience and 
wisdom that worked to strengthen its legitimacy. 
(1) Both democratic development and social stability very much depend on the 
guarantees of the legal system. (2)Citizens throughout the country must all respect our 
country's constitution and laws. (3) Local citizens must respect local legislation. 
(4)Students must respect school regulations. (5)Only then can we discuss the normal 
social order. (6) Only then can we promote the minimum conditions of democracy and 
implement democracy. (7) Failure to observe these conditions undermines democracy 
and inevitably leads to turmoil. (8) With regard to the law, those who have different 
opinions on the regulations and those who have di.f£erent opinions on the affairs of the 
state should pursue them through legal channels. f ~ ~A State Council spokesperson has 
now already published a statement welcoming the student request for dialogue. (10) As 
far as the participation of some students in strikes are concerned, of most importance 
is to resume classes as quickly as possible. (ll)The earlier classes are resumed, the 
less will be lost. (J2)This is in students' vital interest, and is also the hope of all the 
parents and friends and family of students. (J 3) All parts of society, the education 
administrative department, Party organisations in schools and faculty members 
should all rest,ond by showing concern t?r the students and resume classes as quickly 
as possible. ( 4)The sooner, the better. (5) In the present circumstances, the concrete 
act of resuming classes will precisely safeguard the overall situation and safeguard 
stability. 
The final paragraph of the editorial was, effectively, comprised of two parts. The first 
part of the paragraph added to the formulation put forward in the fourth and fifth 
paragraphs that stability was a necessary condition of democratic development by 
stating these two elements were both dependent on ''the guarantees of the legal 
system". This new formulation proposed adherence to laws and regulations as being 
necessary to the achievement of stability and that only once this had been achieved 
could democratic development be undertaken. Moreover, this new formulation also 
offered, for the time in the editorial, a criterion by which to define stability and 
instability, in that people who abided by the laws and regulations could be considered 
to uphold stability while those who violated such laws and regulations could be 
deemed guilty of causing instability. Furthermore, the sixth paragraph defined these 
laws and regulations as including not only China's constitution as well as national and 
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local laws but also school regulations. In effect, the editorial stated that school 
regulations had the same force of law as the country's constitution. Consequently, this 
rhetorical move worked to further delegitimate the demonstrations through the 
implicature that the actions of the student demonstrators were illegal and so made 
them guilty of causing instability. 458 Indeed, the illegality of the demonstrations was 
reinforced in the eighth sentence with the claim that those who disagreed with 
regulations or the affairs of the state "should pursue them through legal channels" .459 
Having rhetorically linked the illegality of student demonstrations to instability, the 
second part of the final paragraph used stability in an attempt to persuade the students 
to resume classes and so end the demonstrations. Indeed, the final sentence of the 
paragraph explicitly linked the student demonstrations to the headline of the editorial 
by stating that the resumption of classes by students was the "concrete act" that would 
"safeguard" the overall situation and "safeguard" stability. In tenns of legitimation, 
this statement used stability to de legitimate the demonstrations by presenting the 
students as responsible for causing instability. Indeed, this responsibility is intensified 
by the claim in the ninth sentence that the government had "welcomed" the students' 
request for "dialogue", which seemed intended to remove the justification for the 
students continuing the demonstrations while, at the same time, conveying a positive 
impression of the government's treatment of the students' demands. Finally, the 
deployment of the term "resuming classes" rather than that of "ending the 
.,1 The protests were illegal under Beijing municipal regulations, which held that all demonstrations 
must receive authorisation from the municipal government. Indeed. these regulations bad been put in 
rJ:" as a response to the 1986-1987 student demonstrations in Beijing. See Ash (1989: 670). 
According to Manion, in the reform and opening up period, CCP leaders, recognising the need for a 
greater degree of consultative politics, had put in place a number of institutional changes such as local 
people's congresses. the receiving ofletters from the public by government offices as w ~ l l l as "mass" 
orpnisations f ~ r r ~ t s , , workers and w o m ~ n , , which were intended to function as the "legitimate 
channels ofsoclahst democracy, through which the masses could communicate their views to the 
authorities." See Manion (1990: xxii). 
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demonstrations" further added to this responsibility by reminding the reader that 
students go to university in order to attend classes rather participate in 
demonstrations.46o 
In considering the construction of the stability discourse in the 29 April editorial, it is 
necessary to begin by focusing on the term "stability" itself. As pointed out earlier in 
the chapter, the term "stability" was consistently deployed in a nominalised form 
throughout the editorial and this allowed the editorial to use stability in a way that did 
not require its meaning to be made explicit. Indeed, the definition of stability put 
forward in the editorial stated only that it is achieved through the "joint efforts" of the 
people under the leadership of the CCP. This definition was later augmented in the 
final paragraph with the stipulation that only people who abided by laws and 
regulations contributed to stability while those who did not were guilty of causing 
instability. In the absence of any additional quantitative measure, the editorial 
effectively made no distinction between violations of the law when determining 
instances of instability. As a result, the term "stability" was discursively flexible and 
this allowed it to be used both positively to strengthen the legitimacy of the CCP and 
negatively, in the form of instability, to delegitimate the demonstrations. 
The positive use of stability in the 29 April editorial began with the headline linking 
the "safeguarding" of stability to that of the overall situation. This link worked to 
establish the importance of stability by presenting it in terms of national concern and, 
in so doing, shifted the focus of stability away from maintaining the power of the CCP 
460 The editorial strengthens this point when it claims that resuming classes is also "the hope of all the 
parents and friends and family of students". For Gill, "[t]his is a fairly standard rhetorical move, in 
which a speaker or write claims to know and articulate the desires of another person or group. It is 
particularly effective .. .in constructions of crisis or threat, since it also implies that the group ... are in 
danger of not being able to speak for themselves." See Gill (2000: 186). 
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and onto the fate of the Chinese nation. In this, it worked to generate consensus over 
the importance of stability amongst the readership. However, having established the 
importance of stability, the editorial then used this legitimatory value to bolster the 
authority of the CCP by linking the existence of China's stability to the founding of 
the People's Republic of China. The positive value of stability was further used to 
strengthen the legitimacy of the CCP leadership with the claims that the economic 
growth and democratic reforms which have taken place since the Third Plenum have 
only been possible because of the condition of stability. As such, these claims 
simplified causal relationships in order to put forward the notion that stability 
precedes economic growth and democratic reforms and, in so doing, denied 
alternative explanations. 
The negative value of stability, or instability, was employed both to complement and 
support the impression of stability's positive value. As a consequence, instability 
worked to both delegitimate the demonstrations against the CCP while, at the same 
time, legitimating the authority of the CCP. In contrast to the presentation of stability, 
however, the negative value of stability was rarely used explicitly but rather was 
conveyed through implicatures. As explained in chapter two, an implicature is a 
"context-dependent linguistic realization" which van Dijk defines as "inferences 
based on general and particular political knowledge as well as on the context 
models".461 The implicatures in the 29 April editorial, which could be made on the 
understanding that it had been published in response to the demonstrations, were 
evident in the claims that the positive value of stability promoted economic growth 
and democratic reforms also implicitly suggested that without stability, economic 
461 van Dijk (2005: 65). 
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growth and democratic reforms was not be possible. However, the editorial's use of 
implicatures also meant that the demonstrations were not explicitly labelled as 
responsible for causing instability. Consequently, the 29 April editorial avoided the 
strategy of explicit negative other-presentation that was employed unsuccessfully in 
the 26 April editorial. A further effect of using implicatures was that it emphasised 
only the act of instability while obscuring possible reasons to explain it. The 
exception to the use of implicatures in the editorial was the open predictions that were 
made concerning the future for a China without stability. In order to strengthen the 
validity of these predictions, the editorial used examples of instability from both the 
Cultural Revolution and the pre-PRC period to suggest that this will be the future for 
China if the condition of stability was not maintained. However, as with the 
implicatures, these predictions only worked by focusing on the acts of instability that 
occurred during these historical periods while leaving the reasons why such instability 
broke out unstated. 
The positive value of stability established in the editorial and its association with the 
leadership of the CCP attempted to strengthen the Party's legitimacy in the same way 
that the negative value attached to instability worked to delegitimate the 
demonstrations. However, this use of stability was only possible on account of the 
vague definition that was proposed in the editorial. So while this enabled the term 
"stability" to be discursively flexible, it also meant that the use of stability in the 29 
April editorial was entirely reliant on rhetoric to enhance the legitimacy of the CCP. 
As explained in chapter two, this chapter is exceptional, in that two articles are 
intensively analysed rather than the combination of intensive analysis and extensive 
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analysis that will follow in the next two empirical chapters. The decision to omit the 
co-textual analysis was due, both to the limited coverage of the military suppression 
in its immediate aftermath and the political significance of the 4 June 1990 editorial. 
This editorial was published on the first year anniversary of the military suppression 
and provided a clear statement of the government's justification for taking military 
action in 1989. In so doing, it hegemonic ally defined the usage of stability in the post-
Tiananmen period and, as a consequence, I felt that this editorial should be intensively 
analysed. 
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4 June Editorial: Textual Analysis462 
"Stability Prevails Over Everything" 
The six Chinese characters of the headline ( ~ ~ f f i i fflJ-t)J) for the 4 June editorial 
were positioned above the body ofthe text, both evenly spaced and in bold black 
font.463 In light of the date's symbolism, the headline articulated the main justification 
for the actions of the CCP leadership the previous year. Furthermore, this headline 
was a phrase that had been first used by Deng Xiaoping two months prior to the 
beginning of the Democracy Movement (bajiu minyun) and, as such, made use of 
Deng's authority to strengthen this justification.464 As for the actual phrase, it worked 
to persuade the reader of its validity by foregrounding the importance of maintaining 
stability. For Fairclough, this rhetorical strategy is effective because "[t]he initial 
('thematic') position in a clause is an informationally prominent one.'.465 Indeed, the 
importance of stability was heightened by the use of the term "everything", which 
served to leave this importance unchallenged. Furthermore, the use of the verb 
"prevail over" carried connotations of force and so implicitly expressed the 
Hobbesian notion that it was legitimate for the state to use violence in order to 
maintain social stability. 
(/) A year has already passed since the quelling of the turmoil and the counter-
revolutionary rebellion that took place in Beijing in the spring and summer of last 
year. (2)The development of the situation in the past year has made us further 
understand the nature ofthe.turmoil and the counter-revolutionary rebellion and the 
great significance in the quelling of the rebellion. 
462 As with the previous article. the aim of this translation is not to necessarily produce the most fluent 
English translation but rather one that closely conveys the meaning and structure of the Chinese 
original. For the Chinese original. see the Appendix section. 
463 Sbelun (4 June 1990). 
464 This quotation was cited in the analysis of the previous article. 
46S Fairclough (2001: 244). 
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The first paragraph opened by making clear that the headline of the editorial did, 
indeed, refer to the military action that had taken place in Beijing. However, the use 
of the temporal marker at the end of the first sentence also worked to link the military 
action to the demonstrations that were taking place in Beijing and, as such, suggested 
that the publication of the editorial on 4 June was to commemorate the ending of the 
demonstrations.466 Thus, the editorial was a less of an apology and more of a 
commemoration. Furthermore, the link between the military action and the ending of 
the demonstrations indicated that the editorial would employ the rhetorical strategy of 
justifying the military action by presenting it as caused by the demonstrations. 
Therefore, this rhetorical strategy would be the opposite of that which had been used 
to delegitimate the demonstrations in the 29 April editorial. In that editorial, only the 
act of demonstrating had been highlighted while the possible reasons to explain the 
students' actions were obscured. 
The phrase used to refer to the military action that took place on 3-4 June in 1989 was 
"the quelling of the turmoil and the counter-revolutionary rebellion". For Brook, the 
naming of the events in 1989 is important because "[t]he Chinese government does 
not dispute the central fact of the killing. What it does dispute is the quality of the act. 
It does so by disputing the name.'.467 As to the use of the term "quelling" (pingxi), 
Brook also comments that, "[a]s in English, the Chinese term ... has an archaic flavor, 
the sort of word that might be used to describe a military campaign in the 18th 
~ ~ Although this point is, to a degree, obvious, I have made it because I feel that there has been a 
tendency in ''western'' reports on the events of this period to separate off the military action-generally 
referred to as the "Tiananmen Massacre" or, alternatively, the ''Tiananmen Incident"-from the 
demonstrations. Consequently, in terms of justification, it is less easy to justify military action when it 
is ~ t e d d in isolation than when it is viewed as a reaction to a set of events . 
.-6 Brook (1992: 4). 
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century.,,468 Indeed, the effect of using a word with such an "archaic flavour" was to 
obscure the violence that was perpetrated by the People's Liberation Anny (PLA) that 
night. Furthennore, this effect was compounded by the rest of the phrase, which 
deleted the participation of the PLA in the act of quelling. Rather, the full phrase 
mentions only the object of the quelling-the demonstrations- while omitting any 
reference to the subject-the Anny- who carried out the action. As to the tenn used 
to refer to the demonstrations in the 4 June editorial, it had been expanded from that 
of"tunnoil" (dongluan), employed in the 29 April editorial, to include "counter-
revolutionary rebellion" (jan 'geming baoluan). For Nathan, this classification 
constituted "an even more severe label than that of"tunnoil," which the authorities 
had applied up to then, and one that implied (falsely) that the demonstrators were 
anned and had shed blood.,,469 This implication was suggested through the use of the 
tenn "rebellion", which had the effect of strengthening the Anny's justification for 
taking action against the demonstrators by presenting it as a necessary response to 
force.47o The use of the label "counter-revolutionary" also carried a negative 
connotation because, as Liu points out, "[i]n Communist China, there is no word more 
sacred or richer in righteous indignation and moral force than "revolution".'.471 This 
derived from the fact that the tenn "revolution" has been discursively linked to the 
founding of the People's Republic of China and so, by labelling the demonstrations as 
"counter-revolutionary", the editorial was claiming that the intention of the 
oW Brook (1992: 4). 
-Nathan (2001: 8). 
410 In addition, there has been much debate over which side actually fired the first shots, with the CCP 
leaderIhip claiming that it was the demonstrators. thus further justifying the military actions. 
471 Liu (1994: 309). 
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demonstrators was to overthrow the Chinese Communist Party and replace the 
(l)Soon after the quelling of the rebellion, the Party Central Committee convened the 
fourth plenary session of the 13th CCP Central Committee, callingfor adherence to 
the country's foundation, taking the road that will lead the country to strength and 
prosperity, and paying special attention to several important tasks. (2) At the sixth 
plenary session of the Party Central Committee, a decision was made to enhance the 
party's ties with the masses. (3)The third session of the seventh National People's 
Congress called on the whole nation to further strive for the steady political, 
economic and social development of the country. (4) In the past year, under the united 
and strong leadership of the Party Central Committee with Comrade Jiang Zemin as 
the core, the Chinese peo£le of all nationalities have overcome mounting difficulties 
and worked vigorously. (:y As a result, the national economy has progressed steadily 
amid economic rectification andfurther reforms; industrial production has risen 
again; inflation has been curbed; prices have tended to be stable; social order has 
improved; progress has been made in building a clean government and in fighting 
corruption; and a turn for the better has occurred on the political and ideological 
front. (6)The people are pleased and satisfied to see all these things done. (7) After the 
quelling of the rebellion, some people worried that there might be changes in the 
good policies implemented since the third plenary session of the 11th CCP Central 
Committee, such as the reform and opening policy, the rural policy and the policy on 
intellectuals. (8)They worried whether there would be stability in the country. (9) People 
have now clearly seen that the policies of the p a r ~ ~ and government have not changed, 
but have been further developed and perfected. (1 The country now enjoys political, 
economic and social stability; it has tided over the most difficult times caused by the 
rampant spread of the ideological trend.of bourgeois Iiberalisation and the turmoil 
and rebellion. 
The second paragraph shifted the focus of the editorial away from what happened 
during the months of April, May and June in 1989 onto that which happened after the 
demonstrations had been ended. The first four sentences of the paragraph detailed 
important decisions that had been taken by the Party leadership at different meetings 
in this period. In addition to relaying these decisions to the reader, they also seemed 
intended to perform the rhetorical function of demonstrating that the CCP was once 
again ''under the united and strong leadership of the Party Central Committee with 
m The label of "counter-revolutionary" also carried legal consequences. Under the penal code 
formulated in 1951,. people accused of " ~ o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n a r y " " crimes could receive the death penalty. 
Indeed, it was only In 1997 that these cnmes were replaced by that of ' ~ e o p a r d i s i n g g national security". 
See He (2001: 121). 
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Comrade Jiang Zemin as the core" following the challenge to its authority from both 
within and without during the first half of 1989. The fifth sentence in the paragraph 
went on to list the achievements that had been made under the Party's leadership since 
the quelling of the rebellion. Fowler notes "[t]he levelling effect of the list-a 
standard effect of listing syntax" and, as a result, the achievements presented in this 
list were not clearly differentiated in terms of importance. However, within this list, it 
was possible to note that the curbing of inflation and stabilisation of prices as well as 
the declaration that "progress has been made in building a clean government and in 
fighting corruption" indicated that, though the CCP leadership had taken the decision 
to end the demonstrations, it had still responded to some of the demonstrators' 
grievances, albeit without, in any way, compromising its hold on political power. The 
sixth sentence in the second paragraph then worked to reinforce the positive self-
presentation of this list by claiming that "[t]he people are pleased and satisfied to see 
all these things done". This is an example of a rhetorical strategy, also employed in 
the 29 April editorial, in which the term "people" functions as a vague category that 
appears to refer to the whole population of China, including the reader, and, in so 
doing, works by claiming to speak on behalf of this group while directing the reader 
to agree with this proposition. For Gill, "part of the force of this categorization is its 
very inexplicitness:.473 Indeed, this rhetorical strategy was employed a further two 
times in the remainder of the paragraph. 
Having established the CCP leadership's version of the events from 1989 in the first 
paragraph, the function of the second paragraph in the 4 June editorial was to further 
justify the use of military action to end the demonstrations by persuading the reader 
473 Oill (2000: 183). 
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that the quelling of the rebellion had restored social stability, which then enabled the 
CCP to regain political stability and so allowed the Party leadership to put in the place 
the measures to recover economic stability. Consequently, the second paragraph built 
on the Hobbesian notion expressed in the headline that it was legitimate for the state 
to use violence in order to maintain social stability by appealing to the perfonnance of 
the state since social stability had been restored. As with the discursive construction 
of stability in the 29 April editorial, this presented stability as constituting the 
necessary condition for the governance of China. 
(1) Looking at today's situation and thinking about last year's events, people will more 
profoundly understand that the strategic decision to resolutely quell the rebellion by 
the central authorities was entirely correct and necessary. (2) Last year's disturbance 
was caused by an international macro-climate and an internal micro-climate, the 
direct opposition of bourgeois liberalisation against the four cardinal principles, and 
the intense struggle between infiltration and anti-infiltration, subversion and anti-
subversion and peaceful evolution and anti-peaceful evolution. (3) Hostile forces, at 
home and abroad, manufactured this disturbance in order to overthrow the CCP 
leadership, subvert the socialist system and so make China a dependency of 
capitalism's developed countries. (4) At this critical life or death moment, the party and 
government had no choice except to resolutely quell the rebellion. (5) If last year's 
rebellion had not been quelled, today's China would unknowingly have chaos. (6) If 
there was chaos in China, it would not just have affected the peace and stability of the 
Asia-Pacific region, but also the peace and stability of the whole world. 
The second paragraph ended by linking the events in 1989 to the "rampant spread of 
the ideological trend of bourgeois liberalisation". According to Schnell, this term was 
used ''by the Chinese government to describe unwanted ideas and values which have 
been readily identified as American or Western.'.474 These ideas and values were 
unwanted because, according to remarks attributed to Deng at the Sixth Plenum of the 
Twelfth Party Congress in September 1986, "[l]iberalization is only of a bourgeois 
nature. There is no proletarian, socialist liberalization.'.47S As a result, the "Resolution 
4'4 Schnell (1999: 4). Alternatively, Fewsmith contends that ''bourgeois liberalization can be 
understood as democracy." See Fewsmith (2001: 228). 
475 Cited in He (200 1: 119). 
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of the Central Committee of the CPC on the Guiding Principles for Building a 
Socialist Society with an Advanced Culture and Ideology", adopted at the Sixth 
Plenum, charged bourgeois liberalisation with "negating the socialist system in favour 
of capitalism" and being "in total contradiction of the people's interests and the 
historical trend.,,476 The charge of bourgeois liberalisation was used to criticise 
political ideas or actions that the CCP leadership viewed as a threat to the socialist 
system.477 Indeed, this was the case with the student demonstrations that took place at 
the end of 1986 and the beginning of 1987, which the CCP leadership viewed as 
advocating political reforms that threatened the socialist system and, as a result, 
brought them to an end on the grounds that they constituted bourgeois 
liberalisation.478 The charge of bourgeois liberalisation made against the 
demonstrations in 1989 seemed similarly intended to discursively present them as a 
threat to the socialist system and so justify the decision by the CCP leadership to end 
the demonstrations in 1989. Furthermore, this charge also performed the rhetorical 
function of negating all the demands of the demonstrators without explicit rebuttal by 
linking them to an anti-western and anti-socialist discourse. However, in order to 
perform this rhetorical function, it was necessary that the meaning of bourgeois 
liberalisation was vague. Indeed, for Schnell, "the term "bourgeois liberalisation" 
exemplifies language which is created to be purposely vague. ,,479 This vagueness then 
enabled the use ofboutgeois liberalisation, as with that of stability, to be discursively 
flexible but, as was also the case with stability, it was entirely reliant on its rhetorical 
force to persuade the reader to accept the charge of bourgeois liberalisation. 
476 Cited in Schnell (1999: 7). 
477 Qiu makes the point that, "[t)he crucial difference between the [tenns) 'political reform' and 
'bourgeois liberalization' is that the former is within the party-state institution, while the latter is 
without. Political changes for the destruction of Communist ideology are offensive, whereas those for 
iJDpl"ovement inside the socialist framework are tolerable." Qiu (2000: 257). 
471 He (2001: 120). 
479 Schnell (1999: 4). 
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The link between bourgeois liberalisation and the 1989 demonstrations at the end of 
the second paragraph was further developed in the third paragraph with the 
identification of "an international macro-climate and an internal micro-climate" as the 
cause of the demonstrations. This claim moved beyond that made during the 
demonstrations, most notably in the 26 April People's Daily editorial, that they were 
being caused by "a small group of people with ulterior motives" to imply that the 
demonstrations were the result of collaborations between the demonstrators, or more 
specifically, those who organised the demonstrators, and foreign states. Furthermore, 
the paragraph claimed that the intention of this collaboration was "to overthrow the 
CCP leadership, subvert the socialist system and so make China a dependency of 
capitalism's developed countries." While these claims could not be verified, their 
rhetorical effect was both to delegitimate the demands of the demonstrators by 
conflating them with a foreign plot to collapse the PRC while also appealing to 
nationalist sentiment to justify the use of military force by presenting the 
demonstrations not as a struggle between the party-state and society but as a conflict 
between China and an external enemy. Whereas the former situation would have 
suggested that the armed party-state attacked the unarmed demonstrators, the latter 
situation worked to justify military force by implying that, in fact, it was China's 
military that had been initially attacked by armed demonstrators. Indeed, this theme of 
foreign "hostile forces" attacking CCP-Ied defenders of China was also implied in the 
description of the demonstrations as "an intense struggle between infiltration and anti-
infiltration, subversion and anti-subversion and peaceful evolution and anti-peaceful 
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evolution".48o As a consequence, the fourth sentence built on the previous sentences 
by deploying the topos of external threat to claim that "the party and the government 
had no choice but to resolutely quell the rebellion." Furthennore, the use of the label 
"rebellion" for the Democracy Movement presented it as an armed force and, in so 
doing, strengthened the claim by denying the existence of alternative means to bring 
the demonstrations to an end. Indeed, for Brook, "[t]he Beijing Massacre was not the 
only possible outcome of the growing tension between state a ~ d d society, nor did it 
have to happen. It occurred for the specific reason that the Party as a state had 
available to it military means and chose to direct those means against the civilian 
ul · fB ... ,,481 pop atIon 0 elJmg. 
The fifth sentence of the third paragraph attempts to strengthen the argument that the 
CCP leadership had no choice in using military action by the employing the 
argwnentative strategy, argumentum at consequentiam, to claim that the 
consequences of not taking military action would mean that China would now be in a 
state of "chaos". Although not directly using the concept of stability, this argument 
did impose a relative understanding of stability by inviting readers to draw 
comparisons between the current situation and that of "chaos". Furthennore, the tenn 
"chaos" was politically significant because it worked to remind the reader of the 
repeated upheavals that China had suffered from the middle of the nineteenth century 
- Commenting on the use of anti-Western rhetoric in the media at the time, Shambaugh notes that. 
"(i]n the wake ofTiananmen, however. it has reached a height unsurpassed since the Cultural 
Revolution." See Shambaugh (1989: 860). Moreover. the sanctions imposed on China by the 
international community worked to both enhance the rhetorical appeal of the CCP's criticism of the 
"West" as well as strengthen the plausibility of its claims that the Democracy Movement had been 
infiltrated by foreigners. Indeed, as pointed out in the introductory chapter. these claims formed the 
basis of the anti-foreign nationalism that was heavily propagated in the post-Tiananmen period. 
41. Brook (1991: 196). 
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up to the Cultural Revolution.482 In fact, the use of history had already been employed 
in the paragraph with the claim that the intention of the "hostile forces" was to make 
China "a dependency of capitalism's developed countries." This claim made reference 
to China's "century of national humiliation" (bainian guochi) that is dated to the 
defeat in the Opium Wars of 1839 and 1842 and was only ended, according to this 
discourse, when the CCP gained power in 1949. Indeed, according to Zhao, the use of 
this historical discourse has been a key rhetorical strategy on the part of the CCP 
''because eliminating "the century of shame and humiliation" is at the heart of a 
principal claim to CCP legitimacy.'.483 Consequently, by linking it to the military 
action that was taken in 1989, it seems that the CCP leadership intended to use this to 
further justify its decision to use this military force. 
(J)Stability is the preconditionfor carrying out the building of socialist modernisation. 
(2) Without a stable environment and with chaos prevailing, people will not have the 
ideas or energy to focus on reform and construction, in the same way that, even with 
the doors of the country open, foreigners will not dare to come to China to set up 
factories, conduct business or do exchanges. (3) Also, socialist democracy can only be 
built under stable conditions and progress at a steady pace according to the 
Constitution and laws. (4)Turmoil can o n ~ ~ create anarchism. (5)Stability represents 
the fundamental interests of the people. {I ~ T h i s s is the sentiment of the people. (7) Party 
committees and governments at all levels and all related departments must regard the 
safeguarding of stability as the most important task at present and pay adequate 
attention to all aspects of this task. (8) Party and government leadership organisations 
at all levels and all comrades of the party must clearly remember the fundamental 
objective of wholeheartedly serving the people, be honest and clean when per/orming 
official duties, work hard, put one's heart and soul into handling the affairs of the 
masses, further improve the environment and rectify order and deepen reforms, as 
well as gradually push the economy forward. (9) At the same time, they must do 
ideological and political work well and fully promote socialist democracy, allow 
people to have peace and tranquillity and society to have stability and unity. 
412 This argumentation scheme has been employed in a number of different contexts. In his research on 
DeWS production in Guangdong province, Latham found that, "[t]he fear of chaos was a consistent 
theme in explanations and justifications of media control...[and] was able to provide a legitimating 
rationalization of government control even for many of those who advocated media liberalization and 
found censorship annoying at least and detestable at most." See Latham (2000: 650). 
a3 Zhao (2000: 30). The use of this discourse is discussed in greater detail in the intensive analysis of a 
commentary published during the "anti-Falun GonK' campaign. 
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The theme of "chaos" put forward at the end of the third paragraph is elaborated upon 
in the fourth paragraph, with the claim that its prevalence would have a negative 
impact upon "reform and construction". This would be not only because chaos would 
deprive people of "ideas and energy" but also because it would deter "foreigners" 
from investing in China. As well as reaffirming the centrality of the Party's key task 
of economic reform and construction, this claim also strengthened the impression that 
chaos would have taken hold if the demonstrations had not been ended and, in so 
doing, worked to privilege the Party's version of future reality over any alternatives. 
Indeed, this version was reinforced with the claim in the fourth sentence that 
"[t]urmoil can only create anarchism", which worked to deny the possibility of other 
outcomes, in particular, the political reform that had been the objective of the 
Democracy Movement. 
The use of the chaos discourse in the fourth paragraph also worked contrastively to 
emphasise the importance of stability. The implication was that. in order to avoid 
chaos, it was necessary to have stability. Furthermore, the fourth paragraph followed 
the 29 April editorial by defming this stability as the necessary condition for both the 
building of "socialist modernisation" and "socialist democracy". The importance of 
stability to the economic and democratic development of China was then reinforced in 
the sixth and seventh sentences with the claims that it represented both "fundamental 
interests of the people" as well as "the sentiment of the people". As in the second 
paragraph, these claims employed the rhetorical strategy of appearing to speak on 
behalf of the ''people'' while working to persuade the reader to accept them. Moreover, 
absent from either of these claims was the point that the maintenance of stability was 
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also in the "fundamental interests" of the CCP in terms of maintaining its hold on 
political power. 
(1) The people demand stability. (2) Stability prevails over everything. (3)This is rfjeople's 
common understanding after experiencing last year's political disturbance. ~ ~We 
must preserve the country's stability as we would safeguard our own lives. (5)We 
simply cannot do anything detrimental to the matter of stability. (6)This way, our 
country's great hope will be the great hope for the cause of socialism. 
The last paragraph concluded the 4 June editorial by emphatically stating the 
importance of maintaining stability. Indeed, the paragraph begins by employing the 
rhetorical device of claiming to represent the views of "the people" while working to 
direct the reader to accept the importance of stability. Indeed, this direction is 
strengthened by the declarative tone of statement. The importance of maintaining 
stability is then made clear in the fourth sentence when readers are instructed to 
regard the preserving of stability as they would "safeguard their own lives". The use 
of the inclusive pronoun ''we'' alongside the modal verb "must" in this sentence also 
worked to strengthen the impact of these instructions by shifting the responsibility for 
maintaining stability onto the reader. In addition, the content of the instructions, in 
comparing the preservation of stability with the protection of one's own life, 
implicitly suggested that it was acceptable to use force in order to maintain stability. 
Indeed, this implication was strengthened by the iteration of the headline of the 
editorial in the second sentence on account of its expression of the Hobbesian notion 
that it was legitimate for the state to use force against its people. Moreover, this 
notion was also given greater legitimacy by the claim in the third sentence that it was 
"people's common understanding after experiencing last year's political disturbance". 
As a consequence, -the rhetorical effect of implicitly suggesting that the use of force to 
maintain stability was acceptable in the future seemed to retroactively justify the 
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decision by the CCP leadership to use military force to end the demonstrations from 
the previous year. 
The 4 June editorial did not deny that military force had been used to end the 
demonstrations in 1989, even if, at the same time, it rhetorically eliminated the 
violence that was caused by these actions. Rather, it sought to justify the decision by 
the CCP leadership to use this military force. The editorial attempted to achieve this 
by using stability, both in negatively portraying the Democracy Movement as causing 
instability and in positively presenting the ending of this Movement as re-establishing 
stability 
The use of stability to justify the decision to use military force began with the 
headline of the 4 June editorial, which implicitly suggested that it was legitimate for 
the state to use military force in order to maintain stability. Following on from this, 
the editorial's portrayal of the demonstrations as causing instability was achieved both 
by labelling the demonstrations as a "counter-revolutionary rebellion" that conveyed 
the impression of an armed force and by the linking of this rebellion to a plot by 
foreign states that was intended to bring about the collapse of the PRC. Consequently, 
the 4 June editorial defines instability by equating it to the ending of CCP rule. In 
order to further strengthen this definition, the editorial used the term "chaos" to 
describe a future for China that it claimed would have been realised had the 
demonstrations not been ended by military force. However, the use of this term also 
had the effect of linking China's future to the period of upheaval from the previous 
one hundred and fifty years and, in so doing, worked to obscure alternative future 
realities. 
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This negative use of chaos also worked contrastively to present stability in positive 
tenns, in that the reader was persuaded to make a comparison between the situation in 
China as it currently existed and one in which there was "chaos". This positive 
presentation of stability was further strengthened by the claim that the political, 
economic and social achievements that had been made under the leadership of the 
CCP since the ending of the demonstrations was the direct result of the social stability 
that had been achieved by use of military force. Consequently, in the same way that 
editorial negatively linked instability with the overthrow of the CCP, it also worked to 
positively link stability with the maintenance of CCP rule. In terms of legitimation, 
this rhetorical strategy was similar to that of the 29 April editorial, in that stability was 
used to strengthen the legitimacy of the CCP while instability was used to 
delegitimate the demonstrations. However, as with the 29 April editorial, this use of 
stability was only possible by deployment of its nominalised form, which enabled the 
defmition of stability to be left unstated in the editorial. As a result, stability was 
discursively flexible but also entirely reliant on rhetoric to enhance the legitimacy of 
tbeCCP. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the editorials of 29 April 1989 and 4 June 1990 with the 
intention of better understanding how the CCP leadership employed the concept of 
stability to respond to the fundamental challenge that was posed by the Democracy 
Movement. In the 29 April editorial, stability was presented as a positive value and 
instability as a negative one. This was achieved by linking stability to China's future 
development, in that it was presented as the necessary condition both for continued 
economic growth and political reform. The positive value of stability was then linked 
to the current leadership of the CCP. In contrast, the negative value of instability was 
achieved by linking it to the period of upheaval in China's modem history, in that 
instability was presented as the sole reason for China's lack of relative development 
in that period. The editorial then worked to implicate the negative value of instability 
with that of 1989 demonstrations. 
As for the 4 June editorial, a similar rhetorical strategy was employed, in that stability 
was again presented as a positive value and instability as a negative one. Furthermore, 
this positive value of stability was also linked to the leadership of the CCP while the 
Democracy Movement was implicated as the negative value of instability. However, 
given that the 4 June editorial was intended to justify the decision to use military force 
in order to bring the demonstrations to an end, the use of stability and instability also 
differed from that in the 29 April editorial. As a consequence, the positive value of 
stability was achieved by linking the political, economic and social developments that 
had taken place since the military suppression to the condition of stability. In this, 
both these developments as well as the decision to use military force were linked to 
the leadership of the CCP and, as a result, the positive value of stability was once 
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again presented in terms of the Party. In contrast, the negative value of instability was 
established by presenting the implications of demonstrations as chaos. Furthermore, in 
the same way that the relative stability that existed in China following the military 
suppression was linked to the CCP's leadership, so it was that the chaos that was 
imagined as resulting from the demonstrations was linked to the overthrow of the 
CCP. 
The key rhetorical feature of both editorials was the nominalised usage of stability. As 
pointed out earlier, the effect of such usage was to "mystify" the definition of stability. 
As a result, what constituted stability and who was threatening this stability was not 
made explicit. This enabled the editorial to use stability in a way that was discursively 
flexible, in that stability was linked only with the CCP while the demonstrations were 
presented only in terms of instability; however, this also meant that the persuasiveness 
of the stability discourse rested entirely on rhetoric. In terms of legitimation, it is 
difficult to assess the effectiveness of this rhetoric, if only because other events must 
also be taken into consideration. This is particularly the case with the 29 April 
editorial, in that the discourse of stability may well have had a positive impact on the 
legitimacy ofthe CCP but, ultimately, the demonstrations against the Party did not 
stop following its publication. Despite this, it is important to remember that the 
editorial was not solely aimed at persuading the demonstrators to end their protests 
but was also intended to persuade those not protesting, both party members and the 
vast majority of the wider populace, of the legitimacy of the CCP's rule. A further 
point to make is that when the protests were brought to an end, the discourse of 
stability constructed in the 29 April editorial may have gone some way to restoring 
the legitimacy of the CCP. Indeed, in considering the 4 June editorial, it is possible to 
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state that the stability discourse seemed to be more effective in restoring the Party's 
legitimacy after the demonstrations were brought to an end. Ironically, this seems to 
have been because of the events that took place in 1989. As Qiu points out, 
"[a]lthough he [Deng] had previously proclaimed that "stability takes precedence over 
everything" ... , this warning had little effect until after June 4th. A decade from then, 
most public security officers and political instructors in Chinese universities are still 
repeating this ultra-conservative motto when there is anything potentially endangering 
"stability".484 Indeed, it seems that the threat to the Party's monopoly of political 
power posed by the events in 1989 actually worked to heighten the rhetorical effect of 
the stability discourse. In terms of discursive selectivity, the Party's hegemonic 
interpretation of these events as causing instability helped to shape a political context 
that favoured the discourse of stability. 
Despite the predictions of collapse that followed the events in 1989, it was a further 
ten years before the authority of the CCP was seriously challenged. On this occasion, 
the challenge came not from politically agitated students but from followers of a 
quasi-spiritual qigong group called Falun Gong. Consequently, the next empirical 
chapter will focus on how the CCP used the stability discourse during the "anti-Falun 
Gong' campaign that was launched in response to this challenge . 
..... Qiu (2000: 257). 
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Chapter 4: The 1999 "Anti-Falun Gong" Campaign 
Introduction 
This chapter will analyse a commentary that was published in the People's Daily 
during the Chinese government's campaign against the quasi-spiritual qigong group, 
Falun Gong.485 Following on from the analysis of the Beijing Spring in the previous 
chapter, the campaign against this group was undertaken in response to the next major 
incidence of instability in the People's Republic of China. Indeed, this incidence, 
which took the form ofa demonstration held by Falun Gong on 25 April 1999 outside 
Zhongnanhai, was described by the government as the "most serious political incident 
since 1989".486 The result of this demonstration was that, after a three month time lag, 
the government decided to outlaw the group and, in so doing, launched what Wong 
describes as "a well-orchestrated nation-wide crackdown, one that China ... [had] not 
seen since the Tiananmen Incident. ,.487 In light of this, the aim of this chapter is to 
analyse a commentary that was published in the initial stages of this crackdown in 
order to better understand how the discourse of stability was employed to legitimate 
the government's suppression of Falun Gong. 
In contrast to the previous chapter, this chapter will only analyse a single article. This 
is because there has been little variation in the usage of stability throughout the ant-
Falun Gong campaign and, unlike the previous chapter, there is little explanatory 
485 In this paper, I use the term Falun Gong to refer to the group rather than the alternative appellation 
of Falun Dolo. The distinction between these terms appears to be that Falun Gong refers to the practice 
of meditative exercises and Falun Dolo refers to the spiritual belief system based on Li Hongzhi's 
teachings. While Falun Dolo is the name that adherents of the group prefer to use, I have decided to 
use Falun Gong to refer to the group on the basis that this term is predominantly used both in the 
~ u l a r rmedia as well as in the academic literature. 
This claim was made by Wang Zhaoguo, who was speaking on behalf of the CCP Central 
Committee on 23 July following the announcement of the ban. See "Official says Falun Gong Most 
Serious Incident since Tiananmen" (27 July 1999). 
487 Wong (1999: 8). 
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value to be gained from analysing more than one article. As such, the article that will 
be analysed is representative of how stability has been used in the campaign. In 
addition, the selected article is a "staff commentator" article (benbao pinglunyuan) 
rather than the editorials (shelun) that were analysed in the previous chapter. 
Although editorials do represent the most authoritative type of commentary, 
commentator articles are also used to express the views of the leadership. Indeed, Wu 
notes that, "[ s ]ince the late 1970s, staff commentator articles ... have flourished, 
partially as a replacement for editorials.'.488 Furthermore, given that the usage of 
stability in the commentary was consistent with editorials which were published on 
Falun Gong at the time, I feel that this commentary is sufficiently authoritative to be 
the subject of my analysis. 
As explained in chapter two, this chapter will begin by presenting a contextual 
analysis of the events that situates the publication of 16 August editorial in the 
political context of this period. Following on from this, an intensive analysis of the 
editorial will be carried out at the paragraphicallevel so as to make explicit my 
reading of the text. Moreover, as with the intensive analyses carried out in the 
previous chapter, the aim of this reading is to answer three principal questions: 
1. What meaning was given to stability in the commentary? 
2. How did the editorial attempt to persuade the reader of the validity of this meaning? 
3. How did this use of stability relate to the legitimacy of the CCP? 
Finally, the chapter will end with a co-textual analysis that examines how the stability 
discourse was used in other articles published during the anti-Falun Gong campaign 
.... Wu (1994: 197). Indeed, in the recent debate over the property rights law, the leadership's views 
were expressed through a signed commentary rather than an editorial. This commentary, which was 
signed using the pseudonym Zhong Xuanli (understood to be an abbreviation for Zhonggong 
zhongyang xuanchuanbu liIun Ju, also known as the Central Propaganda Department's Theory Bureau) 
was published in the People's Daily on 5 June 2006. See Zhong Xuanli (5 June 2(06). ' 
171 
so as to avoid producing an overly narrow understanding of the discourse in this 
period. 
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16 August Commentary: Contextual Analysis489 
The article that will be analysed in this chapter is a commentary from the People's 
Daily entitled "Maintain the Overall Situation and Stability and Push Forward Reform 
and Development-Ninth Commentary on Tightening Efforts to Handle and Solve the 
'Falun Gong' Problem" which was published on 16 August 1999 as part ofa series of 
commentaries concerned with the Falun Gong "problem".49o Furthermore, this series 
was itself part of the wider campaign against Falun Gong that had been launched by 
the Chinese government on 22 July 1999 with the announcement of the resolution by 
the Ministry of Civil Affairs to outlaw "The Research Society of Falun Dala and the 
Falun Gong organisation under its control",491 the release of a Circular by the CCP 
Central Committee forbidding its members from practicing Falun Gonl92 and a set of 
regulations from the Ministry of Public Security prohibiting the promotion of Falun 
Gong.493 For Perry, such a campaign, both in size and scope, had not been conducted 
in the People's Republic of China since the 1950s, when successive campaigns were 
undertaken against the resistance of "counter-revolutionaries". However, this 
comparison notwithstanding, Perry also contends that the campaign against Falun 
Gong was still ''unprecedented'' in that "never before have we witnessed an attack of 
this kind on but a single target. ,,494 Furthermore, this "target" had only been founded 
seven years earlier49S and yet, by the time the campaign was launched, the number of 
419 As with the contextual analysis in the previous chapter, this analysis is not intended to provide a full 
historical account of Falun Gong and the government's campaign against the movement but rather, in 
keeping with the Discourse-Historical approach. to present my understanding of the issues relevant to 
this period in order to make more explicit the meanings within the 16 August Commentary. 
490 Benbao Pinglunyuan (16 August 1999) 
491 "On the Resolution Outlawing the Falun Dafa Research Society" (1999: 30-32) 
492 "Circular of the CCP Central Committee Forbidding Communist Party Members from Practicing 
Falun Dafa" (1999: 14-18). 
493 ''Public notice of the Public Security Ministry of the People's Republic of China" (1999: 33-36). 
494 Perry (2001: 170). 
495 According to Vermander, the group's first workshop was held in the city ofChangchun (Jilin 
province) in May 1992. See Vennander (2001: 13). 
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Falun Gong adherents numbered in the millions.496 As Wong points out, "the sudden 
rise ofFLG in the short span of only a few years (as compared to 2000 years of 
history for Chinese Buddhism and 1700 years for Taoism) is simply an astonishing 
phenomenon.,,497 In order to explain how this "phenomenon" came to be and why it 
then became the object of a government campaign, it is first necessary to give a brief 
account of Falun Gong. 
The Philosophy of Falun Gonl98 
Penny describes Falun Gong as "qigong with Buddhist characteristics" and this neatly, 
if simplistically, captures the syncretic blending of Daoist and Buddhist elements that 
are most prominent in the cultivation system promulgated by the groUp.499 Indeed, the 
incorporation of elements from these two religions is reflected both in the name of the 
group and the emblem that represents it. For the name, the term/alun is the standard 
Chinese translation in religious writings for the Buddhist term dharmacakra, which 
496 The exact number of Falun Gong adherents range from the Chinese government's estimate of 
approximately two million to that of one hundred million (70 million in China) put forward by Falun 
Gong spokespersons. While the government's figure is widely regarded to be on the low side, the 
membership figure given by Falun Gong seems extremely high, given as it would put its membership 
above that of the CCP. Furthermore, there is no way to verify the figures given by the group, for, as 
Tong points out, "[o]rganizationally, the/alun gong has ... no institutionalized means to delineate 
members from non-members, authorized from unauthorized agents and no rites of induction and 
:w.ulsion." See Tong (2002: 636, 659). 
Wong (1999: 12). 
498 In attempting to give a brief overview of Falun Gong, it is important to point out that the history of 
the group, and particularly that of its founder, Li Hongzhi, is highly contested, both by those who 
support the ban on the Falun Gong and by those who oppose it. The divergent figures for Falun Gong 
membership cited in Note 8 above is but one example of this contestation. Furthermore, there is also a 
degree of dissonance to be found in the academic literature on these issues, no doubt due in part to 
these contested views but possibly also due to the fact that little research had been conducted on the 
group prior to the government's ban. As a consequence, it has been difficult to establish a consistent set 
offacis on this subject. See also Ownby (2002: 308-309). 
499 Penny (2005: 44). Other authors have suggested that additional spiritual elements can be discerned 
in the Falun Gong belief system. For example, Xiao contends that it also draws on "ethic-teaching 
Confucianism", most notably in the concept ofxinxing (mind nature). For Chang, Falun Gong also 
contains elements of classical Chinese folk religion as well as magic while Shue describes it as "an 
eclectic blend of themes and metaphors drawn from Daoism, Buddhism, Chinese folk myths, Chinese 
medicine, qigong practice, pop science and even science fiction. See Xiao (2001: 131), Chang (2004: 
61), Sbue (2002: 220). 
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means ''the Wheel of the Law .. 500, while the use of the term gong refers to the Daoist 
practice of qigong. Put together, the phrase Falun Gong literally means the "Practice 
of the Wheel of the Law". As for the group's emblem, it displays both the Buddhist 
dharma wheel and the Daoist taiji symbol. 501 
The inclusion ofDaoist beliefs in Falun Gong is most evident in the five sets of 
meditative exercises that constitute the practice of Falun Gong, as these exercises 
draw from that of qigong.502 The concept of qigong, which has been traced back to 
Daoist practices as early as the fourth century BeE,s03 can be broken down into those 
of qi and gong, in which the term qi refers to the notion of a "life energy" that is said 
to be present in all things and the term gong refers to practice, in the form of 
meditation and deep breathing, through which this "life energy" can be cultivated. 
According to Lu, those who practice qigong believe that, ''through cultivating "qi" 
one can gain not only some kind of vital energy that is useful to stay healthy, but also 
obtain some supernormal abilities."s04 Within Falun Gong, this concept of qigong, as 
practiced through the five sets of meditative exercises, was more heavily emphasised 
than that of Buddhism in the early stage of its existence.sos, According to Lu, Falun 
Gong was initially promoted by Li Hongzhi in his lectures and classes as a method for 
healing physical ailments and curing diseases. Indeed, Lu claims that Li would often 
offer to perform immediate treatments on people in order to demonstrate its healing 
500 Penny (2005: 35). However, Ching contends that though this translation is ''technically correct", in 
Buddhism, the tenn "Law" refers to doctrine. See Ching (2005: 42). 
501 Ching, (2005: 43). 
502 However, there is disagreement over the extent to which these exercises can be considered as 
?Jlong. See, for example, Vennander (2001: 5), Leung (2002: 767). 
Ovennyer (2003: 314). Xu contends that the actual tenn is of recent origin; however, this is disputed 
by Leung, who claims that the word first appeared in medical texts during the time of the Jin dynasty 
~ 6 S - 3 1 7 7 CE). See Xu (1999: 973), Leung (2002: 767). 
Lu (2005: 174). 
505 Indeed. ~ o l u n n ~ n g . r e c e i v e d d its ~ c r e d i t a ~ o n , , albeit und.er ~ e e name of "The Research Society of 
Falun Dolo and, With It, the legal ngbt to eXIst as an organtsation from the China Qigong Science 
Research Society (CQSRS) in 1992. See Xia and Hua (1999: 8). 
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power.506 However, this emphasis on the healing power of qigong gave way to a 
spiritual salvation that borrowed from Buddhism with the publication ofLi Hongzhi's 
first book, Zhuan Falun, in 1994. This book, which had been put together by Falun 
Gong adherents from transcriptions of Li's lectures, is, according to Chan, regarded as 
"a sacred text, a revelation of the Truth of the Universe".507 
In Zhuan Falun, Li posits that humanity has been subject to eighty-one near 
annihilations in the phase of pre-recorded history and that, with the passing of each 
one of these events, a process of progressive degradation has been effected upon the 
quality of the remaining human beings, to the extent that the human beings now left 
on earth equate to the "dregs" of humanity. For Li, this means that all human beings 
are polluted by karma (yeli), which he claims is materially represented by a "black 
substance". In addition, this karma will become greater if people commit immoral acts. 
The effect of this karma at a societal level has been to leave it morally degraded while, 
at an individual level, it has resulted in people suffering bad fortune and illnesses. 
According to Li, the only way to eradicate karma is through the cultivation of one's 
"mind nature" (xinxing) and this will only occur once people accept his teachings and 
follow the practice of Falun Gong. By doing this, people will be able to replace karma 
with virtue (de), materially represented by a ''white substance". This substance is to 
be cultivated by the practice of Zhen (truthfulness), Shan (benevolence) and Ren 
(forbearance), which constitute ''the supreme nature of the universe" (yuzhou zuigao 
texing) and take their form in acts such as enduring suffering and setbacks as well as 
doing "good deeds". The purpose of this cultivation is to increase practitioners' "mind 
506 An example is at the second Oriental Health Expo in Beijing in 1993, at which Li offered treatments 
on expo visitors with such success that the Ministry of Public Security praised Li's power of healing 
diseases. See Lu (2005: 175). 
507 Chan (2004: 670). 
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nature" to the level where it is possible for them to attain a state of enlightenment 
known as "consummation".508 Li, in his capacity as master, aids practitioners in 
reaching this state by inserting the falun, literally a small wheel of law, into their 
lower abdomens. According to Li, thefalun constitutes "a miniature of the universe 
that possesses all of the universe's capabilities, and it can operate and rotate 
automatically".509 It enables practitioners to cultivate their own virtue by giving them 
their own cultivation energy, also known as gong. When the/alun rotates clockwise, it 
is said to absorb energy from the universe and when it rotates counter-clockwise, it is 
said to release energy and waste into the universe while at the same time benefiting 
those nearby. 
The Popularity of Falun Gong 
The publication of Zhuan Falun was also significant, in that it served to differentiate 
Falun Gong from other qigong groups. This had proved necessary, as the group's 
emergence had occurred at the height of the "qigong fever" (qigong re) in China.SIO 
Consequently, it had been but one of a number of groups offering qigong. Moreover, 
these groups, such as Zhong Gong and the ''New Guo Lin Qigong", had been 
established much earlier than Falun Gong and, as a result, were bigger, more 
organised and had a stronger reputation for healing diseases. For Falun Gong, it 
proved difficult to attract new practitioners in the environment. However, the 
508 Penny (2003: 644). 
509 Li (2000: 42). 
510 Chan estimates that the number of registered and non-registered groups during this time reached 
approximately 2,000 while Friedman claims that the CQSRS had estimated there to be sixty million 
regular qigong practitioners. As to the larger question of why qigong became so popular in China 
during this period, Chen puts it down to "[t]he combination of the withdrawal of state funds, 
emergence of charismatic masters and a long tradition of self-cultivation", in that the post-Mao period 
bad involved a change in the way that health care was funded, with the result that a greater proportion 
of the health care cost was transferred onto the patient. Consequently, people began to look towards 
less expensive ways of treating illnesses and ailments and. given the long tradition of self-cultivation as 
wen as the emergence of many qigong groups, for many people, q;gong represented a viable alternative. 
See Chen (2003: 506-508), Chan (2004: 674), Friedman (2005: 223). 
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publication of Zhuan Falun, in linking the practice of qigong to that of spiritual 
salvation, enabled it to offer a form of qigong that went beyond the more traditional 
healing practices of most qigong schools and was responsible, in part at least, for the 
rapid growth of the group. From her interviews with Falun Gong adherents, Chan 
concluded that "it was its moral teachings that make it superior to other qigong 
groupS".Sll Ching also found that the appeal of Falun Gong lay in the fact that it 
offered "a set ofbeliefs ... about life and hereafter".S12 For many analysts, the appeal 
of this belief system to so many people in China during this time lay in the declining 
power of the communist ideology. Indeed, Ching traces the decline of this ideology 
all the way back to the deleterious effects of the Cultural RevolutionS13 whereas others, 
most notably Xiao, contend that it was due to the mass lay-offs, widening income 
disparity and official corruption that arose from the economic reforms in the post-Mao 
period.S14 Despite these differences, most agree that the decline of communism had 
led to an "ideological vacuum". Indeed, for Xiao, this vacuum was Falun Gong's 
"most effective recruiting mechanism."sls Leung agrees, explaining that Falun Gong 
"attracted people, including CCP members, seeking traditional values and a more 
idealistic meaning in life, and it offered a philosophy to fill the spiritual vacuum that 
has resulted from growing disillusionment with the Communist ideology."S16 
'11 Chan (2004: 676). 
512 Ching (2005: 49). 
513 Ibid., p. 49. 
'14 See Xiao (2001), Leung (2002) and Chan (2004). An additional factor may have been that Falun 
Gong was set up in the north-east of China which experienced high unemployment in the 1990s. 
'1' Xiao (2001: 130). 
'16 Leung (2002: 783). The limitation of such an argument is that it rests on the presupposition that 
people, or in this case Chinese people. require some form of ideological fulfilment and that 
communism previously provided this fulfilment. Such points are not uncontested and leave 
Unexplained, for example, why some people became FLO adherents while others did not. That said the 
link between "the ideological crisis" in communism and the apparent widespread appeal of Falun ' 
Gong's beliefsystern cannot be entirely rejected. 
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In addition to Falun Gong's belief system, analysts also emphasise the methods 
employed by the group to publicise this belief system when explaining its popularity. 
Alongside the publication of books and the release of audio and video materials that 
were done by most groups, Chen highlights the fact that Falun Gong offered free 
classes for interested practitioners at a time when many other qigong schools charged 
regular attendance fees.517 Chen makes a further point that regular practitioners were 
encouraged to actively discuss Li's teachings with friends and family members. 
Indeed, for Chen, "[t]his was perhaps the main reason for rapid dissemination.,,518 
Johnson makes a similar point, in that Falun Gong, on account of the fact that it was 
registered as an affiliate of the China Qigong Scientific Research Society, was not 
bound by the restrictions placed upon official religions and so was able to proselytise 
in public spaces.519 Vermander also points to Falun Gong's use of public spaces when 
conducting its exercise sessions as enabling it to gain prominence. In fact, according 
to Vennander, Li Hongzhi insisted that it was necessary for exercises to be carried out 
in public so as ''to propagate and improve dharma ... throughout the universe" and 
because "protestation was necessary for salvation".s2o A final reason given by 
, Johnson to explain Falun Gong's popularity does not concern its promulgation 
strategies but rather the failure of the Chinese government to circumscribe such 
strategies. According to Johnson, no government department was prepared to take 
responsibility for dealing with Falun Gong. As it was not classified as a religion, the 
517 According to Ownby, this only occurred once Fa/un Gong bad acquired a level of financial 
success-through the sale of other Fa/un Gong parapbernalia- that made it no longer dependent on 
raising money through lectures. See Ownby (2002: 305-306). 
511 Chen (2003: 511). 
S191obnson (13 December 2000). 
no Vermander (2001: 5). 
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Religion Bureau did not believe that it fell under their jurisdiction while the Ministry 
of Public Security was not able to act unless the group caused a "disturbance".521 
Political Pressure on Falun Gong 
In the same way that Falun Gong's popularity could be explained, in part, by the 
growth in popularity of qigong schools across China, so it was that the government's 
suppression of Falun Gong can be partly explained by its attitude to this growth in the 
practice of qigong. For Lu, this attitude was both "subtle and contradictory", in that 
the government actively sought to encourage the practice of qigong, not least because 
many leaders felt that the healing practice was both effective and reduced the burden 
on the health care system, while at the same time exercising control 9ver qigong 
masters who were viewed as a threat to state rule.522 The government was able to 
display such a contradictory attitude by putting in place regulations that sought to 
distinguish the legitimate form of "scientific" qigong (kexue de qigong) from the 
illegitimate form of ''unscientific'' qigong (wu kexue de qigong/jia qigong).523 
Consequently, in 1986, the China Qigong Scientific Research Society (CQSRS) was 
established and required all qigong schools to obtain its accreditation. Although Lu 
states that this ''played an important role in propelling qigong to high popularity", 524 
it also meant that the activities of qigong schools would now be subject to state 
monitoring.S2S Regulations introduced by the CQSRS stipulated that accreditation for 
qigong schools would be awarded on condition of the qigong master either having a 
medical degree plus further courses in traditional Chinese medicine, having trained 
with an officially accredited qigong master or demonstrating their healing powers 
521 Johnson (13 December 2000). 
522 Lu (2005: 183 note 3). 
523 Chen (2003: 508-510). 
524 Lu (2005: 174). 
525 Leung (2002: 767). 
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before an official board.526 In addition to these regulations, raids were carried out on 
booksellers carrying ''unscientific'' qigong titles and checks were made in public 
parks to ensure that qigong practitioners belonged to an officially registered schoo1.527 
For Chen, the effect of these regulations meant that "[t]he state and its representatives 
thus became crucial gatekeepers to counter runaway popular imaginations of qigong 
masters. ,,528 
The significance of the state's classification of qigong for the later campaign against 
Falun Gong is that, in 1996, the CQSRS suspended the registration of Falun Gong on 
the grounds that it was "advocating superstition".529 The withdrawal of this 
registration now meant that Falun Gong was classified as an illegal organisation in 
China.53o For Ching, the lack of official registration also meant that Falun Gong "was 
without adequate political protection, and thus exposed to attacks or criticisms from 
all quarters. ,,531 Indeed, in the period prior to the 1999 suppression of the group, 
Falun Gong was subjected to criticism from the Chinese media. The first prominent 
526 Chen (2003: 510). 
527 Ibid., p.51 O. 
528 Ibid., p.509. 
529 Xia and Hua (1999: 8). However, there are conflicting accounts over both the timing and the cause 
of Falun Gong's ejection from the CQSRS. According to Lu, the CQSRS suspended Falun Gong in 
1994 but that Falun Gong made the decision to withdraw from the Society in 1996 after it was unable 
to register with a social organisation. Tong, however, cites Falun Gong sources which claim that it was 
Li Hongzhi who initiated Falun Gong's withdrawal from the CQSRS. First, he informed the Society in 
1994 that Falun Gong would no longer run training sessions and then, in September 1996, his deputies 
infonned the CQSRS that Fa/un Gong would no longer run training seminars. In response to this, the 
CQSRS terminated Falun Gong's registration in November 1996. For Leung, Falun Gong was de-
registered by the government in 1997 while Shue dates Falun Gong's removal from the CQSRS only to 
the "mid-1990s"; however, Shue claims that it was due to other qigong masters complaining to the 
CQSRS about Li Hongzhi un-qigong practices. See Lu (2005: 183 note 3), Tong (2002: 640-641), 
LelDlg (2002: 763), Shue (2002: 216). 
530 In light of the fact that Falun Gong's illegality became the main basis on which the government 
initially justified its suppression of the group in 1999, it is important to make clear that this illegality 
meant that Falun Gong was not able to exist in an organisational form nor exercise functions that were 
associated with being an organisation, such as holding training seminars and convening meetings of 
practitioners. However, this illegality did not extend, in theory at least, to stopping people from 
individually following the practices of Falun Gong or reading Li Hongzhi's already published books. 
yet, when the government announced its ban in 1999, it also forbade the practice of Falun Gong. 
531 Ching (2005: 45). 
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attack on Falun Gong occurred when the Guangming Daily published a review of a 
book by Li Hongzhi entitled "Ring the Bell of Warning Forever" Uingzhong 
changming) on 17 June 1996 in which Falun Gong was denounced for "advocating 
feudal superstitions".532 A further denunciation of Falun Gong took place when a 
programme on cults was broadcast by Beijing TV, in which a Chinese physicist, He 
Zuoxiu, accused the group of being a "cult" and of "spreading wrongful theories and 
practices" which had been responsible for committing one of the researchers at his 
institute to a mental asylum.533 In both instances, the response of Falun Gong 
practitioners was to protest in front of the media organisation's headquarters in order 
to demand a retraction of the criticism. In fact, according to the People's Daily, there 
were a total of seventy-eight protests made against media organisation from 1996 to 
1999 by Falun Gong adherents that involved three hundred people or more.534 
Furthermore, Johnson states that, [i]n almost every case, the media had backed down, 
printing or airing apologies to Falun Daja."s3s In the case of the critical book review 
in the Guangming Daily, the response of the Press and Publication Administration 
was to institute the ''three nots" policy, which stipulated that, in reports concerning 
groups such as Falun Gong, the media should not be for it, against it or label it as 
either good or bad.s36 In the case of the Beijing TV broadcast, following a two 
thousand-strong protest that lasted over three weeks and which showed no sign of 
abating before the politically sensitive date of 4 June, Johnson claims that political 
leaders "ordered the television station to end the Falun Daja protest at any cOSt.uS37 
m Xia and Hua (1999: 8). 
m Vennander (2001: 12 note 3). 
534 party Paper says Falun Gong ''True Cult" (29 October 1999). For Chen, this represented another 
difference between Fa/un Gong and other qigong schools, in that "[t]hough hundreds of qigong masters 
and forms were active in post-Mao China, few overtly criticized the state." See Chen (2003: 512). 
535 Johnson (13 December 2000). 
536 Ibid. 
537 Johnson (13 December 2000). 
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Therefore, Beijing TV brought the protests to an end by handing out lunchboxes to 
the protestors and offering to air a programme that presented a more sympathetic 
profile of Falun Gong. 
The "25 April Incident" 
In light of the success of these protests by Falun Gong adherents, it was not 
unsurprising when the publication of another critical article in the Youth Science and 
Technology Review (qingshao nian keji baonan) in April 1999 caused adherents to 
employ this tactic once again. The article, entitled "I Do Not Approve of Teenagers 
Practicing Qigong", was written by the same physicist, He Zuoxiu, who had been 
critical of Falun Gong in the Beijing TV programme. Although the main point of the 
article was that athletic sports were better for the physical development of young 
people than qigong, it also accused Falun Gong of being responsible for the death of 
several young people.s38 With the article having been published by Tianjin Normal 
University, protestors gathered outside the journal's editorial building there. Initially, 
the protest consisted of just fifty or so demonstrators; however, as the days passed, the 
number of protestors steadily increased and, by April 24, approximately six thousand 
demonstrators had massed in Tianjin. According to Chang, the forcible removal of ten 
of the protestors by the police provoked the remaining protestors to march on Tianjin 
City Hall.s39 However, though serious in its own right, the protest in Tianjin merely 
served as a precursor for the events that would unfold in Beijing the following day. 
SH Ching (2005: 45). Johnson also claims that Falun Gong adherents were offended by the article's use 
of the term ''boss'' (toutou) rather than "master" when referring to Li Hongzhi. See Johnson (13 
December 2000). 
539 Chang (2004: 106). 
183 
On 25 April 1999, approximately ten to fifteen thousand Falun Gong adherents 
assembled outside the Xinhuamen entrance to the leaders' residential compound, 
Zhongnanhai.540 The protest lasted from 4 am until II pm and involved practitioners 
from six different provinces.541 Although its aims were not entirely clear,542 it seems 
that the main objective of the protest was to petition the national leaders to restore 
Falun Gong's legal status and so allow it to resume its organisational functions.543 
The protestors agreed to leave the site after the designated Falun Gong leaders had a 
meeting with the Chinese premier, Zhu Rongji.544 The initial reaction ofCCP leaders 
to the protest, in public at least, was muted. Although it was declared illegal and a 
warning was issued to citizens and, in particular, to officials not to participate in 
further demonstrations,545 the only mention of the protests in Xinhua was an article 
published on April 27, which reported the protests as well as those that took place in 
Tianjin while emphasising the role of government officials in "persuading" the 
protestors to end their demonstration. Furthermore, the article chose to refer to Falun 
Gong only as a "health fitness activity". 546 
The Campaign Against Falun Gong 
However, as stated at the start of this chapter, the government eventually responded to 
this protest some three months later when it published the decision to outlaw Falun 
Gong. For Wong, this decision was inevitable because "[t]o the government, such an 
S40 Penny (2003: 643). 
541 Tong (2002: 637). According to Xiao, the protestors came from the provinces of Hebei, Shandong, 
Liaoning and Inner Mongolia as well as the municipalities of Beijing and Tianjin. See Xiao (2001: 124). 
542 The objectives of the protest were difficult to discern because the demonstrators did not hold aloft 
banners or shout out slogans. Rather, the majority of protestors merely read Li Hongzhi's books and 
carried out the Falun Gong meditative exercises. As such, the demonstration was calm and peaceable. 
543 Ching (2005: 41). Leung also contends that a further reason of the demonstration was to protest 
against Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' labelling of the group as an "evil religious sect" while 
Chang claims that it was due to the arrest of the ten adherents in Tianjin. See Leung (2002: 763), 
Chang (2004: 106). 
544 Ching (2005: 41). 
545 Chen (2003: 514). 
546 Chen (2005: 22-23). 
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open demonstration would undermine public confidence in its ability to maintain 
stability in this politically sensitive year of 1999 and would hence make the 
government "lose face" internationally and domestically.,,547 Though 1999 was a 
politically sensitive year on account of the number of anniversaries that would take 
place, such as the eightieth year of the May Fourth Movement, the fiftieth year of the 
founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as well as the tenth year of the 
events at Tiananmen,548 others point to additional factors that influenced the 
government's decision to ban the group. For Chen, it was due to the fact that "[t]he 
protest directly confronted socialist leaders ... [and so] transformed this healing sect 
into a politi9al organization that challenged state legitimacy. ,,549 Indeed, Chen makes 
the point that the holding of the protest outside Zhongnanhai indicated the political 
intentions of Falun Gong, both to contest the CCP's authority and to publicise its own 
cause.sso Furthermore, Xia and Hua contend that, "[i]fthe FLO was allowed to have 
its legitimacy and official recognition, it amounted to the opening up of a public 
sphere for the existence of autonomous organizations and associations ... [and this] 
would be antithetical to the monopoly of political power over the China by the 
Communist party."S51 However, others, most notably Leung, suggest that the 
government's decision to ban Falun Gong was due to the organisational capabilities 
that the group had demonstrated on 25 April. 552 As Leung points out, ''the 
movement's ability to gather 10,000 members from across the country to take part in 
an orderly and disciplined protest outside Zhongnanhai needs an organizational 
,." Wong (1999: 13). 
548 Perry (2001: 1 6 ~ 1 6 7 ) . .
549 Chen (2003: S13-S14). 
550 Chen (2003: SI3). 
551 Xia and Hua (1999: 11-12). 
552 See Cben (2003), Ching (200S), Lewg (2002) and Tong (2002). 
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network and a disciplined code of conduct. ,,553 Indeed, in the intervening period 
between the 25 April protest and the government's decision to ban Falun Gong, Chen 
claims that there was 307 protests involving Fa/un Gong adherents across China.554 
According to Xia and Hua, approximately 70,000 Falun Gong adherents went to 
Beijing from 3-6 June to petition the government against banning the group, 
following rumours that such a move was imminent. 555 Powers and Lee claim that a 
further petition of 14,000 signatures was presented to the government on 14 June 
making the same request.556 Additional protests of between 3,000 to 5,000 people 
were also reported in Hubei and Shandong provinces as well as in several large 
Chinese cities.557 For Powers and Lee, "[s]uch displays of organizational 
ability ... were certainly calculated to symbolize the widespread distribution of FLG 
practitioners internally and internationally and to embarrass the Chinese government 
into recognizing the group's legitimacy.,,558 However, for Wong, such behaviour may 
have actually influenced the government's decision to ban the group. 
The varied composition of Falun Gong's membership is a further reason that has been 
put forward by analysts when considering the decision to ban ·the group. For Perry, 
this is because "movements that spill across jurisdictional and/or occupational 
boundaries are ... viewed as cause for central concern. ,,559 In the case of the Falun 
Gong, it appears that its membership base consisted of a broad range of people from 
different groups throughout Chinese society. Although reliable infonnation is difficult 
553 Leung (2002: 765). 
554 Chen (2005: 18). In addition to those within China, protests by Falun Gong adherents also took 
place in other cOlDltries. See Powers and Lee (2002: 263). 
355 Xia and Hua (1999: 10) 
556 I n t e r e s t i n g l y ~ ~ Xinhua did publish an article on 14 June which reassured Falun Gong practitioners 
that the group would not be banned. See Chen (2005: 23), 
m Powers and Lee (2002: 264). 
551 Ibid., p.264. 
"'Perry (2001: 169). 
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to obtain, Leung cites an unpublished report from an investigation conducted into the 
group by the Chinese government, which states that the average age of Fa/un Gong 
followers was above forty and sixty percent were female. In addition, the majority, 
approximately seventy percent, could be classed as low income, both those from 
urban and rural areas, while those from the "margins" of society, such as retired and 
semi-retired cadres and teachers, who had fallen behind following the implementation 
of the economic reforms, constituted the next largest group offollowers. The smallest 
group within Falun Gong was also considered to be the most influential and consisted 
of elites from the CCP, the military, the civil service as well as professionals.56o 
Moreover, within these three main groups of Fa/un Gong adherents, many were also 
said to be members of the CCP. Zong Hairen states that investigations by the national 
public security services in July 1999 suggested that 15.6 percent of the 2.3 million 
Falun Gong followers were members of the CCP,561 while Leung cites a party official 
who claimed that as many as seven million members of the CCP were also followers 
of Falun Gong.562 In addition, an internal estimate of China's air force concluded that 
there were four to five thousand Falun Gong "sympathisers" amongst the two 
hundred thousand-strong force. 563 Consequently, for Leung, "[t]he reaction of the 
state and the CCP to the FLG protests reveals the extent to which both were seriously 
threatened by the turning of so many state officials and CCP members to the 
$60 Leung (2002: 765-767). 
561 According to Zong, it was the revelation of these figures that caused the CCP leaders to ban Falun 
Gong. See Zong (2002: 67). It should be pointed out that Zong Hairen is a pseudonym for a person or 
group of people who claim to have had high-level access to the top leadership of the CCP. Despite this 
and the apparent intention of the book to discredit the then Secretary-General, Jiang Zemin, I have • 
cited this information both because it bas been cited by other authors and, more specifically in this 
instance, it is supported by other information. ' 
562 Leung (2002: 773). 
563 Murphy (15 February 2001). 
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movement".564 In terms oflegitimacy, CCP leaders may have determined that cadres' 
loyalty was compromised by their following of Falun Gong and that this had the 
potential to undermine the Party's authority.565 For evidence of the effect that could 
cause, Perry points to the defection of Guomindang members to the CCP during the 
civil war: "When Guomindang members at all levels began to go over to the 
Communist side, the civil war tilted decisively in favor of the revolutionaries.,,566 
The appeal to history is the final reason most often cited by other analysts when 
considering the decision to ban Falun Gong. However, this appeal is more rooted in 
China's history of sectarian-led uprisings that stretches back to the Yellow Turban 
rebellion, which contributed to the end of the Han Dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE), 
through to the White Lotus, Taiping and Boxer rebellions, which all damaged the 
Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). According to Schell, these uprisings were successful, in 
part because "[s]uch cult-animated uprisings against unjust authority ... have always 
been viewed by Chinese as portents that the legitimacy-or the "mandate of 
heaven"--of a ruling dynasty has been withdrawn.',s67 Although the legitimacy of the 
CCP is no longer derived from the "mandate of heaven" (tianming), Perry suggests 
that the actions of the CCP, in both banning Falun Dolo and cracking down on Falun 
Gong practitioners, has "invited just such historical allusions. ,,568 
564 Leung (2002: 773). A Circular issued by the Central Committee of the CCP forbade Party members 
from practicing Falun Gong and Notices from the Ministry of Personnel and the State Council also 
forbade civil servants. 
565 However, Ching contends that, as Falun Gong was not initially classed as a religion, cadres may not 
have felt that they were violating the terms of their membership. See Ching (2005: 47). 
566 Perry (2001: 171). 
567 Schell (1999). 
561 Perry (2001: 174). 
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However, the main reason put forward by the Chinese government when the decision 
to ban Falun Gong was announced was that the group constituted an illegal 
organisation. In effect, this presented the decision taken by the government to be one 
that was based on PRC Law. According to the government, the Falun Gong had 
violated nine different articles within two Laws and two set ofregulations,S69 which 
ranged from failing to have the required registration to operate as a mass organisation 
to disrupting social order by holding unauthorised assemblies to utilising superstitions 
to delude people and cause their death. Consequently, the Chinese government used 
these laws as the basis on which to arrest Falun Gong practitioners. However, in 
carrying out these arrests, the government, in the initial stages at least, distinguished 
between those who practised Falun Gong for health reasons and those who had 
played a role in organising the protests. According to Chen, the arrests began with 
seventy of those considered to be "key figures".s7o The decision to ban Falun Gong 
also led to a purge of government and Party officials who were alleged to be Falun 
Gong adherents. According to Ching, in one instance, approximately 1,200 
government officials were taken away to schools for a weekend in order to study 
Chinese Communist Party documents and renounce their belief in Falun Gong.57 ) 
Furthermore, Chen notes that, in the months following the ban, all government and 
party institutions both publicly declared their support for the campaign against Fa/un 
Gong and criticised those former colleagues who were a l l e g ~ ~ to have been Fa/un 
Gong members. 572 
r 
569 For a detailed list of these laws, see "Laws Exist for the Banning of Falun Gong" (1999: 4345). 
570 Chen (2003: 517). 
571 Ching (2005: 47). 
sn Chen (2003: SIS). 
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In addition to the arrests of practitioners both within and without the CCP, the 
campaign against the Falun Gong also included the launching of the largest 
propaganda campaign since the events at Tiananmen took place in 1989.573 For 
Powers and Lee, the aim of this campaign was "to try to discredit the FLO 
organization, practices, belief system, and social consequences.,,574 Furthennore, the 
government attempted to achieve this by utilising all the available media platfonns. 
Though not an issue with the protests in 1989,575 the Internet had been regarded as 
playing an important role in the continued existence of Falun Gong after 1996 and the 
government's response was to block all Falun Gong-related websites and search 
tenns while also publishing its own articles against the group online.576 In addition, it 
also took the step of temporarily shutting down several e-mail services on the grounds 
that they were being used by Falun Gong followers to communicate with each other 
in order to co-ordinate their activities.577 As for television, Chen states that it was "a 
key medium to illustrate why the state viewed the sect as an evil cult. ,,578 As well as 
Falun Gong being the main topic of news broadcasts,579 regular programming was 
also interrupted by the airing of shows condemning Falun Gong. Chen notes that an 
anti-Falun Gong documentary was shown repeatedly on state television from 21 July 
unti12S July while Ching recounts that the broadcasts on Falun Gong featured such 
items as the leaders of China's official religions denouncing the group, former Falun 
573 Xia and Hua (1999: 11). 
574 Powers and Lee (2002: 268). 
575 However, technology, both in the form of phones as well as fax machines, did playa role in 
allowing demonstrators to relay information about the demonstrations within and without China. 
576 Chen (2003: 515-516). 
577 An example of this was the closure of approximately one million free e-mail accounts from the 
~ v i d e r r 263.net. This took place on 22 July and lasted for several days. See Lin (2001: 224). 
• Chen (2003: 516). 
579 For example, on 24 July 1999, the CCTV programme ''National News Hook-up" featured Falun 
Gong in thirty-one of the thirty-three items broadcast that evening. "TV news Devoted to Massive 
Criticism of falun Gong" (24 July 1999). 
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Gong practitioners criticising its belief system as well as experts detailing the litany of 
crimes that Falun Gong had committed.s8o 
510 Ching (200S: 42). 
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16 August Commentary: Selection of Data 
The 16 August commentary was selected following a number of searches that were 
conducted within the available categories in the People's Daily database.581 The time 
frame within which the search was carried out was a five-week period that started 
with the official announcement of the group's ban on 23 July 1999 and ended on 31 
August 1999. This period was chosen because it was the time when the campaign was 
at its most intense, with a large number of articles published on the subject of Falun 
Gong.582 Indeed, of the 4,140 articles that had been published during the selected time 
frame, a total of 385 articles featured the tenn "Falun". 583 In addition, a keyword 
search for the tenn "stability" (wending) produced a total of 480 articles for this 
period. Moreover, the first result on the list of articles was not concerned with Falun 
Gong; however, the second result, with a relevance score of 99% was the 16 August 
commentary. Furthennore, when restricting this search to include only articles that 
had been published on the first page of the People's Daily, the 16 August commentary 
was the top result, with a relevance score of 100%. 
Expanding the search for articles that mentioned both "stability" and "Falun" 
produced a total of 116 articles, in which the 16 A u ~ s t t commentary was placed tenth 
with a relevance score of 86%. Again, narrowing this search to include only those 
articles published on page one reduced the number of articles to 39, with the 16 
August commentary placed as the seventh most relevant article. The search was 
further restricted to include only those articles on page one that featured "stability" in 
511 As detailed in chapter two, these categories are: date (riql); headline (biao/I); page number (band); 
edition (banming); author (zuozhe); special column (zhuanlan); text (zhengwen). 
512 Chen (2003: 516). 
583 This term had been c h ~ s ~ ~ so as to include articles that used the term Falun Gong or Falun Dala or, 
indeed, both terms. In add1tion, a search for the keyword of Fa/un Gong yielded a total of 360 articles 
while a search for the keyword of Falun Dala resulted in a total of20l articles. 
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the headline and the keywords of "stability" and "Falun". This search produced a total 
of five articles for the period between 23 July 1999 and 31 August 1999. The first 
result on the list, with a relevance score of 1 00%, was the 23 July editorial entitled 
"Improve Our Understanding, Recognize the Danger, Maintain a Hold on Policy, and 
Uphold Stability". However, though the editorial was politically significant in tenns 
ofthe campaign against Falun Gong, it presented this campaign as a struggle between 
the beliefs of the CCP and the beliefs of Falun Gong and, as a result, the concept of 
stability was not heavily emphasised. Indeed, "stability" was only used a total of nine 
times in the six paragraph editorial, of which two mentions were in the first paragraph 
while the remaining seven were in the fourth paragraph.584 The second result on this 
list was an article that had also been published on 23 July entitled "Cadres and Masses 
in All Parts of the Country Resolutely Support the Party and Government's Handling 
of Falun Gong; Resolve to Uphold Science, Abolish Superstition and Safeguard 
Stability" and had a relevance score of 94%.585 Again, however, though stability was 
used in the headline, it was not the central theme of the article. Rather, this article 
extended the main theme of the editorial by presenting the campaign as a contest 
between "science" and "superstition", in which science was associated with the 
beliefs of the CCP while Falun Gong's beliefs were said to be based on "superstition". 
In fact, despite the article consisting of sixteen paragraphs, the concept of stability 
was only used three times, once each in the second, thirteenth and fifteenth 
paragraphs. 
The third result on the list was the 16 August commentary with a relevance score of 
86%. However, by contrast with the two previous articles, the concept of stability was 
584 Editorial (1999: 79-82). 
515 Shelun (23 July 1999) 
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heavily emphasised throughout the article. Indeed, stability was used a total of 18 
times and featured in every one of the commentary's seven paragraphs. The fourth 
result of the list was a Xinhua special commentary entitled "Ban Unlawful 
Organisation, Safeguard Social Stability" that was published on 31 July 1999 and 
which also had a relevance score of 86%.586 However, as with the first two articles on 
the list, the main focus of this article was not stability, which was used only four times 
in the five paragraph article, once each in the first, second, fourth and fifth paragraphs. 
The final result on the list was an article entitled "Take a Clear-cut Stand and 
Thoroughly Resolve the "Falun Gong" Problem, Beijing ensures stability and 
economic development" that was published on 8 July 1999. Again, despite having 
stability in the headline, the concept was not heavily emphasised and, indeed, was 
only mentioned three times in the four paragraph article, once in the first paragraph 
and twice in the third paragraph. 
Following the searches carried out on the People's Daily database, I selected the 16 
August commentary for my analysis of stability's usage in the government's 
campaign against Falun Gong.587 The article was not selected solely on the basis that 
it mentioned stability more times than any of the other articles but also because the 
concept was the central focus of the article. As such, the commentary elucidated more 
clearly than the other articles how stability was used in relation to justifying the 
516 Xinhua PinglWlyuan (31 July 1999). 
"7 Indeed, a broader three year search from 23 July 1999 to 23 July 2002 for articles that featured on 
page 1 of the People's Daily with "stability" in the headline and the keywords of "stability" and 
"Falun" reinforced this decision on account of the fact that, of the 13 results, the 16 August 
commentary was fourth on the list behind the two articles published on 23 July 1999 and a commentary 
p u b l i ~ ~ ~ on 20 January 2001. A I ~ o u g ~ ~ the 20 Januar:>' c ~ m m e n t a r y y was concerned with "stability", 
mentiomng the term a total of 13 times, It also dealt With Issues beyond the campaign against Falun 
Gong, such as the 10th Five-Year Plan and the ''Three Represents". As a result, I felt that the 16 
August commentary better r e f 1 e ~ t e d d ~ o w w stabili.ty was used in the anti-Falun Gong campaign. In 
addition, there were no substantive differences m the concept's usage in either of the commentaries. 
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suppression of Falun Gong. That said, the 16 August commentary was also 
representative, in that the use of stability was consistent with the other articles. 
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16 August Commentary: Textual Analysis588 
"Maintain the Overall Situation and Stability and Push Forward Reform and 
Development-Ninth Commentary on Tightening Efforts to Handle and Solve the 
'Falun Gong' Problem" 
As explained in chapter two, the headline indicates the most important topic of an 
article. In the case of the 16 August commentary, the headline was comparatively 
long and the use of the em-dash effectively worked to separate it into two interrelated 
parts.589 In turn, each of these two parts consisted of two clauses. In the first part of 
the headline, the first clause worked to establish a relationship of equivalence between 
''the overall situation" and stability, as had also been the case with the two editorials 
analysed in chapter three. However, in contrast to the militaristic metaphor, 
"safeguard", that had been predominantly used in those two editorials, the 16 August 
commentary employed the term "maintain" and this constructed the impression that 
the overall situation was currently stable. In addition, "maintain" was used in its 
imperative form and this directed the reader to follow this order, while at the same 
time, presenting the stability of the overall situation as a positive value, in the sense it 
was worth ''maintaining''. The second clause of the first part of headline also worked 
to present the policy of "reform and development" positively, with the imperative 
''push forward" linking the clause to a discourse of progress. Furthermore, the use of 
the conjunctive conjunction "and" also joined the two clauses, so the condition of 
maintaining the stability of the overall situation was related to that of pushing forward 
reform and development. 
511 As with the articles analysed in the previous chapter, the intention of the translation has not been to 
necessarily produce the most fluent English translation but rather one that closely conveys the meaning 
and structure of the Chinese original. For the Chinese original, see theAppendix section. 
SI9 While the headlines often used in commentaries and editorials of the People's Daily are not 
necessarily short, t h e ~ ~ generally consist of one or two clauses. Consequently, this headline, which 
f'eatures four clauses, 18 somewhat longer. 
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In the second part of the headline, the second clause makes reference to Fa/un Gong 
by explicitly framing the group in tenns of a "problem-solution" schema.59o Indeed, 
this schema, as expressed in the fonnulaic phrase "solving the ... problem" 
(jiejue ... wenti), is one that is commonly employed by the CCP and has the effect of 
attaching a negative value to the "problem".S91 In addition, it also works to direct the 
readers' attention away from the question of why the problem came into being and 
onto that of how the problem can be solved. In the case of Falun Gong, this schema 
closed off potentially awkward questions, such as why so many people across China, 
both inside and outside the CCP, practiced Falun Gong while, at the same time, 
suggested that people's belief in the group's teaching was something that was, indeed, 
solvable. As to how this problem could be solved, the first clause of the second part of 
the headline indicated that many solutions were put forward at the t i m e ~ S 9 2 2 however, 
the one expressed through the complete headline for the 16 August commentary was 
that the Fa/un Gong problem would be solved by maintaining the stability of the 
overall situation while pushing forward refonn and development. In tenns of 
legitimation, stability was being used to justify both the continued rule of the CCP 
and the decision to suppress the Falun Gong. 
590 Fairclough (2001). 
591 A prominent example of this is that issues concerning the grievances of ethnic minority groups are 
frequently expressed through the "solving the ethnic problem" (jiejue minzu went;) schema. 
592 Other commentaries in the series included: the fourth commentary, which attempted to explain more 
clearly the ''nature of the struggle" against the group by emphasiSing their threat to society; the fifth 
commentary, which focused on exposing the "harm" caused by Falun Gong's teachings; and the 
seventh commentary, which suggested that the way to solve the Falun Gong problem was to 
demonstrate the "theoretical superiority" of the CCP's teachings. In addition. at the end of June, the 
People's Daily began a series on articles on atheism, which, in hindsight, seemed to prepare the ground 
for the suppression of the group. See Staff Commentator (30 July 1999); Staff Commentator (4 August 
1999); Shao Jingjun (29 June 1999). 
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The headline in the 16 August commentary, more so than was the case with the 
editorials in chapter three, also functioned as an "advance organiser" of the article. 
For Renkema, an advance organiser can be "a title or subtitle that ... provides clues 
about the macrostructure or superstructure. ,,593 The clues provided by the headline of 
16 August commentary were that the macrostructure (content) would be concerned 
with demonstrating both why the Falun Gong was a "problem" and why maintaining 
stability and pushing forward with reform and development constituted the solution. 
As for the commentary's superstructure (construction), the first paragraph elaborated 
upon the headline before the second and third paragraphs highlighted the actions of 
Falun Gong that necessitated the government's decision to ban the group. The fourth 
paragraph focused on the importance of maintaining stability and the fifth paragraph 
attempted to demonstrate the material benefits that would accrue from continuing 
with the policy of reform and opening up. The final two paragraphs concluded the 
commentary by emphasising the importance of suppressing Falun Gong's activities 
and the continued leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. 
(l)In tightening the effort to handle and solve the "Falun Gong" problem, the basic 
starting point is that to further maintain the stability and unity of our very good 
situation,' it is beneficial to focus our energy on promoting reform, opening up, 
modernisation and construction. (2) Not to excise this poisonous tumour and not to 
punish these elements causing turmoil will leave the Party without peace, the country 
without peace and the people without peace, and will seriously interfere with reform, 
opening up, modernisation and construction. 
The first paragraph expanded upon the themes put forward in the commentary's 
headline. As a consequence, the use of the terms "very good" and "beneficial" when 
describing the link between maintaining stability and promoting reform and 
development emphasised the positive value of the relationship in the first sentence 
"'Ilenkema (2004: 99). 
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and were contrasted against the repeated use of the terms "not" and "without" in the 
second sentence that stressed the negative consequences that would arise if no action 
was taken against Falun Gong. Furthennore, these positive and negative values were 
strengthened by the use of the modal verbs "is" and "will" that asserted the 
truthfulness of the sentences. For Fowler, the effectiveness of this type of modality is 
derived from the fact that "[t]here is no equivocation ... No space is provided for any 
questioning of the truth of the claim, or the satisfactoriness of the situation 
described. ,,594 
The reference to stability in the first sentence was also significant, in that it was 
expressed through the Chinese phrase "an ding tuanjie" ( ~ 1 E m ~ ) , , meaning 
"stability and unity", rather than that of "wending" ( ~ 1 E ) , , meaning only "stability", 
which had been used exclusively in the editorials in chapter three. According to He, 
the phrase "stability and unity" can be traced back to a 1974 directive issued by Mao 
that was intended to bring an end to the conflicts in Chinese society at that time. He 
notes that, since then, the phrase has also been frequently "invoked by the CCP 
leadership ... and is considered to be the underlying premise for carrying out all Party 
tasks". S9S In contrast, the use of the singular term "stability" is dated by He to Deng 
Xiaoping's pronouncement in 1989 that "stability prevails over everything".s96 Indeed, 
it is this later form of stability that has, subsequently, been used more frequently by 
the CCP leadership than that of "anding tuanjie".S97 In part, this may be due to its 
usage drawing upon Deng's authority but also partly because the phrase "anding 
594Powler(1991: 128). 
595 He (2001: 3). 
'" Ibid. 
WI The main exception to this is for articles that concern minority nationalities, when "anding tuanjie" 
is more often employed. 
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tuanjie" carries a different connotation.598 This difference is largely due to the 
presence of"tuanjie", which, in referring to "unity",599 operates as a signifier for the 
maintenance of China's territorial sovereignty. Indeed, in the same way that the use of 
"stability" implicates the notion of chaos (luan), so it is that "unity" implicates the 
charge of "splittism" (Jenlie zhuyi). This charge draws on the discourse of "national 
humiliation" (guochi) promulgated by the CCP since the founding of the People's 
Republic of China in 1949600 that links the decline of China as a "great power" to both 
its occupation by other nations as well as the secession of areas, such as Tibet, Taiwan 
and Mongolia, that had all been part of the Qing empire. Indeed, the restoration of 
China's territorial integrity and, with it, the ending of the "century of national 
humiliation" (bainian guochi) is one of the claims upon which the CCP's legitimacy 
rests. Furthermore, the notion of China once again becoming one of the world's "great 
powers" also works, in part, to sustain the legitimacy of the current regime. In light of 
this, Callahan points out that "fragmentation constitutes one of the few political 
crimes left in China; the worst epithet is not capitalist or counterrevolutionary, but 
splittist.',601 Although this direct charge was not made in the paragraph,602 the use of 
the phrase "stability and unity" in the first sentence, and indeed throughout the 
commentary, implicitly accused Falun Gong of causing chaos and "splitting" China 
and, in so doing, both acknowledged the "cross-class" and "cross-territorial" appeal of 
59S The usage of ''wending'' and "anding' can overlap; however, the meaning of "anding" is more 
IWTOW, in that it refers to the material situation of societal stability-it literally means "fixed peace"-
whereas, ''wending' has a broader meaning and is used in contexts beyond that of societal stability, 
such as political stability, economic stability and, even, mental stability. 
599 "Tuanjie" can also mean "amity" as well as ''to join forces" (and, indeed, is used in this latter sense 
in the final paragraph of the commentary; however, in the official translation of "anding tuanjie", it is 
referred to as ''unity''. 
600 Callahan points out that the discourse of national humiliation can be traced back to 1915 protests 
against the government's acceptance of Japan's "21 demands". However, he also notes that the content 
of this discourse has changed. See Callahan (2006). 
dOl Callahan (2004: 209). This crime is also legally supported by Article 4 of the Constitution, which 
orohibits national minorities from seceding from China. 
iOl lt is, however, made in the fifth and seventh paragraphs. 
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the group's teachings603 as well as amplified the charges against the group by 
appealing to the reader's nationalist sentiments. By the same token, it also worked to 
strengthen the legitimacy of the CCP by placing it, through implicature, in the 
position of maintaining the nation's stability and territorial sovereignty. 
(1)Li Hongzhi used the "Falun Gong" organization to maliciously confuse people's 
minds, manufacture turmoil and destroy the stability and unity of the very good 
situation. (2) He then intended to profit from the chaos, collude with hostile domestic 
and foreign forces, overthrow the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, change 
the socialist system, subvert the people's democratic dictatorship, and lead all the 
ethnic groups of China into a dark and evil abyss. (3)This is not sensationalism, but 
actual facts. 
The second paragraph follows on from the first by detailing the charges against Falun 
Gong. In this regard, the 16 August commentary differs from the two editorials 
analysed in chapter three, in that Falun Gong and its leader, Li Hongzhi, are explicitly 
depicted in terms of negative other-presentation whereas the negative presentation of 
demonstrators in 1989 was largely achieved through the "context-dependent linguistic 
realization" of implicatures. Indeed, for Powers and Lee, this negative labelling of the 
group was the most important strategy in the government's propaganda campaign as, 
if successful, it "would lead the populace to condemn the FLG and pressure its 
members to discontinue their practices and beliefs. ,,604 In the second paragraph, the 
negative presentation of Falun Gong was achieved by conflating the group with its 
founder, Li Hongzhi, and by employing the rhetorical strategy of argumentum ad 
hominem against Li, in which he was presented as a svengali-like figure who used his 
teachings to create turmoil in order to overthrow the CCP and the socialist system. 
The conflation of Falun Gong with Li was effected in the ftrst sentence of the 
paragraph with the claim that Li ''used'' Falun Gong to "confuse" people's minds. 
603 Perry (2001: 169) . 
.. Powers and Lee (2002: 268-269). 
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This claim put forward the impression that Fa/un Gong adherents were under the 
control ofLi and, as such, their actions were the product of his intentions. In addition, 
this claim worked to delegitimate Li's teachings by suggesting that they did not 
represent a higher truth, as Li himself had claimed,605 but rather caused adherents to 
suffer from a form of "false consciousness,,606 Indeed, this delegitimation was further 
strengthened through the appeal to the practical consequences of chaos and the 
destruction of stability and unity that Li' s teachings had intentionally caused. As in 
the previous paragraph, stability and unity were linked to the positive value of the 
''very good situation" while Li was placed in the position of the agent carrying out the 
negative act of "destroying" this "very good situation". 
The use of stability and unity was also significant, in that their"destruction" provided 
the basis for the list of charges made against Li in the second sentence of the 
paragraph. Although these charges claimed knowledge of Li 's intentions, that they 
were never realised means that their effect was largely rhetorical. Indeed, this effect 
was heightened through the use of the propaganda technique of "name-calling". 
According to Cross, this technique "consists oflabelling people or ideas with words 
of bad connotation.,,607 Consequently, the second paragraph associated Li with 
adjectives, such as "dark" and "evil", adverbs, such as "maliciously", and verbs, such 
as "confuse", "destroy" and "subvert". As to whether there was any truth in the 
charges is largely unknown. Vermander suggests that these charges derived from a 
number of factors, including "Li Hongzhi's exile in the United States, the role that the 
movement's adherents play outside China, the appeals from humanitarian 
60S According to Xiao, Li bad declared that ''no government, including that of the CCP, could deal with 
the social problems existing in China, but that supernatural power, possessed by the Falun Gong alone 
was the answer." See Xiao (2001: 128). ' 
606 Friedman (2005: 226). 
WI Cross (1989), as cited in Kuo (2002: 292). 
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organisations, press reports or interventions--even indirect-by foreign 
governments,,608 In argumentative terms, the list of charges seemed intended to 
present Li as an "enemy of the state" and, in so doing, justify the government's 
decision to suppress the group on the grounds of pre-emption, in that he had intended 
to commit these crimes against the CCP and the nation in the past and must be 
arrested before being allowed to actually commit them in the future.609 
(I) In order to destroy the situation of stability and unity, they deceived the masses into 
following it and doing evil. (2) Looking at the facts already available, since last year 
they have used "wisdom gong" and "making known the Law" to plot, organise and 
direct many illegal mass protests, laid siege to party and government institutions and 
propaganda departments, until the "25 April" illegal protest of more than 10,000 
people at Zhongnanhai. (3) For Li Hongzhi, the more people who tookfr.art in this 
intentional, premeditated, and organised major incident the better. (4 Furthermore, he 
wanted to create bloodshed and make the incident bigger, and then blame it on the 
party and government. (5)How poisonous are his motives! (6)They also spreadfallacies 
to confuse people, exerted control over people's minds and shook people's beliefs, 
propagated theories about the destruction of the earth, the end of the world, the 
futility of science, the futility of labour and the futility of government, intentionally 
caused chaos, destroyed stability and seriously destroyed normal work, production, 
education and research, disrupted reform, opening up and socialist modernization 
construction, and interfered with the Party and government's decision-making and 
planning in handling a series of major issues in international and domestic affairs. 
The third paragraph continued with the argumentative strategy of attacking Li and, by 
extension, Falun Gong; however, the first part of the paragraph moved away from 
detailing Li's "evil" intentions to documenting the protest activities of the group. In 
this, the concept of "stability and unity" was again used to delegitimate Falun Gong 
by linking the holding of demonstrations to the "destroying" of "stability and unity". 
Furthennore, this link was s t r e n ~ h e n e d d through the scientistic appeal to "facts" in the 
second sentence, which also worked to obscure the commentary's particular 
interpretation of those "facts". Indeed, a similar appeal was employed at the end of the 
608 Vermander (2001: 5). 
fOP This depiction of Li as a criminal was given further credence by the issuing of a warrant for his 
arrest to Interpol, even though Li resided in the United States, with whom China did not have an 
extradition treaty. 
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second paragraph when the intentions of Li were held to be "not sensationalism, but 
actual facts." For Gill, such rhetorical moves are "designed to protect or 'inculcate' an 
argument from criticism and to offer a 'preferred reading', indicating the way the 
argument should be interpreted.,,61o A further effect of these appeals may have been to 
signal to the reader that the views expressed in the commentary were based on science 
and, as such, stood in contradistinction to the "pseudo-science" of Falun Gong. 
As for the group's protest activities, the second sentence emphasised that they were 
both organised and illegal. In terms of organisation, Tong makes the point that it was 
"in the interests of the regime to demonstrate that the falun gong was well 
organized ... [t]he more organized thefalun gong could be shown to be, then the more 
justified the regime's repression in the name of social order was.,,611 Indeed, if it 
could not be demonstrated that Falun Gong was an organisation, then it would not 
have been in breach of the "Regulations on the Registration and Management of Mass 
Organisations" that had been the primary legal basis upon which the government's 
decision to ban the group had been taken. Consequently, presenting the protests as the 
result of organised events by Falun Gong leaders rather than spontaneous occurrences 
by Falun Gong practitioners was an important part of the attempt by the CCP 
leadership to demonstrate that Falun Gong constituted an organisation.612 As for the 
illegality of the protests, this classification was similar to the verdict against those in 
1989, in that it focused on the act of demonstrating while obscuring the reasons for 
such demonstrations. Indeed, Perry makes the point that ''the Falun Gong 
demonstrations had been prompted precisely by a desire for the official recognition 
610 Gill (2000: 182). 
611 Tong (2002: 638). 
611 Additional claims put forward in the media campaign against Falun Gong included detailing its 
uationwide network of teaching centres, its hierarchical leadership structure and its set of 
institutionalised rules and regulations. See Chen (2005), Powers and Lee (2002), and Tong (2002). 
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and registration that the state refused to grant.,,613 Ching concurs, stating that, in the 
absence of mass voting, "[ t ]he only means of mass protest is petition of the 
government ... yet, mass petitions become the basis for mass suppression.,,614 
Nevertheless, the classification of the protests as illegal also had the effect of 
presenting Fa/un Gong members as criminals and, in so doing, also worked to justify 
the action taken by the government towards adherents of the group. Indeed, the 
second sentence attempted to strengthen this justification by deploying the textual 
device of citing numbers when claiming that more than 10,000 protestors gathered 
outside Zhongnanhai. In addition to what Leach identifies as the intensifying phrase 
of "more than", van Dijk also points out that numbers are often used in news reporting 
in order to convey a sense of "truthfulness".61S In this, the number of protestors could 
be understood as a "linguistic mean" that performed a similar function to epistemic 
modality. 
The lack of explanation concerning the reasons for Fa/un Gong's demonstrations 
opened up space for the commentary to again claim knowle.dge of Li' s intentions for 
holding them. In this, the commentary effectively built on the charges made in the 
second paragraph by claiming that Li had organised the demonstrations with the 
intention of "creating bloodshed" as a pretext for challenging the authority of the CCP. 
However, as with the claims m ~ e e against Li in the second paragraph, the 
commentary does not put forward any evidence to support these claims and, as a 
result, their force is entirely dependent upon rhetoric. Indeed, the declarative 
statement that followed the fourth sentence can be understood as an attempt to direct 
the reader to accept these claims, with the use of the metaphorical adjective 
613 Perry (2001: 173). 
614 Ching (2005: 51). 
615 van Dijk (1988: 87-88). 
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''poisonous'' further strengthening the impression conveyed throughout the 
commentary that Li' s motives were harmful and destructive towards China. Yet, in 
the final analysis, Li's intentions were not realised at the 25 April demonstration. 
Rather, reports of the protestors' behaviour indicated that they were calm and 
peaceable throughout the duration of the demonstration, with many spending the time 
outside Zhongnanhai reading Li's books and performing Falun Gong. As a 
consequence, this suggests that either the "evil" intentions ascribed to Li were not 
correct or that he had not managed to "maliciously confuse" members of Falun Gong 
as was claimed by the CCP leadership. Indeed, both Perry and Ching contend that the 
25 April demonstration was largely organised by Falun Gong adherents within China, 
who were using it to gain official recognition for the group,616 while the extent of the 
role played by Li, who had by this time already emigrated to the United States of 
.. I 617 Amenca, IS not c ear. 
The calm and peaceable behaviour of the Falun Gong demonstrators on 25 April also 
provides a material referent for questioning the link put forward in the third paragraph 
between the protests and the destruction of "stability and unity". Indeed, considering 
that protests were not an altogether unusual occurrence at that time in China, the 
commentary did not make explicit why only the demonstrations by Falun Gong 
members, as opposed to other contemporaneous protests, had destroyed "stability and 
unity".618 Furthermore, unlike the protests in 1989, which lasted for over a month and 
eventually required, at least in the view of the CCP leadership, the use of military 
616 See Perry (2001: 173), Ching (2005: 41). 
617 In the Chinese media, Li was alleged to have co-ordinated the protest via the telephone from Hong 
Kong. See Tong (2002: 648). 
611 Other protests that took place in China in 1999 included fanners demonstrating against increased 
levies in rural areas, collective resistance by laid-offworkers as well students responding to the NATO 
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade." See Perry (2001: 167). 
206 
force to bring them to an end, the demonstration outside Zhongnanhai only lasted one 
day and was brought to an end, not by military force, but by the "persuasion work" of 
government officials.619 In terms of appearance, this demonstration did not appear to 
destroy "stability and unity". However, the lack of media coverage given to the 
demonstration, which, in the case of Xinhua, was a single article published two days 
later, as well as the intervening period of nearly three months between the 
demonstration and the launch of the government's campaign against the group 
worked to obscure the actual events that took place on 25 April and, in so doing, 
enabled the charge of destroying of stability and unity to be made against Falun Gong. 
Yet, as with the editorials analysed in chapter three, this charge employed the concept 
of stability, and, in this case, unity, in a normalised form that had the effect of leaving 
the concept to be defined in a way that was not transparent. Consequently, as with the 
claims made over Li's intentions, the delegitimating effect of the link between the 
Falun Gong protests and the destruction of "stability and unity" was achieved largely 
through its rhetorical appeal. 
(l) In today's reform, opening up, modernization and construction, those who want to 
cause turmoil and destroy the situation of stability and unity also commit a crime 
against the nation and a crime against the nationalities. (2) We must safeguard the 
hard-won situation of stability and unity as we would safeguard our own eyes. (3) For 
Chinese people, who are concentrating their energy on reform, opening up and 
socialist modernization construction, stability is of overwhelming significance. 
(4)Stability is politics,' stability is the overall situation; without stability, what can be 
done. (j)The consensus of the wholelarty and all ethnic groups of China is that 
stability prevails over everything. ~ ~ After the truth about "F alun Gong" was 
published, the masses saw clearly their political character and serious harm and 
actively joined in the struggle against "Falun Gong. ,,(7)This is a serious ideological 
and political struggle, and also a political struggle to protect social stability. 
619 As pointed out in the contextual analYSis, this was the explanation given in the sole Xinhua article 
on the demonstration that was published on 27 April 1999. 
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Having established, albeit through largely rhetorical means, the negative link between 
the Fa/un Gong protests and "stability and unity", the focus of the commentary 
moved onto the positive value of the relationship between "stability and unity" and 
reform and development. In this, the fourth paragraph particularly emphasised the 
importance of "stability and unity". As a consequence, the second sentence presented 
the safeguarding of "stability and unity" in terms of safeguarding one's "own eyes", 
with such an analogy directing the reader to imagine "stability and unity" in terms of 
a body part that Chinese culture holds to be most important. Furthermore, the 
rhetorical effect of this analogy was heightened through the deployment of the 
inclusive pronoun ''we'' alongside the modal verb "must" that implicitly suggested a 
sense of obligation on the part of the reader. The second sentence, in collocating 
"stability and unity" with the predicate "safeguard", was also another example of the 
positive value that was being associated with "stability and unity" throughout the 
commentary. As pointed out in chapter three, the use of the militaristic metaphor 
"safeguard" conveyed the impression that "stability and unity" was under attack and, 
as such, was something that was worth defending. Indeed, this positive view of 
safeguarding "stability and unity" was reinforced by the contrasting negative view put 
forward in the first sentence, which paired "stability and unity" with the metaphor 
"destroy" and had the effect of presenting the concept as a material object. Moreover, 
the first sentence strengthened such negativity by equating the destruction of stability 
and unity to a crime against the nation and nationalities. Not only did this rhetorical 
move make use of a populist appeal to the readership but it also attempted to persuade 
them to view such people as criminals. As Powers and Lee point out, "once a 
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phenomenon is placed into a category of "equivalents", people tend to treat the 
individual instance so labelled as they would any other member of the category.,,620 
The remainder of the paragraph strengthened the positive value of stability by 
repetitively stressing its importance. Consequently, the third sentence claimed that 
stability was of "overwhelming significance" while, in the fourth sentence, stability 
was equated with politics and the overall situation. The fourth sentence also 
highlighted the importance of stability by posing the rhetorical question of what could 
be achieved "without stability", in which the positioning of stability in a conditional 
clause conveyed the impression, already established in the commentary, that it was 
the necessary condition upon which all other things depended. Furthermore, the space 
opened up by the rhetorical question was answered through Deng's authoritative 
maxim that "stability prevails over everything". Indeed, this statement also employed 
the rhetorical device of claiming "consensus" for this position while, at the same time, 
directing the reader to accept this proposition. Moreover, the acceptance of this 
proposition also opened up the space for stability to be used to delegitimate Falun 
Gong while, at the same time, strengthening the justification of the government's 
suppression of the group, in that the final sentence of the paragraph contlated this 
suppression, in the form of the political codeword "struggle" (douzheng), with that of 
''protecting'' stability. Indeed, the term "struggle" performed a similar function to that 
of "problem" in the headline. However, whereas "problem" suggested that Falun 
Gong was something that could be "solved", the term "struggle" presented Falun 
Gong as the CCP's opponent, with its suppression representing ''victory''. 
620 Powers and Lee (2002: 268). 
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(J)Reform and opening up is the path to a powerful country. (2)The more than twenty 
years of reform and opening up have caused a fundamental change in the destiny of 
our motherland and socialism, with the unprecedented liberation and development of 
our country's social productive forces, the continuous improvement in people's living 
standards, the increasing strength of our nation's comprehensive power and its rising 
international status. (3) All of this is due to reform and opening up. (4)To unswervingly 
push forward reform and opening up is to unswervingly implement the fundamental 
political line of the party and comprehensively push forward the cause of building 
socialism with Chinese characteristics. (5) Reform and opening up can only advance, 
not retreat; can only win, not fail. (6) Chinese people, with no small difficulty, have 
moved down the path of strengthening the country, not simply to allow it to be 
disrupted and destroyed. (7) But to further push forward reform and opening up, we 
must have a stable domestic environment and a favourable international environment. 
(8)Only by maintaining the situation of stability and unity can China quickly become 
rich and powerful. (9) Jf "Falun Gong" is allowed to spread, the situation of stability 
and unity will be disturbed and China will then either return to being a closed state or 
be "Westernized," "split up, " "weakened, " and become a dependency of imperialists. 
(lO)These two outcomes would be disastrous for socialist China andfor its 1.2 billion 
people. 
The fifth paragraph followed on from the fourth by focusing on the second part of the 
relationship between stability and unity and reform and development. Indeed, where 
the fourth paragraph emphasised the importance of stability, the fifth paragraph used 
the programme of reform and opening up to explain why it was important. Moreover, 
the elaboration of this programme's success could also be understood as an attempt to 
persuade the reader of the CCP's leadership. In effect, it advocated the materialism of 
the CCP, which was presented as modernizing and progressive, over the idealism of 
Falun Gong, which was viewed as primordial and backward. Indeed, this dualism had 
also featured in the third paragraph; however, in that paragraph, the emphasis was on 
delegitimating ideas attributed to Falun Gong, which, again, took place through the 
rhetorical technique of "name-calling". Consequently, Falun Gong's ideas were 
labelled as "fallacies" and associated with "confusing" people, "shaking" their beliefs 
and "controlling" their minds while the theories attributed to the group were 
derogated with the appellation "futility". In addition, the third paragraph attempted to 
delegitimate these ideas and theories by highlighting their negative consequences. 
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Moreover, the consequences that were highlighted also corresponded to the political 
objectives ofthe CCP and conveyed the impression that the idealism of Falun Gong 
was negatively impacting upon the CCP's materialism. 
In promulgating the success of the reform and opening up programme in the fifth 
paragraph, the theme of national (re)glorification was used to present the 
programme's success in terms of China's development. Furthermore, the paragraph 
discursively constructed this development as being both progressive and modem. 
Consequently, reform and opening up was held to be responsible for the liberation and 
development of the country's social forces that was both "productive" and 
''unprecedented''; people's living standards had seen "continuous improvement"; 
China's comprehensive power had "increasing strength"; while its international status 
was "rising". Indeed, according to the commentary, reform and opening up could only 
"advance" and "win" but not "retreat" or "fail". In addition, the use of the metaphor 
''path'' in the first sentence along with that of "destiny" in the second sentence 
combined to construct the impression that China's future realisation as a "powerful 
country" was entirely dependent on the programme of reform and opening up. 
Having established the positive value of the reform and opening up programme, the 
paragraph then introduced stability and unity as the necessary condition to "push 
forward" with the programme and, in so doing, make China a "rich and powerful" 
country. Moreover, the use of stability and unity in relation to reform and 
development opened up the space for further delegitimation of Falun Gong, in that the 
"spread" of the group was linked to the negation of stability and unity. In addition, 
this delegitimation was heightened through the use of a counterfactual statement that 
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presented the imagined consequences of Falun Gong's "spread" being either a 
"closed state", thus directing the reader to imagine the period before 1978, or "a 
dependency of imperialists", thus directing the reader to imagine the period prior to 
1949. The final sentence then reinforced the negative projection of future effects by 
claiming that they would be "disastrous" while, at the same time, attempting to 
persuade the reader of this judgment. 
In argumentative tenns, the fifth paragraph effectively proposed that the refonn and 
opening up programme, carried out under the CCP leadership, had been both 
successful and, indeed, was essential for China's future development but that, in order 
to "push forward" with the reform and opening up programme and make China into a 
rich and powerful nation, it was necessary to maintain stability and unity. The 
converse of this argument then read that those who disrupted stability and unity would 
prevent the programme of reform and opening up from pushing forward, which would 
in tum prevent China from becoming a powerful country. In fact, according to the 
paragraph, it would tum China into either a closed state or a "westemised" state. The 
corollary of these argument schemes was to justify the government's suppression of 
Falun Gong on the grounds that it was protecting stability and, in so doing, would 
make China rich and powerful. 
(l)The current struggle has momentum and vigour, the "Falun Gong" organisation 
has suffered heavy losses, theface of the organisation is already paralysed, the 
majority of the practising "Falun Gong" masses have broken away from the "Falun 
Gong" organisation, and the overall situation in the capital and all parts of China is 
stable. (2) We have won an initial victory in the struggle, but the struggle is long-term, 
difficult, and complex. (3)To completely destroy the "Falun Gong" organisation and 
completely purge the e,ernicious influence of Li Hongzhi's evil doctrine. much 
remains to be done. (- We must pay full attention to maintaining the overall situation 
of stability, bring to bear the policies of might. alleviate social shocks, allow the 
people of all ethnic groups of China and all levels of society to concentrate their 
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energy on building of the two forms of enlightenment. (5) All levels of party 
organization and government must give prominence to maintaining social stability. 
The sixth paragraph concludes the argument scheme put forward in the fifth 
paragraph by using the claim of maintaining stability to specify the "destruction" of 
Falun Gong. Although the first sentence of the paragraph claimed that the "overall 
situation" in China was, at that time, "stable", it also worked to construct Falun Gong 
as a militaristic opponent. Indeed, this construction built on the description of the anti-
Falun Gong campaign as a "struggle" that was first used at the end of the fourth 
paragraph. Consequently, in the first sentence, Falun Gong was said to have "suffered 
heavy losses'" had the "face" of its organisation "paralysed" and lost the "majority" of 
the "practicing masses". Moreover, these claims also put forward the implicature that 
Falun Gong was being "defeated" as a result of the measures put in place by the CCP. 
Not only did this work to position the Party as the agent "defending" the nation 
against the Falun Gong threat and, so, displaying "leadership" but also linked it to the 
positive discourse of "progress" that had been used throughout the commentary, 
particularly in the fifth paragraph. This impression of Falun Gong's "defeat" was also 
reinforced with the claim that China was stable. However, this use of stability 
simultaneously worked to strengthen the topos of threat, as it suggested that, prior to 
this point, the "overall situation" in China was not stable. Furthermore, the reference 
to stability in Beijing and "all other parts of China" suggested that the threat posed by 
Falun Gong was geographically spread across the country. 
The topos of threat was temporally extended in the second sentence as the claims of 
success in defeating Falun Gong were said to constitute only an "initial victory". 
Rather, the "struggle" against the group was vaguely described as "long-term, 
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difficult, and complex". Indeed, this was reinforced with the claim in the following 
sentence that "much remains to be done". Moreover, what it was that the commentary 
stated needed to be done to Falun Gong could be interpreted as constituting the final 
victory over the group: namely its complete "destruction". However, as with the 
inexplicitness over how long it would take to "destroy" Falun Gong, the commentary 
was also vague in detailing how Falun Gong would be "destroyed". Nevertheless, the 
imperative to "pay full attention" to maintaining stability as well as the sanctioning of 
"policies of might" appeared to legitimate the use of force in order to achieve this 
final victory against the group. Indeed, the usage of stability in this context, in the 
form of the singular "wending" rather than "anding tuanjie", was redolent of the 4 
June editorial, in which the need to maintain stability also appeared to express the 
Hobbesian notion that it was legitimate for the state to use force. 
In argumentative terms, the construction of Falun Gong as a military opponent was a 
further example of how the commentary worked to reclassify the quasi-spiritual 
qigong group. And, as in the other examples, this reclassification seemed intended to 
legitimate specific actions to be taken against the group based on its categorisation. In 
the case of the sixth paragraph, classifying Falun Gong as a military opponent worked 
to legitimate actions that were necessary to defeat such an opponent. Furthennore, the 
use of the temporally vague topos of threat allowed for such actions, which, though 
never specifically elaborated, were suggestive of the use of force, to be further 
justified in tenns of maintaining stability. 
(l)We mustfurther educate, transform, and emancipate the majority of the masses who 
practice "Falun Gong", while, in accorda"(,ce with the law, striking hard against the 
extremely small number of organisers, plotters, and behind-the-scenes manipulators 
who insist on making trouble. (2) We must resolutely handle those elements that cause 
turmoil and destroy the very good situation of stability and unity before aI/owing them 
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to create an atmosphere which will bring disaster and calamity to the country and the 
people. (3) Whoever violates the law cannot escape the punishment of the law. (4)We 
want stability, not turmoil; unity, not splittism; scientific truths, not evil doctrines. 
(5) We must rally more tightly around the Party Central Committee with Comrade 
Jiang Zemin as its core and concentrate our energy on pushing forward reform, 
opening up, modernization and construction. (6)This is the common wish of the whole 
party and of the people of all the ethnic groups of China! 
The final paragraph of the commentary moved on from the sixth paragraph by 
drawing a distinction between those who would and those who would not be targeted 
in the government's "destruction" of Falun Gong. In this, the paragraph made clear 
that ''the majority of the masses" who practiced Falun Gong would be treated 
differently from those who were held to have engaged in organisational activities 
against the state. Indeed, though the previous paragraph had made the claim that the 
majority of the masses had already "broken away" from Falun Gong, the claim to 
"further educate, transform and emancipate" these adherents continued the theme of 
false consciousness that had run through the commentary and worked to delegitimate 
Li Hongzhi's claims to represent "the truth" while, at the same time, making the 
implicature that the CCP, if not knowing "the truth", at least knew what was not "the 
truth". As for the label given to those who engaged organisational activities, the term 
"extremely small number of people" was similar to that used during the 
demonstrations in 1989 and, indeed, in many other political campaigns throughout the 
course of the People's Republic of China. For Kuo, this phrase can be categorised as a 
"downtoner" on account of the fact that it worked to minimise the number of people 
in the country who opposed the authority of the party;621 however, its usage in 
previous political campaigns also suggested that the government would employ 
similarly coercive techniques to treat those who were charged with this crime. Indeed, 
though the paragraph claimed that these people would be treated "in accordance with 
621 Kuo (2002: 299). 
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the law", it also subsequently stated that "[w]e must resolutely handle these elements". 
For Fowler, this latter expression is an example of a "pseudo-locative" phrase, in that 
it "mystifies a set of complex relationships .. .in a single locative phrase.,,622 In this 
particular example, no detail is given over, amongst other things, how particular 
suspects will be identified or what type of punishment they would expect to receive. 
As a consequence of obscuring such details, the pseudo-locative phrase allowed the 
impression of legality put forward by the paragraph to go unchallenged.623 In addition, 
within this pseudo-locative phrase, the reference to those engaged in organisational 
activities as "elements"'was an example of, what Fowler also termed, a "nominal 
expression", in that these people were replaced by a technical term. For Fowler, such 
expressions achieve "a remarkable and dehumanizing transformation of a human 
individual into a depersonalized object. ,,624 Indeed, commenting on the dehumanising 
effect of labels during the Cultural Revolution, Lu states that "[0 ]nce people were 
labeled as ghosts, snakes and devils, they were treated like animals.,,62s In the case of 
the second sentence, the negative effect of the term "elements" was strengthened by 
the charge such people had "destroyed" stability and unity. Furthermore, the use of 
stability and unity, in combination with the term "elements", seemed intended to 
further justify the government's action towards Falun Gong on the grounds that it was 
necessary to take pre-emptive action in order to maintain stability and unity and so 
prevent an "atmosphere of disaster and calamity". Indeed, though the following 
sentence reinforced the impression of legality, the use of the rhetorical strategy of 
argumentum at consequentiam in the third sentence suggested that the prosecution of 
6Z2 Fowler (1991: 128). 
623 As pointed out earlier, legal violations fonned the main justification for the government's decision 
to suppress Falun Gong. 
624 Fowler (1991: 128). 
w Lu (1999: 497). 
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Falun Gong adherents was not solely based on what laws had been violated by their 
past actions but also on what laws might be violated by their future actions. 
The final three sentences of the final paragraph, in many ways, encapsulated the 
central message of the commentary, with the positive values of stability, unity and 
scientism being associated, by implicature, with the leadership of the CCP and, in tum, 
being contrasted against the opposing negative values of turmoil, splittism and evil 
doctrines, which were used to delegitimate Falun Gong. Following on from this, the 
leadership of the CCP was emphasised in relation to pushing forward the Party's 
economic plan of reform and development. Finally, the persuasiveness of this 
message was strengthened by the rhetorical strategy of claiming "consensus" for this 
position while, at the same time, directing the reader to accept this proposition. 
The use of "stability and unity" in the 16 August commentary was similar to that of 
"stability" in the two articles analysed in chapter three, in that it was discursively 
constructed as a positive value while its antonymical equivalents were presented 
negatively. Furthermore, the positive value of stability was used to legitimate, albeit 
through implicature, the authority of the CCP while its negative value was used to 
explicitly delegitimate Falun Gong. The positive value of stability and unity was 
initially constructed through the headline, which linked the maintenance of stability to 
that of the overall situation. As in the previous articles, this immediately presented 
stability in terms of national interest and, as such, shifted the focus of maintaining 
stability away from preserving the power of the CCP and onto the fate of the Chinese 
nation. Indeed, the link between maintaining stability and preserving the power of the 
CCP was never explicitly articulated throughout the commentary but rather was 
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implicated in the link between stability and the programme of reform and 
development, which could be read as constituting the Party's competing version of the 
"higher truth". This link had also been put forward in the commentary's headline and 
further strengthened the positive relationship between stability and the future of the 
Chinese nation. In argumentative tenns, stability and unity was presented as the 
necessary condition upon which the success of the programme of reform and 
development was dependent. In tum, the commentary presented the success of this 
programme as being the necessary condition upon which China's future as a rich and 
powerful nation was dependent. Consequently, the maintenance of stability and unity 
was justified in terms of China's future development. Furthermore, despite 
simplifying causal relationships in order to put forward this notion, this argument 
scheme opened up the space for its converse to be put forward i.e. the failure to 
maintain stability and unity would affect the success of reform and opening up which, 
in turn, would prevent China from becoming a rich and powerful nation. This 
converse argument scheme constructed the negative value of instability. Moreover, it 
was into this argument scheme that the 16 August commentary attempted to position 
Falun Gong as the agent responsible for "destroying" stability and, in so doing, 
legitimate the government's suppression of the group. 
However, this positioning of Falun Gong rested upon two claims. The first claim was 
that the group had destroyed "stability and unity" through the series of demonstrations 
that had been held between 1996 and 1999. Of these demonstrations, the 25 April 
demonstration outside Zhongnanhai was presented as the most egregious violation of 
social order. The second claim against Falun Gong built on the first claim by putting 
forward the proposition that, if left ''unsuppressed'', the group would continue to 
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destroy stability and unity and eventually lead to China becoming either a "closed" 
state or a "westernised" state. With regard to the first claim, it was significant that, in 
the absence of a formal definition of stability, quantitative or otherwise, put forward 
by the commentary, this claim offered a material referent by which the claim of 
destroying stability and unity could be assessed. In fact, reports of the behaviour of 
Fa/un Gong adherents at the 25 April demonstration as well as the Xinhua report 
published two days later did not appear to support the claim that stability and unity 
had been destroyed by Fa/un Gong. Indeed, this impression was further strengthened 
by the fact that the CCP waited nearly three months before issuing a formal response 
to the protest. In contrast, the use of stability in the second claim was more consistent 
with those analysed in chapter three, in that its emphasis on future consequences 
provided no material referent. Rather, the second claim privileged the Party-endorsed 
future reality over competing alternatives and, as such, was entirely reliant on rhetoric. 
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16 August Commentary: Co-textual Analysis 
The response from Fa/un Gong adherents to the decision by the government to outlaw 
both the group and its practice as well as the subsequent propaganda campaign was 
similar to that when Falun Gong was de-registered by the CQSRS in 1996, in that 
members of the group contested the decision. As Ching points out, "[ fJrom the 
beginning, Falun Gong members did not take the ban passively.,,626 Indeed, even on 
the day that the ban was announced, tens of thousands of people took part in 
demonstrations against the ban in ten cities across China.627 For Vermander, this 
response from Falun Gong adherents could be explained by the fact that "[ t ]he 
repression, once it began, enhanced still further the redemptive effect of the 
affmnation of faith and, in this regard, public protests take on a ritual character".628 
Chen fmds that this response to the ban was paralleled by those of earlier sectarian 
movements which had been outlawed in imperial times, in that "during periods of 
official repression or adversity, followers were mobilized into greater levels of 
commitments.,,629 Moreover, by seeking to contest the government ban, Falun Gong 
effectively transformed itself from a quasi-spiritual qigong group into a fully political 
organisation. 630 Indeed, the performative act of outlawing Falun Gong seemingly had 
the effect of turning the group into the very organisation that the government accused 
it of being and thus provided further justification for the government's actions. 
626 Ching (2005: 47). 
627 For more, see Powers and Lee (2002: 264), Ching (2005: 41). 
621 Vennander (2001: 5). 
629 Chen (2003: 513). 
610 Chen points out that not all members of Falun Gong have become political, in that members who 
follow Li Hoogzhi's teachings are generally more politically active than those who use Falun Gong for 
its healing effects. See Chen (2005: 513). 
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In addition to maintaining the propaganda campaign against the group,631 the CCP 
responded to the actions of Falun Gong adherents by introducing new legislation that 
would allow it to ban "cult organisations". This legislation, which was passed by the 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) on 30 October 1999 in 
the "Decision on Banning Cult Organisations and Preventing and Punishing Cult 
Activities", built on the existing legislation governing "cult" organisations under 
Article 300 of the Criminal Law to expand the number of activities for which 
practitioners could be tried as well as clarified the severity of their punishments.632 
Furthennore, due to the interpretation of the Decision by the Supreme People's Court 
(SPC) and the Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP) on 1 November 1999, these 
expanded powers were given greater legal force by sanctioning their retroactive 
application.633 As a result, even those who were not directly connected with the group, 
for example bookshop owners who had once stocked Falun Gong books, could now 
be, and indeed were, subject to arrest.634 In addition to the new legislation, new 
measures, such as the launching of an education movement to "reveal the truth" about 
Falun Gong as well as "the comprehensive management of public order" to protect 
against the Falun Gong threat, were also announced in order to further aid the attempt 
to "comprehensively eliminate" the group. 635 
631 In his research on the anti-Fa/un Gong campaign in Xinhua, Chen found that, between 23 July and 
31 July, there were one hundred news items published on Fa/un Gong, while, for the whole month of 
August, the number of articles totalled ninety-one. The number of articles remained significant 
throughout the remainder of the year, except for the half-month period prior to the fifty year 
umiversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, See Chen (200S: 21). 
632 In fact, "cult organisations" were only included in the 1997 revision of Criminal Law. Previously, 
they were not listed as criminal. See Penny (200S: 44 note 4). 
633 Keith and Lin (2003: 638-639). 
634 Leung (2002: 779). Leung makes the point that such people "[t]he retroactive application of the law 
defies Donnal concepts oflegality." Peerenboom agrees to the extent it "raises questions in such cases 
about the legality of retroactive sanctions." See Peerenboom (2002: 96). 
63$ Keith and Lin (2003: 638). 
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The Decision passed by the NPC Standing Committee resulted in Fa/un Gong being 
labelled as a "cult organisation" (xiejiao zuzhi).636 Although the tenn had been used in 
relation to the group prior to the Congress, such usage had been infrequent; however, 
following the passing of the new legislation, the use of "cult organisation" when 
referring to Falun Gong became the consistent rhetorical appellation.637 For Chen, the 
tenn "xiejiao" ( $ ~ ) ) carried "pathological notions of "twisted", "perverse" or 
''malignant'' associated with evil.,,638 Mostly, this was due to the presence of the 
character "xie", which literally means "evil" or "heretical". However, though the 
character '1iao" generally refers to "teachings" and, indeed, is used in the Chinese 
tenn for "religion" (zongjiao), Vennander quotes a ~ e a c h i n g g booklet published as part 
of the education campaign against "cult organisations" which stated that "[t]hejiao in 
xiejiao does not refer to the same jiao as in zongjiao (religion). It refers to an alleged 
religion, a peverse or evil force. A cult organisation is not the equivalent of a nonnal 
religious organization.,,639 Indeed, Ownby notes that this usage of "xiejiao" differed 
from earlier periods of Chinese history, in that where it had previously been used to 
distinguish "orthodox teachings" (zhengjiao) from "heterodox teachings" (xiejiao), it 
was now being used to differentiate the secular from the religious.64o Furthennore, 
even though China is officially an atheistic and communist country, Falun Gong was 
being suppressed on the grounds that it was not a religion. Moreover, this designation 
of the group as a "cult organisation" was not detennined by a religious body but by 
636 The official translation ofxiejiao in government sources has increasingly become "evil cult". 
However, I have chosen to use "cult organisation" as it does not contain the pejorative "evil", which is 
present but not explicit in the Chinese original. Furthermore, I do not use the older translation of 
"heterodox teachings" because it does not convey the religious element that was given to the term in its 
usage during the anti-Falun Gong campaign. 
637 Prior to the Decision, most articles used "Falun Gong organisation" ("Falun Gong" zuzhi); after the 
Decision, the standard reference was "Falun Gong cult organisation" ("Falun Gong" xiejiao zuzh,). 
63. Chen (2003: 519). 
639 Guo Zhengyi, "Jujue Xiejiao: Shaonian Jiaoyu Duben" (Denouncing Cult Organisations: Education 
Handbooks for Young People), (Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe, 2001), p.39, as cited in 
vermander (2001: 4). 
~ ~ Ownby (2003: 305). 
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the Chinese government. For Leung, the labelling of Falun Gong as a "cult 
organisation" was intended to legitimise "the use of stronger measures to control FLG 
d h 1,· ,,641 compare to ot er re IglOUS groups. 
The passing of the new legislation and, with it, Falun Gong's designation as a "cult 
organisation" also signified a shift in emphasis in the government's propaganda 
campaign. Although the main justification for the suppression of the group remained 
its illegality, the introduction of the new legislation allowed for the focus of the 
campaign to move away from the group's lack of registration and its disruption of 
public order and onto those negative characteristics that made the group a "cult 
organisation", as defined by the government. 642 While articles attacking Li Hongzhi 
and Falun Gong had always been part of the overall propaganda campaign. they 
previously worked to discredit the group; now, however, such articles constituted the 
main basis on which the government's suppression of the group was justified. As a 
consequence, many of the articles concerned with Falun Gong following the 
legislation on "cult organisations" repeatedly emphasised the hannful effects of Li 
Hongzhi's teachings upon Falun Gong practitioners and their families, so that stories 
were published documenting those who were caused to take extreme measures, such 
as cutting open their stomachs in an attempt to find the falun wheel or refusing 
medical treatment in the belief that it would promote bad karma but dying as a 
result.643 In addition, the designation of Falun Gong as a "cult organisation" also 
641 Leung (2002: 774), 
642 The characteristics of a "cult organisation" were enumerated to be: the worship of a cult leader who 
often has political ambitions; the brainwashing of members; the spreading ofherctical ideas, such as 
the end of the world theory; the illegal collection of funds; the secrecy of organisation; and the causing 
ofbarm to society. See "Party Paper List Qualities Which Mark Fahm Gong as Cult" (30 October 
1999). 
64' For Chen, the credibility of such stories was questionable because there was often little or no 
attribution of sources and, even in those cases where sources were attributed, they followed the 
.,vemment line. See Chen (2005: 28), 
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allowed it to be presented alongside other notorious groups, such as the "Restoration 
o f t h ~ ~ Ten Commandments of God Movement", the "Branch Davidians" and "Aum 
Shinrikyo",644 and, in so doing, worked to further justify the actions of the CCP by 
relating them to those which were taken by the other governments when dealing with 
these groups. 645 
The harmful effects of Falun Gong were graphically demonstrated when an incident 
of self-immolation involving five people took place at Tiananmen Square on 23 
january 2001. Although Falun Gong denied that any of its members were involved 
and, indeed, even suggested that it had been staged by the Chinese government in 
order to discredit them, that the people performed meditative gestures in a style akin 
to those practiced by the group appeared to support the claims made by the 
government. Indeed, as Friedman points out, the immolation "led to a more effective 
portrayal of FLG as an alien cult similar to the murderous Awn Shinrikyo in 
Japan ... and Branch Davidians in the USA.,,646 Furthermore, this incident brought 
about a second wave in the campaign to suppress the group, in which, according to 
Leung, "China mobilized the strongest accusation and heavy-handed propaganda blitz 
which recalls [sic] the Maoist campaign in the Cultural Revolution, when 12 million 
644 The "Restoration of the Ten Commandments of God Movement" was a ''post-Catholic'' group in the 
southwest region of Uganda that preached about the imminent end of the world. However, when this 
end did not occur as predicted (in 2000), leaders of the group began to carry out executions on its 
members. The exact death toll is not known but it claimed that it is somewhere in the region of 790 
followers. Aum Shinriyko was a religious group in Japan that sought to teach the "supreme truth" about 
the "creation and destruction of the universe" and was responsible for the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo 
subway system in March 1995 that resulted in the deaths of 12 people and the injuring of many. As for 
the Branch Davidians, it preached about a form of apocalyptic reckoning and gained infamy when it 
was involved in a 5 I-day siege with the FBI in Waco, Texas that ended in the deaths of 86 of its 
members. 
645 Peerenboom points out that China is not the only country to ban groups considered to be "cults". 
Indeed. all countries include some limits on the practice of religious freedom where violation of 
criminal law takes place. See Peerenboom (2002: 95). 
6t6 Friedman (2005: 227). The incident of self-immolation also highlights the role played by the 
aemiotic dimension of discourse. 
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Chinese youth were mobilized to sign a "civil convention in the anti-cult struggle.,,647 
In addition, the second wave led to more followers being sent to detention camps in 
order to undergo "re-education and training".648 Consequently, despite the intermittent 
individual and small group protests that have taken place across China since the start 
of the government campaign, mostly at sites of symbolic value, such as Tiananmen 
Square,649 Chen concludes that, "[b]y 2002, most organizers and followers within 
China had either renounced their beliefs or were in reform camps.,,6S0 Furthermore, 
Friedman notes that, "[w]ith FLG leader Li Hongzhi organizing from America and 
demonstrators in Tiananmen increasingly foreigners, FLG began to be experienced as 
a foreign plot to embarrass China ... Educated Beij ing people commented that to allow 
superstitious, pre-modem Chinese peasants to act as modem and sophisticated 
urbanites could elsewhere would destabilize China.,,6S1 
647 Leung (2002: 775). 
648 Vennander (2001: 7). 
649 Chan (2004: 677). However, Chung, Lai and Xia cite Public Security statistics indicating that Falun 
Gong still maintains a national network in China and is actively recruiting new members. See Chung, 
Lai and Xia (2006: 26). 
650 Chen (2003: 518-519). In addition to jail and "re-education camps", those accused of being 
members were also detained through hospitalisation in psychiatric wards on the grounds that they were 
suffering from "q;gong deviation" (q;gong p;ancha). See Perry (2001: 172). 
651 Friedman (2005: 227). 
225 
Conclusion 
The success of the government's campaign against Falun Gong has been due to a 
combination of coercive and persuasive techniques. Coercive techniques, such as the 
arrest and detention of people accused of being members of the group, have worked to 
effectively dismantle Falun Gong's organisational network inside China while the 
persuasive techniques, in the form of the government's propaganda campaign, has 
served to justify the necessity of the government taking such coercive action while 
also attempting to convince the rest of the population not to associate with the group 
or its practices. Moreover, while the use of coercion has remained largely consistent, 
if unevenly applied throughout the campaign, there was a shift in emphasis in the 
content of the propaganda. In the initial stages, the government sought to justify the 
banning of the group on the grounds that it was not a registered organisation and that 
it had disturbed public order. Following the passing of the Decision banning "cult 
organisations", it was now sufficient to justify the banning the group by 
demonstrating that it was, indeed, a "cult organisation". Consequently, the harmful 
nature of the group's teaching as well as its effects upon practitioners and society 
became the main focus of the propaganda campaign. As for the use of stability in the 
propaganda campaign, its usage remained largely consistent despite this shift. In this, 
the group's capacity to "organise" demonstrations was put forward as evidence of it 
destroying "stability". In addition, this charge was used to justify the government's 
actions on the basis that, if Falun Gong was not "destroyed" then it would destroy 
stability in the future and this would, in tum, prevent China from becoming "rich and 
powerful". Despite these arguments being used repeatedly throughout the campaign, 
however, stability was never presented as the main justification for the outlawing of 
Falun Gong but rather worked to support other arguments. Indeed, its usage was less 
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prominent than in the government's response to the events in 1989. This may have 
been due to the fact that, unlike 1989, the demonstrations which had been held by 
Falun Gong did not appear to "destroy" stability, at least not when they were 
concluded without the use of military force and, in the case of the 25 April 
demonstrations, that the government waited three months before officially 
condemning them. Moreover, this suggests that there are limits to the government's 
use of the stability discourse on occasions when a material referent can be used to 
judge the rhetorical claims. Indeed, in terms of discursive selectivity, the 
government's use of the stability discourse did not appear to "resonate" with Chinese 
people, in that the context at this time did not "favour" this discourse. 
The final empirical chapter focuses on the most recent large-scale demonstrations to 
have taken place in China. However, unlike 1989, the ire of the protestors was not 
directed against the Chinese government but rather the Japanese government. Despite 
this, these demonstrations still presented the Chinese government with a challenge 
over how best to handle the demonstrations in such a way as to prevent the ire of the 
protestors turning on the Chinese government. Consequently, this chapter analyses 
how the CCP employed the stability discourse during this period to successfully bring 
the demonstrations to an end. 
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Chapter 5: The 2005 "Anti-Japan" Demonstrations 
Introduction 
This chapter will analyse a commentary that was published in the People's Daily 
following a series of "anti-Japan" demonstrations652 which had taken place in a 
number of Chinese cities during the month of April in 2005. Although these protests 
did not explicitly challenge the authority of the CCP, as in 1989, nor were they 
organised by a quasi-spiritual qigong group that the CCP leadership perceived to be a 
threat to its authority, as in 1999, the demonstrations directed against Japan did 
indirectly challenge the leadership of the CCP. This was because they presented the 
Party's leadership with a dilemma over how best to bring them under control. If the 
leadership allowed the demonstrations to continue for too long, historical precedents 
suggested that they could open up a space which would enable the expression and 
mobilisation of discontent against the rule of the CCP. However, other historical 
precedents indicated that bringing the protests to an end too soon could also open up a 
similar space as protestors reacted to the government's suppression of their patriotic 
actions by challenging its authority. Consequently, as Shirk points out, "[w]henever 
anti-Japanese emotions boil over into large-scale protests that threaten to spin out of 
control, it takes a delicate touch to halt the protests without having them turn against 
652 The labelling of the protests as "anti-Japan" rather than "anti-Japanese" is based on the claims made 
by demonstrators-or, at least, those who claimed to speak on their behalf-that their actions were 
directed against the Japanese government as well as those who endorse the views of "right-wing 
militarists" rather than the majority of the Japanese population (this is also the line of the Chinese 
government). Whether such a distinction was actually maintained during the demonstrations when 
some Japanese businesses as well as Japanese products were vandalised, even ifby a minority, is a 
moot point. However, it is also incidental to the focus of this chapter. 
An additional point c o n c e ~ s s the use of the terms ''protest'' and "demonstration", More generally. I use 
the term "demonstration", again on the grounds that it is more neutral-in my opinion, it describes the 
act taking p l a ~ ~ w h ~ r e ~ s s ~ e e ! e ~ ~ ' ' p ~ o t e s t ' ' ' a l ~ o o includes inte,rpretation ( o ~ ~ used pejoratively) of the 
event. That saId, thIS dlstlDction IS shgbt and, lD order to aVOId over-repetition, the two terms are used 
interChangeably, 
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the CCP instead.,,653 In light of the fact that the CCP leadership was able do just that 
and successfully bring the "anti-Japan" demonstrations to an end without 
encountering either of the two outcomes listed above, the aim of this chapter is, by 
intensively analysing a commentary that was published in response to these 
demonstrations, to better understand how the discourse of stability was used to 
legitimate the authority of the CCP in bringing an end to the "anti-Japan" 
demonstrations. 
As with the previous chapter, this chapter will only intensively analyse a single article 
on account of the fact that the usage of stability throughout government's campaign to 
bring the demonstrations to an end was relatively consistent. As such, this article is 
considered to be largely representative of how stability was used in the campaign. 
That said, the usage of stability in other significant articles published in this period, 
where different, is also detailed in the "co-textual analysis" section of this chapter in 
order to give a more complete understanding. 
As explained in chapter two, the analyses of the editorials will begin by presenting a 
contextual analysis of the events that situates the publication of 17 April editorial in 
the political context of this period. Following on from this, an intensive analysis of the 
editorial will be carried out at the paragraphicallevel so as to make explicit my 
reading of the text. Moreover, as with the intensive analyses carried out in the 
previous chapters, the aim of this reading is to answer three principal questions: 
1. What meaning was given to stability in the commentary? 
2. How did the editorial attempt to persuade the reader of the validity of this meaning? 
65' Shirk (2007: 144-145). 
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3. How did this use of stability relate to the legitimacy of the CCP? 
Finally, the chapter will end with a co-textual analysis that examines other significant 
themes in the campaign to bring the "anti-Japan" demonstrations to a successful end 
and, in so doing, avoid producing an overly narrow understanding of the discourse 
during this period. 
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17 April Commentary: Contextual Analysis654 
The article that will be analysed in this chapter is a signed commentary from the 
People's Daily entitled "From Building a Hannonious Society See Stability" which 
was published on 17 April 2005.655 The publication of this article was significant, in 
that it constituted the opening salvo of a broader campaign by the CCP leadership to 
bring under control a series of "anti-Japan" demonstrations that had taken place in 
different parts of China on the three previous weekends.656 The first of these 
demonstrations took place on 2 April in the geographically disparate cities of 
Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province in Western China, and Shenzhen, close to 
the border with Hong Kong in the southern province of Guangdong. The protestors, in 
both instances, numbered around ten thousand and sought to direct their grievances 
against local Japanese supermarkets and department stores.657 According to Shirk, 
"[i]n both cities, the police allowed the protestors to damage the stores, but barred 
them from entering.,,658 Demonstrations again took place in Shenzhen the next day, 
with approximately 3,000 protestors attacking two Japanese department stores.659 
The following weekend, further demonstrations against Japan were held in the cities 
of Shenzhen and Guangzhou in Guangdong province as well as the municipalities of 
654 As with the previous chapters, this analysis is not intended to provide a complete account of the 
events surrounding the "anti-Japan" demonstrations in 2005 but rather, in keeping with the Discourse-
Historical approach, to present my understanding of the issues relevant to this period in order to make 
more explicit the meanings within the 11 April Commentary. 
65' He Zhenhua (11 April 2005). 
656 Shirk estimates that protests took place in t w e n t y ~ f i v e e cities across China whereas Jin claims that 
they occurred in "nearly forty major cities". He contends that the demonstrations were even more 
widespread, having broken out in "dozens of Chinese cities spanning over 20 provinces". Consequently, 
II these varied figures indicate, the precise scale of the protests is hard to ascertain, particularly as 
media reports tended to pay most attention to those taking place in the major cities. Suffice it to say, 
protests did take place in numerous locales throughout Cbina, with the most substantial demonstrations 
occurring in the major urban areas. See Shirk (2007: 142), Jin (2006: 25), He (2007: 1). 
657 Mooney (4 Apri12005). 
651 Shirk (2001: 142). 
659 Mooney (4 April 2005). 
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Chongqing and Beijing.660 In the case of the latter. being both the capital as well as 
the city in which the embassies of foreign countries were resident. such a 
demonstration carried a greater degree of political symbolism. The protest initially 
began in a shopping mall for hi-tech goods in the district of Zhongguancun and 
consisted of approximately 10.000 students. most of whom were students.661 As with 
the demonstrations that had taken place in Chongqing and Shenzhen on the previous 
weekend. the target of the protest appeared to be businesses that sold Japanese 
products. According to Shirk, the demonstrations became violent, as protestors 
"smashed electronic billboards advertising Canon cameras and other Japanese 
electronic products ...• kicked and hammered Toyota automobiles caught up in the 
melee, and broke the windows of Japanese banks and restaurants.,,662 Following this, 
the demonstration moved out of the Zhongguancun district towards Tiananmen 
Square. However, according to van Kemenade, they were prevented from entering the 
square by the People's Anned Police (PAP),663 who, in conjunction with the Beijing 
police, redirected around 1,000 or so demonstrators into the foreign embassy 
district. 664 Once there, Shirk claims that, "the demonstrators threw bottles, tiles, stones, 
and eggs over the heads of the five-man-deep cordon of People's Armed Police" 
before being taken home in waiting buses, with the crowd of protestors effectively 
being dispersed by the early evening.66s However, when protestors attempted to gain 
entry to the embassy district the following day, Bezlova claims that they were 
prevented from doing so by "full gear riot police". 666 Nevertheless, on the same day in 
660 See Bezlova (13 April 2005), "Anti-Japan Protests Flare Up in China" (16 ApriI2ooS). 
461 Shirk (2007: 140). 
662 Ibid., p.141. 
M3 This is, effectively, a national paramilitary organisation which bas responsibility for the "quelling of 
"sudden incidents"". See Cheung (1996: 527). 
Ci64 van Kemenade (9 April 2005). 
665 Shirk (2007: 141-142). 
'" Bezlova (13 ApriI200S). 
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the city of Guangzhou, approximately 3,000 protestors were able to surround the 
Japanese Consulate while a further 10,000 people demonstrated in Shenzhen.667 
By the following weekend, the final set of demonstrations took place, most 
prominently in the cities of Shanghai, Hangzhou, Tianjin and, once again, Shenzhen, 
while protests in the cities of Guangzhou, Chongqing and Beijing were all blocked by 
the authorities.668 Of these, the demonstration held in Shanghai on 16 April was the 
largest, with estimations for the number of people taking part ranging from 20,000 up 
to 100,000.669 Furthermore, Shirk also contends that the Shanghai protest was the 
"most violent" of those that took place in April, with reports of Japanese businesses 
being attacked and Japanese cars being overturned.670 As with the demonstration that 
took place in Beijing on 9 April, protestors converged on the Japanese Consulate, 
whereupon a variety of objects, including stones and paint, were thrown at the 
building; however, as with the Beijing protests, riot police prevented protestors from 
. . try t th d 671 gammg en 0 e compoun . 
Causes of the" Anti-Japan" Demonstrations 
Two immediate issues were considered to have led to the three weeks of protests 
across China. The first issue concerned the possibility that Japan could obtain 
Permanent Membership of the United Nations Security Council (PMUNSC). 
Concerns over this were raised when Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, issued a 
report on 21 March 2005 entitled "In Larger Freedom: towards Development, 
667 "China's Anti-Japan Rallies Spread" (10 April 2005). 
661 "Anti-Japan Protests Flare Up in China" (16 April 2005). 
669 Acco!ding to Shirk, a government spokesman put the number of protestors at 20,000 while a variety 
ofeyewtmesses put the figure at anywhere from 50,000 to 100,000. See Shirk (2007: 143). 
670 "Japan Anger at Shanghai Violence" (16 April 2005). 
"1 Farrer (29 April 2005). 
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Security and Human Rights for All".672 This report proposed two models by which the 
membership of the Security Council would be expanded from its current membership 
of fifteen countries to twenty_four.673 In addition, it specified that the criteria for 
determining which countries should hold such seats as being "those who contribute 
most to the United Nations financially, militarily and diplomatically".674 In light of 
the fact that Japan was the United Nations (UN) second largest financial donor, 
contributing approximately US$800 million or just under 20% of the UN's overall 
budget,675 had recently dispatched Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to take part in UN 
peacekeeping missions in Cambodia and Nepal, and was the only non-permanent 
member aside from Brazil to have served eight Security Council terms, it was 
regarded as having a strong bid to gain one of the newly created seats.676 Indeed, this 
bid was strengthened by having the declared support from the United States, 
European Union countries as well as many countries in the developing world.677 
Although a vote on the proposals put forward in the UN report was not scheduled 
until September of that year and,. even in the unlikely event of one model gaining 
sufficient support,678 China, as one of the five UN Security Council Permanent 
Members, would have the power to veto any Japanese bid. Despite this, a group of 
672 He (2007: 1). 
673 Model A proposed an additional six Permanent Memberships (PM) with two drawn from the "Asia 
and Pacific" region alongside three more two-year non-renewable seats. Model B did not propose the 
creation of any additional PMs but suggested that a new category of eight four-year renewable seats be 
created, ofwhicb 2 would also be drawn from "Asia and Pacific". See U.N. General Assembly (2005: 
43). 
671, Ibid., p.42. 
61' Roy (2005:192). 
676 Breummer (2006: 1). Japan had begun its eighth two-year non-renewable term in January 2005. It 
only became a member of the United Nations in 1956. 
677 Gordon (1 October 2005). 
611 Acceptance of any structural reform of the Security Council requires support from at least two-
thirds of the tn:'l m e m ~ e r r nations as well as all f i ~ e e current PMs. G i v ~ ~ that two models were being 
proposed on thiS occaslOn, as well as the contentious nature of Secunty Council reform, it seemed 
unlikely that either model would gain the necessary support from the member nations to become 
eaacted. As it transpired, neither of the proposals gained enough support. 
234 
Chinese people living in the United States organised an online petition to oppose any 
possibility of Japan gaining Permanent Membership.679 The initial aim of the 
petitioners was to obtain one million signatories; however, following widespread 
coverage in the Chinese media, the total number of signatures on the petition ended 
up exceeding this figure by, at the very least, a multiple often.68o Indeed, the 
popularity of the petition was such that it even spread offiine, with reports that there 
were signing stations being set up in various Chinese cities as well as workers in 
factories and offices bringing the petition round for colleagues to sign.681 According 
to He, the most frequently cited reason for signing the petition was the refusal by the 
Japanese government to acknowledge the acts that were committed by the Japanese 
Imperial Army during its occupation of China from 1931 to 1945.682 
The second issue that led to the "anti-Japan" protests was the release of the list of 
approved school history textbooks by the Japanese Ministry of Education in early 
Apri1.683 Concerns over Japan's portrayal of its wartime actions in its school history 
textbooks had been an ongoing issue since objections were first raised by the Chinese 
government in 1982;684 however, for He, the release of this list in 2005, coming so 
close to the setting up of the online petition, was, in effect, "the straw that broke the 
679 Mooney (4 April 2005). 
610 The figures range from 10 million, which is put forward by Reilly up to Shirk's claim of 40 million. 
In between, Zhao estimates 20 million signatories (also reported by the Economist) while Joseph Kahn 
(of the New York Times) puts the figure at 30 million. None explain how such a figure was reached. 
See Reilly (2006: 211), Zhao (2005: 131), "Asia: The genie escapes; China and Japan" (16 April 2005) 
Joseph Kahn (15 April 2005), Shirk (2007: 173). ' 
"1 Reilly (2006: 211), Shirk (2007: 173) . 
.. 2 He (2007: 1) . 
• 3 Every four years, the Ministry of Education releases a list of school textbooks (usually numbering 
seven or eight) that have been approved by the Textbook Authorisation Research Council. See 
Masalski (2001), Nakamura (30 October 2007) . 
.. The approval of the first edition of the JSHTR in 2001 also drew protests from the Chinese and 
South Korean governments and prompted the Japanese Ministry of Education to require 124 changes 
See "Japan History Texts Anger E Asia" (5 April 2005). . 
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camel's back".685 Of the eight books that had been approved that year, it was an 
updated edition of the textbook published by the Japanese Society for History 
Textbook Refonn (JSHTR) that caused the most offence. In addition to claiming that 
Japan's wartime actions had been borne out ofthe need for "self-preservation" and 
that the invasions of China and Korea were carried out in order to liberate the Asian 
region from "western domination",686 its reference to the events that took place in 
Nanjing at the end of 1937, in which the Japanese Anny is widely accepted to have 
killed hundreds of thousands of people over a period of several weeks, as an 
"incident" aroused the greatest level ofindignation.687 Moreover, the textbook did not 
provide an estimate for the number of Chinese people killed during this period, 
instead stating only that "many had been killed".688 Despite the fact that the JSHTR is 
used in less than 1 % of schools in Japan,689 Barme makes the point that the repeated 
approval of such textbooks feeds "into a perception that China's neighbour continues 
to avoid confronting its-albeit imperial-past. .. and that it is a nation that is 
incapable of redressing those wrongs through meaningful, substantive and sustained 
acts and expressions of official contrition.,,69o Moreover, Jin contends that, for many 
in China, this lack of contrition over past actions is also linked to the present-day 
issue of regional security, as it demonstrates that Japan has never abandoned its 
imperialist ambitions and, indeed, that the intention of right-wing groups within the 
political establishment is to once again remilitarise the country.691 
615 He (2007: I). 
616 "China 'Jails Democracy Activist'" (25 December 200s). 
W1 The episode is more commonly referred to as the "Nanjing massacre". although the term "the rape 
ofNanjing" has been popularised since the publication of Iris Chang's book of the same name . 
.. Indeed, only one of the approved textbooks in 2005 actually gave figures for the number of Chinese 
DOODle killed during the events in Nanjing. See "Japan History Texts Anger E Asia" (5 April 200S) 
119 Miyazaki (16 ApriI200s). 
1190 B8I'IIl6 (16 May 2005). 
691 lin (2006: 38). 
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However, these immediate issues surrounding the "anti-Japan" demonstrations had 
also been preceded by a series of diplomatic incidents. Chief among these was the 
release of a joint statement by the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee on 19 
February 2005. In this statement, the two countries stated that one of their "common 
strategic objectives" was to "[ e ]ncourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning 
the Taiwan Strait through dialogue".692 As well as constituting the first direct 
expression made by Japan on the status of Taiwan since it normalised relations with 
the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1972, this statement was taken to mean that 
Japan would assist the United States in defending Taiwan from military attack by the 
PRC.693 Given that the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty is central to the CCP's 
nationalist credentials,694 any statement or action on this issue by an outside country 
that does not fully endorse the People's Republic of China's "One-China" principle 
can provoke diplomatic tension.695 However, in the case of Japan, such diplomatic 
tension can be even more severe on account of the fact that, as Shirk points out, 
"[t]oday's Chinese can't forgive Japan for dismembering China and ruling Taiwan as 
a colony until the end of World War 11.,,696 Furthermore, He makes the point that, 
because of such feelings, "[p ]olicy flexibility is particularly limited when problems 
regarding Taiwan arise between China and Japan".697 
69110int Statement of the U.S.-1apan Security Consultative Committee (19 February 2005). 
693 "Sino-1apanese Relations under the ''New US-1apan Security Alliance· .. • (1 March 2005). 
6M However, this issue has only assumed such importance in the post-Mao period and, indeed, can be 
traced back to Deng Xiaoping's call in 1980 for the "return of Taiwan to the motherland" as the second 
of the government's three "major tasks" ("opposing international hegemonism" and "economic reform" 
were the first and third tasks respectively). 
695 A recent example of this was said to be the Chinese government's decision to deny the USS Kitty 
Hawk permission to dock in Hong Kong for Thanksgiving celebrations in retaliation for the US 
government's earlier decision to sell Patriot II missile systems to Taiwan. See Lague (29 November 
2007). 
"'1apan gained control of Taiwan in the Treaty ofShimonoseki follOwing China's defeat in the Sino-
~ ~War of 1894-1895. See Shirk (2007: 152). 
Indeed. He contends that "[t[he government would face a legitimacy crisis if it showed any signs of 
compromise in sovereignty disputes over Taiwan." See He (2007: 13). 
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Although the Chinese government did not take overt retaliatory action against Japan 
over the statement, the following month saw the passing of an anti-secession law 
relating to Taiwan ifanfenlie guojiafa) at the Third Session of the Tenth National 
Party Congress. This law authorised China to employ "non-peaceful means" in the 
event of • .. ·Taiwan independence" secessionist forces" attempting to declare 
independence for the island, "major incidents" that would lead to the island's 
independence or when the possibilities for peaceful reunification had been 
"completely exhausted".698 In effect, the Anti-Secession Law presented a response to 
the statement issued by the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee by reasserting 
China's right to take military action in order to prevent Taiwan from becoming 
independent. Furthermore, although the Law was not drafted in reaction to the US-
Japan statement,699 the extensive media coverage given to both the statement and the 
passing of the Anti-Secession Law had the effect of keeping the twin nationalist 
issues of Taiwan and Japan in the public consciousness in the period leading up to the 
demonstrations. 
However, in order to better understand why the issue of Japan's wartime actions was 
able to bring about three weeks of demonstrations in China more than fifty years later, 
it is necessary to examine how these actions have been viewed throughout the course 
of the People's Republic of China. 
691 "Anti-Secession Law adopted by NPC (full text)" (14 March 2005). 
699 A draft version of the Law bad been submitted to the NPC Standing Committee in December 2004. 
Moreover, for Shirk, the Law was drafted in response to the possibility of a law being passed that 
would authorise the holding of a referendum on the island's independence. See Shirk (2007: 203-206) 
"China Prepares to Enact Law Against Secession" (18 December 2004). ' 
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Japan in the Maoist Era 
For Gries, the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, or the "War of Resistance Against 
Japan" (KangRi Zhanzheng) as it is more commonly referred to in China, can be 
considered "the birthplace of the People's Republic of China". 700 Indeed, this view 
was expressed by Mao Zedong on the occasion of the normalisation of Sino-Japan 
relations in 1972 when he stated that, "[w]e must express our gratitude to Japan. If 
Japan didn't invade China, we could [have] never achieved the co-operation between 
the KMT [Nationalist Party] and the Communist Party. We could have never 
developed and eventually taken political power for ourselves. It is due to Japan's help 
that we are able to meet here in Beijing.,,70I As Denton points out, the reason as to 
why Mao was so grateful for the Japanese invasion was that it "allowed the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) to emerge from the shadows and become a legitimate 
claimant to political hegemony in China.,,702 Prior to the outbreak of war, the CCP 
had been under sustained military attack from the Guomindang (GMD),703 which was 
pursuing the strategy of "first internal pacification, then external resistance" (xian 
annei, hou rangwai).704 However, the onset of war against a common external enemy 
provided both the political opportunity for a weakened CCP to establish its nationalist 
credentials vis-a-vis the Guomindang70S and the military opportunity to turn the 
attacks of the Guomindang towards the Japanese.706 In so doing, it enabled the CCP 
700 Gries (2004: 69). 
101 Cited in Barme (16 May 2005). 
102 Denton (17 October 2007). 
703 As pointed out in the "note on transliteration" (p. iv), Kuomintang (KMT) and Ouomindang (OMD) 
both refer to the Nationalist Party. 
704 This meant ';,acifying" the CCP before ''resisting'' the Japanese Anny. See So (2002: 213). 
70S There much concern at the time in China that it was necessary for the OMD to join forces with the 
CCP in order to resist the Japanese. Indeed, this was one of the central motivations of the December 
Ninth Movement in 1935. 
706 The GMD eventually agreed to suspend its war against the CCP and formed a Second "United 
Front" in 1937 to fight the Japanese army. 
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the time and space in which to regain its military strength.707 Indeed, by basing itself 
in rural parts of China, the CCP was simultaneously able to recruit a large number of, 
mostly, peasants and avoid sustaining heavy losses at the hands of the Japanese army. 
As a consequence, when Japan surrendered on 15 August·1945 following the 
dropping of the two atomic bombs by the United States, the CCP possessed a 
significantly stronger military force with which to take on the Guomindang in the 
ensuing civil war. 
In light of the crucial role that the War of Resistance against Japan played in 
facilitating the CCP to gain political control of China, it is not surprising that it 
occupied a central position in the Party's post-revolutionary legitimising narratives. 
However, within these narratives, the War was depicted only in so far as it related to 
the CCP's leadership. As Gries explains, "[t]he Communist storyline was simple: 
without the Party-led defeat of the Japanese, there would be no New China.,,708 
Indeed, "New China" was imagined as an enlightened and sovereign nation that had 
been "liberated" from a "semi-feudal" and "semi-colonial" past, of which the "War of 
Resistance" constituted its "denouement". 709 In effect, the main theme of such 
narratives was that of heroic victory.710 Moreover, the role of villain was not played 
by the Japanese Army but by the Guomindang. As He points out, during this period, 
"communist propagandists premised national identity on the "defining fundamental 
fissure" between the Chinese Communists and the Capitalists, especially the 
7f11 This is not to suggest that the CCP's actions were motivated only by self-interest but rather to make 
the point that it had the effect of enabling the CCP to emerge from a period in which its survival was 
uncertain. 
'701 Gries (2004: 73). 
709 Denton (17 October 2007). 
110 Gries (2004: 69-75). 
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Kuomintang ... governrnent in Taiwan.,,71I Consequently, in relation to the War, the 
GMD was portrayed as responsible for governing a weakened Chinese state that both 
created the conditions for a stronger Japan to invade and which was then unable and 
uninterested in resisting its occupation. 
An additional feature of the post-revolutionary narratives was the lack of attention 
that was given to the atrocities which had been committed against the Chinese people 
during the Japanese occupation. As Denton explains, "War and revolutionary martyrs 
were worshipped for their noble sacrifice to the nation, but victims of atrocities-the 
"rape ofNanjing" or the medical experiments led by the infamous Unit 731 of the 
Japanese Imperial Anny-did not fit well this prevailing heroic narrative.,,712 Indeed, 
this was reflected on the occasion of the normalisation of relations between the two 
countries in 1972. In addition to accepting what Barrne describes as a "superficial 
apology" from the Japanese Prime Minister, Tanaka Kakuei concerning the atrocities 
committed by the Japanese Army in China, the Chinese leaders also waived any 
claims for war reparations.713 According to Shirk, Zhou Enlai reasoned that "they did 
. not want to use a wartime indemnity to construct their country; it would harm peace 
to force the losing country to be responsible for the huge indemnity; and it was 
unreasonable to require the generation that didn't fight the war to pay for it.,,714 
However, He contends that the Chinese government's readiness to overlook these 
issues was more to do with the strategic importance of resuming relations with 
711 He (2007: 5). 
712 Denton (17 October 2007). 
713 According to He, the Japanese Prime Minister expressed "deep reflection" for the "much trouble" 
caused by Japan during an ''unfortunate period" rather than making a formal apology. See He (2007: S). 
714 Shirk (2007: 158). This also followed the example of the Republic of China, which foreswore 
reparations when signing the Treaty of Taipei. . 
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Japan.715 In terms of geopolitics, China was keen to form an alliance with Japan in 
order to offset its increasingly tense relations with the Soviet Union.716 In economic 
tenns, the normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations would open up the opportunity for 
bilateral trade to take place between the two countries at a time when China was 
economically weak. And in terms of Taiwan, a condition for the normalisation of 
relations was that the Japanese government both recognise the People's Republic of 
China as the sole legitimate representative government of China rather than, the GMD, 
as previously acknowledged in the 1952 Treaty of Taipei, and endorse the PRC's 
position that Taiwan was an "inalienable part of China". Commenting on the 
normalisation of relations, He states that "Beijing's attempt to create an illusion of 
Sino-Japanese friendship without first settling the historical account was largely 
successful.,,717 However, the changeover in the leadership of the Party and the new 
political direction pursued by Deng also brought about changes in the way in which 
the War of Resistance would be understood. 
Japan in the Post-Mao Era 
The first indication that the historical account between China and Japan had not been 
completely settled was in 1982, when the Chinese government, along with the Korean 
government, objected to changes that had been proposed by the Japanese Ministry of 
Education to a textbook written by Ienaga Saburo. These changes included replacing 
such phrases as the Japanese army's "aggression into" China with the army's 
"advance into" China.718 Although the Ministry of Education responded to the protest 
by dropping the proposed changes and, indeed, even introduced the additional 
71S He (2007: 4). 
716 Indeed, Reilly claims that the normalisation agreement contained an "anti-hegemony" clause that 
was specifically devised to counter the threat from the USSR. See Reilly (2006: 192). 
717 He (2007: 6). 
711 Masalski (2001). 
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criterion of requiring textbooks to demonstrate understanding in their portrayal of 
historical events concerning other Asian countries, the protest was significant, in that 
it represented the first time in the post-war period that the Chinese government had 
opposed a Japanese account of the War. Moreover, it also signalled that the official 
narrative of the War which had been propagated throughout the Maoist period was 
now subject to revision. For He, "[ d]omestic' politics was the main cause of the 
change.,,719 
Within domestic politics, this cause was the new policy of "reform and opening up" 
implemented under Deng Xiaoping' s leadership. Although largely welcomed by a 
population still recovering from the excesses of the "class struggle as the key link" 
version of communism that had been practiced throughout latter part of Mao's rule, 
this new policy encountered resistance from within the CCP. And when the new 
economic reforms began to cause unanticipated problems, such as inflation and 
unemployment, it also began to lose support amongst the public as well. The CCP 
leadership, at least those within the leadership that were in favour of the reforms, 
responded by increasingly justifying the reform programme through appeals to 
''patriotism'' (aiguozhuyi) rather than that of communism.72o This concept, which had 
also been used during the Maoist period,721 was intended to cut across notions of class 
and appeal to all sections of society by promoting the inclusive idea of Chinese 
identity. He notes that this involved trying "to inspire the people's love for the nation 
719 He (2007: 6). 
720 The concept of "patriotism" is also commonly referred to as "official nationalism" or "state-
sanctioned nationalism". However, within a Marxist-Leninist framework, the concept of "nationalism" 
is associated with "capitalist-imperialist" countries, who used it as a pretext to invade (and to a lesser 
extent, interfere in the affairs of) other countries. In contradistinction, the concept of "patriotism" 
referred to the idea of defending and protecting your own country. 
nJ Although the concept had been employed during this period, its usage carried class connotations. 
For more, see Schubert (2001: 138-141). 
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by praising China's national greatness as well as accentuating the differences between 
China and other nations.,,722 The link to the economic reform programme came from 
the fact that much of the national greatness which was highlighted by the concept of 
patriotism was located in China's past and so the implicit (and sometimes explicit) 
argumentation was that this "greatness" could only be achieved again in the future by 
pursuing the policy of "reform and opening up" under the leadership of the CCP. This 
claim was further reinforced by emphasising China's so-called "century of 
humiliation" as a contrastive example to demonstrate how weak China had once been. 
The use of the "century of humiliation" in this way also brought about changes in the 
depiction of its most important episode, at least for the CCP, namely, the "War of 
Resistance". The result was that the "victor" narrative, which had emphasised the 
heroic struggle of the Chinese people during this episode, now gave way to a "victim" 
narrative that highlighted their suffering. 723 
Although elements within this new narrative were carried over, particularly the crucial 
role of the CCP in defeating the Japanese Army, the role of the GMD as the villain 
was now played by Japan, with "China" being presented as the victim of its 
atrocities.724 Indeed, the atrocities that had once been suppressed in the previous 
narrative were now heavily emphasised. This "gorification" of the atrocities had the 
dual effect of strengthening the sense of Chinese victimhood while, at the same time, 
intensifying antipathy towards the Japanese. The centrepiece in this new narrative was 
the events that took place in Nanjing at the end of 1937 and the start of 1938. Where 
7Z2 He (2007: 6). 
723 Gries (2004: 79). 
724 The replacement of the GMD as the villain as well as the subsequent acknowledgment of its role in 
fighting alongside the CCP could also be interpreted as a political overture to Taiwan's rulers, 
particularly in light ofDeng's "three major tasks" In addition, this replacement also reflected the de-
ompbasising of class struggle as the "fundamental fissure" of national identity. See Coble (2007: 402). 
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. ,.'.' 
previously, there had largely been silence, in the post-Mao period it has come to 
represent, what He describes as, "the prime icon of Japanese brutality". 725 In addition 
to being the focus of intense academic research as well as popular culture,726 the 
events in December 1937 and January 1938 have been commemorated with the 
building of the "Memorial to Victims of the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders" 
(QinHua Rijun Nanjing datusha yunan tongbao jinianguan).727 For Ross, this 
Memorial has become "not only a key source of infonnation about the events of 1937 
but, more importantly, a source of Chinese government sanctioned interpretations of 
that history.,,728 Most contentious within this interpretation has been the insistence 
that the number of deaths caused by the Japanese Army during the seven week period 
totalled 300,000 people. Indeed, though this figure is heavily disputed, it is repeatedly 
displayed throughout the Memorial in Nanjing.729 For Coble, this emphasis on the 
number of deaths is representative of how the wartime actions of the Japanese Anny 
are now portrayed, in that it "often resembles a "numbers game", in which the goal 
seems to be to maximize the number ofvictims.,,73o Indeed, this point is echoed by 
Gries, who contends that "[t]he new victimization narrative obsesses about two 
m He (2007: 6). 
726 An example of this was the publication of the ''Great Nanjing Massacre" (Nanj;ng datusha) in 1987, 
which reportedly sold 150,000 copies in the first month of its release. More recently, the Irish Chang 
book. "The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II", brought the events of 1937-
1938 to an English speaking audience. See He (2007: 8). 
727 The Memorial was built on the site of a mass grave and first opened in 1985. It has since been 
expanded twice, in 1995, which coincided with the 50th anniversary of the ending of World War II, 
and December 2007, which coincided with the 70th anniversary of the start of the Japanese incursion 
ioto Nanjing. For a detailed description of the Memorial, see Denton (17 October 2007). 
721 Ross (2006: 4). This importance is heightened by the Memorial's status as a tourist destination. 
Indeed. the number of visitors for 2005, the last full year it was open was put at 2.1 million. See 
"Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall Receives 2 mln Visitors Last Year" (24 January 2006). 
'729 The 1948 Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal estimated the number of deaths to be 200,000 while Ross 
cites a wide range of sources that put the figure between 40,000 and 150,000. Ultimately, as Shirk 
~ ~ out, the ''true number may never be known." See Ross (2006: 2-3), Shirk (2007: 155). 
Coble (2007: 44). This ''numbers game" has also been evident in the overall estimate for the number 
of Chinese people killed in the war. In its immediate aftennath, Chiang Kai-shek put the number of 
soldiers killed at 1.75 million while, in 1949, Mao stated that 9.32 million soldiers and civilians had 
died. In 1991, the State Council White Paper on Human Rights put the combined figure for those killed 
IDd il\jured at ''more than" 21 million. However, in 1995, Jiang Zemin, in a commemoration speech to 
made the War's end, raised this last number to 35 million. 
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subjects: quantifying Chinese suffering and presenting the Chinese case to the 
world. ,,731 
Popular "Anti-Japan" Sentiment 
The government's use of the "victim" narrative in relation to Japan in the post-Mao 
period has resonated strongly with the Chinese public. For Denton, this is because 
"[d]epictions of Japanese atrocities are morally unambiguous and serve to direct 
divisive class resentments toward an external other.,,732 Moreover, He points out that, 
"[ w ]hen the Chinese people embraced the new victim narrative, their emotions of 
self-pity and grievances towards Japan outpoured.,,733 This outpouring has been 
evident in a number of incidents in which Chinese people have displayed antipathy 
towards Japan. In all of these incidents, the issue of Japan's past actions in China was 
implicitly or explicitly present. Indeed, this was the case with the first mass 
demonstrations that took place after the Cultural Revolution. These demonstrations, 
which had been organised by university students to take place on the historically 
symbolic date of 18 September 1985, were in response to the recent visit to the 
Yasukuni Shrine by the then Japanese Prime Minister, Yasubiro Nakasone, as well as 
China's increasing trade deficit with Japan?34 The visit to the Yasukuni Shrine was 
provocative to many Chinese people on account of the fact that the souls of many of 
those who executed the "Greater East Asian War", including the wartime leader, 
Hideki Tojo, were enshrined at the temple.73s Moreover, as Nakasone attended in his 
731 Gries (2004: 80). 
132 Denton (17 October 2007). 
733 He (2007: 8). 
734 The date commemorated the "Mukden Incident" when the detonation of part of the Southern 
Manchurian railway line by the Japanese army served as a prelude to its invasion of Manchuria. 
7J5 The Yasukuni Shrine, a Shinto temple that was built in 1869 at the start of the Meiji Restoration to 
honOur all those who would give their life defending Japan, enshrined the souls of those who were 
judged to Class-BC war criminals at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal in 1959 while in 1978 the 14 
Class-A war criminals were secretly enshrined by the resident priests. In total, there are e s t i ~ t e d d to be 
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capacity as Prime Minister, many people interpreted the visit as indicating the 
Japanese government's official support for, or, at least, lack of remorse over, it's 
wartime actions.736 As for the trade deficit, He notes that, despite the many possible 
reasons to explain this deficit, including the lack of quality control over Chinese-made 
goods as well as Japan's high trade barriers, "Chinese students instantly linked the 
economic issue with history.,,737 Indeed, the calling for an economic boycott of 
Japanese goods was itself a nationalistic tactic with historical resonance, having been 
periodically employed since Japan issued the Twenty-One Demands in 1915.738 
The spectre of history, as represented through the victim narrative, has also been 
present in issues that do not, on the surface at least, appear to be connected with 
Japan's wartime actions. In 2000, there was an incident involving defective Toshiba 
notebook computers, in which rumours circulated that Toshiba was paying 
compensation out to European and US customers for the selling of a faulty product 
while failing to do so with Chinese customers. As with the trade deficit in the mid-
1980s, though they were plausible explanations, such as the lack of existing laws 
within the Chinese legal system that required the paying of compensation to Chinese 
customers in such a scenario, the incident was interpreted as another example of 
Japanese discrimination towards China.739 This view was also taken when Japan Air 
Lines' (JAL) neglected to give Chinese passengers any food or lodging following an 
emergency landing in Osaka due to a snowstorm in January 2001. Despite the fact 
that the passengers' attempts to gain compensation of one million Renminhi (RMB) 
approximately 2.5 million souls at the Shrine. See Shirk (2007: 294 note 1), "Koizumi Shrine Visit 
Stokes Anger" (15 August 2006). 
736 Nakasone's visit was the first by a Japanese Prime Minister since the enshrining of the 14 Class-A 
war criminals. Previous prime ministers had visited but only in a private capacity. 
1J7 He (2007: 11). 
1JI Spence (1999: 281). 
7J9 Jin (2006: 30). 
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per passenger was repeatedly rejected by Chinese courts, Jin points out that, "in the 
court of public opinion, it was a typical example of "Japanese discrimination against 
the Chinese" and is still frequently cited in discussions of China-Japan relations 
taki I . Ch' d" 740 ngp ace m ma to ay. 
The issue of Japan's wartime actions has even extended into the realm of sport. In 
2004, China hosted the Asia Cup football tournament and, in each of Japan's group 
games against Oman, Thailand and Jordan, which took place in the wartime capital of 
Chongqing, Chinese fans openly displayed hostility towards the Japanese team by 
burning Japanese flags and shouting anti-Japanese taunts, such as "apologise to the 
people of Asia" and "return the Diaoyu Islands to China".741 However, this hostility 
worsened when China played Japan in the final of the Asia Cup. Although the 
Chinese authorities anticipated possible crowd disturbances by employing around 
50,000 police officers to guard the Beijing Worker's Stadium as well as directing the 
crowd's behaviour over the tannoy system, the Japanese national anthem was still 
booed and anti-Japanese taunts were once again chanted. Furthermore, after the game, 
which had ended in a 3-1 defeat for China, riots involving upwards of 10,000 people 
outside the stadium prevented the Japanese team from leaving and resulted in a 
Japanese diplomat's car being damaged. The hostility displayed towards the Japanese 
men's football team in the 2004 Asia Cup was also in evidence when the Japanese 
women's football team played in the 2007 World Cup being held in China. Describing 
their match against Germany, Zhou states that, "Japan ... had to endure not only the 
onslaught by reigning champions Germany on the pitch, but also a chorus of abuse 
from the almost 40,000 spectators, who had come not so much to cheer the Europeans 
140 Jin (2006: 29). 
141 Ibid., p. 26. 
248 
but to jeer their Asian neighbours.,,742 Furthermore, this hostility did not completely 
dissipate when, at the end of the match, the Japanese team returned to the pitch 
carrying a banner that said "Thank China". Commenting on the attitude of Chinese 
spectators, Liu opines that, "following the increased fervency of nationalism in recent 
years, any encounter between China and Japan in international competition becomes a 
venue for the Chinese angry young patriots to release their hatred.,,743 
The "increasing fervency of nationalism" that Liu makes reference to has been partly 
the result of the government's promotion of "patriotism", which has grown more 
pronounced since the events in 1989, but has also been due to the frequent publication 
of anti-Japanese stories in the media in recent years. As Shirk notes, "[ e ]very 
perceived slight by Japanese leaders, every revision of Japanese textbooks-as well as 
every misstep by Japanese students studying in China or Japanese visitors to China-
is an opportunity for tabloid newspapers and Internet Web sites to attract audiences 
and whip up popular passions.,,744 While the government's heavy use of the victim 
narrative has resulted in a Chinese public that is receptive to such stories, it has also 
been the government's gradual commercialisation of the media as well as a loosening 
on reporting restrictions that has enabled newspapers to publish these stories.745 
Indeed, this new media environment is epitomised by the emergence of the "Global 
Times" newspaper (huanqiu shibao), whose strongly nationalistic editorial focus has 
seen it become China's most popular newspaper.746 
142 Zhou (30 September 2007). 
143 Liu (19 September 2007). 
144 Shirk (2007: 156). , 
145 This commercialisation of the media came about through the government's decision to reduce 
funding for media groups, thus forcing newspapers to attract readers in order to gain advertising 
revenue. The split between newsstand sales and advertising revenue is reported to be roughly 10%-90%. 
See Shirk (18 October 2007). 
746 The G l o ~ a l . .Times is p u b l i ~ h e d d by t h ~ ~ People's Daily ~ i a a group and was initially published as a 
weekly penodlcal. However, its populanty has led to an mcrease in the frequency of its publication and 
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This new media environment has also coincided with the advent of the Internet in 
China. In addition to becoming the primary source of news for many people, the 
regulation of which is more difficult for the government to control,747 the Internet has 
opened up an alternative space, in the fonn of online forums, bulletin boards and chat 
rooms, that allows people both to disseminate and discuss such news.748 Moreover, 
the increasing popularity of nationalist content offline has also been reflected online. 
Consequently, Shirk notes that "[e]very reported outrage sparks excited discussions 
on Internet chat rooms.,,749 With regard to anti-Japanese stories, this was 
demonstrated when, in September 2003, the Chinese media reported that the police 
were investigating a three-day orgy involving four hundred Japanese businessmen and 
approximately five hundred Chinese prostitutes that had taken place at a hotel in 
Zhuhai in Guangdong province.75o The release of this infonnation provoked more 
than 7,000 comments being posted on several popular forums in the two days after the 
reports first ran, with the vast majority being highly critical of the actions of the 
Japanese businessmen as well as Japan.7Sl Indeed, the public's reaction was so strong 
that China's Foreign Ministry took the unusual step of summoning a Japanese 
representative to express its outrage over the incident,752 which it did by framing the 
it is now published five times a week. Its focus is on foreign affairs, with stories on Taiwan, Japan or 
the United States often featuring prominently on the front page, alongside pictures of military hardware 
or combat graphics. See Shirk (18 October 2007). 
747 News articles tend to be posted first and removed when considered too politically sensitive. In the 
interim, which may be as short as a couple of hours, the article can be copied and reposted in a number 
offorums, so that, though the original article may no longer be unavailable, people may still be able to 
access a copy. 
741 Liu (2006: 145). 
749 Shirk (2007: 156). 
7SO "Japanese Orgy Hurts Chinese Feelings" (30 September 2003). 
751 That the orgy took place on 16-18 September and coincided with the nnd anniversary of the 
"Mukden Incident", which, no doubt, served to heighten people's sense ofindignation. 
752 It was unusual, in that the orgy was not technically a state-to-state matter. 
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actions of the Japanese businessmen in tenns of the victim narrative when claiming 
that they had "hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.,,7s3 
The Japanese "sex tour" scandal demonstrated not only that the Internet allows for the 
wider dissemination of news, thus keeping the public better infonned but also that it 
provides a platfonn for the public to communicate its opinions about this news and, in 
so doing, can affect the actions of the government.7S4 Moreover, though the critical 
views expressed online can potentially impact on all areas of government policy, it 
seems that it has the greatest impact on the government's Japan policy.755 A possible 
explanation for this is that the government's repeated use of the victim narrative, by 
highlighting the past suffering of Chinese people, has worked to both stimulate and 
legitimate present grievances towards Japan and, in so doing, opened up the space, as 
well as providing the language, for people to challenge the policy on Japan. 
Consequently, when dealing with Japan, the government is put in the position of 
representing the public's will rather than that of "leading" the public, as is the case on 
most other issues. For He, this has led to a situation in which, "[i]n order to placate 
public anger and deflect anti-establishment challenges, the government has to 
maintain a hard-line policy towards Japan.,,7S6 Mooney concurs, arguing that the Party 
leadership "fears that appearing weak-kneed vis-a-vis Japan will damage Party 
I ·t· ,,757 egt unacy. 
753 "Japanese Orgy Hurts Chinese Feelings" (30 September 2003). 
154 However, the extent of the public's influence is difficult to gauge, given the opacity of the Chinese 
political system. Indeed, the possibility exists that the government uses the cover of public opinion 
when it feels that such actions are in its best interests and suppresses such opinion on other occasions. 
That said, Shirk claims that leaders do read what is posted online and this corresponds to the trend of fC:ter responsiveness on the part of the government in the post-Mao period. 
S Examples are: the train project, the online petition and the new thinking on Japan. 
156 He (2007: 11). 
7S1 Mooney (4 April 2007). 
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The fears of the Party leadership over public opinion on relations with Japan have 
been deepened by an additional feature of the Internet: the increased capacity, both in 
tenns of time and scale, to organise collective action. Consequently, it is now not only 
possible for people to exchange their opinions online but also to organise 
demonstrations offline. Indeed, this capacity was vital in the organising of the "anti-
Japan" protests in April 2005. According to Liu, "[d]espite some official restrictions 
and prohibitions, the Chinese protesters were still able to make their way to the 
internet and disseminated a range of protest information extensively across the whole 
nation.,,758 Such information was spread using a wide range of web-based tools, such 
as websites, blogs, bulletin boards, instant messages, e-mail as well as Short Message 
Service (SMS) on mobile phones. Moreover, for Shirk, the organisation of the "anti-
Japan" protests was unprecedented in the history of the People's Republic of China, in 
that it involved "decentralised, bottom-up mobilization with no visible organization or 
leadership.,,759 That said, it was also the case that the Party leadership had indicated, 
most notably with the prominence given in the official media to the petition opposing 
Japan's bid for PMUNSC, that displays of "patriotic action" against Japan would be 
tolerated, even if, according to Yardley, "the scale of the protests did seem to surprise 
the govemment.,,760 
Ending the" Anti-Japan" Demonstrations 
The eventual outbreak of the "anti-Japan" demonstrations presented the Party 
leadership with a dilemma over when best to bring the protests to an end. Allowing 
the demonstrations to continue for too long could run the risk of bringing domestic 
151 Liu (2006: 144). 
759 Shirk (2007:' 142). Contrary to this, Lam cites a "Beijing source close to the security establishment" 
claiming that the protests had been organised by "anti.Japan" NOOs. See Lam (26 April 2005) 
7fII Yardley (25 April 2005). . 
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grievances to the fore, of which they were many, and so turn the protests against the 
CCP. Then again, attempting to bring demonstrations to an end too soon might also 
cause the protestors to tum on the government for suppressing their "patriotic actions". 
Moreover, there existed historical precedents which suggested that both scenarios 
were real possibilities. With regard to the first scenario, there had been a number of 
demonstrations that had taken place throughout the course of the twentieth century in 
China which had initially started out protesting the actions of Japan before 
subsequently developing into protests against the government of the day. As for the 
second scenario, He notes that, "[n]o Chinese government in modem history, the late 
Qing, Republican, or Nationalist, succeeded in putting down patriotism; each time 
they tried, it incurred massive anti-government revolts.,,761 
The government finally decided to bring all demonstrations to an end following the . 
third successive weekend of protests. According to Zhao, the Party leadership was 
"concerned both about the risk of confrontation with a foreign power and that the 
public's passions could tum against the govemment.,,762 Indeed, Shirk notes that, by 
the time of the government's decision, large-scale protests directed against the 
government had already taken place. These included a riot between approximately 
30,000 "townspeople" and the police over pollution from a local factory in southeast 
China, a strike by 10,000 workers at a Japanese-owned factory in Shenzhen over 
union representation, as well as a sit-in held by 2,000 or so retired military officers 
outside the PLA's Beijing headquarters over the level of pensions. Although these 
single-issue protests have become relatively common in China over the past few years 
and are not, as such, directed against the central government, the timing of these 
761 He (2007: 19). 
162 Zhao (2005: 141). 
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protests added to the threat ofinstability.763 In addition, the make-up of the 
demonstrations was of concern to the Party leadership. While the first series of 
protests was largely made up of students, by the third week of demonstrations, people 
from other sections of society, including workers and businessmen, were also taking 
part.764 Of further concern were the purported calls circulating on the Internet for 
larger demonstrations to be held on the upcoming anniversaries of International 
Labour Day on 1 May and the May Fourth Movement, also officially designated 
Youth Day, on 4 May. Indeed, given the politically symbolism of these anniversaries, 
particularly the patriotic anti-government association of the May Fourth Movement as 
well as the fact that the first week of May was an official holiday in the PRC, the 
concern was that these demonstrations would be directed against the CCP. 
Furthermore, in the event of these demonstrations going ahead, the 4 June anniversary 
would only be the following month and could add further momentum to any anti-
government movement. 
Beyond domestic considerations, Party leaders were also concerned with maintaining 
good relations with Japan. According to Lam, "Chinese leaders remained worried that 
repeated violent protests against Japan or boycotts of Japanese products would 
eventually drive Japanese businesspeople away.,,76S Moreover, Lam contends that the 
protests had already served their purpose by reducing the likelihood of Japan 
obtaining Permanent Membership of the UN Security Council. 766 
763 Shirk (2007: 175). 
164 Ibid., p. 142. 
16$ Lam (26 April 2005). 
766 According to Lam, the Party leaders are "dead-set" against Japan gaining PMUNSC as it would 
effectively transform it into a ''normal'' country with a ''normal'' military. See Lam (26 April 2(05). 
17 April Commentary: Selection of Data 
The 17 April commentary was selected following a number of searches that were 
conducted within the available categories in the People's Daily database.767 The time 
frame within which the search was carried out was a five-week period that started on 
1 April 2005 and ended on 4 May 2005. Although a media blackout on the reporting 
of the demonstrations was in place from 6 April until 17 April,768 I chose to begin the 
search period on 1 April 2005 so as to include any significant articles on stability that, 
though they may not have directly mentioned the protests, may have been intended to 
signify the need for them to be brought to an end. As it was, there were only six 
articles published in this period that contained stability in both the headline and as a 
keyword and these were generally short articles that were concerned with economic 
issues?69 As for the selection of the end date of 4 May, this was chosen because, as 
767 As detailed in Chapter two, these categories are: date (riq,); headline (biaot,); page number (bane,); 
edition (banming); author (zuozhe); special column (zhuanlan); text (zhengwen). 
768 According to a report in the South China Morning Post, the news blackout was imposed on 6 April 
through an "Eight-Point Circular" from the Party's Central Propaganda Department that attempted to 
reduce the level of public antagonism towards Japan. See Staff Reporter (6 April 2005). 
769 However, two articles concerned with stability were published in People '$ Daily Online (Renmin 
Wang) during this period (note: they were not available on the database as this lists articles only 
published in the People's Daily newspaper). The first article. entitled "Think About the Overall 
Situation, Safeguard Stability", was written under the name of Wei Minyan and published on 14 April. 
In addition to calling for greater focus on reform and opening up, the article followed the more usual 
government line that the textbook issue was being caused "right-wing militarists" line. The article also 
referred to the "anti-Japan" protests, albeit only once through the expression "spontaneous protests" 
(zi/a de /cangy,), while stability only featured significantly in the final paragraph. in which it was 
mentioned six times, with its usage merely emphasising its importance in terms of economic 
development and building a ''well-off society". The second article, entitled ''Stability is Most Precious". 
was attributed to Yi Zhi and was published on 1 S April, albeit it was also reposted on 16 and 17 April. 
This article differed from the previous one in that it did not directly address the issue of the 
demonstrations but rather implicated them within the wider context of civil strife. In this. the article 
used the example of Yugoslavia, which it claimed was economically successful in 1980s before it 
descended into chaos in the 1990s following the outbreak of conflict in the 1990s, to call for stability. 
lUting that it would allow for China's "miraculous" economic development to continue and so benefit 
"all parts of the country". The article also pointed out that,like the issue of Japan's textbooks. China 
would have to deal with challenges in the future but that it should rely on the "Party and government's 
diplomatic expertise" to solve them whilst people should carry out their patriotic duty by studying hard. 
being productive and maintaining stability. Interestingly. the rhetorical style of these articles was very 
different to those that later appeared in the print versions of the People's Daily, in that they were less 
formulaic in their use of language while also more populist in their argumentation. That said, they were 
consistent in adopting the "softly-softly" approach that was being employed at the time to deal with the 
demOnStrations. See Wei Minyan (14 April 2005), Yi Zhi (15 ApriI200S). 
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pointed out above, there had been attempts to organise larger demonstrations on this 
politically significant date and so, with the passing of this date without incident, it 
seemed to mark the point at which government had (re)gained control of situation 
offline, if not necessarily online. As with the searches that were used to select the 
articles in the previous chapters, the intention of the searches was to begin with the 
broadest possible search before adding more specific criteria that would allow for the 
number of hits to be reduced to the point where the most suitable articles could be 
selected. However, as made clear throughout the thesis, the selection of an article was 
not based solely on the ordered results of the People's Daily database search but was 
also dependent on other variables, such as the political significance of the article as 
well as the relevance of its content to the stability discourse. Moreover, the relative 
weighting of these variables was not subject to statistical calculation but rather, in 
keeping with the discourse-historical approach, was determined by the judgement of 
the analyst. 
The first search to be conducted was a keyword search for the term "stability". From a 
total of 4,0 I 0 articles that were published during the selected period, 447 articles 
featured this keyword. The first result was a staff commentary that was published on 
29 April entitled "Keep in Mind Everything We Cannot Accomplish without 
Stability", in which "stability" was mentioned a total of32 times.77o Moreover, 
according to the People's Daily ratings system, this article had a relevancy rating of 
100%. The second article on the list was a signed commentary by Zhong Xuanli, 
entitled "Actively Produce Things in Favour of Social Stability", that was published 
no Benbao Pinglunyuan (29 April 2005). 
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on 23 April.771 This article, which had a relevancy score of 95%, also mentioned 
"stability" 32 times. The third most highly ranked article, with a rating of 92%, was 
the 17 April commentary, entitled "From a Harmonious Society See Stability", which 
was signed using the penname "He Zhenhua".772 Moreover, in comparison to the first 
two articles, stability was used a total of 25 times throughout the article. The fourth 
article on the list was an editorial from the Global Times, which was republished the 
following day in the People's Daily on 21 April, entitled ''Nothing Can Be Done 
without Stability". 773 This article, which had a relevancy rating of 85%, mentioned 
stability a total of 18 times. The fifth article on the list was an editorial that had 
originally been published in Guangming Daily (guangming ribao) on 27 April but, as 
with the previous article, was reprinted the following day in the People's Daily. This 
article, entitled "Doubly Taking the Interests of the Whole into Account", only 
mentioned stability 10 times and had a relevancy rating of 74%.774 
The second search to be conducted added the additional criterion of searching for 
articles that contained the term "stability" in the headline. As pointed out in earlier 
chapters, making use of this criterion is based on the understanding that the headline 
generally indicates the most important topic to be addressed in the article.775 However, 
though my research suggests that the inclusion of stability in the headline does not 
always ensure that the concept is the central focus of the article, its absence from the 
headline does indicate that the concept will not feature prominently enough to make 
771 Zhong Xuanli (23 April 2005). As pointed out in the previous chapter. "Zhong Xuanli" is a pen 
name for the CCP Propaganda Theory Bureau. 
m He Zhenhua (17 April 2005). He Zhenhua is also a pen name for a group of commentators. Indeed. 
the 17 April commentary was one of a series of four articles that were published between 17 April and 
23 April on different aspects of the building a socialist harmonious society concept. Moreover, the 
name is a homonym that literally means "how China can be revitalized". My gratitude to Professor 
Zheng for providing this information. 
773 Huanqiu Shibao Pinglunyuan (21 Apri1200S). 
774 Ouangming Ribao Pinglunyuan (27 April 2005). 
775 van Dijk (1985: 69). 
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intensive analysis worthwhile. Dfthe twenty-two articles that featured "stability" both 
as a keyword and in the headline, the first four results were the same as the first 
search while the fifth article on the list was a staff commentary, entitled "Promote the 
Healthy Stable Development of Sino-Japanese Relations as a Guiding Principle", that 
was published on 30 April 2005.776 This commentary had a relevancy rating of71 % 
and mentioned stability a total of 13 times. 
The final search to be conducted was to restrict the headline and keyword search to 
include only those editorials and commentaries published on the first page of the 
People's Daily. As acknowledged at earlier points in the thesis, though these articles 
were not necessarily more influential than those published on other pages of the 
newspaper, notwithstanding the difficulty in measuring such an effect, their placement 
on the first page did signify that they were more likely to represent the authority of the 
top leadership of the CCP. 777 Df the six articles to be returned in the search results for 
this time period, the first article, with a relevancy rating of 100%, was the 17 April 
commentary. The second result was also a commentary, entitled "Consciously Handle 
Matters in Accordance with the Law, Uphold a Stable Overall Situation", that was 
published on 22 April and only mentioned a total of eight times while the remaining 
four articles were short items that were related to Party announcements.778 
However, the selection of the 17 April commentary for intensive analysis was also 
based on the political significance of its publication. As noted above, a media 
blackout on the reporting of the protests had been in place since 6 April; however, the 
publication of this commentary constituted the first attempt by the CCP leadership to 
716 Benbao Pinglunyuan (30 April 2005). 
mWu(1994). 
718 Xinhua Pinghmyuan (22 April 2005). 
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bring to an end the "anti-Japan" demonstrations. As Shirk points out, "[a]fter three 
weeks of protests, the Communist Party finally sent a clear signal that it was time to 
stop ... when the People's Daily published a front-page official commentary 
that ... urged young people to "cherish social stability".,,779 Moreover, the significance 
of the commentary was also reflected in the fact that it was posted on a number of 
forums and bulletin boards as well as the websites of local governments.780 Indeed, a 
simple and, by no means "scientific" search for this article-putting the title of the 
article in quotation marks-on the localised Google search engine in China 
(www.google.cn) brought up a total of 7,080 hits while the same search on the Baidu 
search engine (www.baidu.cn) produced a total of 8,920 hits. By comparison, a 
similar search for the 23 April commentary by Zhong Xuanli yielded only 47 results 
on Google and 748 results on Baidu while the 29 April commentary scored 252 hits 
on Google and 37 hits on Baidu.781 
A further consideration influencing the selection of the 17 April commentary was that 
it elaborated the relationship between building a socialist harmonious society and 
stability. As such, it was also hoped that analysing this article would provide insights 
into how stability was being conceptualised in relation to the latest ideological 
programme being promulgated by the CCP leadership. That said, the arguments being 
179 Shirk (2007: 143). . 
710 Checking the popular Sino-Japanese board in the "Strong Country Forum" (qiangguo IUn/an) during 
this period (http://bbs.people.com.cnlboardList.do?action=postList&boardld=13), which Liu contends 
"bas become one of the most dramatic and controversial virtual political forums in China", the 17 April 
commentary was posted in full, with the title of the post highlighted in red. Even allowing for the fact 
that the forum is run by the People's Daily group and, according to Brady, has "at least six online 
censors and a manager to monitor, censor and guide discussions online", the 17 April commentary 
drew a high number of responses, with an even spread between those who expressed agreement with 
the need for stability and those who rejected such an argument. See Liu (2006: 145), Brady (2006: 68). 
711 An additional search on the articles concerned with stability that were published on 14 and 15 April 
showed that the former article produced a total of 330 hits on Google and 29 hits on Baidu while the 
latter article produced 11,600 results on Google but only 9 results on Baidu. However the 11 600 
results from Google is somewhat misleading. as only 57 items are listed in total. ' , 
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put forward in other prominent editorials and commentaries published during the 
selected time period are also interrogated in the "co-textual analysis" section of this 
chapter. 
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17 April Commentary: Textual Analysis782 
"From Building a Harmonious Society See Stability" 
As explained in chapter two, it is important to begin a textual analysis with the 
headline, as it indicates the most important topic of the article. In the case of the 17 
April commentary, the headline immediately established a relationship of equivalence 
between the concepts of "building a harmonious society" and "stability". Moreover, 
this relationship differed from those established in the headlines of the articles 
analysed in the previous chapters, in that the concept of "building a harmonious 
society" replaced that of the "overall situation". 783 Although both tenns implicated the 
effects of protesting upon China, the "overall situation" did so more by emphasising 
the threat to China's present whereas "building a harmonious society" projected it 
onto the nation's future. Furthermore, the teleological appeal of the latter term may 
have been intended to generate greater consensus over the need to stop protesting, in 
that it shifted the readers' focus away from the comparative question of whether the 
protests actually threatened the "overall situation" onto the speculative one 
concerning China's future development and, in so doing, worked to minimise the 
current grievances by placing them in a wider context. 784 In addition, the use of the 
shortened "harmonious society" over the official formulation of "socialist harmonious 
society", although not necessarily an intentional rhetorical move, reduced the political 
content of the headline by pairing the more neutral concepts of harmony and stability. 
712 As pointed out in the previous chapters, the intention has not been to necessarily produce the most 
fluent English translation but rather one that closely conveys the meaning and structure of the Chinese 
original. 
713 The exception to this is, of course, the 4 JWle 1990 editorial. However, its headline "stability 
~ a i l s s over everything", did not construct a relationship of equivalence with s t a b i l i ~ . .
Ofcourse. the use of the "overall situation" in the previous headlines also attempted to achieve a 
.imilar rhetorical effect. 
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In its function as an "advance organiser", the headline indicated that the 
macrostructure (content) of the 17 April commentary would be concerned with 
elaborating the relationship between building a (socialist) harmonious society and 
stability. Moreover, despite the fact that the publication of the commentary 
constituted the first move on the part ofthe government to bring the "anti-Japan" 
demonstrations to an end, the commentary did not acknowledge, either directly or by 
clear implicature, the "anti-Japan" demonstrations nor did it address the subject of 
Sino-Japanese relations. Rather, it was the commentary's concern with stability, 
which could also be read as "instability", as well as the timing of its publication and 
the prominence accorded to it on the front page of the People's Daily, which indicated 
that it had been published in response to the ongoing protests. And while this lack of 
overt reference to the demonstrations can be partly explained by the fact that the 
government-imposed news blackout on the reporting of the protests still remained in 
place, for Shirk, it also reflected the government's "soft touch" in dealing with these 
protests.785 Indeed, though this approach stood in contradistinction to those employed 
in response to the early protests in 1989 as well as the Falun Gong demonstrations in 
1999, it was similar to that used during the 1985 "anti-Japan" demonstrations. 
As for the superstructure (construction) of the 17 April commentary, the first 
paragraph began by setting out the concept of the socialist harmonious society in 
greater detail before the second paragraph emphasised the importance of stability in 
building such a society. The historical importance of stability in relation to the 
achievements of the reform and opening up period was recounted in the third 
paragraph while the fourth paragraph suggested that China was now entering a period 
115 Shirk draws parallels with the government's handling of the "anti-Japan" demonstrations held in 
September 1985. See Shirk (2007: 161). 
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in which such achievements would be challenged. In the fifth paragraph, law and 
order were proposed as the solutions needed to overcome such challenges and realise 
social harmony while the final paragraph focused on the role to be played by Chinese 
citizens in contributing to this goal. 
(l)The Party Central Committee proposed b u i l d i n ~ ~ a socialist harmonious society and 
it enjoys the support of the Party and the people. '2)In February of this year, Comrade 
Hu Jintao delivered an important speech on the major significance of building a 
soCialist harmonious society that systematically and comprehensively elaborated its 
basic features and important principles as well as the primary tasks needed to be 
done. (3) If we want to build a socialist harmonious society, it should be a society 
featuring democracy and the rule of law, fairness and justice, Sincerity and 
trustworthiness, amity and vitality, stability and orderliness, and harmony between 
mankind and nature. (4)Comprehensively and accurately understanding the 
fundamental characteristics and important principles of a harmonious society, an 
important point then is having a full understanding of the important significance of 
maintaining stability and order and safeguarding social stability. (5) In practice, 
people realise more and more deeply that to build a harmonious society, you must 
safeguard social stability. 
The first paragraph introduced the concept of building a socialist hannonious society 
by employing the familiar People's Daily rhetorical device of claiming broad support 
for a Party slogan while, at the same time, directing the reader to support it. 
Indeed, at this time, building a socialist hannonious society constituted a new 
ideological innovation and, as such, the rhetorical device, as well as the commentary 
in general, could be understood as part of a broader campaign by the CCP to 
popularise the concept. Although the origin of this concept could be traced back to the 
work report delivered by Jiang Zemin at the 16th Party Congress in 2002 which, in 
calling for the development of a ''well-off society in an all-round way" (qianmian 
jianshe xiaokang shehui), set the realisation of a "more hannonious society" as one of 
its major goals, it emerged in its present form at the Fourth Plenum of the 16th Party 
Central Committee in September 2004 when the resolution on ''Decisions of the CCP 
Central Committee on Enhancing the Party's Ability To Govern", listed building a 
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socialist harmonious society as one of the main tasks to be undertaken in 
strengthening the Party's governing capacity.786 However, according to Po, it was 
only after a speech by Hu Jintao in February when opening a "special-topic" seminar 
on building a socialist harmonious society for "provincial and ministerial principal 
leading cadres", referenced in the second sentence, that the concept "began to gain 
tum ,,787 momen . 
In setting the teleological goal of building a socialist harmonious society, General 
Secretary Hu stated in this February speech that ''to realize social harmony and build a 
happy society has always been a social ideal which mankind has assiduously sought 
and is also a social ideal which Marxist political parties, including the CCP, have 
made unremitting efforts to seek.,,788 However, though social harmony has always 
been the (very) long-term objective of Marxist political parties, it had previously been 
conceptualised in terms of being achieved through communism rather than as an end 
in itself. Indeed, Miller makes the point that, under Mao, it was not "social harmony" 
that was pursued but rather, "class struggle" that was waged in order to "continue the 
revolution under the proletarian dictatorship".789 Miller also notes that, despite its 
rejection of "class struggle" in favour of reform and opening up, "at no point in the 
Deng era did authoritative Party statements endorse a "harmonious society" as the 
716 "A Basic Task of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics-Penetratingly Understanding 
the Momentous Significance of Building a Socialist Harmonious Society" (1 March 2005). 
717 Po (2006: 24). 
711 "Hu Jintao Emphasizes the Necessity ofOaining a Thorough Understanding of the Oreat 
Importance of Building a Socialist Harmonious Society and Earnestly Doing a Oood Job in Vigorously 
Promoting Social Harmony and Unity, at the Opening Session of a Seminar for Provincial and 
Ministerial Principal Leading Cadres on the Special Topic of Increasing the Ability to Build a Socialist 
Harmonious Society; Wen Jiabao, Wu Guanzheng and Li Changchun Attend and Zeng Qinghong 
Presides over the Opening Session" (19 February 2005). ' 
719 Miller (2007: 5-6). 
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overarching goal of the Party.,,790 Rather the goal of realising social harmony 
appeared to be one that, on a rhetorical level at least, drew more on the Confucian 
concept of harmony (datong).791 That said, Miller makes the point that, "apart from 
the shared overarching goal, there seems little in common between the values and 
concepts of traditional Confucianism and those of "socialist harmonious society.,,792 
While this is correct in a literal sense, in that building a socialist harmonious society 
. does not give any space over to the practicing of traditional rituals such as filial piety, 
the formulation of this new concept did appear to "recontextualise" elements of 
Confucian thought.793 Indeed, Lam states that, "[a]ccording to party insiders, the new-
found stress on harmony has grown out of a "neo-Confucianist" strain of thinking 
within the Hu-Wen leadership.,,794 Moreover, the promulgation of building a socialist 
harmonious society was striking for the fact that the values and concepts that were put 
forward in the third sentence did not appear to have much in common with those of a 
communist society either. Indeed, for Holbig, these values and concepts, such as 
democracy, rule of law and justice, go "far beyond the ''paternalist'' mode of 
legitimation in many former Soviet-type societies ... [and] approach more "liberal" 
governance styles in modem industrial societies.,,79S Consequently, the introduction of 
790 Miller (2007: 6). Indeed, Barme points out that, "[r]ather than ushering in a socialist ideal in some 
distant future, Deng's formula aimed at creating a wealthy and strong nation-a long cherished hope 
dating from the 19th century-in the here and now." See Sarme (21 November 2006). 
791 According to Chen, this concept has long been "one of the core aspirations of Chinese politics." 
Banne also notes that, in traditional thought, "xiaokang was an imagined preliminary to the great 
harmony." See Chen (2006: 154), Barme (21 November 2006). 
792 Miller (2007: 8). 
793 For instance, Cabestan notes that the concepts of fairness (gongping) and justice (zhengy,), both 
listed in the third sentence, were ''two notions that very much existed in imperial China." Consequently, 
their reappearance under the banner of building a socialist harmonious society is consistent with 
Wodak's concept ofrecontextualisation, which holds that "[a]rguments, topics, narratives, events, 
appraisals, topoi, etc. change when transmitted from generation to generation, from one genre to 
another, from one public space to a different sphere and so on." See Cabestan (2005: 48), Wodak (2006: 
132). 
794 Lam (2004: 14 October 2004). 
'" Holbig (2.006: 28). However, M i ~ l e r r d i s p ~ t e s s such an interpretation, albeit indirectly, by comparing 
the changes 1D the CCP to those which were lDtroduced during Khrushchev's leadership of the CPSU. 
See Miller (2007) 
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building a socialist harmonious society could be understood as significant on account 
of the fact that it represented a further attempt by the CCP to make the transition from 
a "revolutionary" party (gemingdang) to that of a "ruling" party (zhizhengdang). 
While the first three sentences of the paragraph introduced the concept of building a 
socialist harmonious society, the fourth sentence built on its relationship with stability 
that was initially established in the commentary's headline. Employing the topos of 
stability, this sentence proposed that the aspirational goal of building a socialist 
harmonious society was conditional on the maintenance of stability, with the implied 
conclusion that instability would prevent its realisation. Moreover, the implicature of 
this topos, as a "context-dependent linguistic realization", was that the "anti-Japan" 
protests could cause such instability. The persuasiveness of this conditional 
proposition was also heightened by the use of epistemic modality. Indeed, though this 
modality was commonly employed in the commentaries and editorials of the People's 
Daily, it carried greater weight in the 17 April commentary on account of the fact that 
the concept of building a socialist harmonious society had not yet been widely 
disseminated and so placed the commentary in a position of authority both to educate 
and instruct the reader to accept its claims. The truthfulness of the link between 
building a socialist harmonious society and stability was re-emphasised in the fifth 
sentence through the claim that it had been "realized" by ''people''. Indeed, the 
references to ''understanding'' and "practice" in the final two sentences worked to 
support this claim, as well as negate possible criticisms, by suggesting that such 
truthfulness could only be reached through knowledge and experience of building a 
socialist harmonious society. The first paragraph ended with the frequently employed 
266 
use of the deontic modal verb "must" to implicitly obligate people to "safeguard" 
stability. 
(l)Stability is the prerequisite andfoundation of harmony. (2) To push towards the 
construction of a harmonious society, we must maintain social peace, stability, and 
order. (3) Without stability, we cannot even begin to discuss the building of a socialist 
harmonious society. (4)Only ifwe have stability are we then able to develop the 
economy and achieve social harmony. (5) Building a harmonious society needs work 
and maintaining stability and order and safeguarding social stability are the most 
important tasks. 
The short second paragraph continued the theme of the first paragraph by further 
emphasising the importance of the relationship between building a socialist 
harmonious society and stability. Indeed, the opening sentence was a declarative 
statement that extended the conditional proposition put forward at the end of the first 
paragraph by presenting stability as the necessary condition of building a socialist 
harmonious society. In this, the commentary employed the same rhetorical 
fonnulation that had been used in the articles from the previous chapters, except that, 
where those articles justified the maintenance of stability solely in terms of reform 
and development, the 17 April commentary appealed to the new ideological 
construction of a harmonious society. Despite this, the rhetorical formulation was 
consistent in its presentation of stability in a nominalised form that allowed for its 
definition to remain vague. 
This nominalised form of stability also allowed for the second paragraph to 
discursively construct the concept's positive value. Consequently, the middle three 
sentences in the paragraph, while making further use of the topos of stability in a 
conditional proposition structure, presented the relationship between stability and 
building a socialist harmonious society in terms of progressive movement from one 
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stage to another. In the second sentence, this was achieved through the use of the verb 
"push towards" (mJ£). The use of the metaphor "discuss" ( ~ ~ ) ) in the third sentence 
had the effect of suggesting that stability constituted the pre-existing condition for 
such action to take place. The fourth sentence then used the verbs "develop" (1itJi) 
and "achieve" ( J ~ ¥ U ) ) in extending the conditional relationship between stability and 
building a socialist harmonious society to include the economy and, in so doing, 
suggested a linear progression from stability to economic development and onto a 
socialist harmonious society. The final sentence book-ended the second paragraph 
with a further declarative statement that iterated its central theme. 
(1) Maintaining social stability is the overall situation; this is an extremely important 
experience of our country's modernization and development. (2) In the past twenty 
years of reform and opening up, our country's economy has consistently maintained 
rapid and healthy development, our comprehensive national power has notably 
strengthened, people's lives have gradually improved, enterprises are thriving and 
full of vitality, and our international prestige is continuously rising. (3)This is all 
closely related to the situation of our maintaining unity and stability. (4) We should 
truly cherish this hard-earned, very good situation. (5)Comrade Deng Xiaoping once 
pointed out: "the problem that China has is that the need for stability prevails over 
everything. In an environment without stability, nothing can be accomplished, and 
even the results which have been achieved can be lost. ,, (6)This has not only beenfully 
demonstrated by the putting into practice of reform and opening up and 
modernization construction, but is also the shared conclusion that has been reached 
by the cadres and the masses from experience and training; it is the common 
aspiration of the people. 
Having rhetorically established the importance of stability in relation to the building 
of a socialist harmonious society, the third paragraph moved on to justify its 
importance by highlighting the achievements of the reform and opening up period. In 
effect, the commentary was using these achievements to legitimate its claim of 
maintaining stability. Consequently, the selectively chosen achievements, which 
further developed the impression of progress that had been a discursive feature of the 
second paragraph with terms such as "continuously rising", "gradually improving" 
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and "notably strengthened", were solely attributed to the condition of stability. The 
connection between stability and reform and opening up was put forward in the first 
sentence and then iterated in the third and sixth sentences. Moreover, each of these 
sentences employed the same rhetorical strategy of appealing to objective 
circumstances while offering a subjective interpretation. In the first sentence, this was 
achieved with the claim that the link between stability and the "overall situation" was 
based on the "experience" of the reform and opening up period. According to van 
Leeuwen and Wodak's typology of legitimation strategies detailed in chapter two, this 
claim constituted a form of instrumental rationalisation, in that the "means" of 
maintaining stability were justified by the "results" of the reform and opening up 
period, as expressed through the "moralized activity" of "experience".796 In contrast, 
the third sentence followed earlier instances in the text by using the epistemic modal 
verb "is" to suggest the truthfulness of its claims. In terms of legitimation strategies, 
this type of modality relied on the authority of the commentary as well as that of the 
People's Daily to persuade the reader of the link between stability and reform and 
opening up. The final sentence of the paragraph, in restating this link once more, 
combined the legitimation strategies employed in the first and third sentence by 
invoking the authority of "cadres" and ''the masses" to endorse its appeal to the 
"moralized activity" of "practice". Indeed, the use of terms, such as "demonstrated", 
"practice", "reached", "experience" and "training", all worked to discursively 
emphasise the domain of empirical observation while, at the same time, obscuring the 
political act of interpreting these observations. Moreover, the use of these terms also 
appeared to index the slogan "practice is the sole criterion of truth" (shijian shi 
796 van Leeuwen a n ~ ~ ~ o d a k k define " m o ~ l i z e d d a c ~ v i t i e s " " as those which are "represented by means of 
abstraet terms that dtstll from them a qualtty that triggers reference to positive or negative values to 
'moral concepts'." In the case of "experience", it linked into a discourse of moral values that p r e ~ t e d d
the economic reform programme only in positive terms. See van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999: lOS). 
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jianyan zhenli de weiyi biaozhun) that is most closely associated with Deng Xiaoping 
and had been one of key principles in guiding the economic refonn programme.797 
The authority of Deng was also explicitly invoked in the fifth sentence with a direct 
quotation that served to reinforce the importance of maintaining stability. Although 
the first part of this quotation had been employed, either directly or indirectly, in each 
of the articles analysed in the previous chapters, the 17 April commentary was alone 
in including the second part of this quotation. The significance of this inclusion was 
that, in contrast to the paragraph's emphasis on the positive value of stability, it 
sought to legitimate stability by appealing to the negative consequences of instability. 
Furthermore, this rhetorical move had the effect of opening up the space for the final 
sentence of the paragraph to reassert the positive value of stability and, in so doing, 
build consensus around the proposition that only a Party-led future reality could 
maintain stability. 
(1)Safeguarding social stability is a necessary requirementfor building a socialist 
harmonious society. (2) Presently, our international and domestic environment is very 
complicated, as we face great opportunities and encounter serious challenges. (3) By 
uniting as one to maintain stability, only then do we have the c a ~ a c i t y y to seize 
opportunities, overcome difficulties and respond to challenges. 4)Our country's 
modernization construction correctly lies in a period of important strategic 
opportunity; by ensuring stability, we have the ability to seize and use well this &eriod 
of strategic opportunity to realise economic development and social harmony. ) By 
ensuring stability, we have the ability to resolve contradictions and to better balance 
morale, unify all the forces which are capable of being unified and mobilize all 
positive elements. (6) By ensuring stability, we have the ability to properly solve the 
various kinds of problems we face and produce a good internal and external 
environmentfor the development of the economy and society. (7)Facing the overall 
situation of modernization and development, we must cherish and safeguard social 
stability like we cherish our own eyes. 
791 Scboenhals (1991). 
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This empl)asis on a Party-led future reality at the end of the third paragraph served as 
the pretext for the reintroduction of the building a socialist harmonious society 
concept at the start of the fourth paragraph. Moreover, the restatement of the link 
between this concept and stability signified that the focus of the commentary would 
nOW shift away from legitimating stability in terms of the past experience of reform 
and opening up and onto the future challenge of building a socialist harmonious 
society. In this, the commentary employed the rhetorical strategy of appealing to 
future effects in order to justify the present situation. Indeed, the slogan of building a 
socialist harmonious society, though rhetorically oriented towards the teleological 
goal of social harmony, can also be understood as an acknowledgement by the CCP 
that China did not currently have social harmony, nor was it likely to, until it had 
reached an as-yet undefined level of development at a non-specified point in the 
future. Indeed, for Holbig, the Party's new concept was "a strategic attempt of the 
new leadership to rationally resolve the root causes of growing social contradictions 
which are increasingly perceived as a risk to social stability and to the political 
legitimacy ofCCP rule.,,798 Such "contradictions" included the widening income gap 
between the rich and poor as well as the rural and urban areas, unemployment, 
environmental concerns, such as pollution and over-use of natural resources, 
corruption and land requisition.799 However, though the goal of building a socialist 
bannonious society constituted an acknowledgement of these problems, it did not link 
them to the Party's leadership of the country but rather presented such problems as 
structural changes that were due to the current stage of the country's "modernisation 
construction". Indeed, by placing these problems within the context of building a 
socialist harmonious society, the Party was attempting to strengthen its leadership 
191 Holbig (2006: 28). 
199 Po (2006: 24). 
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authority by positioning itself as the "expert" that both understood these problems and 
understood how best to solve them. In terms of stability, this rhetorical move worked 
to strengthen the Party's claim that it was the necessary condition upon which 
building a socialist harmonious society was dependent. 
This link between stability and building a socialist harmonious society was then 
emphasised in the fourth paragraph through a series of conditional propositions. 
Moreover, this paragraph, in keeping with the government's policy of "positive 
propaganda" (zhengmian xuanchuan), 800 worked to enhance the legitimating effect of 
stability by emphasising its positive value. In this, the condition of stability was 
presented in terms of "resolving contradictions", "solving problems", "seizing 
opportunities", "overcoming difficulties" and "responding to challenges". However, 
in the same way that use of the terms such as "difficulties", "challenges" and 
"opportunities" in relation to the building of a socialist harmonious society constituted 
an acknowledgement of the problems that were present in Chinese society, so it was 
that this emphasis on the positive value of stability also suggested, albeit by 
implication, the negative consequence of not having stability and, in so doing, worked 
to further strengthen the argument in favour of stability and the continued rule of the 
CCP. 
The fourth paragraph, in focusing on the importance of stability in building a socialist 
bannonious society, appeared to be concerned with the future direction of Chinese 
society. However, its central theme could also be understood as addressing, albeit 
through implicature, the issue of the "anti-Japan" demonstrations. Indeed, the 
100 Brady (2002: 569). 
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reference in the second sentence to the "presently" "complicated" "international and 
domestic environment" seemed to be an indirect reference to these protests. 
Consequently, in relation to the demonstrations, the use of stability in the fourth 
paragraph seemed to suggest that the protests were causing instability, with the 
implication that, if continued, they could impact upon the country's development. 
Moreover, by appealing to the possible impact of the protests, the paragraph worked 
to set the grievances of the protestors within the larger context of development and, in 
so doing, minimise these grievances while, at the same time, attempting to assert the 
leadership of the CCP in dealing with the issue of Japan. 
(l) In safeguarding social stability and realising social harmony, an important issue is 
handling the problems that we face in accordance with law and order. (2) Ruling the 
country in accordance with the law is a statement that everyone supports. (3)This then 
means that we must perfect the socialist legal system with the important intention of 
folly developing the rule of law by promoting, realising and guaranteeing all-round 
social harmony. (4) Social development is always likely to face contradictions and 
problems but also always advances through the continuous solving of these 
contradictions and problems. (5) In today's very unstable world, we are likely to have 
all types offriction and problems; domestic reform and d e v e l o ~ m e n t t is not likely to be 
plain sailing, and we are sure to have all kinds of difficulties. 6) In resolving these 
contradictions and problems, we can only be calm and rational and proceed 
according to law and order. 
Having elaborated why stability needed to be maintained in the fourth paragraph, the 
fifth paragraph moved on to explain how it could -be maintained. In this, the 
commentary proposed that China should be ruled "in accordance with the law" (yifa 
zhiguo). According to Zheng, this concept, which can also be referred to by the tenn 
"rule by law",801 holds that "a country ... [is] governed not by leaders' personal 
101 There is some disagreement over whether the phrase "ruling the country in accordance with the law" 
( i « ~ j f t C i i l ) ) should be translated as ''rule by law" or ''rule oflaw". Whereas Zheng and Cabestan 
a m o n g ~ t t o ~ e r s . . both opt for the fon.ner t r a n s l ~ t i o n , , Peerenboom contends that the wording ofth; 
phrase Imphes that the government IS constramed by the law and, as a result, is "more conducive to 
nile of law." However. I have chosen to use the former translation on the grounds that the alternative 
pbrase ''jazhi'' ( ~ f f l ) ) is more commonly interpreted as ''rule of law". Indeed, it is this term which is 
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authority, but by institutional authority."g02 In effect, the "rule by law" concept 
connotes an instrumentalist view of the law, in which the state uses the law as an 
"instrument" with which to exercise its authority.803 Moreover, it can be distinguished 
from the concept of the "rule of law" on the grounds that, in a system governed by the 
"rule by law", the authority of the state is not necessarily bound by the constraints of 
the law. Consequently, though the "rule by law" system is perceived to be an advance 
on that of "rule by men" (renzhi) and, indeed, since 1979, China has increasingly 
moved towards this system of governance,804 its promotion in relation to the building 
of a socialist harmonious society did not signify that the CCP was intending to reduce 
its authority but more that it was attempting to regularise it. Indeed, for Cabestan, the 
Party's promotion of the "rule by law" concept is "aimed both at enhancing the 
regime's political legitimacy and at stabilizing society and relations between state and 
society by opening new avenues for the presumably more reliable settlement of 
disputes."sos Consequently, where the building a socialist harmonious society concept 
acknowledged the social problems that had resulted from the programme of refonn 
and opening up, albeit in the guise of promulgating the aspirational goal of a 
bannonious future, and where the concept of stability was put forward as the sole 
condition needed to overcome these problems, albeit through using the implicit threat 
of instability, the concept of "rule by law" was being proposed as the means by which 
used in both the first paragraph and the third sentence of this paragraph in relation to the building of a 
socialist harmonious society. See Zheng (2000), Cabestan (2005), Peerenboom (2002: 64-65). 
102 Zheng (2000: 142). 
103 Peerenboom (2002: 8). 
104 During the period under the leadership of Mao, China was generally classified as a ''rule by men" 
system. Since then, the legal system has been increasingly developed, particularly following China's 
entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO). As to whether it should be classified as "rule by law" 
or "rule oflaw" system, the majority of academic literature on this subject tends towards classifying 
China's system as ''rule by law". An additional point in relation to the reappearance (and 
recontextualisation) of Confucian ideals has been the recent introduction of ''rule by virtue" (dezhi). 
According to Zheng and Lai. this concept holds that "a ruler has to be educated in Confucian virtues 
before he can be a legitimate ruler of the country and people" and is intended to complement the goal 
of the ''rule oflaw". See Zbeng (2000: 141-144), Cabestan (2005: 44), Peerenboom (2002: 237), 
Zbeng and Lai (16 March 2001). 
105 Cabestan (2005: 48). 
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these problems would be solved, thus ensuring stability and so enabling China to 
achieve its goal of social harmony. 
This emphasis on the "rule by law" concept was reflected in its usage throughout the 
fifth paragraph. Consequently, the first sentence stated that it was necessary to 
"handle" problems "in accordance with law and order" while the fourth sentence 
claimed that development could only move forward by "continuously" solving such 
"contradictions" and "problems". The fifth sentence iterated the proposition that 
economic development produced social problems before the final sentence 
emphasised the role of law and order in "resolving" these problems. 
However, though the discussion of "rule by law" in the fifth paragraph appeared to 
refer to ihe wider issue of social grievances, it could also be understood as referring to 
the "anti-Japan" protests. This was because these protests had not been legal, in that. 
though they may have received unofficial encouragement, they had not, at least in the 
major urban areas, gained the necessary official permits to allow the staging of 
. 
demonstrations. Consequently, by making this implicature, the 17 April commentary 
provided a further indication that its publication was intended to bring an end to the 
"anti-Japan" protests before the demonstrations that had been planned for 1 May and 
4 May anniversaries could take place. Moreover, the emphasis on legality suggested 
that those taking part in future demonstrations, unlike those up to this point, may be 
subject to legal prosecution.806 
(1) Harmony and stability is in accordance with the fundamental interests of the nation 
and the people; to promote harmony and safeguard stability is every citizen's 
106 AI. it turned out, arrests were later made in relation to the demonstration that took place in Shanghai. 
On 26 April, sixteen "youths" were "fonnally arrested" while a further twenty people were 
'"tempOrarily jailed". See Cody (26 April 2005). 
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responsibility. (2) We all hope to live in a harmonious and stable society; we all hope 
the nation becomes rich and powerful as quickly as possible and that people become 
well-off. (3) We all hope to smoothly realise the grand goals of modernization and 
development. (4) So, everyone should do their duty to the utmost for harmony and 
stability and exert themselves to that end. (5) So long as we are all united, with 
everyone cooperating and acting in concert with each other and have unity and 
stability, then there are no problems that we cannot overcome. (6) We believe that an 
even richer, more powerful, more democratic and more civilized China will inevitably 
stand towering like a giant in the forest of the world's nations. 
The final paragraph of the 17 April commentary filled out the concept of building a 
socialist harmonious society by enlisting the participation of the Chinese people in 
achieving this goal. Consequently, the opening sentence of the paragraph stated that 
the safeguarding of stability and the promotion of harmony were the "responsibility" 
of "citizens". Rhetorically, this relationship was achieved by the linking of the two 
declarative statements, which, for Fairclough, has the effect of constructing a "non-
dialogical divide between those who are making all the assertions and those they are 
addressed at. ,,807 In this sentence, the commentary appeared to be telling the reader 
that the building of a socialist harmonious society involved a reconfiguration of the 
state-society relationship, with the Party-state allowing Chinese people a greater 
degree of personal freedom while, at the same time, reducing its responsibility for 
their welfare. In this, the use of the term "citizen" (gongmin) as opposed to the more 
frequently used alternatives such as ''the people" (renmin) or "the masses" (qunzhong), 
seemed significant on account of the fact that it presented the Chinese people as 
baving a set of, albeit unspecified, inalienable rights as well as being "stakeholders" 
in the building of the harmonious society.808 Indeed, the use of this term seemed 
intended to promote loyalty to nation, in that it connoted the obligation of the 
individual to ensure the welfare of the collective. That said, the introduction of the 
107 Fairclough (2001: 260). 
l1li However. Holbig contends that the use oftenn "citizen" was not intended to refer "to the whole 
populace but only to the educated and aftluent urban elites which. in fact, appear as the main 
protagonists in the vision of a "harmonious society". See Holbig (2006: 29). 
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new concept was not intended to limit the government's control over society but 
rather to strengthen its governing capacity. Indeed, it was first presented in a 
resolution on "Decisions of the CCP Central Committee on Enhancing the Party's 
Ability to Govern" at the end of the Fourth Plenum of the 16th Party Central 
Committee. Moreover, in his February speech on the concept, Hu Jintao stated that 
building a socialist harmonious society was "essential for consolidating the party's 
social foundation to govern and achieve the party's historical governing mission. ,,809 
This intention to strengthen the government's governing capacity by granting citizens 
greater responsibility for their own and, by extension, the country's material 
development appeared to draw on modes of governance associated with Confucian 
thought. Indeed, as Chen points out, "[t]he Confucian idea of social harmony places a 
duty upon the individual to organize the different elements of society into the greatest 
possible end product.,,810 Moreover, Zheng makes the point that, "[e]ven though 
Confucius put much emphasis on the role of rites in governance, his emphasis was on 
individual virtue and public morality.,,811 However, this emphasis historically 
produced authoritarian systems based on hierarchy rather than democratic systems 
based on equality. Even allowing for the recontextualisation of traditional Confucian 
ideals in China's modem political system, it seemed that the promulgation of the 
building a socialist harmonious society concept opened up the space in which 
"citizens" could playa more active role in society with the intention of maintaining 
stability and, in so doing, strengthen the rule of the CCP. 
109 Cited in Holbig (2006: 27). 
110 Chen (2006: 164). 
In Zbeng (2000: ISS). 
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This link between the individual and the maintenance of stability and harmony was 
emphasised throughout the remainder of the fifth paragraph. Indeed, in contrast to the 
first sentence, the second, third and fourth sentences provided an example of more 
explicit argumentation, in that the use of the logical connective "so" in the fourth 
sentence indicated that people doing their "duty to the utmost" was necessary in order 
to realise the aspirational national goals of harmony, stability and economic 
development. This point was reinforced through the appeal to unity and stability in 
order to overcome problems, which, as in the previous paragraphs, also conveyed the 
implication of not having these conditions before the final sentence attempted to 
generate consensus for the Party's plan by inviting the reader to "believe" in a future 
vision of China that contained properties which were implicitly linked to the building 
of a socialist harmonious society. 
However, as with the earlier paragraphs, the focus on China's future in this paragraph 
could be understood as a means by which to indirectly address the issue of the "anti-
Japan" demonstrations. Indeed, as Dunmire points out, "cueing the public's view of 
the future is a particularly powerful means of influencing contemporary behavior.,,812 
Consequently, this emphasis on China's future as well as the difficulties involved in 
achieving that future again served to minimise the current grievances of the protestors 
by setting them within this larger context while the appeals to the notions of citizen 
responsibility and individual virtue attempted to persuade the protestors to bring the 
demonstrations to an end for the sake of the national good. 
112 Dunmire (2005: 483). 
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The use of "stability" in the 17 April commentary was similar to the articles analysed 
in previous chapters, in that it was discursively constructed as a positive value. 
Moreover, this construction of stability's positive value also opened up the space for 
the commentary to make the implicit suggestion that a lack of stability would lead to 
negative consequences. Consequently, the positive and negative use of stability was 
used to legitimate, albeit through implicature, the authority ~ f f the CCP. 
This positive value of stability was, once again, initially constructed through the 
headline, which linked the maintenance of stability to the new concept of building a 
socialist harmonious society. This rhetorical move immediately worked to present the 
condition of stability in terms of China' s national interest as well as its future 
development and, in so doing, shifted the focus of maintaining stability away from the 
preservation of the CCP's power and onto the future of the Chinese nation. Indeed, 
the link between maintaining stability and preserving the power of the CCP was never 
explicitly articulated throughout the commentary but rather was only implicated 
through the relationship between stability and the programme of building a socialist 
hannonious society.813 Moreover, in this relationship, stability was presented as the 
necessary condition upon which the building of a socialist harmonious society was 
dependent. Although the promulgation of this new concept did put forward a more 
comprehensive vision of China's future development than had been the case with the 
articles analysed in the previous chapters, which only specified the goal of making 
China "a richer and more powerful nation", substantively, the use of stability 
paralleled those in the earlier articles, in that the future development of China was 
.13 That said. the Party's authorship of this new programme was only mentioned in the opening 
sentence of the commentary. Moreover, given that "building a socialist harmonious society" sounded 
more Confucian than communist, the 17 April commentary, in contrast to the articles a ~ a l y s e d d in the 
previous chapters, was notable for its lack of explicit reference to the leadership of the CCP. 
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held to be contingent on maintaining stability. The argumentation schemes to support 
this central claim were also substantively similar to those employed in the earlier 
articles, with the successes of the reform and opening up period being attributed the 
condition of stability, the importance of the legal system being emphasised in the 
maintenance of stability and the responsibility of the people in the safeguarding of 
stability. 
The use of these argument schemes also opened up the space for the converse 
argument to be made through implication. In effect, the commentary argued that the 
failure of people to observe the law would lead to instability, which would, in turn, 
negatively affect the progress of modernisation construction and, in so doing, prevent 
the teleological goal of building a socialist harmonious society from being realised. 
Moreover, this argument scheme implicated the "anti-Japan" demonstrations. While 
not employing the tactic of explicitly labelling these demonstrations as responsible for 
"destroying" stability, as was the case with Falun Gong in the previous chapter, this 
use of implicature to suggest the demonstrations would cause instability marked the 
start of a campaign by the CCP leadership to bring them to an end in order to restore 
"stability" . 
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17 April Commentary: Co-textual Analysis 
This campaign was stepped up with the release of an announcement by the Ministry 
of Public Security (PSB) on 21 April that directly addressed the issue of the "anti-
Japan" demonstrations. This announcement, which was reported in the following 
day's edition ofthe People's Daily,814 continued the government's "softly-softly" 
approach by using the term "demonstration" (youxing shiwei) to describe the protests 
rather than more politically negative terms, such as "disturbance" (naoshi), which had 
been used to describe the demonstrations that took place at the end of 1986 and the 
start of 1987, or "turmoil" (dongluan), which had described the initial protests in 
1989.815 Moreover, the announcement did not blame ''the masses and students" for the 
"spontaneous" protests nor did it attribute them to "people with ulterior motives", as 
had been the case in 1989, but rather claimed that they had been caused by Japan's 
"erroneous attitudes on history ... as well as its incessant adoption of conduct which 
harms the Chinese people's sentiment". Indeed, the announcement voiced support for 
the demonstrations by stating that "[ w]e fully understand this type of passionate 
patriotism of the vast masses and students" as well as arguing that it was necessary for 
the "Japanese side to conscientiously address the Chinese peoples' concern and 
properly deal with the problem." 
In terms of bringing an end to the demonstrations, the Ministry of Public Security's 
announcement followed on from the 17 April commentary by emphasising the 
importance of the law. Indeed, in keeping with the rhetorical strategy of the 
commentary, the announcement used the future as a way of dealing with the present 
114 ''Gong'an bujiujinqi yixie difang fasheng sheRi youxing shiwei fabiao tanhua" (22 ApriI200S). 
115 Moreover, the description of the demonstrations as "involving Japan" (sheR,) rather than the 
conventional English description as "anti-Japan" (janR,) maintains the government's line that the 
demonstrations were not against Japan per se but rather were caused by Japan. 
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and, in so doing, avoided direct criticism of the previous actions of "the vast masses 
and students".816 Consequently, the announcement stated that all demonstrations must 
adhere to laws and regulations set out in "the People's Republic of China Law on 
Assembly, Procession and Demonstration" (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jihui 
Youxing Shiwei Fa);817 that permits must be obtained from the PSB; that the content 
of the demonstrations must be approved by the PSB; and that organisational material 
distributed via the Internet and mobile phones must be approved by the PSB. In effect, 
the announcement was stating that those who contravened PRe Law would be 
considered guilty of causing "illegal behaviour", with the implicit threat of arrest and 
possible imprisonment. The announcement also emphasised the theme of building a 
socialist harmonious society while asserting the leadership of the CCP and the 
government in "handling Sino-Japan relations". As for the use of stability, it was only 
mentioned briefly in relation to realising the goal of harmony and the need of citizens 
to protect the "hard-won stability and Wlity of the overall situation". 
The commentary that was published alongside the PSB announcement, entitled 
"Consciously Handle Matters in Accordance with the Law, Uphold a Stable Overall 
Situation", did feature stability more prominently; however, its usage was consistent 
with that of the 17 April commentary, in that the promotion of harmony was linked to 
the condition of maintaining stability.818 Moreover, the 22 April commentary iterated 
the justificatory claim that "China is currently in a crucial period in the 
comprehensive building of a well-off society and urgently requires a stable domestic 
.16 The exception to this was the accusation that "a very small number of people" who "seized the 
opportunity to engage in the smashing of public and private property and various illegal activities that 
disturbed the peace, and have damaged our country's image" . 
• 17 This Law was introduced on 31 October 1989 in response to the events earlier that year. See Wong 
(2006: 186). 
'1. Xinhua Pinglunyuan (22 April 2005). 
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situation and a good international environment." That said, the main focus of the 
commentary was, as with the announcement by the PSB, emphasising the importance 
of the law and persuading people to "express their feelings calmly, rationally and 
lawfully. " 
As the campaign to bring an end to the "anti-Japan" demonstrations continued, the 
link between economic development and stability was increasingly promoted in a 
number of articles. These articles expanded on the argument put forward in the 17 
April commentary that China's economic development was due to the condition of 
stability and, in so doing, made the implicature that the "anti-Japan" demonstrations, 
by causing instability, would adversely affect China's future development. As 
explained in chapter two, implicatures can be understood as "inferences based on 
general and particular political knowledge as well as on the context models".8J9 
Moreover, given the importance of the economic relationship between China and 
Japan, this implicature may have been suggesting that this would be caused by the 
negative impact of the demonstrations upon Sino-Japan relations.82o Consequently, a 
signed commentary entitled "Actively Produce Things in Favour of Social Stability" 
by Zhong Xuanli, which was published on 23 April, pointed out that China's "average 
GDP per capita had already broken through the 1000 USD mark"; "[t]he people's and 
the masses' material lives as well as their spiritual and cultural lives have received 
great improvement"; "China's reform and opening up and socialist modernization and 
development had attracted worldwide attention".821 The commentary then linked these 
successes to condition of stability when stating that "[i]fwe were to have a social 
119 van Dijk (2005: 65). 
GO During this period, there appeared to be many, at least those partiCipating in online forums that 
believed there had been a shift in the balance of the Sino-Japan economic trade relationship ~ d d that 
J ~ ~ was now more dependent on China than had been the case previously. See Liu (2006: 149-152). 
a Zhong Xuanli (23 April 2005). 
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environment without stability, without a favourable social order, we would not be able 
to have today's immense development and profound change." This link between the 
successes of reform and development and stability allowed the commentary to state 
that, with China entering "a period of emerging contradictions" in which it would face 
"all kinds of problems which are difficult to predict", it was necessary to "maintain a 
clear head, consider stability as China's highest interest and consolidate the stable and 
unified overall situation." In addition to positioning the resolution of such problems 
within the teleological goal of building a socialist harmonious society, the 23 April 
commentary also attempted to further justify this argument by presenting this 
relationship in terms of global consequences. Consequently, the commentary claimed 
that ''the world also needs China's stability ... China's development is inseparable 
from the world and the world's peace and development also needs China ... Protecting 
China's stability conforms to the force of world peace and the common desire of 
human progress." Indeed, this justification was also reproduced in other articles 
concerned with demonstrating the importance of the link between economic 
development and stability. A staff commentary that was published on 29 April, 
entitled "Keep in Mind Everything We Cannot Accomplish without Stability", stated 
that China's development was "inseparable from the world, and the world's prosperity 
needs China ... A stable, open and prosperous China is essential in protecting world 
peace and making an even greater contribution to advance common development.,,822 
Following the holding of a meeting between President Hu and Prime Minister 
Koizumi at the Asia-Africa Summit in Jakarta on 23 April, at which Hu put forward a 
"five-point proposal" (wudian zhuzhang) aimed at restoring Sino-Japanese relations, a 
G2 Benbao Pinglunyuan (29 April 2005). 
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number of articles were published emphasising the importance of these relations. 
Moreover, these articles did so by highlighting the economic aspect of the Sino-
Japanese relationship over that of history while, at the same time, using stability only 
in terms of maintaining this bilateral relationship. Consequently, an article published 
on 27 April, entitled "Treating Sino-Japanese Economic Cooperation Rationally", put 
forward a number of statistics to illustrate the growth of the trade relationship 
between China and Japan since normalisation in 1972 in order to demonstrate the 
importance of this relationship.823 According to the article, trade between the 
countries had grown 160-fold in the thirty-three years, with the total for 2004 reaching 
US$167.8 billion in 2004. Moreover, Japan had invested a total ofUS$66.6 billion in 
contracted value in China. In addition, the article stated that an economic boycott of 
Japanese goods would violate the terms of China's WTO membership, as they 
required it to "fulfill its foreign commitments, persist in opening to the outside world 
as it has always done, develop normal economic and trade relations with various 
countries, treat foreign commodities on the Chinese market in a manner of fairness 
and equality, and protect the legitimate rights and interests of foreign investors."s24 
The article also pointed out that, in light of the fact that China's dependence on 
foreign trade stood at 70 percent, not to mention a number of additional economic 
benefits, such as employment, tax revenue and foreign exports sales, an economic 
boycott of Japanese goods would actually end up negatively impacting China's 
economy. The need to restore Sino-Japanese relations was also stated in a 
commentary, entitled "Promote the Healthy Stable Development of Sino-Japanese 
Relations as a Guiding Principle", that was published on 30 ApriI200S.82s Although, 
this commentary emphasised the importance of economic relations between the two 
123 Gong Wen (27 Apri1200S). 
124 Ibid. 
125 Benbao Pinglunyuan (30 April 2005). 
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countries, it also made reference to Hu's "five-point proposal" in order to demonstrate 
the leadership of the CCP in taking a "tough line" with Japan. 
In addition to the propaganda campaign,826 the government undertook practical 
measures to bring the "anti-Japan" demonstrations to an end. On 19 April, the CCP 
propaganda department, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the Ministry of 
Education as well as some other government departments convened a meeting of 
some 3,500 senior officials at which the Foreign Minister argued that the continuation 
of the "anti-Japan" demonstrations would harm Sino-Japan relations and cause 
instability in China. Following on from this, a "speech tour" was launched in which 
former diplomats were sent to college and university campuses in a number of cities 
that witnessed demonstrations in an effort to explain to students the importance of 
maintaining friendly relations with Japan.827 Moreover, Shirk notes that security 
officials also visited these campuses in order to persuade students "to settle down".828 
In light of the pivotal role that the Internet played in the organisation of the "anti-
Japan" demonstrations, the government also sought to use this medium to bring the 
protests to an end. Consequently, according to Shirk, "[t]he authorities ... got the anti-
Japanese activists who operate under official protection to urge calm on their Web 
826 An exception to the generally positive tone of the propaganda campaign was the publication of a 
staff editorial in the Shanghai-based Liberation Daily (jiefang ribao) on 25 April entitled 
"Understanding the Essence, Investigating the Violation of Law". This editorial stated that there was a 
''prepOnderance of facts to prove that the recent illegal marches were not a patriotic movement, but 
rather amounted to illegal behaviour." Moreover, it also claimed that the demonstrations had not been 
"a spontaneous movement of the masses, but rather a backstage plot." Although Shirk describes this 
editorial as ''mysterious'', a reader's letter had been published in the same paper on 23 April claiming 
that the actions of the protestors were not patriotic as they had "smashed the larger backdrop of Sino-
Japanese friendship". Though the letter did not directly criticise the protestors of having "ulterior 
motives", the fact that it was published on the front page of the paper suggests that it may have been 
intended as a prelude to the criticisms being made in the later editorial. See Shirk (2007: 175), Li 
z.ongxin (23 April 2005). 
127 Yardley (22 April 2005). 
121 Shirk (2007: 175). 
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sites:,829 In addition, Liu notes that "[m]any Chinese websites, which contained 
protest-related information, were closed down by the Chinese authorities.,,83o Indeed, 
this was symbolised by the closing down of the well-known anti-Japanese website, 
www.japanpig.com. which had played a leading role in encouraging people to 
protest. 831 Other measures taken to restrict the online organisation of protests included 
increased censorship of internet chat rooms and the addition of the term 
"demonstration" (youxing) to the banned list of words on the most popular instant-
messaging software client, "QQ". 832 
The other communication technology that had played an important role in the 
organisation of the demonstrations was mobile phones, particularly text messaging, 
and this was also targeted by the government in its attempts to end the demonstrations. 
However, in contrast to the censorious approach that was employed in dealing with 
the Internet, the government used text messaging technology to individually warn 
citizens against taking part in demonstrations.833 Consequently, according to Zhao, in 
the run-up to the symbolic 4 May anniversary, mobile phone users received "a 
blizzard of text messages" which warned people against "spreading rumours, 
believing rumours, or joining illegal demonstrations". 834 Commenting on those sent to 
the nine million residents in Beijing, Barme notes that the mass text messages were 
issued by all the telecom operators "at the behest of the Public Security Bureau" while, 
129 Shirk (2007: 176). 
130 Liu (2006: 1 S3 note 2). 
131 Indeed, according to Brooke, on the weekend prior to 16 April, the website bad been encouraging 
demonstrations to take place in at least six cities. See Brooke (14 April200S). 
131 Liu (2006: 153 note 3). 
133 Approximately 350 m ~ l l ~ o n n people ~ e e said to own mobile phones in China, which equates to 
roughly 27% of the 1.3 bllhon populatton. Moreover, of these, a disproportionate number are owned by 
younger people and urban dwellers. See Yardley (25 April 2005). 
134 Zhao (200S: 141). 
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according to Dickie, the 30 million mobile phone subscribers in Jiangsu province 
were sent text messages on behalf of the "Office for Maintaining Stability".83s 
However, the government did not rely solely on the circulation of text messages to 
prevent the possibility of further protests taking place but also made use of a more 
traditional approach to such situations by deploying the security services. According 
to Zhao, "[p ]olice in major cities throughout China went on full alert to prevent a 
recurrence of demonstrations." Moreover, Banne notes that they were "reports of 
bus loads of police and soldiers being deployed to protect Japanese interests in the 
Chinese capital and other cities." With the anniversaries of Labour Day and Youth 
Day passing offwithout incident,836 these approaches appeared to be successful. 
Indeed, despite predictions that the "anti-Japan" demonstrations could presage a 
period of increased protest activity, there has, as yet, been nothing on this scale 
since.837 Moreover, despite the cancellation of a meeting arranged between China's 
vice-premier, Wu Vi, and Prime Minister Koizumi in May 2005, political relations 
between China and Japan appear to have improved significantly in the intervening 
period. Indeed, in September 2006, following his election to replace Iunichiro 
Koizumi, the then Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, chose China, as opposed to that of the 
United States, as the destination of his first foreign visit. Furthermore, in April 2007, 
Wen liabao gave the first address by a Chinese Premier to the Japanese parliament, 
135 Barme (16 May 2005), Dickie (29 April 2005). 
136 Wasserstrom reports that, on 4 May, ''there was a conspicuous police presence around Tiananrnen 
~ u a r e . " " See Wasserstrom (2005: 60). 
13 Wasserstrom noted at the time that ''the rest of2005 is filled with interesting-and potentially 
provocative-anniversary dates." Meanwhile, Shirk predicts that "[t]he 2005 protests were the first-
but certainly not the last-Chinese experiment with a new-style, technology-enabled collective action 
that mimicked the Ukraine's [sic] "Orange Revolution"". However, though a demonstration against the 
building of chemical plant in Xiamen in June 2007 was notable for its use of technology in organising 
collective action, it was more limited both in size and scope than those in 2005. As for Ukraine's 
"orange revolution", such a comparison places too much emphasis on the role of technology while 
ignoring the key role played by NOOs, particularly foreign ones, in organising opposition to the 
electoral result. See Wasserstrom (2005: 63), Shirk (2007: 142-143). 
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the Diet. And despite the surprise resignation of Abe in September 2007, his 
replacement, Yasuo Fukuda, recently went on record to state that Sino-Japanese 
relations were improving as if "spring had already arrived" before undertaking a 
diplomatically successful visit of China at the end of 2007.838 Moreover, alongside the 
wanning up of political relations, economic relations between China and Japan have 
continued to groW.839 Indeed, the trade between the countries reached the record level 
ofUS$207.36 billion in 2006 while the figures for the three quarters of 2007 showed 
a year-on-year growth of 14%. In addition, China has now become Japan's largest 
trading partner while Japan is China's second largest source of Foreign Direct 
Investment. 
838 Kato (4 January 2008). 
139 There are also, allegedly, plans being put in place for Hu Jintao to visit Japan in April 200S-the 
fint visit by a Chinese president since Jiang's largely unsuccessful trip ten years earlier. 
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Conclusion 
The CCP has increasingly relied on "patriotism" to legitimate its authority in the 
refonn and opening up period and particularly since the events of 1989. In this, the 
nationalistic goal of making China a "strong and powerful nation" and, more recently, 
"building a socialist harmonious society", is presented in terms of the Party's 
economic reform programme and this has the effect of fusing the concept of the state 
with that of the CCP. Moreover, in order to strengthen the appeal of these claims, the 
concept of patriotism makes use of China's relative weakness prior to the economic 
refonn programme and, in particular, during the so-called "century of humiliation". 
Whereas the "dream of a strong nation" is accompanied by a narrative of pride in 
China's future achievements, the "century of humiliation" has produced one of 
victimisation, at least in post-Mao period. In this, the main focus of this victimisation 
narrative is on the actions that were committed by the Japanese army during its 
occupation of China from 1931-1945. However, this has had the effect, particularly 
with the government's repeated use ofthis victimisation narrative in the post-
Tiananmen period, of arousing and legitimating present grievances towards Japan 
based on the past suffering of Chinese people and, in so doing, opening up the space, 
as well as providing the language, for people to participate on issues relating to Sino-
Japanese relations. Indeed, it seems that on this particular issue, the Chinese 
government is especially sensitive to the views of the public. 
It was in this context that the "anti-Japan" demonstrations took place. The immediate 
issues that provoked the demonstrations appeared to be Japan's bid for a Permanent 
seat on the UN Security Council, its approval of particular school history textbooks, 
as well as its indirect expression of support for Taiwan independence. However, 
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following the outbreak of demonstrations in a number of Chinese cities over a series 
of weekends in April, the government was presented with a dilemma over when to 
bring them to an end. The need to do so was borne out of the concern that, as with 
previous demonstrations that had been initially targeted against Japan, these protests 
could eventually be redirected against the leadership of the CCP. However, there was 
also concern, for which historical precedents also existed, that attempting to bring 
protests to an end too quickly would leave the government vulnerable to the charge of 
suppressing "patriotic actions". In contrast to the response when dealing with the 
1989 protests and with Falun Gong in 1999, the government adopted a "softly-softly" 
approach, which was initiated with the publication of the 17 April commentary. In 
this, demonstrators were being urged to once again end their actions on account of the 
need for "stability". In the particular instance of the 17 April commentary, the need 
for stability was explained, as with earlier articles, in tenus of economic development. 
Indeed, the programme of refonn and opening up was presented as being dependent 
upon the condition of stability. However, the 17 April commentary also introduced a 
new concept for which the condition of stability was necessary: building a socialist 
hannonious society. Although this concept did not fundamentally change the way in 
which stability was used, it did prescribe, at the rhetoricallevel at least, a Confucian-
inspired vision of China's future and, in so doing, may have worked to strengthen the 
appeal ~ f f stability in the present. 840 
140 Although the resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the 16th Party Central Cotnnlittee put forward a 
more substantive programme to fill out the concept of building a socialist harmonious society, there has 
been speculation that this populist concept does not have unanimous support within the Party. That said, 
conducting a People's Daily database for the articles containing the phrase "harmonious society" (hexie 
lhehu,) over the past three years (the database only carries articles up to May 2007) indicates that: in 
200S, of the 40.387 articles published that year, 1,982 articles (4.9%) contained this phrase; in 2006, of 
the 39,487 articles published, 2,277 articles (5.8%) contained this phrase; and for the five months of 
2007, o f t h ~ ~ 1 ~ , 0 8 0 0 a r t ~ c l ~ s s p u b l i s h ~ d , , 1 , 4 ~ ~ a r t i c l ~ ~ ~ 8 . 8 % ) ) contained this phrase. Consequently, 
whether b w ~ d m g g a soclahst h ~ O D l O U S S socIety WIll, l ~ d e e d , , become the overarching ideological goal 
of the CCP 1D the short- to medIum-term or whether, like a number of other ideological slogans through 
the years, it will be quietly retired can only be assessed with the advent of time. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis began by considering the increasing number of demonstrations that have 
been taking place across China. Indeed, these demonstrations, coupled with the 
mounting governance challenges that confront the Chinese government, have served 
to strengthen the view of many analysts that the end of Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) rule is simply a matter of time. Moreover, this view can be traced back to the 
government's use of military force to suppress the demonstrations in 1989. Yet, since 
this time, the CCP has managed to remain in power. Furthermore, the recent protests 
in China do not appear to be directed at the central level of government but rather are 
concerned with localised and specific grievances. Although these grievances are 
serious and point to problems with governance that, if unsatisfactorily resolved, may 
yet bring about a direct challenge to the government's authority, the rule of the CCP 
appears to be relatively stable, in the short-term at least. Consequently, accepting that 
its power does not fully rest on coercion, this thesis has sought to explain how the 
CCP has remained in power in the post-Tiananmen period. 
In explaining this situation, this thesis has deployed the concept of legitimacy in an 
analysis of state-society relations. Within the academic literature on this subject, the 
dominant view is that the CCP's legitimacy is mostly derived from the performance 
of the economy, with nationalism also being used to fill the "ideological vacuum" left 
by the declining legitimatory power of communism. While agreeing that these two 
sources have played an important role in legitimating the Party's authority, closer 
analysis suggests that both sources have limitations. In the case of the economy, 
history indicates that economic growth tends to produce instability rather than 
stability in a country. Indeed, during the post-Tiananmen period in China, though the 
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overall GDP rate has been consistently high, economic growth has been unevenly 
spread amongst different regions in the country and different groups in society. As 
such, the economic refonns have produced an increasing number of "losers". In order 
to explain how the regime has managed to remain in power, many analysts have 
identified the ideational effects of nationalism. However, though heavy use has been 
made of nationalism in the post-Tiananmen period, the government's propagation of 
official nationalism has also opened up the space for the emergence of popular 
nationalism. Indeed, examples from the past fifteen or so years suggest that popular 
nationalism has worked to challenge the government's authority. While this does not 
mean that official nationalism no longer effectively legitimates the CCP, it does 
suggest that it can be subject to resistance and, as such, is more limited in its 
legitimating force than commonly suggested. Moreover, accepting this point opens up 
the possibility that the CCP may have made use of additional sources of legitimacy 
throughout the post-Tiananmen period. Of these, this thesis has focused on one source: 
the government's ideational use of "stability". 
However, in order to fully explain how the government's use of stability legitimates 
its authority, a suitable conceptual framework in which this analysis could take place 
was developed in chapter one. In this, the first step was to interrogate the concept of 
legitimacy. Adopting a social scientific conceptualisation, this thesis held that it is 
possible for all regimes, including the CCP, to obtain legitimacy, which, once 
obtained, would allow for the conversion of political power into authority. That said, 
, legitimacy should not be viewed as fixed or evenly spread amongst all groups in 
society but rather as a dynamic concept which can fluctuate both positively and 
negatively over time and amongst different groups in society. Moreover, it is possible 
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for a regime to be considered legitimate, even if all groups do not view it as legitimate 
at all times. Indeed, this point highlights the need to disaggregate society when 
considering legitimacy, in that different groups can have greater influence depending 
upon the spatio-temporal context. In this thesis, the "intra-elites" relationship is held 
to be the most important in maintaining the legitimacy of the CCP. 
In turning to consider the process by which the CCP obtains its legitimacy, this thesis 
found Weber's conceptualisation, which is the standard framework in such analyses, 
to be overly structuralist and, as a result, limited in its explanatory value. In order to 
overcome this, the thesis situated the concept of legitimation within the strategic-
relational approach. The effect of this conceptual move was to extend the 
understanding of legitimation beyond the identification of specific modes by 
interrogating the interaction of strategic actors and a strategically selective context 
from a spatio-temporal perspective. In this, the possibility was opened up to consider 
multiple temporally and geographically variable legitimating strategies. Moreover, 
through the concept of discursive selectivity, space was made in which to consider the 
role played by discourse in mediating between the structural effects of rules and 
norms and the Lebenswelt notion of belief that informs action, in particular, the 
"cognitive filters" used by powerful actors to influence the formation of strategies by 
other less powerful actors. Consequently, this thesis conceptualised the stability 
discourse as a cognitive filter that has been used by the CCP to enhance its 
legitimation in the post-Tiananmen period. 
The method by which this discourse would be analysed was elaborated in the second 
chapter. This method was the discourse-historical approach, which is associated with 
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the broader school of critical discourse analysis (CDA), and it was selected on 
account of its emphasis on the historical dimension of discourse as well as its 
incorporation of argumentation theory. Moreover, having chosen the media as the site 
of enquiry, the discourse-historical approach was used to analyse a selection of 
articles from the People's Daily newspaper covering the period from 1989 to 2007. 
The selection ofthe People's Daily as the source for this analysis was due to its status 
as the CCP's "official mouthpiece". Moreover, within the time period from 1989 to 
2007, three instances were identified for analysis: the "Beijing Spring" in 1989, the 
"anti-Falun Gong" campaign in 1999 and the "anti-Japan" demonstrations in 2005. 
These events were selected on the basis that they constituted exceptional instances in 
which the stability discourse was used to legitimate the CCP's authority. Moreover, in 
each of these three instances, the challenge to the Party's power was different and, as 
such, carrying out an analysis of how the stability discourse was used in each of these 
instances would hopefully lead to a more complete understanding of the discourse. 
The first of the three empirical chapters in the thesis focused on the use of the stability 
discourse both during the "Beijing Spring" in 1989 and after the military suppression 
of these demonstrations. This period was selected for analysis on the basis that the 
demonstrations in 1989 represented a direct challenge to the CCP's authority that 
resulted in a legitimation crisis, ifnot an outright loss of legitimacy. Of the two 
articles that were analysed in this chapter, the first was the 29 April editorial entitled 
"Safeguard the O v e r ~ l l Situation, Safeguard Stability". This editorial was politically 
significant, in that it was published during the initial stages of the demonstrations. 
Moreover, it was intended as a response to the infamous 26 April editorial, which, in 
labelling the demonstrations as ''turmoil'', had only succeeded in provoking larger 
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protests. Consequently, analysing the 29 April editorial demonstrated how the CCP 
leadership used the stability discourse both to maintain its legitimacy against the 
challenge posed by the demonstrations as well as undermine the legitimacy of the 
demonstrations so as to bring them to an end. In the editorial, the term "stability" was 
only deployed in a nominalised form and this allowed the editorial to use stability in a 
way that did not require its meaning to be made explicit. Consequently, stability was 
used both positively to strengthen the legitimacy of the CCP and negatively, in the 
form of instability, to delegitimate the demonstrations. 
This positive value was achieved by establishing the importance of stability. In this, 
the 29 April editorial presented stability in terms of national concern, which worked 
to "depoliticise" stability by shifting its focus of maintaining stability away from 
preserving the power of the CCP onto the future of the Chinese nation. However, by 
presenting the future of the Chinese nation in terms of economic development and 
political refonn, the editorial worked to link this future with the period since the Third 
Plenum in 1978. Moreover, by presenting stability as the necessary condition for the 
economic growth and political reform in the post-Third Plenum period, the editorial 
linked the maintenance of stability to China's future development and, in so doing, 
attempted to legitimate the authority of the CCP. In contrast, the negative value of 
instability was achieved by presenting a Chinese future without stability. Indeed, in 
the same way that the positive view of China's future was linked to the post-Third 
Plenum period, so it was that this negative view of China's future was linked to 
periods of upheaval in China's modem history, including the Cultural Revolution as 
well as the pre-PRC period. In presenting instability as the sole reason for the lack of 
relative development in these periods, the editorial projected a historical view of 
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China's future in order to delegitimate, by implicature, the demonstrations as the 
cause of future instability. 
The second article that was analysed was the 4 June editorial entitled "Stability 
Prevails Over Everything", which was published on the first year anniversary of the 
military suppression. This editorial was selected because it used the stability discourse 
to justify the use of military force in bringing the demonstrations to an end. Moreover, 
it provided the definitive statement on the paramount importance of stability in the 
post-Tiananmen period. Indeed, this meaning was directly expressed in the headline 
"Stability Prevails Over Everything", which implicitly conveyed the Hobbesian 
notion that it is legitimate for the state to use violence to maintain social stability. The 
remainder of the editorial sought to justify this position by demonstrating the negative 
value of instability and the positive value of stability. In this, the use of the stability 
discourse was similar to that in the 29 April editorial; the most striking difference was 
that the negative value of instability was emphasised more strongly than the positive 
value of stability. Indeed, whereas the link between the demonstrations and instability 
had been implicated in the 29 April editorial, it was explicitly stated in the 4 June 
editorial. In addition to labelling the demonstrations as a "counter-revolutionary 
rebellion", the editorial sought to further strengthen the negative impression of the 
demonstrations by linking it to a plot by foreign states that was intended to bring 
about the collapse of the People's Republic of China and, in so doing, defined 
instability in terms of the collapse of CCP rule. Indeed, this theme would form the 
basis of the anti-foreign nationalism that was heavily propagated by the CCP during 
the post-Tiananmen period.841 Moreover, as with the 29 April editorial, the 4 June 
841 For more on this, see pp.17-19. 
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editorial viewed a CCP-Iess future as "chaos" and, in so doing, served to present this 
future in terms of the upheavals from the previous one hundred and fifty years of 
Chinese history. 
As for the positive value of stability, it was similar to the 29 April editorial, in that it 
was presented as the necessary condition for economic development and political 
reform; however, whereas the first editorial used the example of the post-Third 
Plenum reforms, the 4 June editorial emphasised the political, economic and social 
achievements that had been made under the leadership of the CCP since the ending of 
the demonstrations. In this, the editorial was attempting to legitimate the use of 
military force as well as the post- rather than the pre-Tiananmen political leadership. 
Moreover, it followed the 29 April editorial in linking the positive value of stability 
with the maintenance of CCP rule. 
In addition to the positive and negative use of stability, the two editorials were similar 
in their nominalised usage of stability. As pointed out earlier, the effect of such usage 
was to "mystify" the definition of stability. As a result, what constituted stability and 
who was threatening this stability was never made explicit. This enabled the editorials 
to use stability in a way that was discursively flexible, in that stability was linked only 
with the CCP while the demonstrations were presented only in terms of instability; 
however, this also meant that the persuasiveness of the stability discourse rested 
entirely on rhetoric. Moreover, in terms of legitimation, though this is difficult to 
properly assess, it seems that the 4 June editorial had greater legitimatory effect. 
Indeed, given that the analysis of the two editorials did not reveal substantive 
differences between the pre- and post-Tiananmen forms of the stability discourse, it 
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seem possible to suggest that the events in 1989 represented a strategic moment in the 
fonnation of this discourse, in that the government's hegemonic interpretation of 
, these events helped to shape a political context which "favoured" the discourse of 
stability. 
The second of the three empirical chapters in the thesis focused on the use of the 
stability discourse during the "anti-Falun Gont' campaign in 1999. This period was 
selected for analysis on the basis that it represented the next politically significant 
instance of instability in the post-Tiananmen period. In addition, the challenge to the 
authority of the CCP differed from that in 1989. Then, the protestors, at least in the 
initial stages, pushed for refonns within the political system, whereas, in 1999 , Falun 
Gong presented an alternative without the political system. The article that was 
selected for analysis in this period was a 16 August commentary entitled "Maintain 
the Overall Situation and Stability and Push Forward Refonn and Development-
Ninth Commentary on Tightening Efforts to Handle and Solve the 'Falun Gong' 
Problem". In this commentary, the use of stability, or "stability and unity" to be 
precise, was similar to that during the "Beijing Spring", in that it was consistently 
deployed in a nominalised fonn which did not require its meaning to be made explicit. 
Furthennore, stability was discursively constructed in both a positive sense, which 
worked legitimate the CCP leadership, and in a negative sense, which worked to 
delegitimate Falun Gong. 
The construction of stability as a positive value was similar to that deployed during 
the Beijing Spring, particularly the 29 April editorial, in that stability was presented in 
termS of national interest. Again, this rhetorical move seemed intended to shift the 
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focus of maintaining stability away from preserving the power of the CCP and onto . 
the future of the Chinese nation. This future, which was articulated as becoming a 
"rich and strong nation", was similarly imagined in terms of continued economic 
development and political reform. As with the 29 April editorial, China's future was 
linked with the period since the Third Plenum in 1978 and, through implicature, the 
leadership of the CCP. By then presenting stability as the necessary condition for the 
economic growth and political reform in the post-Third Plenum period, the editorial 
was linking the maintenance of stability to China's future development and, in so 
doing, attempting to legitimate the CCP leadership. In contrast, the negative value of 
instability was again achieved by presenting a Chinese future without stability. Indeed, 
in the same way that the positive view of China's future was linked to the post-Third 
Plenum period, so it was that this negative view of China's future was linked to 
periods of upheaval in China's modem history, for which instability was identified as 
the sole cause. In establishing the negative value of instability, the commentary 
attempted to delegitimate Falun Gong by positioning it as the agent responsible for 
causing this instability and, in so doing, justify the government's ban. 
However, despite these arguments being used repeatedly throughout the campaign, 
stability was not presented as the main justification for the outlawing of Falun Gong. 
Rather, it was used in support of other arguments, particularly following the passing 
of legislation to ban "cult organisations". Moreover, this use of stability was less 
prominent than in the government's response to the events in 1989. This may have 
been due to the fact that, unlik.e 1989, the demonstrations which had been held by 
Falun Gong did not appear to "destroy" stability, particularly given that they were 
ended without the use of military force and, in the case of the 25 April demonstrations, 
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that the government waited three months before officially condemning them. Indeed, 
the use of the stability discourse in the "anti-Falun Gong" campaign suggested that 
there are limits to the use of this discourse on occasions when its rhetorical claims can 
be measured against a material referent. Consequently, unlike the government's 
hegemonic interpretation of the demonstrations in 1989, the labelling of Falun Gong 
as "destroying" instability did not appear to "resonate" with Chinese people. This 
suggests that the context did not favour the stability discourse and, as such, its 
effectiveness in legitimating the rule of the CCP might be limited to particular 
contexts. 
The final empirical chapter in the thesis focused on the use of the stability discourse 
during the ""anti-Japan" demonstrations in 2005. This period was selected for 
analysis on the grounds that these demonstrations presented the most recent challenge 
to the government's authority. Moreover, as with the previous two instances, this 
challenge was different in nature, in that the demonstrations were directed against the 
Japanese government and so did not directly challenge the government's authority. 
That said, the demonstrations did indirectly challenge the Chinese government, in that 
it faced a dilemma over when to bring the protests to an end without turning the 
grievances away from Japan towards the government. Indeed, historical precedents 
suggested that ending them too quickly or allowing them to last too long could result 
in such a scenario being realised. The 17 April commentary marked the start of the 
government's campaign to bring the demonstrations to an end. This use of stability in 
this commentary was similar to the earlier articles, in that it was discursively 
constructed as a positive value and a negative value. However, where it differed from 
those articles, particularly the 4 June editorial and the 16 August commentary, was in 
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the lack of an explicit negative other presentation. Indeed, the negative value of 
instability was only implicitly suggested in the space opened up by the positive value 
of stability. This lack of negative other presentation appeared to reflect the 
government's "softly-softly" approach in dealing with demonstrations. 
The positive value of stability followed the articles from the earlier period in being 
initially constructed through a headline which linked the maintenance of stability to 
China's national interest as well as its future development and, in so doing, shifted the 
focus of maintaining stability away from preserving the CCP's power and onto the 
future of the Chinese nation. However, the headline in this commentary was also 
politically significant, in that it introduced the new concept of "building a socialist 
harmonious society". This Confucian-inspired vision of China's future development 
differed from the earlier articles by providing a more concrete teleological goal. That 
said, the use of stability paralleled those in the earlier articles, in that the future 
development of China was still held to be contingent on maintaining stability. 
Moreover, as with those articles, the importance of maintaining stability was justified 
by presenting it as the necessary condition for the economic development and political 
reform that had taken place in the reform and opening up period. Also, the link 
between maintaining stability and preserving the power of the CCP was never 
explicitly stated. Indeed, the 17 April commentary did differ from the previous 
articles in its lack of explicit references to the CCP leadership. 
As pointed out above, the negative value of instability was only implied through the 
construction of stability's positive value. In this, the commentary suggested that the 
failure of people to observe the law would lead to instability, which would, in turn, 
302 
negatively affect the progress of modernisation construction and so prevent the 
teleological goal of building a socialist harmonious society from being realised. 
However, at no point in the commentary was the "anti-Japan" demonstrations referred 
to. 
The diachronic analysis of the stability discourse in these three instances indicates that 
the usage of this discourse has been relatively consistent within the post-Tiananmen 
period. In this, stability was always presented in a nominalised form that served to 
"mystify" its definition and, in so doing, allowed it to be discursively flexible. As a 
result, stability was discursively constructed as a positive value to legitimate, often 
indirectly, the authority of the CCP and as a negative value to delegitimate the "other", 
be that the demonstrators in 1989, Fa/un Gong demonstrators in 1999 and the "anti-
Japan" demonstrators in 2005. Moreover, these constructions of stability made use of 
the same argumentation. In terms of the positive value of stability, the direct link 
between maintaining stability and preserving the power of the CCP was obscured in 
favour of presenting stability as an issue of national interest. Indeed, this link was 
always initially established through the headline. In addition, this link demonstrated 
how the stability discourse, though analytically distinct, drew on other discourses, in 
this case, nationalism. Presenting stability in terms of national interest also worked to 
view the current challenge to the government in terms of its future consequences. As 
Dunmire's research suggests, with the future undetermined, this positioning of the 
current challenge opened up the space in which to put forward the CCP's vision of the 
future and, in so doing, privileged this version over competing alternatives.842 In the 
CCP's version, China's future development, in the form of a "rich and powerful 
842 For more, see Dunmire (2005). 
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nation" or, more recently, "building a socialist harmonious society", was claimed to 
be dependent on continued economic development and political reform. In addition, 
by claiming that the "successes" of the reform and opening up period were due to the 
necessary condition of stability, this vision of the future was, in effect, claiming that 
only the CCP could lead China towards this future development state. In terms of 
effectiveness, it could be argued that this hegemonic interpretation of China's future 
has performed a similar role to the government's hegemonic interpretation of the 
events in 1989. 
This vision of China's future was also reinforced by the construction of stability's 
negative value. As pointed out above, though the identification of the "other" changed 
in each instance, the argumentation differed only in explicitness. In the cases of the 
military suppression in 1989 and the "anti-Falun Gong" campaign in 1999, the 
government's action necessitated the explicit negative presentation of the other while, 
in the cases of the pre-military suppression period and the "anti-Japan" 
demonstrations in 2005, this negative presentation was mostly done through 
implicature. Nevertheless, the arguments were effectively the reverse of those used in 
the positive construction of stability, in that the intention of the negative other, 
sometimes in collaboration with foreign states, was to destroy China's stability which 
would, in turn, lead to the collapse of the CCP and so bring about a future state of 
"chaos" similar to experienced during periods of upheaval from China's modem 
history. In each of these instances, the challenge confronting the Chinese g o v ~ r n m e n t t
was presented in terms of a fundamental challenge to the political system. In addition 
to the intentions of the negative other, its actions were always presented in terms of 
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violating the law thus effectively making them criminals and, in so doing, further 
justifying the response of the government. 
In terms of linguistic features, the selected texts in each of the three instances were 
also similar. The most frequently employed argumentative strategy was that of 
argumentum at consequentiam. As explained in chapter two, this strategy was used 
both to justify action (e.g. suppression) by appealing to the consequences of inaction 
(e.g. instability) and justifying inaction (e.g. the demands of demonstrators) by 
appealing to the consequences of action (e.g. chaos). Indeed, this argumentative 
strategy, by appealing to events which had not yet taken place, played an important 
role in putting forward the CCP's hegemonic interpretation of the future. Moreover, 
this interpretation was strengthened by the repeated use of the topos of threat in the 
selected texts. As explained in chapter two, this topos worked to justify the ending of 
collective action by presenting them in terms of "threatening" the stability of the 
country. Additional discursive strategies used in the selected texts included those 
identified by van Leeuwen's typology of legitimating strategies as "theoretical 
rationalisations". As explained in chapter two, this type of strategy referred to 
declarative statements that took the form of "definitions". Indeed, these statements, 
along with the "linguistic mean" of epistemic modality, contributed to the . 
authoritative ''voice'' of the articles that attempted to persuade the reader to accept the 
authority of the CCP. As pointed out above, the use of implicatures, particularly in 
instances of negative other presentation, was frequently employed throughout the 
texts in order to heighten the persuasiveness of the CCP's claims. 
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In terms of legitimation, the CCP's use of the stability discourse throughout the post-
Tiananmen period has relied on "consequentialist" arguments to persuade members of 
Chinese society to support its authority. In this, China's undetermined future has been 
imagined in terms of "good" and "bad" consequences and, in so doing, appeals to 
people's fear and self-interest. However, using Zhong's classification of "positive" 
and "negative" stability, it is possible to suggest that such arguments constitute a form 
of "negative" stability, in that they avoid finding "appropriate solutions to solve 
emerging economic, political and social problems".843 So while the stability discourse 
may well continue to sustain the regime in the short- to medium-term, it seems that it 
will not, in the long-term, serve to generate legitimacy for the CCP in the way that 
''positive'' stability would. Indeed, given that the stability discourse has remained 
largely the same in the pre- and post-Tiananmen periods, it seems possible to suggest 
that its legitimatory effectiveness has been due, in large part, to the hegemonic 
interpretation of the events in 1989 and subsequent collapses 'of communist regimes 
that has shaped a political context which favours this discourse. Moreover, accepting 
this view also suggests that, at some future point, the political context may no longer 
favour this discourse and, as such, it will lose its effectiveness in legitimating the 
CCP's authority. Indeed, the use of the stability discourse in the "anti-Falun Gong" 
campaign has highlighted the limits of this discourse in instances where its rhetorical 
claims could be measured against a material referent. Moreover, the demonstrations 
that have been taking place at the local level across China, most recently in Tibet, 
further acknowledge that the stability discourse is not always effective in persuading 
people to stop demonstrating in instances where grievances are specific rather than 
843 Zhong (1996: 217-218). 
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systemic.844 That said, it is also possible that another strategic moment, similar to that 
in 1989, could occur which will serve to strengthen the legitimating logic of stability. 
Setting stability within the broader context of CCP legitimacy, the analysis of selected 
articles has demonstrated that this discourse is not independent of other forms of 
legitimation. Indeed, the persuasiveness of the stability discourse is due, in large part, 
to the economic success of the reform and opening up period and the Party's 
propagation of a nationalist identity, particularly in the post-Tiananmen period. As 
such, the Party's legitimacy makes use of a number of overlapping and mutually 
reinforcing legitimating strategies and should be considered more in terms of 
dialectical effect than direct causality. Moreover, as the disaggregation oflegitimacy 
in chapter one demonstrated, Chinese society is composed of a number of strategic 
groups, which all playa role in legitimating the Party's authority. Consequently, 
assessing the effect of the stability discourse upon the overall legitimacy of the CCP is 
difficult to determine; however, for the duration of the period in which China's one 
party-state remains without an effective mechanism to distinguish between system 
and regime legitimacy, challenges to the CCP's power will likely will be interpreted 
in terms of political instability, thus ensuring the continued use of the stability 
discourse. 
844 Indeed, this distinction was evident in the most recent edition of the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences' Blue Book. As Fewsmith points out, "overall, the data look favorable in terms of social 
stability. But as soon as the questions become more concrete-health care, employment, welfare issues 
local government-then the answers given are less upbeat and sometimes suggestive of considerable ' 
conflict." See Fewsmith (2007: 22-23). 
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Appendix: Analysed Newspaper Articles (Chinese Originals) 
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